Tuesday, June 23, 2020



PORTRAIT OF VICE PRESIDENT XI JINPING: "AMBITIOUS SURVIVOR" OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION



Summary ------- 1. (C) According to a well connected Embassy contact, Politburo Standing Committee Member and Vice President Xi Jinping is "exceptionally ambitious," confident and focused, and has had his "eye on the prize" from early adulthood. Unlike many youth who "made up for lost time by having fun" after the Cultural Revolution, Xi "chose to survive by becoming redder than the red." He joined the Party and began mapping out a career plan that would take him to the top of the system. In our contact's view, Xi is supremely pragmatic and a realist, driven not by ideology but by a combination of ambition and "self-protection." Xi is a true "elitist" at heart, according to our contact, believing that rule by a dedicated and committed Communist Party leadership is the key to enduring social stability and national strength. The most permanent influences shaping Xi's worldview were his "princeling" pedigree and formative years growing up with families of first-generation CCP revolutionaries in Beijing's exclusive residential compounds. Our contact is convinced that Xi has a genuine sense of "entitlement," believing that members of his generation are the "legitimate heirs" to the revolutionary achievements of their parents and therefore "deserve to rule China." 2. (C) Xi is not corrupt and does not care about money, but could be "corrupted by power," in our contact's view. Xi at one point early in his career was quite taken with Buddhist mysticism, displaying a fascination with (and knowledge of) Buddhist martial arts and mystical powers said to aid health. The contact stated that Xi is very familiar with the West, including the United States, and has a favorable outlook toward the United States. He also understands Taiwan and the Taiwan people from his long tenure as an official in Fujian Province. End Summary. Introduction ------------ 3. (C) A longtime Embassy contact and former close friend of Politburo Standing Committee Member and Vice President Xi Jinping has shared with PolOff his first-hand knowledge of Xi's family background, upbringing, early adulthood, and political career, as well as his impressions and assessments of Xi's personality and political views. The information was acquired in multiple conversations over a two-year period 2007-2009. The contact is an American citizen of Chinese descent who teaches political science at a U.S. university (protect), hereafter referred to as "the professor." Fifteen-Year Relationship with Xi --------------------------------- 4. (C) PolOff's contact ("the professor") and Xi Jinping were both born in 1953 and grew up in similar circumstances. According to the professor, they lived with other sons and daughters of China's first-generation revolutionaries in the senior leaders' compounds in Beijing and were groomed to become China's ruling elite. The professor did not know Xi personally until they had both reached their late teens, when the professor began to hear about Xi from the professor's best friend, Zhou Sanhua (protect), who was later sent to the same village as Xi in Shaanxi province during the Cultural Revolution. (Note: According to the professor, Zhou Sanhua's father was a former editor-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Daily.) By the time the professor and Xi had returned separately from the countryside, they had come to know each other personally, initially through Zhou Sanhua's introduction, and maintained a relationship for the next 15 years (ca. 1972 to 1987), even though their lives and careers took markedly different paths. Revolutionary Fathers --------------------- 5. (C) Xi's father, Xi Zhongxun, was a communist guerilla leader in northwest China in the 1930s, when Mao and the CCP leaders reached Yan'an at the end of the Long March. Xi Zhongxun was one of the few local leaders to survive later purges, siding with the Mao Zedong faction and rising quickly through Party ranks to become a Vice Premier in the 1950s while still in his thirties. According to the professor, Xi Zhongxun was the youngest Vice Premier among the early generation of CCP leaders. Despite his association with Mao's group, said the professor, Xi Zhongxun was also "good friends" with Deng Xiaoping and was "actually closer to Deng than to Mao." BEIJING 00003128 002 OF 006 6. (C) The professor's father was also an early revolutionary and contemporary of Mao, from a neighboring county to Mao's in Hunan province. The professor's father participated in the revolution periodically but also spent time in Japan and Hong Kong, distinguishing himself as a labor leader. In 1949, according to the professor, his father agreed to return to Beijing at Mao's insistence and became the PRC's first Minister of Labor and a member of the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Standing Committee. 7. (C) Despite Communist Party rhetoric regarding the creation of a "classless" society, the professor described, the pre-Cultural Revolution society and leadership compounds in which he and Xi Jinping grew up were, ironically, the "most precisely class-based mini-society ever constructed." Everything was determined by one's "internal party class status," the professor asserted, including the kindergarten one attended, the place where one shopped, and the type of car one could own. All of these "benefits" were determined by Party rank, such as Politburo Standing Committee member, Vice Minister, or Central Committee member. One's every action, every day, was in some way an indication of one's "class" status, the professor stated. The children of this revolutionary elite were told that they, too, would someday take their rightful place in the Chinese leadership. All of this came to an end in the Cultural Revolution, the professor said, but consciousness of membership in an entitled, elite generation of future rulers has remained among most of the members of this class. Cultural Revolution and Return to Beijing ----------------------------------------- 8. (C) Both Xi Zhongxun and the professor's father were purged during the Cultural Revolution and spent time in prison, according to the professor. (Note: Xi Zhongxun was purged in the early 1960s, several years before the Cultural Revolution began, but things got worse for him and his family once the Cultural Revolution started.) The professor's father was falsely accused of supporting Liu Shaoqi and spent most of the Cultural Revolution years (1966-1976) in prison. Both Xi Zhongxun and the professor's father were later rehabilitated when Deng Xiaoping returned to power. Xi was rehabilitated by Deng in 1978 and was appointed by Deng as Party Secretary in Guangdong in the 1980s. 9. (C) In the early 1970s, the circle of youthful friends, including Xi Jinping and the professor, managed to return to Beijing from the countryside. The professor described themselves as "fugitives" of one kind or another. The professor himself served prison time and spent "years on the run" due to his father's status as a "counter-revolutionary." At this time, the professor said, he knew Xi, but they did not spend a great deal of time together. 10. (C) The professor said that he and others found dramatically different ways to "survive" the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. While the professor and his closest circle of friends descended into the pursuit of romantic relationships, drink, movies and Western literature as a release from the hardships of the time, Xi Jinping, by contrast "chose to survive by becoming redder than the red." (Note: The professor commented that, in a continuation of his attempt to deal with the Cultural Revolution, the professor eventually decided to "flee" China and pursue graduate study -- and a new life -- in the United States.) Unlike the professor and others who shared his Cultural Revolution experience in rural villages, Xi turned to serious politics upon his return to Beijing, joining the CCP in 1974 while his father was still in prison. The professor and his friends were reading DeGaulle and Nixon and "trying to catch up for lost years by having fun," while Xi was reading Marx and laying the foundation for a career in politics. Xi even went off to join a "worker-peasant-soldier revolutionary committee" (note: a label given provincial governing units during the Cultural Revolution), after which the professor had presumed he would never see Xi again. It was an "open secret," the professor said, that it was through the "worker-peasant-soldier revolutionary committee" that Xi got his "bachelor's education." The professor said Xi's first degree was not a "real" university education, but instead a three-year degree in applied Marxism. (Note: Xi's official biography provides no information on Xi between his assignment to Yanchuan county, Shaanxi province, in 1969, and 1975, when, it states, he became a student at Tsinghua University, graduating in 1979.) Neighbors, 1977-1982 -------------------- BEIJING 00003128 003 OF 006 11. (C) When Xi and the professor's fathers were rehabilitated following the Cultural Revolution, the professor said, their respective families were relocated to the "Nanshagou" housing compound in western Beijing, directly across from Diaoyutai. The professor opened his Nanshagou apartment door one day in 1977 and there was Xi, standing across the hall from him. The two friends lived directly across from one another and, the professor said, talked almost daily for the next five years. Xi became a PLA officer "and wore his uniform every day," while the professor became a student at Beijing Shifan Daxue (Beijing Normal University). There were many prominent leaders in Nanshagou, including Wang Daohan, Jiang Zemin's mentor. Jiang frequently rode his bike there, and Jia Qinglin (currently Politburo Standing Committee member) also had a connection to Wang from that time, the professor said. Sporadic Contact, 1982-1987 --------------------------- 12. (C) From 1982 to 1987, the professor only saw Xi periodically, most memorably during a visit to Xiamen in the mid-1980s, where Xi was serving as a local official, and in 1987 when Xi visited the professor in Washington, D.C. In Xiamen, Xi treated the professor like royalty, but they did not spend much time together during the professor's visit there, and Xi said very little of substance. The professor, in turn, hosted Xi in Washington, D.C., where the professor was a graduate student. Xi's 1987 visit to the United States was the last time the two men met face to face. The last time the professor spoke with Xi was when his father, Xi Zhongxun, passed away several years ago, at which time the two spoke briefly over the phone when the professor called to offer his condolences. Xi was serving as the Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province at the time. Xi's Family ----------- 13. (C) Xi was the middle child in a family of three children that included an older sister and a younger brother, all of whom were apparently from his father's second marriage, according to the professor. Xi's older sister, Xi An'an, at some point left China for Canada, and as far as the professor knows, still resides there. Xi An'an's husband was in the PLA, the professor said. Xi's younger brother, Xi Yuanping, moved to Hong Kong when it was under British rule. The last time the professor saw Xi Yuanping was in the 1980s, at a time when Xi's father Xi Zhongxun was still Party Secretary in Guangdong province. The brother had become both obese and very wealthy, the professor said, sporting "expensive jewelry and designer clothing." The professor has lost contact with him since. (Note: Unofficial biographies published in Hong Kong claim Xi had other siblings as well.) Marriage and Divorce -------------------- 14. (C) Xi Jinping's first marriage was to Ke Xiaoming, the daughter of China's 1978-1983 ambassador to Great Britain, Ke Hua. According to the professor, Ke Xiaoming was elegant and well educated. The couple initially lived with Xi's parents in the Nanshagou housing compound, but as his father's political fortunes rose, his parents moved to a new house in "East" Beijing, near the Drum Tower and close to the houses of Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, leaving the young couple to themselves in the Nanshagou apartment. The couple fought "almost every day," the professor said, and the marriage ended when Ke Xiaoming returned to England and Xi refused to go with her. The professor remarked that he thought Xi's "distant" quality contributed to the couple's divorce. He noted that he had watched Xi "drift" further and further from Ke Xiaoming, until she finally left for England. There was, "of course," no way that Xi would go with her, the professor said. Xi later married a famous PLA singer. Xi's Early Career: Single-Minded Pursuit of Power --------------------------------------------- ----- 15. (C) According to the professor, Xi was always "exceptionally ambitious" and had his "eye on the prize" from the very beginning. Once Xi had returned from his education in the worker-soldier-peasant revolutionary committee, he carefully laid out a career plan that would maximize his opportunities to rise to the top levels of the Party hierarchy, first becoming a PLA officer in the late 1970s and then serving in a variety of provincial leadership positions, progressively rising through the ranks. By 1979, Xi was on the staffs of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC), serving as an assistant to the CMC Secretary General and later Minister of National Defense BEIJING 00003128 004 OF 006 (1982), General Geng Biao, a revolutionary comrade of his father's. The professor said he had the impression that Geng Biao had helped Xi Jinping get the PLA job, and that Xi Zhongxun had, in turn, given Geng's daughter a position in Guangdong when he was Party Secretary there. 16. (C) According to the professor, Xi subsequently became even more serious in plotting a career path to the top. By all appearances, with his father having been politically rehabilitated and rapidly regaining his power, Xi Jinping could have continued to rise quickly in the Central Party apparatus. Xi, however, reasoned that in the long run, staying in Beijing would limit his career potential. Xi told the professor that staying with Geng Biao would eventually shrink his power base, which would ultimately rest primarily on his father's and Geng's networks and political support. Moreover, in time, people would turn against him if he stayed in the Center. 17. (C) So in a calculated move to lay the basis for a future return as a Central leader, Xi asked for a position in the countryside and, in 1982, became a local official in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei province. Xi later became the Deputy Party Secretary in Zhengding county, also in Hebei. Xi told the professor at the time that he "would be back one day." (Note: Xi later served for many years in Fujian province, becoming Governor in 2000, then moving to Zhejiang province in 2002 to be Party Secretary, and then to Shanghai as Party Secretary in 2007. He was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee at the 17th National CCP Congress in October 2007 and was appointed Vice President at the National People's Congress in March 2008.) 18. (C) Xi told the professor at the time that going to the provinces was his "only path to central power." Xi thought it was important to know people in the Central Organization Department and to keep his eyes on the Center, even as he worked his way up the ladder as a local official. According to the professor, Xi "had promotion to the Center in mind from day one." Xi knew how to develop personal networks and work the system, first using his father's networks and later building his own. Xi the Person ------------- 19. (C) The professor offered his personal assessment -- based on their similar upbringing and his long association with Xi during his formative years -- of Xi's personality and political views. Although he had not seen Xi in person in more than 20 years, "one cannot entirely escape one's past," he asserted, and "Xi does not want to." The professor on repeated occasions painted a portrait of Xi Jinping as an ambitious, calculating, confident and focused person who in early adulthood demonstrated his singleness of purpose by distinguishing himself from his peers and turning his attention to politics even before the Cultural Revolution had concluded. The professor marveled that Xi joined the Communist Party while his father still languished in a Party prison for alleged political crimes. At the time, the professor and his friend Zhou felt "betrayed" by Xi's embrace of the CCP, but both realized this was one way to "survive." Xi chose to "join the system" to get ahead. Although Xi never said so explicitly, he sent a message that, in China, there was a better way forward than what the professor had chosen: namely, do not give up on the system. Xi was reserved and detached and "difficult to read," said the professor. He had a "strong mind" and understood power, but "from day one, never showed his hand." 20. (C) Unlike those in the social circles the professor ran in, Xi Jinping could not talk about women and movies and did not drink or do drugs. Xi was considered of only average intelligence, the professor said, and not as smart as the professor's peer group. Women thought Xi was "boring." The professor never felt completely relaxed around Xi, who seemed extremely "driven." Nevertheless, despite Xi's lack of popularity in the conventional sense and his "cold and calculating" demeanor in these early years, the professor said, Xi was "not cold-hearted." He was still considered a "good guy" in other ways. Xi was outwardly friendly, "always knew the answers" to questions, and would "always take care of you." The professor surmised that Xi's newfound popularity today, which the professor found surprising, must stem in part from Xi's being "generous and loyal." Xi also does not care at all about money and is not corrupt, the professor stated. Xi can afford to be incorruptible, the professor wryly noted, given that he was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. It is likely that Xi could, however, be "corrupted by power." BEIJING 00003128 005 OF 006 Xi's Political Instincts and Biases ----------------------------------- 21. (C) In the professor's view, Xi Jinping is supremely pragmatic, a realist, driven not by ideology but by a combination of ambition and "self-protection." The professor saw Xi's early calculations to carefully lay out a realistic career path as an illustration of his pragmatism. The most permanent influences shaping Xi's worldview were his princeling pedigree and formative years growing up with families of first-generation CCP revolutionaries in Beijing's elite residential compounds. These influences were amplified by Xi's decision in his early twenties to join the CCP and then the PLA. Xi solidified these views and values during his subsequent very successful 30-year career as a Party official, the professor concluded. 22. (C) Xi is a true "elitist" at heart, according to the professor, and believes that rule by a dedicated and committed Communist Party leadership is the key to enduring social stability and national strength, as in the (self-perceived) elite-dominated society of his youth, knit together by family ties, elders and male authority. After years of conversations with Xi, and having shared a common upbringing with him, the professor said, he is convinced that Xi has a genuine sense of "entitlement," believing that members of his generation are the "legitimate heirs" to the revolutionary achievements of their parents and therefore "deserve to rule China." For this reason, the professor maintained, Xi could never be a "true member" of current President Hu Jintao's camp, even if Xi did not give any indication of opposition to Hu Jintao now. Xi and other first-generation princelings derisively refer to people with non-Party, non-elite, commercial backgrounds like Hu Jintao as "shopkeepers' sons," whose parents did not fight and die for the revolution and therefore do not deserve positions of power. 23. (C) Xi knows how very corrupt China is and is repulsed by the all-encompassing commercialization of Chinese society, with its attendant nouveau riche, official corruption, loss of values, dignity, and self-respect, and such "moral evils" as drugs and prostitution, the professor stated. The professor speculated that if Xi were to become the Party General Secretary, he would likely aggressively attempt to address these evils, perhaps at the expense of the new moneyed class. 24. (C) Xi at one point early in his career was quite taken with Buddhist mysticism, according to the professor. In comments Xi made to the professor, including during the professor's visit to Xiamen while Xi was serving as an official there, Xi displayed a fascination with Buddhist martial arts, qigong, and other mystical powers said to aid health, as well as with Buddhist sacred sites such as Wutaishan. The professor said he does not know whether Xi was actually religious, or whether he was simply looking for a way to aid his health and well-being. Regardless, the professor said, he was extremely surprised by how much Xi knew about the subject and Xi's seeming belief in supernatural forces. Familiarity with the West and Taiwan ------------------------------------ 25. (C) Based on personal experience, the professor noted, Xi is very familiar with the West, with a sister in Canada, an ex-wife in England, a brother in Hong Kong, many friends overseas, and prior travel to the United States. As far as the professor can discern, Xi's family and friends have had a good experience in the West. The professor contrasted Xi's experience and attitudes toward the West with those of people sent to the United States by their work units, such as the nationalist and sometime anti-U.S. Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong. Xi was the only one of his immediate family to stay behind in China, the professor noted, speculating that Xi knew early on that he would "not be special" outside of China. 26. (C) Xi is favorably disposed toward the United States, the professor maintained, and would want to maintain good relations with Washington. The professor said Xi has "no ambition" to "confront" the United States. During Xi's visit to Washington, D.C., in 1987, he told the professor that he had no strong impressions of the United States. Although Xi was not particularly impressed by the United States, he had nothing bad to say about it either. Xi took a detached stance, as if observing from a distance, viewing what he saw as just a normal part of life, not strange, the professor said. BEIJING 00003128 006 OF 006 27. (C) Xi also knows Taiwan and the Taiwan people very well, the professor said, noting that Xi was in Fujian province for more than twenty years. Attracting Taiwan investment to Fujian was an important part of his accomplishments as a Xiamen official. HUNTSMAN HUNTSMAN

Sunday, June 21, 2020

SOURCE:
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-located-and-where-india-and-china-differ-6436436/



Line of Actual Control: Where it is located, and where India and China differ


Written by Sushant Singh | New Delhi | Updated: June 18, 2020 8:42:11 am

India-China LAC explained: As tensions continue between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a look at what the line means on the ground and the disagreements over it.


As tensions continue between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a look at what the line means on the ground and the disagreements over it:

What is the Line of Actual Control?

The LAC is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km. It is divided into three sectors: the eastern sector which spans Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the middle sector in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the western sector in Ladakh.


What is the disagreement?

The alignment of the LAC in the eastern sector is along the 1914 McMahon Line, and there are minor disputes about the positions on the ground as per the principle of the high Himalayan watershed. This pertains to India’s international boundary as well, but for certain areas such as Longju and Asaphila. The line in the middle sector is the least controversial but for the precise alignment to be followed in the Barahoti plains.
The major disagreements are in the western sector where the LAC emerged from two letters written by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to PM Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959, after he had first mentioned such a ‘line’ in 1956. In his letter, Zhou said the LAC consisted of “the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west”. Shivshankar Menon has explained in his book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy that the LAC was “described only in general terms on maps not to scale” by the Chinese.
After the 1962 War, the Chinese claimed they had withdrawn to 20 km behind the LAC of November 1959. Zhou clarified the LAC again after the war in another letter to Nehru: “To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China”. During the Doklam crisis in 2017, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged India to abide by the “1959 LAC”.

What was India’s response to China’s designation of the LAC?

India rejected the concept of LAC in both 1959 and 1962. Even during the war, Nehru was unequivocal: “There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw twenty kilometres from what they call ‘line of actual control’. What is this ‘line of control’? Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of September?”
India’s objection, as described by Menon, was that the Chinese line “was a disconnected series of points on a map that could be joined up in many ways; the line should omit gains from aggression in 1962 and therefore should be based on the actual position on September 8, 1962 before the Chinese attack; and the vagueness of the Chinese definition left it open for China to continue its creeping attempt to change facts on the ground by military force”.

When did India accept the LAC?

Shyam Saran has disclosed in his book How India Sees the World that the LAC was discussed during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 1991 visit to India, where PM P V Narasimha Rao and Li reached an understanding to maintain peace and tranquillity at the LAC. India formally accepted the concept of the LAC when Rao paid a return visit to Beijing in 1993 and the two sides signed the Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity at the LAC. The reference to the LAC was unqualified to make it clear that it was not referring to the LAC of 1959 or 1962 but to the LAC at the time when the agreement was signed. To reconcile the differences about some areas, the two countries agreed that the Joint Working Group on the border issue would take up the task of clarifying the alignment of the LAC.

Why did India change its stance on the Line of Actual Control?

As per Menon, it was needed because Indian and Chinese patrols were coming in more frequent contact during the mid-1980s, after the government formed a China Study Group in 1976 which revised the patrolling limits, rules of engagement and pattern of Indian presence along the border.
In the backdrop of the Sumdorongchu standoff, when PM Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, Menon notes that the two sides agreed to negotiate a border settlement, and pending that, they would maintain peace and tranquillity along the border.

Have India and China exchanged their maps of the LAC?

Only for the middle sector. Maps were “shared” for the western sector but never formally exchanged, and the process of clarifying the LAC has effectively stalled since 2002. As an aside, there is no publicly available map depicting India’s version of the LAC.
During his visit to China in May 2015, PM Narendra Modi’s proposal to clarify the LAC was rejected by the Chinese. Deputy Director General of the Asian Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Huang Xilian later told Indian journalists that “We tried to clarify some years ago but it encountered some difficulties, which led to even complex situation. That is why whatever we do we should make it more conducive to peace and tranquillity for making things easier and not to make them complicated.”

Is the LAC also the claim line for both countries?

Not for India. India’s claim line is the line seen in the official boundary marked on the maps as released by the Survey of India, including both Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan. In China’s case, it corresponds mostly to its claim line, but in the eastern sector, it claims entire Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. However, the claim lines come into question when a discussion on the final international boundaries takes place, and not when the conversation is about a working border, say the LAC.
Line of Actual Control An Army convoy moves along a Srinagar-Leh highway leading to Ladakh, at Gagingir in Ganderbal district. (Express Photo: Shuaib Masoodi)

But why are these claim lines controversial in Ladakh?

Independent India was transferred the treaties from the British, and while the Shimla Agreement on the McMahon Line was signed by British India, Aksai Chin in Ladakh province of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was not part of British India, although it was a part of the British Empire. Thus, the eastern boundary was well defined in 1914 but in the west in Ladakh, it was not.
A G Noorani writes in India-China Boundary Problem 1846-1947 that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s Ministry of States published two White Papers on Indian states. The first, in July 1948, had two maps: one had no boundary shown in the western sector, only a partial colour wash; the second one extended the colour wash in yellow to the entire state of J&K, but mentioned “boundary undefined”. The second White Paper was published in February 1950 after India became a Republic, where the map again had boundaries which were undefined.
In July 1954, Nehru issued a directive that “all our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. The new maps should also be sent to our embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges, etc”. This map, as is officially used till date, formed the basis of dealings with China, eventually leading to the 1962 War.

How is the LAC different from the Line of Control with Pakistan?

The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the UN after the Kashmir War. It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by DGMOs of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement. The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground















PLA ; AKSAICHIN REGION - India-China Faceoff: Precise Details Of Galwan Valley Brawl

SOURCE:
Collected from Media & Social Media




India-China Faceoff: Precise Details Of                         Galwan Valley Brawl 




                                        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y7YNo1YyOFQ

                   

Most Authentic Account by an ex Fire and Fury Corps Cdr.

THE BACK STORY

The Galwan river is a tributary to the Shyok river. It flows in from East and then takes a sharp left turn (aligned with the flow of the river) on account of geological features, to go ahead and meet with the Shyok river. From the point where it turns left is considered to be Indian territory. The LAC passes along the ridge line of the bank of the river, which dips into the bend and moves approximately along the ridge line of the opposite bank. The corner of the bend of the river, known as point 14. This is the point to which Indian patrols go and return.

Early May, a Chinese tent was spotted on a triangular bank, at point 14. This is deemed to be in Indian territory. Not just that Chinese troops patrolled down along the bank towards Shyok. Indian patrol went up from Shyok and confronted them. The Chinese claim now was ALL of the Galwan valley was theirs.

Subsequently, the Chinese dismantled the tent and the camp and fell back. However, they'd keep up intrusions into the Indian part of Galwan, and also pitched tents higher up on the bank. This was right at the corner of the bend. India protested this cos it was on our slope.

THE TRIGGERING EVENT

Post the Lt Gen level meeting on the 6th of June, it was agreed that the two armies would disengage and move back. Indians to Shyok river and the Chinese to point 1, which is further upstream Galwan river.

The Chinese had put up tent/s on a ledge on the ridge above the point. The reason they might have moved the tent/s from the river bed to above was, not only did it give a better vantage point, with the glacial melt the rivers tend to be in spate around now (and this continues till August).

So as to ensure that the Chinese had complied, a patrol was sent to inspect. This patrol essentially consisted of about 12 members. Some accounts suggest that the patrol was being led by Major and the rest soldiers and NCOs. There's one report which says that the Chinese had brought up an earthmover along Galwan river towards construction, upto the point. The tents hadn't been dismantled.

THE FACE-OFF

As per protocols, the patrol had gone in unarmed, possibly carrying only sticks. Once they reached the spot, and on finding the tents still there, they asked the Chinese to comply with the disengagement plan. From most reports, they were waylaid up and held hostage by the Chinese. It can be safe to assume that the Chinese were armed with guns, else it wouldn't be possible to 'detain' the Indian patrol.

The report of this hostage situation reached the base and, as per reports, the CO rushed with another platoon, with back up forces following up. The ledge on which the Chinese were situated is a tough and treacherous trek from the Indian side. Here, it seems, they insisted that the CO come with only a small team and negotiate. There were alleged threats to throw the captive Indian soldiers over the ledge.

THE ATTACK

Col Babu went up the ledge to negotiate. After the negotiation, they seemed to agree to the withdrawal, when they suddenly leapt at Col Babu and the two soldiers who were with him. They had spiked mallets and heavy handheld weapons. They hit and bludgeoned them to death on the spot. Not just that they chase at the rest of the second party who had gone up with the intent to kill. As they were only armed with a staff they tried to retreat and escape, but were chased and either slipped and fell down the ledge, or were thrown or were chased and beaten to death. Remember, the Chinese were at least 3:1 against the Indians and were armed with killer weapons.

THE REINFORCEMENTS & THE MELEE

On seeing this unfold, the main body of Indian troops now rushed to support their comrades. But they could, at best move up in a single file. They resorted to stone-pelting and this happened both ways. There were about 200 odd Indian soldiers.

There was a larger Chinese force which was waiting at the base of the slope, on the Chinese side. They rushed up. Now there were nearly 3-400 odd Chinese to take on the Indians who were scampering up to confront.

Essentially a pell-mell resulted. It's tough to say, being so removed, what exactly transpired or who did what in this situation. There have been some reports of shots being fired (as also bullet wounds), but that hasn't been substantiated.

Remember all this was happening in diminishing light, with the night gaining rapidly. Given the terrain, as the Sun gets hidden by the jagged peaks, darkness falls fast and suddenly. This contributes to more deaths and accidents.

THE LANDSLIDE

The greatest revenge, it seems, was taken by Karma. While accounts differ (Vineet says that it was a Chinese JCB which was ill operated which caused it) the fact of the matter was, there were too many Chinese troops (some say upwards of 300) up on the ledge. They preferred being on the ledge instead of storming on the river bed cos, being on the ledge would give them an unfair advantage over Indian troops who were coming in single file. However, this turned out to be their doom (goes to prove how unfamiliar they are with the terrain). A portion of the ledge gave way under the weight and resulted in a landslide. If you inspect the pictures, you will find that there are a number of landslides along the slopes. This landslide resulted in the maximum number of casualties for the Chinese.

The soldiers who were being kept hostage and their exact fate haven't been outed, yet. There were some reports that at least some of the hostages were freed. Some possibly also were victims of the landslide.

Given the fact that it was night, a rescue was difficult. Most fell into the river below. This resulted in hypothermia as also a lot of injuries.

WAS IT PRE-MEDITATED?

There's no doubt about the fact that this was premeditated. The place of the ambush was carefully chosen. The troops were prepared and in all probability weren't regular Border troops but more hardened troops. They initiated the violence with a clear intent to kill. The weapons they had on were designed for fatal damage. They laid and initiated the ambush. It was their own overzealousness which resulted in a much higher casualty rate for them.

THE GREY AREA CHINA WILL CLAIM

China will claim that it was in its own land cos it was on the ledge at the very edge of the LAC. But the ledge is clearly on the Indian side. The facts of the matter can only be ascertained by fresh satellite images and they must have. Irrespective of whatever China claims, India should mount a diplomatic offensive against China. India will not get a better chance to do so.

CAN ONE DECLARE WAR ON THE BASIS OF THIS?

Highly unlikely. Why? Cos it has transpired in a very grey area. However, one can start exploiting grey areas to India's advantage and go and park parallel to the Chinese camps at Finger 7. Essentially build-up counter …




As received..... Sir my Coursmate unit is 3 Fd Regt.

They had One of the Chinese CO in their custody . On return of our 10 soldiers who were with Chinese their CO was released .

This is the fact

Gnrs of 3 Med got hold of a Chinese CO and it’s what compelled them release our men.



The Gunners of 3 amongst others were called to assist 16 Bihar in the incident of physical face-off. The 2ic along with the brave hearts drove down to assist. In the ensuing mellee the Sikhs definitely killed seven Chinks and got their Chinki Col Alive. Two of own succumbed to injuries while the 2ic and one small own group was overwhelmed. The Chinki Col held by these Sikhs was the fulcrum of all negotiations

: 3 Field Regiment Sikh troops were part of that nasty battle. They fought like Tigers and in bargain lost two JCO. Officiating CO was in injured, two Major got injured along with many JCO NCO. Officiating CO along with JCO presumely PoW or missing. Must have come back yesterday after GOC level negotiation. We must spread the valour of Gunner in the groups known to us. Jai Hind.



Also from another gp....and...quite reasonable👇🏻👇🏻😇

This is being spoken of in other groups too, I can assure you. We must refrain from falling into the “main gunner tu infantry wallah” narrative. Sarhad par ladnewala, marnewala har veer tha hindustani sipahi.

Of course, for the brave Khalsas of 3 Fd, I say this:
"Deh siva bar mohe eh-hey,
subh karman te kabhu na taro.
Na daro arr seo jab jaye Laroon,
nischey kar apni jit karo.
Arr Sikh hoon apne he mann ko,
eh laalach hou gun tau ucharo.
Jab aav ki audh nidan bane,
att he rann me tabh joojh maro.
Nischaykar aapni jeet karoon!
Bole sao nihal, Sat Sri Akaal!"

For the record...

2 x JCOs from 3 Med

Hav Palani from 81 Fd

Lost their lives valiantly🙏🙏🙏