Sunday, April 7, 2019

Delimiting Geopolitics: A Formal Approach to Define the Geopolitical Subject

SOURCE:
https://www.academia.edu/38702026/Delimiting_Geopolitics_a_formal_approach_to_define_the_geopolitical_subject?email_work_card=view-paper





Delimiting Geopolitics: A Formal Approach to Define the Geopolitical Subject

DE LEON PETTA GOMES DA COSTA1 



INTRODUCTION





After several years of neglect, the term “Geopolitics” has been more explored in recent years by academics and the media. This can seem, in general, as a good development, as it relates public opinion to foreign policy and internal territorial management. However, in few instances has the term Geopolitics really been related to the concept and has basic geopolitical study been proper used and applied. Furthermore, the discussion is sometimes not even related to geography by itself, but the term is rather misused in discussions that only focus on international security, nationalism or even international relations without a geographical or spatial approach.


Besides its definitions being extensively explained and explored (sometimes even more) in the last century by old theorists like Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellén, Karl Haushofer or Halford John Mackinder and more recently Yves Lacoste or Saul Bernard Cohen, the limits to consider in determining whether a subject, event, analysis, or article is related to Geopolitics still remain poor and vague, creating voids and gaps that can be filled with anything that an author desires to be a geopolitical issue. Like in the past, when Geopolitics was misused and reinterpreted as the German concept of Geopolitik, almost banishing the main term from academics, the same problem has returned through the overuse of the term in banal cases and situations not related to Geopolitics and, even more dramatically, in situations not even related to any idea of geography or spatial conception. In fact, this can trigger dangerous situations that can render  geopolitics a pseudoscientific field to justify a supposed strategic vision of a malicious author who wants to do something and support it with an eventual geopolitical concern. For this reason, it is important not to create another definition of Geopolitics but rather develop a precise delimitation of its boundaries to determine when such issue, event or article is or is not a geopolitical subject of analysis and, furthermore, when a movement of such a country is related to its geopolitical ambitions

It is the intention of this research to evaluate different samples in which the term Geopolitics was employed to analyse when the term was or was not correctly applied. Furthermore, by these samples, the subject of Geopolitics can be separated and identified to determine when such a report or study is or is not related to the main term and to suggest a methodological chart to delimit when the term Geopolitics may be properly used.




FROM “BAD SCIENCE” TO IGNORED SCIENCE

After World War II, several academics related the concept of “Geopolitics” to a militaristic view linked with the German Geopolitik and the concept of the politically and militarily dominated space of Lebensraum (living space). This eventually resulted in a distance between Geopolitical studies and other academic areas, especially Geography, in North America and Europe. In fact, there was not a single book title in English using the term geopolitics between the 1940s and 1977, with the exception of Sen’s Basic Principles of Geopolitics and History, published in India in 1975, and there were few such papers in geographical or political journals. During this period, even with some scholars advocating that geopolitics retained a fundamental value and that its neglect could be both politically and intellectually dangerous, some academics remained very critical, arguing that anything of value in geopolitics was contained within political geography and that geopolitics should be abandoned completely as a scientific term, except for historical connotations or in cases where its revival was considered very premature. The contours of some Geopolitical subjects were appropriated by the political science, strategic studies and international relations literature or limited to military academies and staff colleges, with only occasional aspects coming to the surface in publications, but even in these cases, very few contributed new literature or analysis to the public debate. In general, the conclusion must be that geopolitical writing declined in both language and substance (Hepple 1986). It is important to note that the term Geopolitics was academically neglected, but the foreign policy of many governments was still guided by Geopolitical objectives and goals, such as the United States policy of  containment in the late 1940s and its approach to China in the 1970s, the Cuban situation for the Soviet Union, and even the French and English adventures in the Suez Crisis. However, it is worth of note the fact that this rejection was stronger in Europe than a general feeling in the academics. Especially in United States (as already cited), Brazil or Chile for example, that kept a regular basis of geopolitical writings. In Brazilian and Chilean cases, probably because their military governments during that period. In other countries, in turn, Geopolitics was normally limited to branches of some departments and not open to the general public or academics, like the former Soviet Union and China (where still is a closed subject), due to its sensitive issues



In 1974, the Swiss P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin published their work about frontiers, and the French Yves Lacoste (Costa 2008) initiated a quasi-revolution in discussions of political geography, first with the Hérodote Journal and later with the book “La Géographie, ça sert d’Abord à Faire la Guerre”, both in 1976. The Hérodote Journal would shake the discussions of strategy and ideology by recognizing the crisis that geography was suffering at that moment because of its excessive pragmatism and depoliticization. Later, an editorial of the founders in 1986 would say that Hérodote (at that moment) was responsible for articulating the Geographical method and Geopolitical analysis. Yves Lacoste stated that Geopolitics was not a monopoly of Ratzel (Ratzel 1983 apud Costa 2008) and his Nazi followers or a Hitlerist concept by arguing that Geopolitics was a concern even for Élisee Reclus (Maspero 1983 apud Costa 2008), a geographer and anarchist and clarifying that it was not a change in his orientation but rather an explanation of characteristics. In fact, Lacoste considered the use of the term Geopolitics by scholars (and the geographers who were the most capable of this) something natural, as they should be explicitly dedicated to this subject. Furthermore, he proposed a critical Geopolitics more related to peace, social justice and democracy (Costa 2008). The matter around the concept was even more sensitive to some countries like Brazil and Chile, where some scholars linked the Geopolitical writing and national security of Brazil and Chile with the geopolitics of fascist Germany, arguing that the historical context and connection reflect its logic and structural connections (Cavalla and Chateaux 1977). Furthermore, the troubled figures of these countries were directly involved in Geopolitical studies, like the former dictator president of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, and General Golbery do Couto e Silva in Brazil, chief of the SNI (the Brazilian intelligence agency during the military dictatorship) (Chapman 2011). To Peters (1999), the term geopolitics was a substantial element of Western foreign policy during the Cold War against the world under  influence of its rival, the Soviet Union. As a concept to explains the competition for spheres of influence, driven by the fear in the Western camp of a ‘strategic strangulation’ by the Soviets


However, Geopolitics barely had regained its centrality in academic discussions when a new “crisis” arrived to Geography by itself. The 1990s and the Post-Cold War Era give a boost to liberal idealism, bringing hard statements like the weakening or even the end of the borders, the inevitable spread of democracy and the loss of the importance of the Geography in a globalized world. Francis Fukuyama argued that the triumph of Western liberal democracy and the free market predicated some form of universal state in a new world, where Geography would have less importance, borders would be useless, and national issues would be more homogenous (+ 1992). In national security matters, even a new generation of threats, like organized crime, terrorism and other non-state agents, would be more important than the older security model based on States as a threat. This “new world” would have deprived the State of its sovereignty with many new globalized threats that do not respect the borders. Furthermore, new technologies would make geography less important than ever. Therefore, the mobility of people and products would drastically increase and lower transaction costs. In fact, geography would be irrelevant in this New Age because irregular (non-state) actors would use the Information Age and cyberspace in a global level of communications, with the resulting absolute loss for the nation-state of the ability to control the mass media and cybernetic space due to widespread access by the population to digital information. In other words, the State would not be able to shape public opinion or control the cyber-criminal enterprises that could hurt its sovereignty (Naim 2006). In this flat world, the concept of space would be useless, like the New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman (2007) has stated. In fact, the sentence “because the globalization…” turned into a general motto or excuse to explain almost any situation, some of them not even really new but only interrupted by the Cold War.



 This process of globalization, initially developed by National States, acquired its own life, developing to even threaten its creators (the StateNation) by its logic and consequences. The implications of the current form of globalization would establish a new pattern of development that could make it at odds with the notion of the old state system (Backer 2004). In this Post-Cold War New World, Geography would be irrelevant, and the Nation-State would die. A vision much shared by academics in the 1990s was that Geopolitics would be something useless and a Cold War relic of an outdated world that no longer existed. Some of these perspectives of a “global fluidic” world remained even after the terrorist attacks in  New York and Washington in 2001, based on the excuse that they were only possible because of their peculiar historical and technological moment (Bonanate 2001). Even today, it is not hard to find speeches trying to present the idea of a useless Geography or that Geopolitics lost its meaning in the globalized world. This idea was sometimes connected to the global War on Terror, a supposed new form of war without borders and without a territory.


THE RECOVERY OF GEOPOLITICS AS A VULGAR USAGE


In the 1990s, some authors noticed the reborn of the term “geopolitics”, even among regional groupings, which had abstained from any kind of power aspect in politics, as the European Union for example. As well the problematic precision of what constitutes the Geopolitical Power. With several military, humanitarian and economic crises in the decade of the 2000s, along with the creation of political/economic/military news blocs and several studies and publishes predicting a more complicated world, there was an attempt to take back the idea of Geopolitics, especially because it is a concept that suggests and connotes an idea of a strategic and scientific accurate situation. The Geopolitical perspective attracted greater attention in the academic and popular views. However, this led to a misconception of what Geopolitics really is and when an incident was a geopolitical scenario, confusing it with a regular political or diplomatic event, an economic investment, or a minor international security issue rather than the main concept. In fact, the term Geopolitics became overused, extensively employed in situations just because some map was involved, or even worse, in cases where there was no Geography at all.

It is possible to take as an example some journal articles of Brazilian newspaper columns “trying to analyse” football and the World Cup from a geopolitical perspective. An issue without any Geopolitical context. For example, “World Cup and the Geopolitics” (Copa do Mundo e a Geopolítica), which the author makes a deep economic and political (even sociological) analysis of the World Cup and the participating teams of the tournament, something regarding the nationalism and the feelings involved in the tournament. Or “Geopolitics and Football” (Geopolítica e futebol), an analysis only about the performance of the teams in the World Cup of France (2002). In both cases, there is not a single direct (or even indirect) relation to Geopolitics, and in fact, there is no Geography involved at all. There is some confusion in mixing nationalism, flags, and performance in the games with a Geopolitical situation, in which even a microlevel of Geopolitics is not involved. In “Sexual Salvation: Affirming Women’s Sexual  Rights and Pleasures”, there is a chapter devoted to the history and the geopolitics of prostitution, with an extensive use of Geography and geographical explanations of different situations of prostitution and sexual slavery around the world, but there is not even a single bridge to connect the subject to a geopolitical context (Mccormick 1994). In fact, even former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (partly responsible for the rebirth of the term in the 1970s and 1980s) overused the term. Besides the spatial element that was always present in his speeches, the geographical content was often unclear (Hepple 1986)


Another situation that can be a context of confusion is the Chinese involvement in Africa (Florcruz 2015). The obvious Chinese interest in Africa and its investments in African countries are typically seen as a Geopolitical movement and expansion. However, such a term is not so often used in situations involving European (Doya 2015) countries’ investments or those of Japan, even though Japanese investments are three times larger than those of China in African countries (Crowley 2015). Hence, despite Africa being a common interest for every large or relevant country in the world, investment in that region is only perceived as a Geopolitical movement when it is convenient to sketch a more militaristic or “sinister” scenario. Despite the article’s claim of a possible military interest in this case, there is no evidence to support it


Even the employment of military personal does not necessarily indicate the Geopolitical interest or ambition of the countries involved in the situation, especially peacekeeper missions. MINUSTAH, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti since 2004 (United Nations), for example, comprises military forces from many countries (twenty countries currently). Although it includes countries with an interest in the Caribbean region such as Brazil and USA, it also includes countries for which it would be harder to argue any type of geopolitical interest in the Caribbean region, like Philippines, Jordan and Nepal. The same applies in MINUSCA, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (United Nations), which would be difficult to call a geopolitical area of interest to Bhutan, Bolivia or Serbia, despite their participation in the mission. This type of situation represents more a diplomatic goal than a geopolitical one. In fact, even participation in a direct military engagement does not necessarily represent a Geopolitical interest, as seen in the Iraq War in 2003, where the Coalition Forces comprised countries such as Poland, Mongolia and Nicaragua, who had no direct Geopolitical goal in the region


The same logic can be applied to the “Lobster War”, when France and Brazil disputed the rights of lobster fishing in a Brazilian maritime region  in 1961. Despite the direct economic interest of the France in fishing lobsters, it hardly proves or indicates that Pernambuco in Brazil was inside the French Geopolitical interest. This discussion is important to show that even military conflicts or crises do not necessarily mean that there is a Geopolitical direct interest. In fact, the word “Geopolitics” is largely deployed in cases in which there is no direct involvement with a Geopolitical background, and this overuse is the result of confusion not only by the media but also by academics who mix this concept with generic geographical information without any basic Geopolitical connection, or in more problematic cases, without even the use of Geography or a map, just a political or a social situation. Although the discussions around Geopolitics, leading to its increased attention in recent years, can be viewed as being generally positive, several precautions must be taken to avoid the unnecessary and excessive use of the concept, causing deterioration to the main subject of Geopolitics


The formal definition of the term is a very old discussion, not only between geographers but also political scientists, with several approaches to this objective. Besides the delimitation of Rudolph Kjellén (Kjellén 1917 apud Cohen 2003), who defined Geopolitics as being “the theory of the state as a Geographical organism or phenomenon in space”, that of Edmund Walsh, who stated that it is “a combined study of human geography and applied political science… dating back to Aristotle, Montesquieu and Kant”, and that of Saul B. Cohen, who defined it as an interaction between geographical settings and political processes (Cohen 2003), the main problem is not to define what Geopolitics is but rather when a study of a case, subject of analysis or political movement is a Geopolitical matter (Geopolitical Subject). As I already demonstrated, several cases referred to as topics of “Geopolitics” are not even close to geopolitical cases. The frontiers to specifying Geopolitics still remain too far open and vulnerable to be interpreted as any writer wants.




Leslie W. Hepple stated the same problem in 1986:                    


Geopolitics serves as an umbrella term, encapsulating the interaction of global and regional issues with economic and local structures. But the term geopolitics often appears only in the title, introduction and conclusions, with no linkage to other geopolitical literature, and with the major analysis being conducted using other political and economic intellectual frameworks, usually with   little geography and few maps      




In his criticism of the overuse of the term “Geopolitics” in 1986, Hepple points to several studies containing geographical or spatial information  (some of them with no geography at all) but with lack of geopolitical data or relevance, like Geopolitics of Information (many studies with the same title have been published in the last years and with the same hardly problematic use of the term) and Géopolitiques de l’Apartheid (Geopolitics of Apartheid), which provide an analysis of the territorial and spatial logic, but with no Geopolitical subject or literature involved. The lack of history or critical philosophy may not only “reinvent the wheel” but misrepresent the concept by creating a blank check to consider any subject a strategic issue without providing any discussion of social and political aspects or/ and models, which must be always involved in social constructions such as geopolitics.

According to Hepple (1986)


            The more general, popularized use of geopolitics is very vague in approach, far away from any   geopolitical or geographical tradition, and whilst  the contributions are often original and valuable,  they seem  to be searching for an appropriate  framework under the general heading of “geopolitics "                                            



WHEN IS AN EVENT A GEOPOLITICAL MATTER?

After exposing the two extremes of the treatment of Geopolitics, from its exclusion from academia to the extensive and unnecessary use of the term, I want to raise a discussion to refocus on the core of geopolitics to define when an event is really a geopolitical matter and subject case of study or analysis. For this reason, I want to introduce some patterns, dimensions and theories to summarize when a subject can be considered a Geopolitical matter

After exposing the two extremes of the treatment of Geopolitics, from its exclusion from academia to the extensive and unnecessary use of the term, I want to raise a discussion to refocus on the core of geopolitics to define when an event is really a geopolitical matter and subject case of study or analysis. For this reason, I want to introduce some patterns, dimensions and theories to summarize when a subject can be considered a Geopolitical matter and/or Effective Regional Territories, the moderately pro-state population areas; Empty Areas, essential areas devoid of population; Boundaries, the mark and limit of the national states; and Nonconforming Sectors, areas with separatism sentiment (Cohen 2003)

Meta-Geopolitics, the geopolitics related to the outer space, suggested by Nayef Al-Rodhan, is constructed according to the seven dimensions that countries involved in large space programs possess: Social and health issues; Domestic politics; Economics; Environment; Science and human potential; Military and security issues; and International diplomacy (Al-Rodhan 2012). Five of his dimensions can be directly connected to the Geopolitical context of the national States, like Social (demographics), Domestic politics, Economics, Scientific potential and Military issues. These five characteristics, grouped into a set, can shape not only the internal geopolitical reality of such country but also its foreign policy interests and capacity to protect or extend its sphere of influence. In other words, this model of dimensions proposed by Al-Rodhan can help in part to define and delimit if such a subject of analysis can or cannot be considered a geopolitical issue by comprising these five points from a geographical perspective and also the geopolitical potential of each state (or non-state) actor.


Peters (1999) modified the Lacoste’s definition by extending the term territory to include maritime and airspace elements, especially because rivalry between two antagonists, especially national States (but not only), are rarely limited to the territorial sense of on-shore territory. Especially because natural resources are also located in the sea, and the control of maritime zones or airspace are indispensable for sustain such power over a delimited piece of territory. Like Al-Rodhan (2012) would do it later by expanding such projection of spatial power to the outer space in modern space program races. Peters also extend this definition with the inclusion of rivalries between groups of States, for example Western OECD against non-Western states, in general she defines the geopolitics term as an analysis of power between different types authorities for political (ideology) and economic dominance over a delimited territory


Among State strategists, not only Kissinger but also Brzezinski (1997) extensively used this approach by explaining the geopolitical base was no longer the geographic part of Eurasia as a point of departure for continental domination, but a fundamental that moved from the regional space to a global dimension, while the Eurasian continent would be the central core of a global primacy. In fact, the term of “Geostrategy” for him would be a long-term management of America’s Eurasian geopolitical interests. Finally, to Brzezinski the geopolitical approach to the “Eurasian Geostrategy” was a:


       management of geostrategically dynamic states and    the careful handling of geopolitically catalytic states,   in keeping with the twin interests of America in the  short-term preservation of its unique global power  and in the long-run transformation of it into increasingly institutionalized global cooperation. To             put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more              brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent  collusion and maintain security dependence among   the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected,  and to keep the barbarians from coming together.                                              
                                                   
                   
Considering the geopolitical literature, I propose a definition to address when a particular subject analysis may or may not be considered a geopolitical subject by the simultaneous convergence of three fundamental aspects (Politics, Economy and Military) inside the specific geospatial sphere of a particular country or political actor (non-state actors may also be interested in geopolitical strategy). The economic aspect must be regarded, for areas that provide a fundamental or vital resource are fundamental to the production of an essential good or are fundamental places on trade routes that provide necessary logistics for these vital resources, so that their loss could or will damage the economic functioning of such a country; in other words, these areas should be controlled directly or indirectly for the State to survive. Although the logistical importance of this aspect is largely based in a Mahanist vision of military naval power and controlled seaborne commerce interdependence (Mahan 1890), it must also be applied to land areas. Those economic considerations are important to separate investments that every state or non-state actor normally pursues from a geographic area of interest that is fundamental to the economic existence of such a political organization


As previously demonstrated, even the most classical and associated aspect of geopolitics, the military, is not always necessarily guided by geopolitical ambitions, so it is important to delimit when a military involvement is or is not inside of the geographic sphere and when a region is considered a geopolitical area of interest of a country. For this reason, the security aspect can be split in two different segments, the external projection capability, which includes conventional military forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), and the capability to maintain control of the central authority within its own territory, normally executed by public security agencies (police departments, for example), especially in nonconforming sectors. Such military involvement can be considered as geopolitical factor if linked to a delimited geographical space that is important to the economic survival of the state (as previously explained) and/or politically important; in the vast majority of cases, the Geopolitical area of interest is around the borders of the national states that ensure the projection of its sphere of political influence. In the case of the internal security agencies, their task is to establish and maintain social and political order in the state’s territory, avoiding problems such as separatist organizations, organized crime and/or terrorist groups that can eventually lead to some type of territorial loss of state power

The third and most subjective aspect is regarded to politics. Again, it is important to split this aspect into two different segments, Demography and Diplomacy, which are the internal management of the population inside the national territory, especially in nonconforming territories, to ensure the presence of the central authorities inside its own borders, and the capacity of the external influence of such country on other countries through diplomatic means, where the ability to maintain control or influence over the political actors (does not need be the government by itself) of a region or a country within its sphere of influence or area of interest is crucial for its strategic interests in that country or region. There are many possible ways that governments can apply this procedure through soft power diplomatic acts, some of them by controversial actions that can involve even bribery


A Geopolitical subject must involve more than a military operation, financial investment or diplomatic or territorial management; the three aspects must be combined simultaneously and based in a geographical plan to consider such an object of analysis as a Geopolitical issue of study. This delimitation is important to guide and separate the different layers of discussion in areas of the humanities, avoiding confusion with different segments of studies like International Security, Political Science and Economy. Furthermore, it makes it clear that Geopolitics is not the same as nationalism, diplomacy or geography, but it can sometimes be related. Above all, it is not necessarily a concept to justify some type of Imperialism, but a geopolitical strategy can also develop a defensive policy to deal with potential external threats in the military, economic and/or political spheres of a country or countries, leading a group of countries to develop countermeasures and partnerships like trade blocs or military alliances. Additionally, it is important to establish that Geopolitics is not exclusivity for foreign policies or international relations, as normally stated (Devetak et al 2011), but may drive territorial management in their homeland policy. I suggest the following schematic that tries to simplify and clarify the main idea:






This graphic illustrates when a subject is a Geopolitical matter by the confluence of the three spheres (aspects) inside a larger sphere based on a Geographic/Spatial plan. For example, besides the political and economic aspects of BRICS and several claims about its Geopolitical arrangement (Leahy 2014), there is not only no military ambition in the involved countries, but, more importantly, there is a complete lack of a geographic and spatial relationship between them, configuring it as a political-economic bloc, not even close to a geopolitical ambition. In this way, it is very different from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Meanwhile, even small-scale conflicts, due to their scale, would hardly relate to a geopolitical situation, including the war on drugs or/and war against terrorism. Military engagements against these assets are punctual and do not mobilize all aspects simultaneously, except if this non-state actor eventually evolves to operate in all three aspects in a particular delimited geographic region, such as the Islamic State briefly was able to achieve.1


There are some factual situations that can also demonstrate when the term can be properly applied, like in the classical Mahan theory regarding the Canal in the Isthmus of Panama (Mahan 1890), involving the geographical aspects that reduced the distance between the two North American coasts by 8,415 geographical miles (Mills 2010), directly affecting the economic and the military logistical structure of the United States and to guarantee the political interests in the region. The American government has always held some type of political influence over Panama, even that of the troubled and obscure involvement with General Manuel Noriega and his corrupt government related to drug trafficking (Marcy 2010). In this case, it is very easy to identify a subject of analysis in the Caribbean and Central America as related to Geopolitics due to the confluence of the geographical factor with the three aspects

This perception is not so far from Brzezinski (1997), in fact it based on. He explored what was called “Geopolitical pivots”. States with importance derived from its very sensitive location and from the consequences of its potentially vulnerable condition. Those geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography, in some cases having a special role either in giving access to important areas or in denying access to resources to another significant player (in general he refers to national States). While in other situations, those geopolitical pivots can play a defensive shield for a vital State or a region. Sometimes, according to him, the existence of a geopolitical pivot can have a significant political and/or cultural consequence for neighboring player. Many years later, Brzezinski (2012) would still sustain such methodology and views of what Geopolitics is by presenting Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and the Great Middle East as the Geopolitically most endangered States while using the same methods that he defined as “Geopolitical pivots”

It is not ironically neither coincidence the fact that those Geopolitical pivots are regions/countries/areas of friction between bigger State powers. In fact, such geographical places turned in pivot areas because they are inside a bigger structure of geopolitical dispute among regional and/or global powers. To define when such matter is or not a Geopolitical Subject of study (and by consequence related with Geopolitics) the researcher must consider such context of frictional disputes because the subject of study in this theme are normally inside this context

An example where the term cannot be applied is the Chinese geopolitics in Africa. Despite many media articles arguing about the geopolitical interests of China in the African countries, there is no clear evidence that supports it. As previously stated, the Chinese investments in Africa are not the largest among other non-African countries. Furthermore, at this point, the Chinese government has not deployed any military asset or base in Africa, and even with several reports and media news describing the possibility (Benabdallah 2015), it is hard to sustain such a position. Even the Chinese naval presence against piracy in the Gulf of Aden (BBC 2008) cannot be considered geopolitical, as it seems to be more related to a multinational task force for peacekeeping than a military engagement. Furthermore, besides the financial investments, there are few signals or evidence of a Chinese direct influence over the local political elites. In fact, the Chinese geopolitical maritime areas of interest are more related to “vertical” expansion near its coasts, in the South China Sea and East China Sea, than a “horizontal” expansion that could eventually go towards Africa (Kaplan 2010). These examples demonstrate that in several cases, there is double standards in use of the term “geopolitics


Another common mistake, which unfortunately is growing, is the split between Geo-economics from Geopolitics, like if eventually one could surpass another. For example, Søilen (2010) who stated:


          Geoeconomics is gradually replacing the   importance of Geopolitics. The transition is marked by the start of the process we call Globalization about two decades old now, but still in  its infancy, when government and government   institutions discovered that they no longer were self-evident key actors and watchmen of world events.The process is an effect of the end of the Cold War and  marks a strategic shift from political ideologies to economic realities.                           
                                            

A statement absurdly wrong because it does not understand the fact that the economy is directly affected by security/military issues, as clearly observed by Mahan more than a century ago, the close relation and interdependence between these two is what defines the modern strategy and economic stability in the world. Especially in the Chinese situation regarding the China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative, considering the obvious fact that connectivity and infrastructure projects are integral element of global political and economic power. The China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), also known as “Belt and Road” or “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, are contemporary connectivity geopolitical projects due to the financial and geographic scale of these projects. Through several economic actions is possible to see its security background context. For example, the objective to promote the development of western Chinese provinces such as Gansu, Guangxi, Ningxia, Shanxi, Yunnan and Xinjiang. To produce a favorable regional/domestic security environment in China’s western areas decreasing challenges of religious extremism, separatism and terrorism. Moreover, reducing the Chinese dependence on sea-based energy transportation routes, especially the Strait of Malacca (Blanchard and Flint 2017). In other words, it is not possible to Geoeconomics replace the importance of Geopolitics, because it is already inside a bigger Geopolitical realm


It is also important to establish objectives and projection limitations that define if a subject is a geopolitical matter according to the potential of the state actor (or non-state actor) involved, which means that if new elements appear, it may change such projections and objectives, in the manner that the Canal of Panama changed the United States’ destiny, as predicted by Mahan, by expanding its interests and projection, or like the political transition of the Soviet Union to Russia, decreasing its projection and geopolitical interests. Furthermore, based on these three aspects, if we take the five main dimensions of Al-Rodhan as a sample of the projection capacity, the United States would be the only country with a global geopolitical interest and projection, at least at this point, with all other countries being more or less limited to specific areas around its own borders. In addition to not expanding their geopolitical projection by the five-dimensional limitations, some of their foreign policy interests are also more restricted, like those of China, Russia and India.2 However, other cases, like England and France, despite aspiring for greater projection, still suffer from serious limitations. This could lead to a reflection that the maintenance of the United States’ geopolitical objectives would necessarily sooner or later crush other states’ geopolitical spheres

These crushes could be represented by the shatterbelt regions, which are strategically oriented regions that are disputed by the competition of Great Powers in geostrategic realms and compression zones, while fragmented areas subject to the completion of neighbouring countries but not Great Powers could be identified as geographical spaces where the geopolitical interests and objectives of different countries overlap and collide with each other. Following the graphic presented before, if fewer than all three aspects collide in this particular place, some sort of competition will start (or in some cases, a deal may be drafted that can turn it into a cooperation or partnership due to its small scale) but would not trigger a geopolitical crisis. In this case, the three aspects should be involved, disrupting a more severe and dramatic situation. As stated by Saul B. Cohen, a good example of a shatterbelt is the Middle East, due to its fragmentation reinforced by a dozen regional states as well the influences and actions of major powers. However, not all areas in turmoil are shatterbelts. For example, the Caribbean did not become a shatterbelt because of the communist Cuba or Nicaraguan uprising in the region, because the United States’ sphere of influence was never seriously contested. Similarly, the conflicts in South Asia did not evolve to a shatterbelt because India’s sphere of influence in the region is not threatened by the United States or China (Cohen 2003). This could change, though, if the Chinese government eventually makes a major movement in the Strait of Malacca, triggering a regional dispute (Kaplan 2010). Those cases are good to validate the theory represented in the previous chart, on how the terminology of Geopolitics would fill in these scenarios and how the term must be employed only in the case of the  political, economic and military aspects being involved at the same time inside a spatial sphere

This elasticity must be also considered as a fundamental characteristic of the Geopolitical Subject. Because the needs and capacity of national States, as well any other political group, will eventually change in time. Boundaries are socio-spatial limits of difference and will define the territorial extent in its legal fact or legitimacy. While at the same time, spatial inscriptions are not static. The hierarchy of territories based on political boundaries are frequently in question, because it involves negotiations for cooperation and competition between interests and identities (Novak 2011). A good example of change of those geopolitical shapes may be found in the European Union expansion and its evolutional integration, a transnational organization not structured on fixed spatial model but based on heterogeneity of dynamics. Although new countries can go in or older members can out, according to its internal and external political context. Also, we must not fall in mistakes by considering that every Security aspect is also a geopolitical subject, because while in several issues both aspects may eventually cross paths, this is not a mandatory factor but just very likely.


                                              CONCLUSIONS


As demonstrated, several uses of the word Geopolitics are hardly connected to the concept itself. It is not surprising, as geopolitical study suffered significant damage in the last half century, coming from the association with the German Geopolitik for at least three decades to a brief recovery in the 1980s, just to suffer another hit with the overuse of the Globalization concept, sometimes more ideologically guided than scientifically. This crisis in Geopolitics is also because Political Geography, throughout the twentieth century, among the other sub-disciplines of geography, had great difficulty with an autonomous academic reflection not related to the immediate demands of national states, such as those by authors in the United States like Spykman and Mahan, Mackinder in England or Haushofer and Ratzel in Germany. Most of the theoretical constructions of classic geopolitical thinking still remain much more determined by the demands of the States than by proper intellectual needs, characteristics of a more academic “pure” reflection. In some Latin countries, geopolitical thought was produced by intellectuals related to the Military, directly linked to the military dictatorships in that time, as in the case of General Golbery in Brazil and General Pinochet in Chile. After the democratization of such countries, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc,  the “End of History” and the “End of Borders” speeches, Geopolitics and Geography lost much space in the Academy. The design of an academic geopolitical thinking produced by civilians or unrelated to national State demands is still in its infancy in several countries

Although the main “Geopolitical Subject” is the national State (at least in most cases), its analysis does not need to always be determined by National interests, but several forms of analysis and knowledge can be offered that may help analysts and researches understand the “bubbles of power” (political groups oriented in such spatial dimensions by one or more of the three aspects previously presented) that comprise the national and international scenarios of analysis. In fact, when such an issue is determined to be a Geopolitical subject, it will demonstrate how deep such a situation is and how much problematic it could become, due to the involvement of the Political, Economic and Military aspects at the same time. A popularization of the term relating the Geopolitics concept to non-sense matters such as football and prostitution, among others, is bad for the concept and bad for the readers who may not be able to understand the complexity and importance surrounding the geopolitical interests

The importance of delimiting a methodology for Geopolitics and the Geopolitical Subject beyond the basic literature of Mahan, Ratzel and Mackinder is because geopolitics presents an important key that drives and guide foreign policies and even national policies. Therefore, its popularization and use without the geopolitical literature or spatial or geographical elements is dangerous, not only for the term itself and the geopoliticians who spend much time studying, writing and analysing the area but also for State and non-state actors that require a geostrategic orientation. As a blank check, the concept can mislead and open doors to any type of political action like the Lebensraum concept in the name of national security or a strategic issue, causing severe damage not only to the science of geopolitics but also to the public who can be misguided. Hence, the Geopolitical Subject must be delimited by the Geographical aspect and composed of political, economic and military aspects, simultaneously, to determine when Geopolitics matters

This exact methodological delimitation, is far more important than only avoiding misinterpretations, it can also help to prevent another assault against Geopolitics and Political Geography, making it difficult to relate them to the Nazi concept of Geopolitik by avoiding an imminent connection with imperialistic acts (because it can be used to develop a defensive geostrategy) and by stating its permanent and strategic importance in the world, even on such a globalized planet. Because Geopolitics is a four-dimensional field of study (not only related to the spatial dimensions but  also the temporal), the proposed chart can also provide a guided orientation more accurate for studies, diplomatic actions and the public. Many political, economic or military reasons in time will change the shape the projection and gravity of the Nation-States. Something recently observed in the dissolution of Soviet Union (a retraction form) which lost its influence and capability over some territories, or in China rising (an expansion form) which is gradually absorbing more abroad areas as a form to sustain its “geopolitical energy”. To conclude, a one- or two-aspect conflict or crisis (Political, Economic and/or Military) is far easier to peacefully resolve than a Geopolitical crisis, due to the combination of the three aspects at the same time inside a geographical sphere that is normally fundamentally important for the states (or non-state actor) involved to survive. In other words, Geopolitics is also important as a delimited term, to show how deep such a situation could be.


REFERENCES


Al-Rodhan, Nayef R. F. 2012. Meta-Geopolitics of Outer-Space. An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 25.

Backer, Larry Catá. 2004. Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: finessing the tensions between Cuban Marxism and Free Market Globalism. Journal of Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. v. 14, n. 2, p. p.ini. – p. fin.

BBC. Chinese ships will fight pirates. BBC News. (18 December, 2008). Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7789303.stm Accessed at: 2016, 4 March.

Benabdallah, Lina. What’s the deal with China’s new military base in Djibouti? Africa is a Country. (May 18, 2015). Available at: http://africasacountry. com/2015/05/what-does-it-mean-that-china-has-a-military-base-in-djibouti/ Accessed at: 2016, 4 March.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F; Flint, Colin. 2017. The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Geopolitics, 22:2. pp. 223-245

Bonanate, Luigi. 2001. La Guerra. São Paulo. Estação Liberdade. pp. 1-20

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. Basic Books. pp. 21

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2012. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. Basic Books.

Cavalla, A. Chateaux, J. 1977. La Geopolitics y el Fascismo Dependiente. Revista “PRINCIPIOS”. Mexico City: Casa de Chile. Available at: http://www.blest.eu/ biblio/cavalla/index.html Accessed at: 2016, 4 March

Chapman, Bert. 2011. Geopolitics, A Guide to the Issues. Praeger. pp.13-20.

Cohen, Saul Bernard. 2003. Geopolitics of the World System. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 11, 33-43

Costa, Wanderley Messias da. (2008). Geografia Política e Geopolítica. Edusp. pp: 243.

Crowley, Kevin. Japan Has Invested More Africa Project Financing Than China. Bloomberg. (2015, 24 March). Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2015-03-24/japan-has-invested-more-africa-project-financing-than-china Accessed at: 2016, 4 March.

Devetak, Richard; Burke, Anthony; George, Jim. (2011). An Introduction to International Relations. Cambridge University Press; 2 Edition. pp. 492

Doya, David Malingha. European Investment Bank Plans Africa Expansion Amid Growth. Bloomberg. (2015, July 16). Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2015-07-15/european-investment-bank-plans-africa-expansionas-economy-grows Accessed at: 2016, 4 March.

Florcruz, Michelle. China’s Geopolitical Ambitions Expand To Namibia’s South Atlantic Sea Walvis Bay Port. International Business Times. (2015, March 30). Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-geopolitical-ambitions-expand-namibias-south-atlantic-sea-walvis-bay-port-1864132 Accessed at: 2016, 4 March.

Friedman, Thomas L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. Ed. Picador. 2007.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of The History and The Last Man? Free Press. pp. 199.

Hepple, Leslie W. 1986. The Revival of Geopolitics. Political Geography Quarterly, Supplement to Vol. 5, No. 4, S21-S36.

Kaplan, Robert D. 2010. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Random House Trade Paperbacks. Ebook version. pp. 404-469

Leahy, Joe. Opinion: the Brics bank is more about geopolitics than investment. (Jul 16 2014). Financial Times Blog. Available at: http://blogs.ft.com/beyondbrics/2014/07/16/opinion-the-brics-bank-is-more-about-geopolitics-than-investment/ Accessed at: 2018, 4 March.

Mackinder, Halford J., “The Geographical Pivot of History”, in The Geographical Journal, na 4, Vol. XXIII, April, 1904

Mahan, Alfred T. 1890. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Little, Brown and Company. Available at: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13529 Accessed at: 2018, 4 March. pp. 25-34

Marcy, William L. 2010. The Politics of Cocaine: How U. S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America. Lawrence Hill Books. pp. 111.

McCormick, Naomi B. 1994. Sexual Salvation: Affirming Women’s Sexual Rights and Pleasures. Praeger; 1st Ed. edition. pp. 85.

Mills, J. Saxon. 2010. The Panama Canal. A history and description of the enterprise. The Project Gutenberg Free Ebook. pp. 244

Naim, Moisés. 2006. Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Zahar. pp. 12,135

Novak, Paolo. 2011. The Flexible Territoriality of Borders, Geopolitics, 16:4. pp. 741-767

Peters, Susanne. 1999. The ‘West’ against the ‘Rest’: Geopolitics after the end of the cold war. Geopolitics. pp. 29.

Raffestin, Claude, Pour une géographie du pouvoir, Paris, Li br. Techniques, 1980.

Søilen, Klaus Solberg. 2010. The Shift from Geopolitics to Geoeconomics and the Failure of our Modern Social Sciences. TELOS Conference – From Lifeworld to Biopolitics: Empire in the Age of Obama


United Nations. MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. Available at: http://www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/facts.shtml Accessed at: 2016, 19 July.


United Nations. MINUSTAH, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts. shtml Accessed at: 2018, 4 March.


Walsh, Edmund. 1944. Geopolitics and International Morals in Compass of the World, ed. H. W. Weigert and V. Stefansson, 12–39. New York: Macmillan.


NOTAS

1. The Islamic State failed in achieve international legitimacy, support and political recognition. Otherwise, it would be able to turn itself in a National or governmental player.

 2. With an eventual change in its capacities, its interests may change.









DE LEON PETTA GOMES DA COSTA
Delimiting Geopolitics: a formal approachto define the geopolitical subject

Tuesday, February 5, 2019

CULTURE- INDIAN NARI SHAKTI

SOURCE:
https://in.pinterest.com/pin/1196337387975950/?utm_campaign=popular_pins&e_t=038c84a1dc69403494288f6b58b66cd0&utm_content=1196337387975950&utm_source=31&utm_term=8&utm_medium=2012






               CULTURE- INDIAN NARI SHAKTI








Monday, February 4, 2019

Narendra Modi Mind Analysis

SOURCE:
http://latestnamowallpaper.blogspot.com/2014/05/NarendraModiMind.html





Narendra Modi Mind Analysis


Posted by : Shan Ahir


Monday, 19 May 2014/ UPDATED 04 FEB 2019




Narendra Modi Mind Analysis

Narendra Modi Mind Analysis 


Narendra Modi The Past Cm Of Gujarat And Now prime Minister of India Has Unique Multi Mind & Multi Window Vision. Lets See How is it.
Narendra Modi As..............


Right Brain                       Left Brain    
Creative                               Analytical
Dream Really Big                  Logical
Focused                               Sequencing
Intuitive                                 Caution
Risk Taker                            Planner
Adventurous                          Detail Oriented
                                             Practical

...............................................................................
Strengths                            Weakness

Political savant                    Loner            
Great Orator                        Not Always A                                                          team Player
Master Strategist                    Opportunistic
Ruthless                                  Arrogant
Patient Listener                       Stubborn
Hardworking
Understands Public Pulse

Sunday, February 3, 2019

Operation Lal Dora: India’s aborted military intervention in Mauritius

SOURCE:
https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/13056/1/Brewster,%20D.%20Operation%20Lal%20Dora%202013.pdf


Operation Lal Dora: India’s aborted military intervention in Mauritius

Mauritius forms an anchor to India’s strategic role in the Indian Ocean. India has long had a special economic, political and security relationship with Mauritius, which a US diplomatic report has characterised as Mauritius’ “willing subordination” to India. 1 A key turning point in the relationship occurred in 1983, when, in Operation Lal Dora, India came to the point of a full scale military intervention in the island state to ensure that it stayed in India’s strategic orbit.


This article will discuss a 1983 political crisis in Mauritius which threatened to overturn a Hindu-led government and led to plans for an Indian intervention in the island. When Indian military leaders hesitated over a military operation, Indira Gandhi instead relied on her security services to achieve India’s objectives. An understanding of this previously undisclosed operation casts light on India’s thinking about its role in the region, its military decision-making processes, and on what could be seen as a long-standing alignment of interests between India and the United States in the Indian Ocean. These issues are particularly relevant as the United States now looks to further develop its strategic partnership with India as part of its ‘Pivot to Asia’

Strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War

The southwest Indian Ocean of the late 1970s and early 1980s was a scene of superpower competition, rivalry and intrigue. The Indian Ocean had become a new frontier of the Cold  War as the Soviet Union and the United States expanded their naval capabilities in the region and jostled for influence over the small and politically weak Indian Ocean island states. The great distances across the Indian Ocean meant that access to local port facilities and air bases became a major focus of competition between the two superpowers. At the same time, apartheid South Africa actively destabilised states that it considered hostile. This strategic competition led to considerable instability in the region. Several of Indian Ocean island states including Seychelles, Comoros and Madagascar suffered coups involving foreign powers or mercenaries. As the Mauritius Times commented in 1978,”Mauritius is the only important island left in the Indian Ocean that is not in the pocket of any superpower…It would be sheer folly to dismiss the likelihood of a coup in Mauritius.”2



For much of the Cold War, the growing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union was the cause of considerable dismay for New Delhi. India saw itself as destined to become the leading power in the Indian Ocean, but it did not have the military capability to challenge the regional presence of either the United States or a “friendly” Soviet Union. The ideology of nonalignment to which India officially subscribed held that the ‘intrusion’ of great powers (particularly Western powers) into any part of the developing world was inherently illegitimate and the primary (if not only) source of insecurity among developing states. From the early 1970s, India had strongly opposed the US military presence in the Indian Ocean as a threat to regional stability. The “intrusion” of a US naval task force led by the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in the closing days of the 1971 Bangladesh war was long remembered in India as an outrageous and impermissible exercise in gunboat diplomacy. New Delhi also strongly resented the US base on Diego Garcia which gave the  United States the capability to dominate the entire Indian Ocean and to potentially intervene in South Asia.



Although India had a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union, it was also concerned about Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean region, particularly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1980. While New Delhi refrained from publicly condemning the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and continued in its anti-US rhetoric, there were increasingly instances where New Delhi and Washington had similar interests in the region. From the early 1980s, the Reagan administration also increasingly saw India as a status quo power that could act as a security provider to the region. 3

Political instability in Mauritius

Mauritius, the island state located some 900 km east of Madagascar, is in many ways the “Little India” of the Indian Ocean. It was colonized by the Dutch, the French and then the British. With no indigenous population, the Europeans imported slaves from Africa and indentured labour from India to work the sugar cane plantations. Between 1834 and 1920, some 420,000 Indian workers migrated to Mauritius, many of them Bhojpuri speakers from the Indian state of Bihar. Today some 70% of Mauritius’ population is of Indian descent with the remainder is mostly French Creole speakers of African descent and a very small white French community. Although the whites no longer hold the reins political power, the key Franco-Mauritian families or “Grand Blancs” as they are called, still exert considerable economic influence.


Since gaining independence from Britain in 1968, Mauritius has managed to maintain a democratic system, but the road has sometimes been rocky. Its early years were dominated by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, leader of the Mauritian Labour Party, who shepherded Mauritius through independence and then governed for the next 14 years. Ramgoolam was pragmatic and a moderate social democrat and, although of Indian descent, he sought to maintain a balance between the various ethnic and religious groups that make up Mauritius. He also balanced Mauritius’ international relationships, although generally taking a pro-Western line. This included a mild, if largely symbolic, opposition to the US presence at Diego Garcia.

Even before the independence of Mauritius, India saw itself as having a special relationship with the island. Early Mauritian political leaders of all persuasions took inspiration from India’s struggle for independence and the Indian community clung tenaciously to the idea of Mother India. After the departure of the Royal Navy from the region, India effectively assumed responsibility for Mauritius’ security under a 1974 defence agreement. In effect, this agreement signified Mauritius swapping one security guarantor for another. Under the agreement India transferred patrol boats and a helicopter to Mauritius and the Indian Navy effectively took responsibility for the Mauritian Coast Guard. Indira Gandhi considered Mauritius to be one of India’s most dependable international partners and a potential safe haven for her and her family.4 


New Delhi had supported Seewoosagur Ramgoolam since independence. But by the early 1980s he was barely hanging on to power and it was clear that he would lose the forthcoming election to the main opposition party, the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM). Ramgoolam was deeply unpopular as compared with the MMM, which had a young leadership and often identified with radical third world movements. The MMM was nominally led by Anerood Jugnauth, a London-trained lawyer of Indian descent, but its “ideological leader”, was a firebrand socialist of French descent, Paul Berenger. With political change likely, the politically active Indian Mission in Port Louis facilitated several meetings in New Delhi between Indira Gandhi, Jugnauth and Berenger in 1980 and 1981. Mrs Gandhi faced the reality of the forthcoming transfer of power and swung her support behind the MMM. Gandhi also hoped to see the new government take a stronger stand against the US presence at Diego Garcia.5


But many still had misgivings about the MMM’s radical policies, and Berenger’s leftist views in particular. Berenger called for close ties with Libya and the Soviet Union and socialist leaning African states. Much attention was also focused on the MMM’s links with Libya whose leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was widely seen as representing both Arab radicalism and as a fellow traveler of the Soviet Union. Among other things Libya was financing the conversion of Mauritian Hindus to Islam.


In June 1982, Ramgoolam decisively lost a general election to the MMM, after which Jugnauth became Prime Minister, with Berenger as Finance Minister. Days later, Indira Gandhi made a triumphant visit to the island, showcasing India’s special relationship with   Mauritius and its approval of the new government. Among other things, Mrs Gandhi approved a double tax treaty that has since allowed Mauritius to position itself as an offshore financial centre and the primary route for foreign investment into India.However ideological and personality differences among Mauritius’ new leaders surfaced within months. There was considerable personal friction between Jugnauth and Berenger, and major disagreements over Berenger’s imposition of economic austerity measures mandated by the IMF. There was also disquiet over Berenger’s attempts to promote French Creole as Mauritius’ national language. For Berenger and other young socialists, creolisation was an important social engineering exercise to transcend what they saw as non-indigenous languages and cultures and create a single homogeneous Mauritian culture.8

The Creole language issue became a proxy for the communal tensions that surfaced under the new government. Some non-Hindu leaders feared that the delicate communal balance in Mauritius that Ramgoolam had nurtured since independence would be upset by Jugnauth and that Mauritius would come to be dominated by a majority Hindu culture. Hindu leaders were frustrated that they had less economic and political power than the Franco-Mauritians despite their majority numbers and feared that Berenger’s role in the new government could signal a return of the “Grand Blancs” to power. Some believed that Berenger intended to exclude high caste Hindus from power and even establish military rule. As one analyst commented on Berenger’s policy of creolisation: “The stake was high: no less than the reversal of the whole ethnic political balance which had structured the regime of independence.”9


By early 1983 Jugnauth had become increasingly concerned about the possibility of Berenger leading a coup against him with the help of Libya and the Soviet Union. The Indian Mission in Port Louis kept a close watch on developments. According to one of Jugnauth’s advisors, after the 1982 election both the United States and the Indians were feeding false intelligence to Jugnauth about Berenger’s socialist links.10 In February 1983, Jugnauth met with Mrs Gandhi in New Delhi, where he requested military assistance in the event of a coup by Berenger. According to an advisor to Jugnauth who was accompanying him, Mrs Gandhi assured him of Indian support, telling him that, “Within five hours a contingent of my air force will be in Mauritius.”11


 The power struggle came to a head in mid March 1983. On Mauritian Independence Day, while Jugnauth was in New Delhi attending a Non Aligned Movement summit, Berenger arranged for the Mauritian National Anthem to be broadcast over Mauritian television in Creole, referring to Creole as the new national language.12 On Jugnauth’s return to Mauritius, Berenger proposed constitutional changes that would strip power from the prime minister. The MMM government disintegrated and Jugnauth was left with a small number of mostly Hindu followers.


 The collapse of the government heightened communal and ideological tensions throughout Mauritius. Jugnauth feared for his safety after he was jostled by Berenger supporters. Local media reported the formation of a “workers’ militia” led by Berenger. Jugnauth spoke of the dangers of “growing fascism,” labelling Berenger a “racist”and comparing him to  Stalin.13 Hindu leaders exploited Hindu communal fears about Berenger, while Berenger supporters saw Hindu leaders such as Harish Boodhoo as being in league with New Delhi.14


New Delhi’s concerns 


New Delhi was extremely concerned about these developments. It was worried about the welfare of the Indian ethnic population in Mauritius under a Berenger government that may favour the Creole and Muslim minorities and potentially provoke a refugee exodus by Hindus.15 Over the previous decades, there had been considerable official discrimination against the Indian minority communities throughout the Indian Ocean region – at the hands of whites in South Africa, black Africans in East Africa and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. In 1972, the entire Indian community had been expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin. In mid 1983, rising communal tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka would explode into pogroms and civil war. Official discrimination against Indians also existed elsewhere in the world, even where Indian community represented a majority or near majority of the population. In Guyana, the majority Indian ethnic community had been excluded from power since independence. In Fiji, constitutional restrictions had been introduced to prevent the majority Indian ethnic community from exercising political control. While India had previously left its diasporic communities to their own fates, by the early 1980s the protection of Indian ethnic communities outside of India had become a factor in New Delhi’s calculations.16


Of probably greater significance were New Delhi’s concerns about the drift of Mauritius out of India’s sphere of influence and the possible loss of Mauritius as the only unquestioning supporter of India’s foreign policy in the Indian Ocean. In particular, New Delhi was concerned about Mauritius’ links with Libya and the Soviet Union, which had been funding the MMM prior to the 1982 election. 17 After the election, Mikhail Orlov, the Soviet Ambassador to the Seychelles, had met secretly with Berenger to offer Soviet assistance in reorganising Mauritian internal security services and they later offered to supply patrol boats to the Mauritius Coast Guard. 18 Jugnauth ruffled feathers in New Delhi by making his first official overseas visit to Libya rather than India. Jugnauth also visited Moscow where he was told that Soviet assistance would be conditioned economic assistance on Mauritius moving towards a socialist system.19 


There were even greater concerns about a government led by Berenger. His French ancestry and his attempts to undermine the power of Hindu communal groups would not have helped create the view that he would be a reliable supporter of India. Although New Delhi saw many benefits from its relationship with the Soviet Union, including its role as a supplier of defence equipment and its strategic role in balancing against China, India remained jealous of its relationships in the region and would have seen a drift of Mauritius into the Soviet orbit, particularly under white leadership, in negative terms. Mrs Gandhi may well have seen the crisis as an opportunity to consolidate India’s political role in Mauritius. This was part of a broader strategy then being followed by New Delhi in asserting and expanding its influence throughout the Indian Ocean region, from Sri Lanka, to Maldives, the Seychelles, Southern Africa and even the Antarctic.20 


The United States also supported the status-quoist Jugnauth against the socialist Berenger. The US was particularly worried that a Berenger government might allow the Soviet Navy access to Port Louis and would also aggressively prosecute Mauritius’ claims over Diego Garcia. General Vernon Walters, the legendary Deputy Director of the CIA, took a close interest in Mauritius, cultivating personal links with Harish Boodhoo and other Hindu leaders.21 While the US was working to undermine Berenger during this period, it is not clear whether the US and India actively coordinated their activities in Mauritius. However, Mauritius’ later move towards a broadly pro-Western foreign policy under a new Jugnauthled government (which will be discussed below) certainly suggests that there may have been considerable US involvement in the crisis


Plans for Indian military intervention: Operation Lal Dora 


As the Mauritian political crisis deepened in mid-March 1983, Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Army and Navy to prepare to intervene against a possible coup against the Jugnauth government. Despite Mrs Gandhi’s earlier promise to Jugnauth, Mauritius was well beyond the airlift capabilities of the Indian air force. Instead, the intervention plan, named Operation Lal Dora 22, involved the landing in Port Louis of two battalions from the 54th Infantry Division, the Indian Army’s designated rapid reaction unit based in Hyderabad.


 The plan unfolded in a way that was typical of the lack of coordination between the Indian Army and Navy at that time. An advance battalion of 54th Division troops arrived unexpectedly at the Indian Naval dockyard in Mumbai after a 30 hour journey from Hyderabad with orders to board Western fleet ships. Remarkably, the Navy’s Western Command in Mumbai, which had commenced planning for the operation, had not been informed of the Army movement and many crew were on shore leave. The troops initially attempted to virtually force their way onto INS Mysore, which was the largest warship berthed alongside, but were stopped by the Operations team of the Western Naval Command and staff of the Western Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral K K Mukherjee.23 After negotiations between the Army and Navy, the troops were sent to camp at the sprawling Colaba Army base to await orders while some of the Army’s equipment was loaded on the INS Mysore, and fuel, victuals and medical supplies were ordered for the amphibious task force.


Indian Naval officers then set to planning the naval operation. Having studied the recent UK operation in the Falklands less than a year previously, they believed that the Navy could transport the troops from its main western naval base in Mumbai to Mauritius with two days preparation, followed by around five days sailing time. The Navy then had no specialised amphibious lift capability in the Western Fleet, but the troops were to be transported on warships. The naval task force was to include:


                     • one or two modern Rajput class guided missile                              destroyers (INS Rajput and/or INS Rana),                                       carrying KA-28 Helix helicopters;

                    • three or four Leander class destroyers carrying                            Alouette helicopters, as well as MK42C Sea Kings                         for slithering operations;

                     • a Deepak class naval tanker, carrying one                                     helicopter;


                      • one or two modern Rajput class guided missile                              destroyers (INS Rajput and/or INS Rana),                                          carrying KA-28 Helix helicopters;

                     • three or four Leander class destroyers carrying                             Alouette helicopters, as well as MK42C  Sea Kings                          for slithering operations;

                     • a Deepak class naval tanker, carrying one                                     helicopter;

                     • a survey and training ship.24

Notably, the naval task force would have no fixed-wing air support. India’s sole aircraft carrier at that time, INS Vikrant, was then in the process of being refitted for new Sea Harrier aircraft and was not available. Despite the crucial role that fixed wing aircraft had played in the Falklands campaign, the lack of air support was apparently of little concern to the Indian Navy given that Mauritius had no air force.


Disagreements in the War Room


While preparations were being made in Mumbai, senior military and intelligence officers met with Mrs Gandhi in the War Room in South Block to discuss the operation. Present at the meeting was Mrs Gandhi’s National Security Advisor, R N Kao, a former head of RAW. The Navy was represented by Admiral O S Dawson, Chief of Naval Staff. The Army was represented by Lieutenant General S K Sinha, who was then Vice Chief of Army. (The Chief of Army, General Krishna Rao, was then on tour in Vietnam and Sinha was preparing to take over from Rao several months later). Dawson was known to be close to Mrs Gandhi and her family since his younger days when he was ADC to the Indian President and would receive Mrs Gandhi’s children at the President’s pool. But Sinha had a more difficult relationship with her.25 


It became apparent that the Indian Army and Navy had quite different views about the operation. There were considerable disagreements between Army and Navy over command and control of the amphibious task force. The naval task force was to be commanded by Vice Admiral Nayyar. Admiral Dawson argued that the Navy should be in overall command of operation, while General Sinha argued for overall command. Mrs Gandhi suggested that Navy would be force commander at sea but the Army would assume command of the task force once the landings took place (an arrangement which Navy was not at all happy with).26


Other than the question of command, the Navy was confident of its ability to execute the operation, even at a distance of some 4,600 km from its fleet base in Mumbai. The Indian Navy believed that it had the capability to conduct operations at long distance, and had become confident in its capabilities to refuel and replenish at sea. The Navy was also familiar with Port Louis, having accumulated intelligence reports and photographs etc from numerous ship visits over the years and from the Indian naval officers stationed there. The Navy was not overly concerned about landing the troops. It was believed that troops could be properly briefed at sea for alongside landings and disembarkation. The Navy did not believe that troops would need to be landed on beaches, but expected that troops could be landed at Port Louis docks without opposition, or at worst a semi-opposed landing at the docks. The Mauritian Coast Guard (commanded by an Indian naval officer) could also provide assistance if necessary. Nayyar however requested Rules of Engagement in the event of US intervention, no doubt remembering the Navy’s experience in 1971 when it had been given no Rules of Engagement in relation to the USS Enterprise.


However, General Sinha told Mrs Gandhi that he did not have confidence in the planned operation.27 Apart from the question of command, Sinha had major concerns about the army’s ability to conduct an amphibious operation of this nature and about the possibility of US intervention. Sinha believed that his troops were inadequately trained for amphibious operations. The Army’s previous experience at an opposed amphibious landing had been disastrous. In the closing days of the 1971 Bangladesh War, in Operation Beaver, a force of Gurkhas had been landed near Cox’s Bazaar in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in an attempt to cut off an escape route of retreating Pakistani troops into Burma. The amphibious force had not been able to find the correct landing beach and several Gurkhas drowned when they were ordered to disembark with full equipment into deep water. The badly planned operation was widely regarded as a fiasco. Sinha, a Gurkha himself, was no doubt deeply aware of this. Sinha was also very concerned about the possibility of US intervention in the operation. The USS Enterprise was still fresh in the minds of Indian military leadership, as was the presence of US forces at Diego Garcia. Some have called a preoccupation among some Indian military strategists with US intervention the “Enterprise Syndrome.”

There is reason to believe that Sinha may have been sufficiently concerned about the possibility of US intervention to take the initiative of personally consulting with US representatives about Washington’s views on the Mauritian political crisis. (In this regard, it is worth noting that the Indian armed forces are notoriously kept compartmentalized from both intelligence analysis and political decision-making in New Delhi.) According to B.Raman, a former head of the counter-terrorism division of RAW, the Indian intelligence   services later became aware that a “senior” Army officer leaked Jugnauth’s request for assistance and the details of the War Room meeting to the US Embassy in Delhi, which later “affected his chances of rising to the top.”28 Two months later, against longstanding tradition, Mrs Gandhi controversially ordered that Sinha be passed over in his expected promotion to Army Chief and he took early retirement from the Army. (Sinha then joined the opposition BJP party and subsequently served as Ambassador to Nepal and Governor of Kashmir.) If Raman is to be believed, Sinha was passed over because of leaks over the Mauritius operation, and not because of his opposition to an assault on Sikh militants in the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which was widely thought to be the reason.29


With the military commanders unable to agree on execution of the operation, Mrs Gandhi decided against the operation and Operation Lal Dora was put on hold. Equipment was unloaded and troops were returned to barracks. The most obvious reason was the Army’s distinct lack of enthusiasm for the operation. However, Mrs Gandhi was shrewd. It is also possible that she merely intended Indian preparations for the operation to act as a signal to relevant Mauritian leaders of India’s determination to support Jugnauth. 30  Word was spread in Port Louis that the Indian Navy was “surrounding” Mauritius.31

Political intervention and the 1983 elections


According to one account, in place of Operation Lal Dora, upon the suggestion of R N Kao, Mrs Gandhi decided to send N F Suntook, then head of RAW, to Port Louis to deal with the crisis at a political level.32 Suntook was due to retire at the end of March 1983 and he was  requested to delay his retirement by a couple of weeks. Suntook’s mission to Mauritius was never publicly disclosed. Indeed, his abrupt disappearance a few days prior to his scheduled retirement provoked somewhat bizarre accusations in the Indian media that he had defected to Washington.33


In Mauritius, Suntook was assisted by Prem Singh, the Indian High Commissioner, who was well known for his highly partisan support for Jugnauth.34 Singh was later accused of having played a virtual pro-consul role in Mauritian politics.35 Suntook and Singh worked with Harish Boodhoo and other Hindu and Muslim leaders to persuade them to swing their support behind Jugnauth, and it is likely that financial incentives were offered.36 Berenger claims that he knew nothing of Suntook’s role.37 The efforts of Jugnauth and his Indian backers to build a new Hindu coalition around Jugnauth were successful. On the day after Suntook returned to Delhi in April, Jugnauth announced the establishment of a new party called the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), which merged Boodhoo’s Parti Socialiste Mauricien with Hindu elements from the MMM. This new party, along with other opposition groups, had the numbers to form a new government in Parliament.


New elections were called for August 1983, which Jugnauth would win convincingly. The election campaign was divided on highly communalist basis and included threats of violence. Boodhoo claimed that a Libyan hit squad was in Mauritius to conduct assassinations.38 There was a purported assassination attempt on Boodhoo on the eve of the election, although some insiders have claimed that the incident had been organised by  Boodhoo himself.39 It is highly likely that the MSM received significant financial support from India during the campaign.40


The Aftermath


The events of 1983 consolidated India’s already extensive influence in Mauritius. Since that time all major political leaders have publicly acknowledged India’s special role in Mauritius’ security. After the 1983 election, Jugnauth requested the appointment of Major General J N Taimini, the Indian Army’s chief liaison officer with RAW, as the Mauritian National Security Advisor. Tamini occupied that post for more than a decade, to be followed since that time by other Indian appointees with connections to RAW.  

Mauritius also took a distinctly pro-Western turn in foreign policy. The new Deputy Prime Minister Gaetan Duval, who represented the old guard of pro-Western leaders, took charge of foreign policy, stating that Mauritius considered itself “a staunch ally of the West.”41 Jugnauth refused to receive the Soviet Ambassador, Nicolai Pankov, who was thereupon recalled to Moscow. The Libyan diplomatic mission was expelled after refusing to cease its non-diplomatic activities in providing financial assistance to the Muslim community. Jugnauth backpedalled on Berenger’s previous strident stance on Diego Garcia, reportedly stating that “we have to accept the base is there.”42 Mauritius continued its formal claim to sovereignty over Diego Garcia, but dropped demands for closure of the base and any appeal to the International Court of Justice. Jugnauth also lifted the embargo on the supply of labour to the US base that had been imposed by his previous government. Relations with  South Africa also improved. Duval was known to be particularly close to South Africa and was a frequent visitor there. Jugnauth stated that Mauritius would be “realistic” in its relations with Pretoria even though it was opposed to apartheid.43 Pretoria was allowed to open a diplomatic presence in the form of a trade office.


The Mauritian crisis also presaged India playing a much more active role throughout the Indian Ocean, particularly after Rajiv Gandhi assumed office in 1984. As Admiral RH Tahiliani (who in 1984 took over from Admiral Dawson as Chief of Naval Staff) commented: “We must take the responsibility that size imposes on us, without having any hegemonistic aspirations. Coming to the help of a small neighbour is a responsibility, but we have no intention of spreading our sphere of influence.”44 In 1986, the Indian Navy secretly intervened used one of its frigates, the INS Vindhyagiri, in the Seychelles to head off one of several attempted coups (Operation Flowers Are Blooming).45 In July 1987, Rajiv Gandhi sent peacekeeping forces in the Sri Lanka in an attempt to enforce a negotiated solution to civil war (Operation Pawan). In November 1988, following a request by the Maldivian President, India flew a battalion of paratroops to the Maldives, making a daring landing at Malé airport to avert an attempted coup by Tamil mercenaries (Operation Cactus). India’s unprecedented level of activity in the Indian Ocean only ended after the humiliating withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka in 1990. Rajiv Gandhi was subsequently assassinated by Tamil extremists in May 1991 in retribution for his role in the operation. India found that foreign interventions can sometimes carry a significant cost. 


Lessons from Operation Lal Dora

In some ways the story of Operation Lal Dora is merely an interesting footnote to the Cold War – when jostling between the West and the Soviet bloc in the Indian Ocean threatened India’s role in the region. However, the story also has broader significance in a number of respects and particularly in light of Washington’s hopes that India will take a broader security role in the Indian Ocean.  

First, the events of 1983 were a turning point in the close security relationship between India and Mauritius, which continues and has in fact strengthened since then. India has effectively become Mauritius’ security guarantor and Mauritius has “willingly subordinated” itself to India in strategic matters. Mauritius now provides an anchor for India’s growing sphere of influence in the southwest Indian Ocean.46


Second, Operation Lal Dora demonstrated the willingness of India during the 1980s to conduct foreign military interventions. In some respects, India was much more of a “normal” state – in terms of its willingness to project military power - than the nonaligned rhetoric of the times would suggest.


 Third, these events demonstrate how Indian and US interests were often aligned, even in the depths of the Cold War - again, despite New Delhi’s rhetoric. India’s interests in maintaining its influence in Mauritius transcended its relationship with the Soviet Union. There seems to have been an interesting, if limited, commonality of interests between India and the United States over Mauritius. New Delhi appears to have considered that its  primary long-term interest in Mauritius lay in supporting the Jugnauth government with the intention of maintaining the dominant position of the Hindu community in Mauritian politics. US interests appear to have been served by supporting a relatively conservative Jugnauth government which could be persuaded to reject Soviet and Libyan influence and adopt a more Western-oriented foreign policy. It is unclear whether or not this was the outcome of a specific understanding between New Delhi and Washington. An implicit alignment of Indian and US strategic interests in the Indian Ocean would be seen in several other instances during the 1980s, predating the public development of strategic links during the 1990s.


Fourth, the story of Operation Lal Dora illustrates the lack of jointedness, failures in operational coordination and lack of communication between services that have long plagued the Indian armed forces. The operation involved little or no joint planning and issues of command remained unresolved. Some steps have been taken to address these problems, including the establishment of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2002, although there are questions about its effectiveness. Despite calls for many years, there is still no Chief of Defence Staff as a single point advisor to the government. Coordination between India’s armed forces is still seen by many to be woefully inadequate compared with other major powers. A lack of coordination in joint operations could have a significant impact on India’s credibility as a major power. This is likely to be a major issue for India in coming years as demands for it to conduct combined force operations grows.


Finally, the story sheds light on India’s military capabilities. Although the Navy was confident in its abilities to successfully conduct the operation, it had to make do without proper amphibious capabilities. Troops were to be transported aboard warships and the fleet logistics train was extremely thin. No fixed wing air cover was available. In contrast, the Army had little confidence in its abilities to conduct the operation. There have been considerable attempts to address these weaknesses. Over the last decade or so the Navy has further developed its amphibious capabilities through the acquisition of the amphibious dock ship, INS Jalashwa and other landing craft. The Indian Navy is in the process of procuring up to four large multi-role support vessels and is establishing an amphibious warfare school at Kakinada on India’s east coast. In 2011, it was announced that the 54th Infantry Division (which was to play a role in Operation Lal Dora) had been designated as a Reorganised Amphibious Formation. The Navy, which demonstrated its amphibious capabilities in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives as part of the 2004 Tsunami relief efforts, is eager to learn from the experience of the United States and others in amphibious operations through bilateral exercises. As India stretches its sea legs in the Indian Ocean and beyond into the Pacific, the need for these capabilities is only likely to grow. 

 



NOTES:-


 1 Report from US Embassy Port Louis to US Secretary of State, “Mauritius Denies Plan To Cede Agalega Islands To India, But Issue Shows Mauritian Subordination”, 15 December 2006, published in The Hindu, 2 April 2011.


 2 The Mauritius Times, 23 June 1978, quoted in P.K.S.Namboodiri, JP Anand and Sreedhar, Intervention in the Indian Ocean, (Delhi: ABC Publishing, 1982), p.260.


3 Which included US approval for India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Maldives in 1988.


 4 During the Indian General Elections in 1977, Indira Gandhi reportedly kept an aircraft on standby at Sarsawa Air Force Base ready to fly her to Mauritius in case her life was endangered. Dilip Bobb, ‘Blunting the Edge,’India Today, 1 September 1980, p.85.


 5 Ajay Dubey, Government and Politics in Mauritius (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1997), p.147. 


6 Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Interview with co-author, 12 May 2012. 


7 Some have claimed that Indian Congress Party leaders had a personal interest in the treaty and the ability to move Indian money offshore. The treaty has recently become a matter of controversy with claims that Mauritius is being used by wealthy Indians to avoid tax and launder money of questionable origin. Attempts by the Indian government to close down the “round tripping” of Indian money is now the subject of tensions with Mauritius.


 8 Kevin Shillington, Jugnauth: Prime Minister of Mauritius (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.114.


 9 Jean Houbert, “Mauritius: Politics and Pluralism at the Periphery” Annuaire des Pays de l’Ocean Indien, Vol 9 (1982/83), pp.225-65.

 10 Satteeanund Peerthum. Co-author interview, 9 May 2012. 

11 S.Peerthum, “L’ingérence néocolonialiste,” in L’Express, “Portrait d’une nation”, 12 March 1998, p.56. 

12 Patrick Eisenlohr, Creole Island or Little India? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p.59. 

13 Malenn D. Oodiah, Mouvement Militant Mauricien: 20 ans d’histoire (1969-1989) (Port Louis, s.n.: 1989), p.146; Times of India, 17 May 1983. 


14 Oodiah, Mouvement Militant Mauricien, p.146. 


15 Selig Harrison, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, p.263.


 16 Most obviously in India’s 1987 intervention in Sri Lanka, but also in India’s response to political developments in Fiji.

 17 Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Interview with co-author, 12 May 2012. At the same time, the CIA had been supporting the Rangaloom government. This came to light in July 1981, when a White House official mistakenly leaked to the press that the United States was seeking to counter Libyan influence in Mauritania. When the Mauritanian government publicly demanded an explanation, the US State Department was left to deny its involvement in Mauritania by explaining that in fact it was supporting the Mauritian government against Libyan influence. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p.159. 


18 Peerthum, “L’ingérence néocolonialiste”, p.56 and Interview with co-author, 9 May 2012. 


19 Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Interview with co-author, 12 May 2012.

 20 India was staging Antarctic expeditions through Mauritius and in March 1983, an Indian Antarctic team was in Port Louis.

 21 Boodhoo met with Walters both in Mauritius and Washington D.C.

 22 Lal Dora means “red thread” in Hindi. It is commonly used in the Hindu puja ritual and other Hindu rituals and invokes the blessings of the Hindu gods. 

23 Confidential interviews with former senior Indian naval officers. 

24 INS Mysore, an ageing Fiji class cruiser built in 1939 and acquired from the Royal Navy in 1957, was deemed non-operational by planners. 


25 Among other things, Sinha’s father, M K Sinha, had been a political opponent of Mrs Gandhi. 


26 The British experience of commanding the Falklands operations in 1982 is often held up as a model of command of amphibious operations conducted far from home. The overall command of the Falklands operation was held by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse who operated from task force headquarters at Northwood, England. Command of all forces within the operational zone around the Falklands Islands initially fell to Rear Admiral John Woodward. As landing operations started at San Carlos, Commodore Michael Clapp, Commander, Amphibious Warfare Forces, took command of landing forces and reported directly to Admiral Fieldhouse at Northwood. Once established on shore, all land operations fell under the command of the Commander, Land Forces who also reported directly to Admiral Fieldhouse at Northwood. 

27 Lt General S K Sinha. Interview with co-author, February 2012. 

28 B.Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane (New Delhi: Lancer, 2007), p. 120. Although Raman does not name Sinha, there is little doubt as to who he is referring. 

29 Shortly after these events, Mrs Gandhi requested Sinha to begin planning an assault against Sikh militants in the Golden Temple in Amritsar - which was subsequently implemented in the highly controversial Operation Bluestar in 1984. However, Sinha strongly advised Mrs Gandhi against such a course of action, fearing (correctly) for its impact on Army morale.


 30 A tactic that Mrs Gandhi was to use the following year in ordering planning for a full scale military intervention in Sri Lanka – to be called Operation Buster .


 31 Prem Singh. Interview with co-author, May 2012. 


32 Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW, p. 119. 


33 The Indian Home Minister, P.C.Sethi, was forced to deny these allegations in parliament. V.Balachandran, “The day media turned a patriot into a traitor,” Sunday Guardian, 19 September 2010.

 34 According, to Kishan S. Rana, who was a later Indian High Commissioner to Mauritius. Kishan S. Rana, “Island Diplomacy”, Indian Express, 7 June 2003; and Kishan S. Rana, The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.74. 


35 Selig Harrison, “India, U.S. and Superpower rivalry” in Selig Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, p.262. Singh was recalled in 1986 following allegations of interference in Mauritian politics. 


36 Peerthum, “L’ingérence néocolonialiste”. 


37 Paul Berenger. Interview with co-author, May 2012. 


38 Colin Legum, Africa contemporary record: annual survey and documents: Volume 13, (New York: Africana Publishing, 1983), Page B231 


39 Oodiah, Mouvement Militant Mauricien, p.153. 


40 Confidential interviews with Mauritian political identities, May 2012. 


41 Legum, Africa contemporary record, p. B221. 


42 Times of India, 17 May 1983. 


43 “Mauritius: a change in direction?” The South African Institute of International Affairs, Brief Report No.53, December 1983.


44 Quoted in Raju G.C.Thomas, “The Sources of Indian Naval Expansion,” in Robert H.Bruce, The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean: Developments and Implications (Perth: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1989), pp.95-108. 

45 David Brewster and Ranjit Rai, “Flowers Are Blooming: the story of the India Navy’s secret operation in the Seychelles,” The Naval Review (2011), pp.58-62. 

46 See David Brewster, “An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?” Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 2010), pp. 1-20