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HUANYANGTON CHINESE TERRAIN MODEL EXPOSES
DRAGON'S WAR WAR PREPAREDNESS TO
CAPTURE LADHAK
PART THREE
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HUANYANGTON CHINESE TERRAIN MODEL EXPOSES
DRAGON'S WAR WAR PREPAREDNESS TO
CAPTURE LADHAK
Chinese Intrusion in Ladakh: Terrain model exposes Dragons War Preparedness
Brigadier Arun Sahgal(Retd), PhD
Chinese perspective of raising tensions in Ladakh is not shaped by any altruistic motives of improving its positions on the border or lay claims to new areas. It is a well planned strategic response aimed at coercion to prevent India from improving its overall strategic posture in the region.
In 2009 media was abuzz with a revelation that China had replicated the whole of Aksai Chin and a large part of disputed Indo-China border in a large-sized sand model over area equivalent to the size of six cricket fields thousands of kilometres away in Huanyangton village near Yinchuan in Ningxia autonomous region (Northern China). Fundamental question then and today is the motivation for China to spend money and resources to replicate a whole mountains, valleys and water bodies of disputed area? This in a sense puts a question mark on China’s peaceful intentions towards India? The satellite images show that the China has replicated around 1, 57,500 Km area on a map scale of 900×700 meters. This is about 500:1 ratio.
What is more intriguing is the attachment of a military unit and an artillery firing range in the proximity of the terrain model. The satellite images obtained from free Google- Earth suggests this to be a major training facility to train PLA troops for high altitude operations in the Ladakh Sector. Large scale model appears to indicate that it is not only for operational planning but to also familiarizes both combat and combat support arms like artillery, combat engineers and communication experts with terrain conditions. The associated firing range appears to indicate live firing facility, to for target engagement with various weapons systems in these high altitude conditions.
The training is not at a platoon or company level but appears to be at regiment (brigade) level. In modern days the training could be given on computer simulation but what provoked China to replicate such a vast area remains a question mark. Probably China wants its troops to have perception about the world’s most tough terrain so that in case of conflict situation with India, its troops can understand terrain constraints and plan in realistic manner.
It needs to be noted that in recent times china has enhanced the number of exercises in Tibet. Some of these exercises have been conducted at altitudes ranging from 4,500 – 5000 meters. One such exercise conducted in 2011 included joint troop drills by the air and ground troops under information-based conditions in frigid area with a high altitude. Troops involved included the Chinese Air Force, ground troops, mechanized units and a range of support entities. Providing rare details while describing the exercise, PLA daily report stated, “At the very beginning… the new type warplanes of the PLA Air Force conducted accurate strikes at the targets… Shortly after seizing the commanding point, the long-range guns launched full-scale shooting at the command post and the artillery position of the enemy.” This was followed by the armoured vehicle group and infantry combat vehicles branching out into columns and launching a “sudden and violent attack on the mountain passes occupied by the enemy. The special operation detachment outflanked the enemy and raided the enemy’s command post”. The report also stated that army aviation troops and anti-aircraft missiles provided cover.[1]
In the backdrop of Chinese moves in Ladakh in the Depsang- Dualat Beg Oldi area indicates that China has been making preparations for a contingency based incursion into Indian Territory, as part of its “local wars under informationization model”.
Pictures accompanying this article highlight the area and the nature of the model.
Chinese perspective of raising tensions in Ladakh is not shaped by any altruistic motives of improving its positions on the border or lay claims to new areas. It is a well planned strategic response aimed at coercion to prevent India from improving its overall strategic posture in the region.
Chinese are aware of infrastructural developments being undertaken by India in Ladakh; upgradation of airfields, development of communications and upgradation of defences etc. These developments are backed by planned Indian capabilities in terms of troops (mountain strike corps), deployment of missiles and upgradation of intelligence and surveillance capabilities. Chinese are conscious that were India to mount an audacious offensive in Aksai Chin it easily could roll down to the Tibetan Plateau and cut off the famous western Highway; main artery linking Tibet Autonomous region with Xinjiang the route for induction of forces from Lanzhou Military Area Command. Such a scenario is depicted in an excellent fictional account in the book titled “Assassins Mace” written by Brigadier Bob Butalia, (Retd), wherein Special Forces backed by credible air power are depicted as cutting off the Western Highway.
The logic behind Chinese intransigence and intrusion in the Sector are two folds; one to get India to dismantle the infrastructure it has developed in the SE Ladakh, particularly in Chumar area, and to an extent in DBO sector as well; second coerce India to sign “Defence Cooperation Agreement” which among other things includes mutual pull back from the LAC and creation of demilitarized zones, dismantling the military infrastructure and to prevent patrol clashes, sharing of patrolling programmes. Clearly above is not acceptable to India particularly when even after 15 rounds of political negotiations India and china have not reached a stage to exchange maps of Western and Central Sector.
Nonetheless Chinese military leadership is aware that tipping point in border negotiations is coming with Indian military modernization and developments of strategic infrastructure particularly the ‘Rohtang Tunnel’ linking plains of Punjab with Ladakh in J&K, together with plans to keep Srinagar – Leh highway open the year round, not to mention opening of rail link to Kashmir valley. These developments when operational will provide India with enhanced strategic build up capability both in J&K and Ladakh sector.
Chinese are sanguine that they cannot indefinitely use the ruse of “allowing future generations” to solve the dispute. Sooner or later it will need to exchange maps of both the Western and the Eastern Sectors. Seen in the above context this could be attempted to firm up their positions to ensure operational advantage in this critical area.
Seen in the above context, Chinese are playing a game of brinkmanship by reinforcing its claim lines, forcing Indian political leadership to halt build up of defensive capability in Ladakh. Indian enhancement of its operational profile in Ladakh carries a price tag for china in terms of forcing it to upgrade its defensive posture in the region where it is militarily not that well poised. As per the recent White Paper on Defence only four of its 18 combined corps are deployed in areas opposite India. In any offensive option china will need to redeploy large forces from hinterland into Tibet Autonomous Region, this will require time and preparation which will surely be picked up by India with its enhanced space and aerial surveillance capabilities. It is in this context the collusive support between Pakistan and China to keep the Indian armed forces engaged poses serious problem and a major strategic concern for India.
Lastly, it needs to be appreciated that this is not a localized incident. Chinese troops would not have taken such a step without full-fledged, assessment of possible implications and a consensus at the level of central military commission or the politbureau. Surely the consequences of Indian reaction would have been analysed and factored. By intruding deep into Indian Territory and effectively challenged by India has created a scenario of stalemate. Big question now for the Chinese is how does it deal with the situation without serious loss of face? It is the answer to this question that both China and India would need to find through diplomacy. The forthcoming visit of Chinese premier to India can help in breaking the deadlock but if that fails the ugly standoff is will be there for a long haul.
In so far India is concerned its options are straight forward, maintain status quo without provoking the Chinese, prepare for overhaul and take all steps necessary to deal with escalation if it is thrust on India.
A potentially dangerous scenario prevails?
The author is Director, The Forum for Strategic Initiative, Distinguished Fellow School of Geopolitics Manipal Academy of Higher Education and Distinguished Fellow SAISA.
[1] Liu Xing’an, Guo Fengkuan and Liu Yinghua, “PLA holds first air and ground forces joint drill on plateau,” Statement by the Chinese Ministry of National Defence cited in, PLA Daily, October 26, 2011.
Related articles
PART THREE
China displays its war preparedness The Chinese perspective of raising tensions in Ladakh is not shaped by any altruistic motives of improving its positions on the border or lay claims to new areas. It is a well-planned strategic response aimed at coercion to prevent India from improving its strategic posture in the region.
Brig Arun Sahgal (retd) In 2009 the media was abuzz with revelations that China had replicated the whole of Aksai Chin and a large part of the disputed Indo-China border on a large-sized sand model equivalent to the size of six cricket fields, thousands of kilometres away in Huanyangton village near Yinchuan in the Ningxia Autonomous Region (Northern China). The fundamental question then and today remains the motivation for China to spend money and resources to replicate whole mountains, valleys and water bodies of the disputed area. This, in a sense, puts a question mark on China's peaceful intentions towards India. Satellite images show that China has replicated around 1,57,500 square kilometres on a map scale of 900x700 meters. This is about 500:1 ratio. What is more intriguing is the attachment of a military unit and an artillery firing range in the proximity of the terrain model. Satellite images obtained from Google-Earth suggest this to be a major facility to train PLA troops for operations in high altitude areas of the Ladakh Sector. The large scale model appears to indicate that it is not only for operational planning but also to familiarise both combat arms and combat support arms like artillery, combat engineers and communication experts with the terrain conditions prevailing in the region. The associated firing range indicates facilities for live firing to train for target engagement with various weapons systems in these high altitude conditions. The training is not at a platoon or company level but at the regiment (brigade) level. Today simulators and large sized electronic map boards are the preferred means for training, particularly in modern armies. What provoked China to replicate such a vast area remains unanswered. Probably China wants its troops to have a perception about the world's most tough terrain so that in case of a conflict situation with India, its troops can understand the terrain constraints and plan in realistic manner.
Brig Arun Sahgal (retd) In 2009 the media was abuzz with revelations that China had replicated the whole of Aksai Chin and a large part of the disputed Indo-China border on a large-sized sand model equivalent to the size of six cricket fields, thousands of kilometres away in Huanyangton village near Yinchuan in the Ningxia Autonomous Region (Northern China). The fundamental question then and today remains the motivation for China to spend money and resources to replicate whole mountains, valleys and water bodies of the disputed area. This, in a sense, puts a question mark on China's peaceful intentions towards India. Satellite images show that China has replicated around 1,57,500 square kilometres on a map scale of 900x700 meters. This is about 500:1 ratio. What is more intriguing is the attachment of a military unit and an artillery firing range in the proximity of the terrain model. Satellite images obtained from Google-Earth suggest this to be a major facility to train PLA troops for operations in high altitude areas of the Ladakh Sector. The large scale model appears to indicate that it is not only for operational planning but also to familiarise both combat arms and combat support arms like artillery, combat engineers and communication experts with the terrain conditions prevailing in the region. The associated firing range indicates facilities for live firing to train for target engagement with various weapons systems in these high altitude conditions. The training is not at a platoon or company level but at the regiment (brigade) level. Today simulators and large sized electronic map boards are the preferred means for training, particularly in modern armies. What provoked China to replicate such a vast area remains unanswered. Probably China wants its troops to have a perception about the world's most tough terrain so that in case of a conflict situation with India, its troops can understand the terrain constraints and plan in realistic manner.
Pentagon’s view Despite increased political and economic relations over the years between China and India, tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh (which China asserts is part of Tibet, and therefore of China), and over the Aksai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau. Both countries in 2009 stepped up efforts to assert their claims. China tried to block a $2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank, claiming part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. This represented the first time China sought to influence this dispute through a multilateral institution. The then-governor of Arunachal Pradesh announced that India would deploy more troops and fighter jets to the area. An Indian newspaper reported that the number of Chinese border violations had risen from 180 in 2011 to more than 400 by September 2012.— Excerpt from the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on Chinese military developments released this month
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Number of military exercises in Tibet up It needs to be noted that in recent times China has enhanced the number of military exercises in Tibet. Some of these exercises have been conducted at altitudes ranging from 4,500-5,000 meters. One such exercise conducted in 2011 included joint drills by the air and ground troops under information-based conditions in frigid high altitude areas. The troops involved included the air force, ground troops, mechanised units and a range of support entities. Providing rare details while describing the exercise, the PLA daily stated, "At the very beginning….the new type of warplanes of the PLA Air Force conducted accurate strikes at the targets… Shortly after seizing the commanding point, the long-range guns launched full-scale shooting at the command post and the artillery position of the enemy. This was followed by the armoured vehicle group and infantry combat vehicles branching out into columns and launching a sudden and violent attack on the mountain passes occupied by the enemy. The special operations detachment outflanked the enemy and raided the enemy's command post". The report also stated that army aviation troops and anti-aircraft missiles provided cover to the attacking units. Chinese moves in Ladakh, particularly in the Depsang--Dualat Beg Oldi sector, although now vacated, highlights China making preparations for a contingency based incursion into Indian territory as part of its "local wars under informationisation model". The Chinese perspective of raising tensions in Ladakh is not shaped by any altruistic motives of improving its positions on the border or lay claims to new areas. It is a well-planned strategic response aimed at coercion to prevent India from improving its overall strategic posture in the region. The Chinese are aware of the infrastructural developments being undertaken by India in Ladakh -- upgradation of airfields, development of communications and strengthening of defences, etc. These developments are backed by planned upgradation of Indian capabilities in terms of troops (mountain strike corps), deployment of missiles and enhancement of intelligence and surveillance capabilities. The Chinese are conscious that were India to mount an audacious offensive in Aksai Chin it could roll down to the Tibetan Plateau and cut off the famous Western Highway, which is the main artery linking Tibet Autonomous Region with Xinjiang -- the route for induction of forces from Lanzhou Military Area Command. Such a scenario is depicted in an excellent fictional account in the book titled Assassins Mace written by Brigadier Bob Butalia (retd), wherein special forces backed by credible air power are depicted as cutting off the Western Highway.
Logic behind Chinese intrusion in Ladakh The logic behind Chinese intransigence and intrusion in the Ladakh Sector are two fold. First, to get India to dismantle the infrastructure it has developed in south-eastern Ladakh, particularly in the Chumar area and to an extent in Daulat Beg Oldi Sector as well, Second, coerce India to sign a "Defence Cooperation Agreement", which among other things includes mutual pull back from the Line of Actual Control and the creation of demilitarised zones, dismantling the military infrastructure, prevent patrol clashes and sharing of patrolling programmes. Clearly, the above is not acceptable to India, particularly when even after 15 rounds of political negotiations India and china have not reached a stage to exchange maps of the western and central sectors. It appears that in the negotiations leading to the pull back by the Chinese, some assurances on both accounts have been provided.Nonetheless what is important is that the Chinese military leadership is aware that the tipping point in border negotiations is not far with the Indian military's modernisation and the development of strategic infrastructure, particularly the Rohtang tunnel linking the plains of Punjab with Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir, plans to keep the Srinagar-Leh highway open round the year and not to mention the rail link to the Kashmir valley. These developments, when operational, will provide India with enhanced strategic build up capability in Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh.The Chinese are sanguine that they cannot indefinitely use the ruse of "allowing future generations to solve the dispute." Their President underscored this when he declared the need to resolve the boundary issue. This could sooner or later lead to exchange of maps of the western and the eastern sectors. Seen in this context, the intrusion could be an attempt to firm up their positions to ensure operational advantage in this critical sector.
China is playing a game of brinkmanship China is playing a game of brinkmanship by reinforcing its claim lines and coercing Indian leadership to halt the build-up of defensive capabilities in Ladakh. India's enhancement of its operational profile in Ladakh carries with a price tag for China in terms of forcing it to upgrade its defensive posture in a region where its militarily not that well poised. According to China's recent White Paper on Defence, only four of its 18 combined corps are deployed in areas opposite India. In any offensive option China will need to redeploy large forces from the hinterland into the Tibet Autonomous Region, involving trans-regional mobilisation that will surely be picked up by India's enhanced space and aerial surveillance capabilities. It is in this context that the collusive support between Pakistan and China to keep the Indian armed forces engaged poses serious strategic concerns for India. Lastly, it needs to be appreciated that this is not a localised incident. The Chinese troops would not have taken such a step without full-fledged assessment of the possible implications and a consensus at the level of its Central Military Commission. Surely the consequences of the Indian reaction would have been analysed and factored in. Intruding deep into Indian territory and effectively challenging India created the scenario of a stalemate. The fact that it has been forced to pull back, albeit by the fig leaf of a face saver should chastise the Chinese. A favorable perspective of the incident has been to put the boundary issue back in lime light if not centre stage. The recent visit of the Chinese premier provided a platform to engage constructively to move forward on the boundary issue. It was also an opportunity for both countries to provide a fillip to their bilateral relations. The writer is a former Director, Faculty of Studies, Army War College, Mhow
