Monday, February 5, 2024

Russo-Ukraine War - 2024

 SOURCE :

(   )  Russo-Ukraine War - 2024 :https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/russo-ukraine-2024.htm

(   ) Russo-Ukraine War - 2024:Russo-Ukrainian War - 04 February 2024 - Day 710 - https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/russo-ukraine-2024-maps.htm


                 Russo-Ukraine War - 2024

A number of claims and counterclaims are being made on the Ukraine-Russia conflict on the ground and online. While GlobalSecurity.org takes utmost care to accurately report this news story, we cannot independently verify the authenticity of all statements, photos and videos.

On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]


The United States continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. This includes Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative [USAI] and Ukraine Presidential Drawdown Replenishment. DoD Components provide estimations for valuing assets provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). Excess Defense Articles [EDA] are provided to partner nation at a reduced price (based on the condition of the equipment) or as a grant once the Military Departments identify excess equipment.

Two years after Russia decided to invade Ukraine, Putin's attempt to swiftly conquer Ukraine has clearly failed. But Russian invaders continue their assault on the front line in Ukraine's east and south. Putin's forces continue to target innocent civilians across Ukraine with missiles and drones. But the more Putin tries to impose his imperial vision through violence and aggression, the more Ukraine resists and the more Ukraine's allies and partners come together. The Kremlin has isolated itself. It is left to seek weapons from ally -- from the likes of Iran and North Korea. Failure to counter Putin's war of choice will mean aggressors and autocrats worldwide will be emboldened.

"We have heard reports from the Ukrainian government that they have concerns -- from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and general staff that they are concerned that they believe that units are not -- do not have the stocks and the stores of ammunition that they require, and that is one of the reasons we have been focusing on the need to answer Congress's questions so that they are able to move forward on a decision to pass the supplemental." Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said 24 January 2024.

Wallander said "we are able to provide ammunition and interceptors that were contracted for in 2022 and 2023 under USAI, but those levels are not -- are not at the same level when we were able to provide on a regular basis ammunition and interceptors and other capabilities funded both by PDA and by USAI. So without USAI, we're not able to sustain the same levels of provision of capability to Ukraine."

The Biden administration and House Republicans failed to reach a funding deal that would have included an additional $60 billion in security assistance for Ukraine's military effort. In an interview 16 January 2024 with ABC News, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba said that this money would potentially allow Ukraine to avoid a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, in which American troops would be forced to intervene. "Even if we run out of weapons, we will fight with shovels. Because the existence of this nation is at stake for Ukraine," he told ABC News during an interview in Kyiv.


The "prospects for passing any deal on immigration policy and Ukraine aid in the Republican-led House are near zero... House Speaker Mike Johnson, who is beholden to his right wing and to former president Donald Trump.... in a leaked call with GOP members, Johnson went further, saying he wouldn’t accept any Senate deal and that he doesn’t think the border issue can be solved until a Republican becomes president.... Johnson has no political motivation to move against his right wing and defy Trump to support a Senate compromise. Why give President Biden a win on the border going into the general election? Setting extremist standards for immigration reform was part of MAGA’s plan to kill both efforts all along." wrote Josh Rogin in The Washington Post 19 January 2024.

Despite the huge American and Western aid amounting to more than $100 billion during 2023, its counterattack - which was much promoted - ended in great disappointment after Russia repelled it, and the Ukrainian army did not succeed in regaining the territory controlled by Moscow, which is estimated at a fifth of Ukrainian territory. If Kiev receives a large boost of US aid in 2024, as President Biden hoped, it may still have to consolidate its power and absorb the relentless Russian attacks.

The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center noted that Russia commenced 2024 with the biggest air and drone strikes since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, attacking civilians and infrastructure in cities including Kyiv and Kharkiv, as ammunition for Western-provided air defense ran out and debates continued in Washington on whether to provide more. With deflated expectations on territorial progress by Ukraine, and attention shifted to the Israel-Hamas war, international media has largely deemed the ongoing counter-offensive a failure and the war on Ukraine a stalemate.

However, contrary the expectations of pessimists, Ukrainian strikes into the Black Sea and the Russian navy headquarters in Sevastopol crippled Russian naval efforts in the region and broken the long-standing blockade on Ukrainian trade. As recently as late December 2023, Ukrainian drone and missile strikes hit and destroyed key Russian warships and landing craft in occupied Crimea. Additionally, the Ukrainian military continued to repel Russian forces in cities in the east and south, inflicting possibly unsustainable manpower and equipment attrition on the Russian military.

The dubious framing of the war as a stalemate had become an argument against further Western support for Ukraine and led some to push for negotiations with the Kremlin. Such narratives discount the substantial successes Ukraine enjoyed in the Black Sea and ignored the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin had shown no real indication of moving away from his maximalist war aims for conquest of Ukraine and imposition of a New Europe. Nor had Putin shown the political will to conscript the army needed to realize such ambitions.

The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center proposed the key quesitns for the new year - What does Ukraine need to succeed in 2024? How did the media narrative of the failed counteroffensive form, and how can Ukraine’s Western allies best maintain international support for continued aid? What is the true danger of accommodating a continuously aggressive Kremlin?

Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba stated 25 January 2024 that the gross domestic product of Ukraine and its allies is 21 times higher than that of Russia and its allies. The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported this in an interview with Foreign Affairs. "If you take the states that militarily support Ukraine and those that militarily support Russia, the combined GDP of our state and allies is 21 times greater than that of the Russian "coalition," Kuleba said. The minister emphasized that, "according to this, the world has enough resources for Ukraine's victory even in a war of attrition."

Kuleba emphasized that even when analyzing the ability to create coalitions, Ukraine exceeds the capabilities of the Russian Federation in this regard. "And it's funny, because Ukraine is not a member of the G7, and yet the G7 is much more united in helping Ukraine protect its interests. Russia is one of the founders of BRICS, but BRICS is much less supportive of the Russian Federation, even though it is supposedly a member of their families," said the minister.


Saturday, February 3, 2024

ON THE MODERN DESIGN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR: IN THE FIGHT FOR THE INITIATIVE

SOURCE :

 (  )  ON THE MODERN DESIGN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR: IN THE FIGHT FOR THE INITIATIVE:   https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400154/ukraine-valerii-zaluzhnyi-essay-design-of-war.pdf

(   ) Technology, Complexity, Uncertainty, and Deterrence:  https://sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/technology-complexity-uncertainty-and-deterrence

(   ) Technology, Complexity, Uncertainty, and Deterrence:    https://mediahost.sais-jhu.edu/saismedia/media/web/files/kissinger/technology-complexity-uncertainty-deterrence.pdf

(   ) Exclusive: Ukraine must adapt to a reduction in Western military aid, embattled army chief says:  https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/01/europe/zaluzhnyi-ukraine-russia-war-analysis-intl/index.html

(   ) The principles of operational art :  https://www.google.com/search?q=The+principles+of+operational+art&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#ip=1

(   )  Learnings from the Ukraine battlefield for armed forces: https://www.orfonline.org/research/learnings-from-the-ukraine-battlefield-for-armed-forces


ON THE MODERN DESIGN OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR: IN THE FIGHT FOR THE INITIATIVE

                                                                                By    

            Ukraine’s popular army chief Valery Zaluzhny 


The news about Zaluzhny comes as Russia's invasion of Ukraine is set to enter its third year. [ 
Zelensky set to announce dismissal of Ukraine’s top commander within days as rift grows over war, source says  : https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/31/europe/zaluzhny-oust-ukraine-army-zelensky-intl ]


Almost eighty years separate us from the last battles of World War II, which became the basis of the strategic vision of the wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

 Despite the rapid development of weapons and equipment, namely: aviation, missiles and space assets, the development of communications and electronic warfare, the victory strategy was to destroy the enemy and capture or liberate the territory. At the same time, the forms and methods by which this was achieved directly depended on the level of development and the number of weapons used. 

Of course, knowledge of the basics of strategy, operational art, tactics should accompany the career growth of military specialists and serve to solve two main tasks

The first one is probably secondary. It consists in training of the commander directly for the upcoming war with the task of predicting the situation of war that will be at the beginning of hostilities. It is such a super-difficult task in the event of a solution that allows you to rise to an occasion and give a worthy rebuff to the enemy, bleed his strike forces and thereby buy time to seize the initiative. This whole process involves huge risks and doubts, which are due to the presence of only one chance to give decent resistance to smaller forces with limited resources

The second task, in my opinion, is the main one – to find out in time the requirements put forward by the war related to the development of technological progress, and, as a result, the rapid development of weapons and equipment, the political situation both in the world and in the state itself, the economic situation, etc. And, therefore, for each war it is necessary to find only its own unique strategy and logic, which will allow in new conditions to find the way to the Victory

Speaking of our own particular strategy, we can in no way reject fully existing doctrines that describe the process of preparing and conducting operations. We just have to realize that they will be constantly changing and filled with new content. 

The principles of operational art will remain unchanged. [  https://www.google.com/search?q=The+principles+of+operational+art&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#ip=1 ]

Therefore, taking into account the requirements of today, our most important task will be to adopt a new point of view on the forms and methods of using the Defence Forces to achieve the Victory

The main reason for the change in the strategy, forms and methods of employment of forces, of course, is the development of weapons and equipment, especially unmanned systems, the use of which has become widespread and allows to perform a wide range of tasks, which is constantly growing. Therefore, unmanned systems, along with other advanced types of weapons, are almost the only tool for withdrawing from military operations of a positional form, which are not beneficial in terms of time for Ukraine for a set of reasons.

At the same time, in the current situation, there are still a number of factors that undoubtedly influence the decision to search for new forms of employment of defence forces. Here some of them:

  •       unstable political situation around Ukraine, which leads to a reduction in military support;
  •       exhaustion of our partners' stocks of missiles and ammunition for artillery and air defence due to the high intensity of hostilities in Ukraine and the impossibility of their rapid production against the background of the global shortage of propellant charges;
  •       insufficient effectiveness of the sanctions policy, resulting in the deployment of the capacities of the military-industrial complex in russia and its partner states, which allows at least successfully waging a positional war of attrition;
  •      a significant advantage in the mobilization of human resources of the enemy and the inability of state institutions in Ukraine to improve the state of manning of the Defence Forces without a use of unpopular measures;
  •        ''imperfection of the regulatory framework governing the military-industrial complex in our country, and partial monopolization of this industry lead to difficulties in the production of domestic ammunition, as a result - the deepening of Ukraine's dependence on the supply of allies;  https://sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/technology-complexity-uncertainty-and-deterrence ] https://mediahost.sais-jhu.edu/saismedia/media/web/files/kissinger/technology-complexity-uncertainty-deterrence.pdf ]
  •      uncertainty of the further nature of the armed struggle of such a scale as a consequence of the complexity for our allies in determining the priorities of support;

The experience of combat operations by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, especially in 2022-2023, is unique, and still remains only our heritage, and therefore, constantly looking for a way to the Victory, obliges us to constantly conduct an audit of existing capabilities, on which the result of combat operations depends and look for ways to gain an advantage over the enemy. Moreover, using the concept of the result of hostilities, we understand the conditions under which the enemy will refuse further aggression, and it is the creation of such conditions that is perceived as an effective use of the capabilities that are available in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In view of the mentioned above, as well as in accordance with the conditions of war today, perhaps the main option for gaining an advantage is to master the entire arsenal of relatively cheap, modern and extremely effective assets that are rapidly developing. It is the attempt to take advantage of the progress in the development of new technologies that will allow to win the scientific, technical, technological and tactical battle and will lead not only to the unconditional Victory, but also to savings and conservation of resources both by Ukraine and our partners

The need to significantly increase the capabilities of unmanned systems and other advanced technological systems, to positively influence the course of hostilities, as a consequence, encourages the search for new forms and methods of use, which, in turn, will certainly affect the structure of both the Armed Forces and other components of the Defence Forces of Ukraine. It is possible to increase the impact of the UAS and other newest systems on the effectiveness of combat operations due to:    

  •       continuous improvement of situational awareness of commanders and the possibility of maintaining it in real time in the area of the operation both day and night, in all weather conditions;
  •      round-the-clock maintenance of fires and strikes in real time;
  •       providing intelligence for the strikes in real time;
  •       inflicting accurate and high-precision strikes against the enemy and its targets both at the forward edge of the battle area and in depth.
Consequently, it is necessary to create a new design of operations based on existing technological capabilities, which will be based not only on the spatial and temporal indicators of military (combat) operations, but also mainly on the creation of decisive conditions and the achievement of appropriate effects that will contribute to the realization of the purpose of the operation.
 
Based on the experience of combat operations and the forecast of the development of armed struggle, such decisive conditions are the following:
  •        achieving absolute superiority in the air, especially at altitudes that provide effective fire engagement, ISR, and logistics; https://www.google.com/search?q=depriving+the+enemy+of+the+ability+to+conduct+offensive+or+defensive+operations%3B&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 ]
  •        depriving the enemy of the ability to conduct offensive or defensive operations; [ https://www.moore.army.mil/mssp/PDF/adp3_90.pdf ]
  •        increasing the mobility of own troops and completely limiting the mobility of enemy troops; https://www.google.com/search?q=increasing+the+mobility+of+own+troops+and+completely+limiting+the+mobility+of+enemy+troops%3B&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#ip=1 ]
  •        safe access to certain lines, taking control of important areas of the terrain;
  •       depriving the enemy of the ability to restore the lost position and bolster efforts.

At first glance, these are absolutely conservative and classical conditions, the achievement of which serves long-standing forms and methods. But this is only at first glance, since the means of achieving them have already changed, and the old assets, unfortunately, are increasingly a dream for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the ways of achieving them are changing first of all.

In accordance with the presented idea of сreating defining conditions, the process of achieving them, of course, will be ensured by solving a number of operational tasks, and during the solution of each operational task, the necessary effects will be created, due to the involved assets. And it is they who, at the expense of technological superiority, should act differing from the template and in accordance with at least the current doctrine

The creation of the necessary effects, no doubt, today already radically leads to changes in the system of employment. Thus, to implement the conditions for creating the necessary effects, today it is necessary to consider as separate the following:
  • digital field creation operation 
  • radio-electronic situation control operation;
  • combined attack operation of unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber assets; https://www.google.com/search?q=combined+attack+operation+of+unmanned+aerial+vehicles+and+cyber+assets&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 ]
  • logistic operation   [ https://www.google.com/search?q=logistic+operation&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 ]
All listed operations are already being mastered and developed. They are conducted according to a single concept and plan, coordinated and interrelated, but differ in content.

Regarding the conduct of direct operations to achieve effects, presumably in their content, they will essentially be defensive and offensive, but in terms of the method of execution they might be the following:
  • operation to reduce the economic capabilities of the enemy; [ https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/01/opinions/ukraine-army-chief-war-strategy-russia-valerii-zaluzhnyi/index.html ]
  •  operation of complete isolation and attrition; 
  • robotic search and strike operation; [ https://www.google.com/search?q=robotic+search+and+strike+operation%3B&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 ]
  •  robotic operation to control a crisis area; [ https://www.google.com/search?q=robotic+operation+to+control+a+crisis+area%3B&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#ip=1 ]
  •  psychological operation by attack assets; [ https://www.google.com/search?q=psychological+operation+by+attack+assets&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 ]
  • defensive technological contactless operation
This list of operations will grow steadily with the development of the assets themselves, and of course, will encourage changes in doctrinal documents and the formation of an entirely new philosophy of preparation and conduct of hostilities. The emergence of new independent operations or their combination leads to the neccesity to create a new table of organization . All this will be possible with a flexible and rapid response of state institutions to changes.

Thus, there are changes in the essence and content of classic defensive, offensive and stabilization operations, the approach to planning and conducting of which was usually linear and template-based. At the same time, these operations were combined in essence, including according to the views of partners. Along with this, the long-known concept of network-centric warfare in new conditions, due to high-tech assets of armed struggle, finds its interpretation not through the operations of troops, but through the creation of effects and the achievement of decisive conditions with the help of appropriate capabilities.

In addition, I would like to note that in addition to improving the effectiveness of combat operations, unmanned and other advanced technological systems are able to solve a number of key problems in the organization and conduct of combat operations of the Defense Forces of Ukraine:

  •        increase the degree of non-contact conduct of hostilities and, as a result, reduce the level of losses due to the possibility of remote control of these assets;
  •        reduce the degree of involvement of traditional weapons in combat missions; ensure the conduct of hostilities with limited use of heavy military equipment; 
  •       despite the lack of navy vessels, defeat both surface and submarine forces of the enemy and its coastal infrastructure to almost the entire depth of the theater at sea with high efficiency and minimal risk to personnel; 
  •       inflict massive sudden strikes against critical infrastructure facilities,
  •       important communications without the use of expensive in operation and production missiles and manned aircraft.
This list of advantages is incomplete and will undoubtedly change, expanding the range of effective employment. Of course, on the battlefield, the enemy will look for ways to protect and try to seize the initiative. Therefore, with the development of the capabilities of attack systems, including unmanned ones, it is extremely necessary to improve protection and counteraction systems. Thus, in order to master new forms and methods, the Defence Forces need to create a completely new state system of technological rearmament, which will include the following subsystems: 

  • development and scientific support; 
  • production and maintenance;
  •  training of personnel and generalization of combat experience;
  •  use of troops (forces);
  •  flexible financing;
  •  logistics.
Most likely, each of the subsystems will need separate research and development in the future, but now it is safe to say that the system should be holistic and at the same time flexible both to the entities that can be involved and to finance and change production.

Undoubtedly, all this will take time, but it is the time that is decisive.

Taking into account the already existing system of employment, the technical solutions found and the already established command and control system and the experience gained, as well as according to the views of partners in modern conditions, the creation of such a system with the required volume of production can take up to five months. This term is due to the need to create appropriate tables of organization and their manning and equipping, personnel training, resource support, creation of the necessary infrastructure, logistics and development of a doctrinal framework.

With this in mind, in 2024 we need to focus our main efforts on:

  • creation of a system for providing the Defence Forces with high-tech assets;
  •  introduction of a new philosophy of preparation and conduct of hostilities, taking into account restrictions; 
  • as a result, in the shortest possible time to master the new capabilities for the conduct of hostilities.
So, we are talking about the fact that in modern conditions, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, together with other components of the State Defence Forces, have capabilities that allow not only to destroy the enemy, but also ensure the existence of statehood itself. Therefore, it is extremely necessary to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the new conditions of war to maximize the accumulation of the latest combat capabilities, which will allow less resources to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, stop his aggression and protect Ukraine from it in the future.

Friday, January 12, 2024

Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’

 SOURCE : 

(   ) Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’ :  https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-grows-assertive-as-chinese-private-military-companies-come-out-of-the-shadows/#:~:text=The%20article%20suggested%20that%20Beijing,Russia%20and%20the%20United%20States.

(   )  China’s Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road :https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-private-army-protecting-the-new-silk-road/

(   )  The Rapidly Growing Market for Chinese Private Security Contractors in Africahttps://youtu.be/og1P4exF5lQ




(Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)


For more than a decade, China has been using its own private military companies (PMCs) to guard Chinese facilities abroad, preferring to use them rather than rely on protection from local firms or PMCs from other countries. On occasion, Beijing will employ PMCs to put pressure on governments in other countries (see EDM, March 25, 2021). Until now, it has always done so without much fanfare. Chinese officials typically deny that PMCs play a role greater than merely defending Chinese interests. Beijing often chooses to call these entities by various other names to hide their true nature (Window on Eurasia, August 25, 2022December 28, 2023). This approach has led Western analysts to stress the limited and defensive nature of Chinese PMCs in contrast to what they and others admit are the larger and more strategic actions of Russian and American PMCs (Voice of America, March 31, 2023; Sukhankin, “An Anatomy of the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry,” January 3, 2023). In the words of one Moscow commentator, Chinese PMCs have “come out of the shadows.” The analyst referred to a recent meeting in Beijing in December 2023 during which officials from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and officers of various Chinese security companies took part. Discussions during the event alluded to the broader role for these paramilitary forces in taking on a more assertive posture globally (Fondsk.ru, December 25, 2023).

The session in Beijing featured speakers who declared that China has no choice but to deploy even more PMCs around the world. They asserted that this is sorely needed as currently there are more than 47,000 Chinese companies employing 4.1 million people, including 1.6 million Chinese citizens, in some 190 countries. The meeting was followed by the publication of what can be described as a programmatic discussion of Chinese PMCs in the South China Morning Post (SCMP). The article suggested that Beijing plans to expand its use of PMCs to pursue broader political goals (SCMP, December 24, 2023). This public stance indicates that China feels that it can now use PMCs more openly due to the growth of Chinese power abroad and the declining influence of Russia and the United States. This, in turn, suggests that Chinese officials will deploy these entities more frequently and more broadly than in the past, allowing Beijing to defend its infrastructure on foreign soil and put additional political pressure on other countries.

These developments have attracted the attention of Central Asian countries that may become the targets of Beijing’s broader use of PMCs (Inbusiness.kz, December 25, 2023). Moscow is also keeping a close watch, as, in the past, it has seen Chinese PMCs as allies and helpmates. The Kremlin must now confront the very real possibility that these Chinese entities are becoming competitors or even active opponents to Russian PMCs (TASSKommersant, December 24, 2023;Vedomosti, December 25, 2023).

China’s recent activities and other powers’ reactions are the outgrowth of developments over the past five years. Mission creep on the part of Beijing has increasingly focused on protecting economic interests, leading those entities deployed to fulfill related objectives to become more involved in political issues. This has elevated the nervousness of outside powers regarding China’s increased willingness to flaunt its growing power.  (On the emergence of these trends, see China Brief, May 15, 2020).  The US reaction has been limited thus far. It will almost certainly intensify in the coming weeks, given rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan, US concerns that Chinese PMCs may threaten American partners, and a growing interest in seeing how Chinese assertiveness may undermine Beijing’s cooperation with Moscow.

Central Asia and Africa represent the two areas where the role of Chinese PMCs appears likely to expand most rapidly in the near term (Sukhankin, “Chinese PSCs: Achievements, Prospects, and Future Endeavors,” November 20, 2023). In these two regions, some governments are weak. Outside groups like PMCs can play a major role at minimal cost, permitting those behind them to maintain a veil of deniability. (On Chinese moves in Central Asia, see EDM, December 7, 2021, and Window on Eurasia, February 15, 2022; on similar moves by Beijing in Africa, see Sukhankin, “The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa,” January 10, 2020, and EDM, June 29, 2021.) As highlighted in the December meeting, given the breadth of Chinese involvement globally, Beijing may use its PMCs in similar ways elsewhere as well—wherever and whenever it senses weakness on the part of host governments or their Western supporters.

In the past, Russian observers expressed confidence that China would move cautiously in using PMCs for any broader political goals, though they were open to the idea that such Chinese actions might benefit Moscow by generating widespread chaos (Ia-centr.ru, March 25, 2021). Western specialists have followed in their wake, assuming that China will invariably take the longer-term view and not take risks when it has reason to believe that history is moving in its direction. This perspective contrasts sharply with Russia, whose leaders have become embroiled in numerous troubles due to overreach in places such as Afghanistan or Ukraine (Voice of America, March 31, 2023). Nevertheless, the words coming out of China regarding PMCs over the past month and Beijing’s actions on the ground suggest that China has decided to change course and that it has concluded now is an appropriate time to press forward and use PMCs in ways experts only a few years ago thought would happen in the distant future (Current Time TV, February 2, 2019).

If that proves to be the case, then Chinese PMCs with names few in the West even know may soon displace Russia’s Wagner Group as objects of primary geopolitical concern. The very public nature of Beijing’s actions suggests that this is highly likely. These entities may prove even more dangerous than Russian PMCs, especially because the rise and expanded use of Chinese PMCs has so often been downplayed until now.

Wednesday, January 10, 2024

Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation in the Red Sea: What’s at Stake?

 SOURCE : 

(    )Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation in the Red Sea: What’s at Stake?: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/houthi-attacks-and-military-escalation-in-the-red-sea-whats-at-stake/


 

Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation in the


 Red Sea: What’s at Stake?