Monday, January 25, 2016

OROP KRANTI : OROP CHALTA CHALTA RUKTA




                              OROP CHALTA CHALTA  RUKTA




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Anil Kaul posted in Indian Ex Servicemen Movement.
 
   
Anil Kaul
January 25 at 12:31pm
 
A meeting was held with MOS Finance Sh Jayant Sinha on 25 Jan 2016. This meeting was consequent to our Dharna at Sh Arun Jaitley's residence. Meeting was attended by 
1. Maj Gen Satbir Singh 
2. Lt Gen Balbir Singh 
3. Col Inderjit Singh 
4. Gp Capt VK Gandhi 
5. Wg Cdr CK Sharma 
6. Lt K Pandey 

Minister explained that he has discussed the anomalies with RM and MOD officials. He also informed that the issue is complex and would need more intense discussions with all concerned parties. He confirmed that Govt is serious to find solution to this vexed problem of OROP. Govt is keen to find solution at the earliest. Next meeting will be fixed with RM or FM soon. 
Gandhi














INDIAN SECURITY : HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT HONESTLY OR PERISH - THE BIG INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE

SOURCE:
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-military-india-defence-manohar-parrikar/





      INDIAN  GEO POLTICAL SECURITY : 
    HAVE POLITICAL WILL TO FACE IT                     SQUARELY & HONESTLY 
                                   OR
                               PERISH 
                             THE BIG 
    INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE





THE BIG  INDIAN MILITARY CHALLENGE


 


PM has a bold vision for defence reform. 


Can his Defence Minister deliver?




                                   BY

                   

                       Anit Mukherjee


     The writer is an assistant professor at the 


     S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies,

     Nanyang Technological University, Singapore




pathankot attack, indian army, india military, military in india, india news, modi, parrikar, narendra modi, manohar parrikar, editorials today


 Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Defence Minister 

                                    Manohar Parrikar




The terrorist attacks on Pathankot Air Force Base 

revealed weaknesses in our intelligence, police and 

security procedures. While all of them need to be 

addressed, however there are larger issues—which can 

have far more disastrous consequences for India’s 

national security, which need attention. This is the issue 

of defence reforms—initiated in the aftermath of the 

1999 Kargil war (which followed from a previous Lahore 

yatra by a BJP Prime Minister to meet Nawaz Sharif), 

virtually ignored by the two UPA governments and 

brought to life by the current government. Indeed, in an 

important speech, while addressing the Combined 

Commanders Conference last month Prime Minister 

Modi challenged his defence minister and senior 

military commanders to reform their “beliefs, doctrines, 

objectives and strategies.” This is nothing less than 

appealing for a paradigm shift, on a number of different 

fronts, echoing the sentiments of generations of military 

reformers. The Defence Minister, who has publicly 

supported defence reform, has his task cut out for him. 

Unfortunately he should not count on support from 

civilian bureaucrats in his Ministry. In turn, it is far from 

assured whether the current generation of senior 

military officers are up to this task. In short, while the 

prime minister’s vision is bold, its implementation faces 

formidable obstacles. The attacks in Pathankot should 

remind him—and his security managers, that India lives 

in a dangerous neighbourhood and it should therefore 

focus on strengthening our military.





It is an open secret that former Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh was keen to undertake some form of 

defence reforms. His office was the driving force behind

 the Naresh Chandra Committee, established in 2011, 

ostensibly to revisit the defence reforms process. This 

committee recommended the creation of a Permanent 

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee—a less than

perfect nomenclature for the Chief of Defence Staff. For 

the first time ever all three service chiefs supported 

creating such a post. However, Defence Minister A.K. 

Anthony, for reasons not entirely clear, was not that 

enthusiastic. Civilian bureaucrats in his ministry also 

shared his scepticism. Later, numerous controversies 

surrounding General V.K. Singh put paid to any talk of 

defence reforms.




Prime Minister Modi identified six broad areas for 

reforms—in defence planning, enhancing jointness (the 

ability of the army, navy and air force to operate 

together), urging manpower rationalization (smaller 

tooth to tail ratio), emphasizing professional military 

education, restructuring higher defence management 

and in the defence procurement process. His analysis of 

problems in each of these sectors challenged the 

assumptions, and world-view, of India’s senior military 

commanders. For instance, India is probably the only 

country in the world which is expanding its military 

manpower which, by definition, curtails resources for 

military modernization (China recently announced cuts 

of up to 300,000 troops). The Indian military is among 

the least ‘joint’ major militaries in the world and its 

system of professional military education emphasizes 

training over education. However, like with so many of 

the prime minister’s project, the most important issue is 

that of implementation. If this initiative is left to the 

bureaucracies—civilian or military, then reforms are 

unlikely to succeed.





Conventional wisdom would have the government 

announcing reform measures and leaving it to the 

military and the defence ministry to implement them. 

Doing so will likely subvert the reforms, as has 

happened in the past. In 1986, Arun Singh was 

instrumental in creating a tri-services and joint civil-

military institution called the Defence Planning Staff 

(DPS) in an attempt to rationalise defence planning. It 

quickly lost its relevance as the services opposed this 

initiative. More recently, the Ajai Vikram Singh 

Committee was tasked to find way to lower the age of 

combatant commanders. However, the implementation 

of the committee report was left to the services. In the 

army this created a major controversy—which is 

currently being battled in the courts. The Andaman and 

Nicobar Joint Command, which was founded to be an 

experiment in jointness has, in practice, been 

“subverted” by a non-cooperative attitude from the 

services. Finally, there is a variance between the report 

submitted by the late K. Subrahmanyam (under the 

aegis of the Committee on National Defence University) 

on India’s Defence University and how it is currently 

being implemented by the military. In sum, reforms will 

not succeed if its implementation is not closely 

monitored.




There are three significant obstacles to defence

 reforms. First, it is not clear if, and how, will the Chiefs 

of the three services give up powers for the proposed 

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). If the restructuring of 

higher defence management results in an institutionally 

weak CDS then it defeats the purpose. Second, it is not 

clear how the government will create more joint 

commands, especially since this is opposed by the 

military. Their opposition, shorn of its elegance, is 

primarily because it curtails the number of posts 

available for their upward mobility. It is not surprising 

therefore that they will advocate for more joint 

commands—Cyber, Space, Special Forces for instance, 

but will be unwilling to integrate existing commands. 

Effectiveness and efficiency is therefore sacrificed to 

the logic of bureaucratic expansion and increased 

promotion pathways. Third, there is opposition, usually 

in private, from civilian bureaucrats who do not want to 

change the status quo. They prefer the existing 

arrangement which gives them considerable powers 

 little accountability.




Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar—responsible for 

implementing the prime minister’s vision, has claimed 

that he has read the Goldwater Nichols Act, which 

transformed the U.S. military. However, this initiative did 

not occur overnight and was preceded by a public 

debate and, perhaps more importantly, required a civil-

military partnership consisting of reform minded 

individuals. As he faces obstacles from his own officials 

perhaps Mr. Parrikar should consider forming a Defence 

Reforms Unit comprising politicians, former officials 

and technocrats all sharing the vision for defence 

reforms. This could thereby monitor the progress of 

different reform measures.



The media is fond of comparing the leadership styles of 

President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi. It is 

surely a coincidence that both have publicly come out 

with statements calling for reforming their militaries. We 

therefore have the unique opportunity to compare two 

different institutional and leadership styles. It would be 

India’s loss if, after a year, defence reforms remains an 

aspiration.


Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU in Singapore.



















OROP KRANTI :: Change of Definition of OROP in Various Correspondence of DESW







Dear Veterans,

Letter written to RM with copies to FM and three chiefs regarding Change of Definition of OROP in Various Correspondence of DESW Noticed dated 25 Jan 2016  is enclosed for your information and further circulation please.



With regards,


                       Yours Sincerely,


 Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM(Retd)                                                                         
Advisior United Front of Ex Servicemen & Chairman IESM
Mob: 09312404269, 0124411057
Email: satbirsm@gmail.com                         






                                                                                                                                 25th January 2016
Shri Manohar Parrikar                                                                                                                                                                    Hon’ble Raksha Mantri                                                                                                                                                                   104, South Block, New Delhi

Change of Definition of OROP
in Various Correspondence of DESW Noticed

Dear Sh Manohar Parrikar Ji
Pl refer to:
1.   MOD letter no 12(01/2014-D (Pen/Pol) dated 26 Feb 14
2.   MOM of the meeting chaired by RM on 26 Feb 14 to discuss OROP
3.   Reply of MOS Defense Sh Rao Inderjit Singh Dated 2 Dec 14 in a written reply to Sh Rajeev Chandrashekhar in Rajya Sabha
4.   GOI press release dated 5 Sep 15
5.   GOI letter no 12(1)/2014 dated 7 Nov 15 and
6.   GOI letter no 12(01)/2014-D(pen/pol)- Part–II dated 14 Dec 15
GOI has accepted following definition of OROP in the letters dated 26 Feb 14 and MOS statement in Rajya Sabha dated 2 Dec 14.

One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners. This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners.

However in the Press Release dated 5 Sep 14, a phrase has been added at the end of the OROP definition “at periodic intervals”.

Definition of OROP given in 5 Sep Press Release is given below:

One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, irrespective of their date of retirement. Future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners. This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners at periodic intervals.

This phrase has probably been added to justify pension equalisation every five years as is being propagated by the MOD.

Again, another attempt has been made to change/ distort the definition of OROP in GOI notification dated 7 Nov 15. OROP definition given in 7 Nov letter is reproduced below.

One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Defence Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, regardless of their date of retirement, which implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners at periodic intervals.

I am sure you would notice subtle progressive change in the language of definition of OROP, wherein the line “This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioner” has been changed with the line “This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners at periodic intervals”.

It further states as one of the salient features that it has been decided that the gap between rate of pension of current pensioners and past pensioners would be refixed every five years.

This completely changes the definition of OROP and if implemented in its changed form, it will deprive past pensioners of monetary benefits and will completely destroy the definition of OROP and in turn, destroy the very soul of OROP.

UFESM (JM) believes that this change in the definition in OROP has been inserted only to justify pension equalisation every five years. Pension equalisation every five years is against the definition of OROP and is a matter of serious concern for all Ex-servicemen. The correct and acceptable situation is that pension equalisation must be done as soon as pension of two soldiers with same rank and same length of service is noticed to be different and it must be equalised immediately. Ex-servicemen are ready to accept pension equalisation every year only to make administration of this concept easily implementable. Incidentally, any computation can be easily achieved on press of a button in today’s computer era – and this needs no emphasis.

However the matter did not end at one instance of change of definition of OROP, it has been once again repeated in GOI letter dated 14 Dec 15 “OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the Defence Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, regardless of their date of retirement, which implies that bridging the gap between the rate of pension of current and past pensioners at periodic intervals”.

The GOI letter dated 14 Dec 15 is the notification for the formation of one-man judicial committee. It is a matter of great importance that if incorrect definition is given to the Chairman of anomalies committee, he is bound to work within the constraints given by MOD and will thus give his recommendations as per incorrect definition given to him. This will be gross injustice to ex-servicemen. Ex-servicemen might be justified to think that these changes are a planned move for the vexed problem of OROP in view of the past experiences in which meanings of Honorable Supreme Court orders were changed by making subtle changes in the decision of HSC.

We sincerely hope that these changes are probably only clerical errors and not a planned direction change. We therefore sincerely request you to correct these mistakes in definition of OROP and give following definition approved by Parliament to all committees.

One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces Personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners. This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners.


We will be thankful to get a suitable reply from you at the earliest.

            With regards,

Yours Sincerely,

Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM (Retd)                                                                                                                                             Advisor United Front of Ex Servicemen & Chairman IESM                                                                                                        Mobile: 9312404269, 01244110570                                                                                                                                                 Email:satbirsm@gmail.com       

Copy to :-   
       Sh Arun Jaitley                                                                For Information and action please
       The Finance Minister
       Govt of India, North Block
       New Delhi – 110001
General Dalbir Singh                                  
PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC                                               Chief of the Army Staff                      Integrated HQs of Ministry of Defence (Army)South Block, New Delhi-110011


                        -do-
Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha               PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC                                               Chief of the Air Staff & Chairman,                                               Chiefs of Staffs Committee (CoSC),                                  Integrated HQs of Ministry of Defence (Air Force) Vayu Bhawan, New Delhi 110011


                       -do-
Admiral R K Dhowan,                           PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC                                                         Chief of the Naval Staff                                                      Integrated HQs of Ministry of Defence (Navy)  South Block, New Delhi -110011


                       -do-