(d)
SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL
“Strategic Depth”: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?
: Raheem ul Haque
In assessing Pakistan's response to the ongoing 'global
war on terrorism' in Afghanistan, this paper presents two
sets of arguments; First, I argue that Pakistan's strategic
interests constituting secure and peaceful borders along
with internal strength, development and prosperity, are
annulled rather than furthered by the Strategic Depth
policy framework, adopted and pursued for the last three
decades. Although this framework has allowed Pakistan
to maintain a semblance of regional military power balance with India, yet it has led to a rise of extremism and
militancy within Pakistani society and to a loss of internal
sovereignty. Today, this flawed policy has created conditions that have made Pakistan a sanctuary for ideological non-state actors. Second, with an in-depth analysis
and scrutiny of factors and actors in the three decades
of the Afghan war theatre, I submit that Strategic Depth
is an outcome of the institutionalization of Ideological
Guardianship mindset within Pakistan Army during the Zia
years, and its continuation has led to civil-military power
imbalance which needs to be altered to secure Pakistan
from militancy and terrorism. Democratic consolidation,
peace, prosperity and sustainable development in Pakistan
hinges on abandoning the flawed, failed and nationally
injurious policy of Strategic Depth.
Overview: from Muslim to Islamic
Pakistan was born with undefined and problematic
boundaries. On the Eastern front it inherited the Kashmir
dispute with India and on the Western front the Durand
Line1, which divided the Pashtuns between Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Given the Pashtun ethnic factor, relations
between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained bitter but
generally bearable. For example, at the time of independence Afghanistan was the only country that opposed
Pakistan's entry into the UN, yet, over the year's transit
trade between the two counties has rarely been discontinued. On the other hand, relations with India have
largely remained adversarial to hostile, punctuated by
border skirmishes to outright wars (1965 and 71, while
1999 Kargil is recognized as a limited conflict). The 1971
Indo-Pakistan war and the resultant break of Pakistan had
three consequences for South Asia. First, India emerged as
the 'dominant power' of the region, second that fied Pakistan's insecurity syndrome leading to an illusive
search for Strategic Depth , third, although it shook the
foundations of "Two Nation Theory", Pakistan still began
to drift towards Islamization through invoked fears of
'Hindu India'. All this obliterated Jinnah's vision of liberal,
secular and democratic Pakistan. Although the process
had begun with the adoption of Objectives Resolution in
1949, anti-Ahemdia riots in 1953, Pakistan's joining of
anti- Communist block, SEATO and CENTO pacts, however, it accelerated through State sanction in post 1971
Pakistan with the passage of bill (1974) declaring Ahmedis
as 'non-Muslim', the religious parties led PNA movement
against the PPP government in March-April 1977 and
General Zia- ul Haq's military coup in July—who was quick
to announce that Pakistan was an 'Ideological State'2,
thus Jinnah's vision of Pakistan was deconstructed3.
Institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship within the
Military: 1978 - 1989
General Zia-ul—Haq's rise in Pakistan coincided with the
Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Socialist Revolution in
Afghanistan supported by Russian forces. He had been
quick in revealing his 'Islamist and fundamentalist' streak
when he changed the army's motto from Jinnah's 'Unity,
Faith, Discipline' to 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi sabeelillah'
(Faith, Obedience of God, Struggle in the path of Allah)
as army chief.4 Following the coup, he went full pace
in Nifaz-e-Islam (the implementation of Islam) making
the army not just the guardian of territorial but also the
ideological frontiers of Pakistan.5 Zia aligned himself with
the Islamist Jamaat-Islami, inducted its cadres in state
institutions, while manipulated his core constituency, the
Army through promotion and incentivization of religiosity,
even allowing Tableeghi Jamaat to preach in the military
academy. More importantly, the Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) which had developed links with Jamaat-e-Islami during the era of General Yahya Khan(1969-71) to counter
mainstream PPP, NAP and National Awami League6,
became directly responsible for operational, logistical and
psychological warfare during the US and Saudi-Arabia
sponsored Afghan Jihad. This network was instrumental in
churning out 80,000 warriors between 1982 and 19877.
By most accounts ISI emerged as the sole conduit of funds
to Afghan Mujahideen and encapsulating both Operations and Intelligence functions, it became independently powerful and resourceful growing in strength from 2000 employees in 1978 to 40,000 with a $1bn budget in 19888.
The distribution of funds and linkages to Afghan groups
based solely on being more Islamist and pro-Pakistan9
helped it take on an ideological character. Thus as Saudi
Arabia matched America's funding for the Afghan war, in
reality Zia's Islamization drive would be better categorized
as 'Wahabization' of Pakistani State and society10. Additionally, during this decade use of ideology emerged as a
potent factor in regional and global politics.
The 1980s also saw the rise of an ideological US president
Ronald Reagan, thus providing an ideological affinity for
the Pak-US leadership. This affinity was to play a crucial
role in subsequent years on the formation and emergence
of Taliban and the internationalist Al-Qaeda. While the
situation fit the strategic interests of both America to
counter the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia to counter
Iran—giving it overt sectarian overtones. On the other
hand, Pakistan played the role of a client state accepting America's strategic interest of defeating the Soviet
Union rather than securing its Western border; simultaneously, accepting thousands of Islamic radicals from other
countries and putting up hundreds of 'militant training
cells' to generate the radicalized manpower needed for
this task. There was little realization about the cultural
consequences to a plural and a relatively peaceful society.
Rather than finding a political solution to the Afghan imbroglio to end war and its consequences as suggested by
the Russians as early as 198311, Pakistan pressed on with
America's strategic interests to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan only to sign on the Geneva Accords in 1988. After fulfilling its strategic interests in Afghanistan, America
left the region leaving behind a war torn country, millions
of refugees and thousands of trained Islamist militants
while additionally splashing sanctions on Pakistan soon after for its nuclear program. This period thus involved an
overt State sponsorship of Islamist ideology, full throttle
international support for ideological non-state militants
(the Mujahideen) and institutionalization of Ideological
Guardianship within the army.
Manifestations of Ideological Guardianship in Strategic
Depth: 1989 - 2001
The third phase of Pakistan's history began with a transition to democracy rather than a fundamentalist ideologue
at the helm, however, the ideological tilt of the military
lingered on; first, the army ventured to undercut the
liberal PPP in elections through the formation of an alliance of rightist parties—Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI), then
it dictated terms for government formation12 and eventually it brought an aligned political party to power. Zia's
ideological focus continued with the new army chief Gen.
Mirza Aslam Baig, who disregarded Pakistan's territorial
interests by wanting to sell nuclear know how to Iran, but
the deal was rejected even by the ideologically aligned civilian leader13. The Soviet failure and eventual withdrawal
provided further impetus to the framework of Jihad- the
nexus of Islamist ideology and the use of non-state actors.
Thus as the Kashmiri rose in open revolt against Indian
policies and a rigged election, rather than strengthening
the nationalist movement to build internal and international impetus to resolve the tripartite issue, Pakistan
instead wrested the struggle away in favor of an ideological framework14 negating the territorial aspect of undefined boundary and nationalist aspirations at the heart of
the issue. The surplus manpower and infrastructure of the
Afghan war was redirected to the Kashmiri struggle with
the confidence that if a superpower could be defeated
so could India.15 The ideological aspect was pushed to its
logical conclusion by Zia's civilian protege, Nawaz Sharif
with the appointment of an Islamist ideologue (General
Javed Nasir, who had connections with Tableeghi Jamaat)
to head the ISI thus extending Jihad operations beyond Afghanistan and Kashmir. It was only after the fall of
civilian government that the existing military dispensation
removed the ISI chief and sent personnel back to their
regular army units, but only when Pakistan was threatened with being declared a terrorist state16
The concept of Strategic Depth evolved and was promoted
under these broad considerations. With the US departure;
Afghanistan still in shatters, the Western front gradually
became an extension of Pakistan's battle with India. The
institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship was based
on the fear of India invoked in religious terms; the nonstate actors were galvanized as ideological weapons and
the second line of defense against India. This provided a
rationale for the option of strategic space in Afghanistan
to safeguard military assets against India. Its practical
manifestation was the pursuit of an illusionary and flawed
policy of Strategic Depth . With Jihad now transformed
into a civil war among former Mujahideen leaders, Pakistan shifted its support 17 to an alternative Pushtun movement of Taliban (Deobandi Madrassa students) to bring
peace in Afghanistan. While the march through Pushtun
areas into Kabul was easy, the diversity of Afghanistan
either afforded peace of the dead or a multi-ethnic and
multi-sectarian broadening of the Taliban, an impossibility within the Taliban's ideological framework. As Pakistan
became one of only three countries (in addition to UAE
and Saudi-Arabia) to recognize the Taliban government,
Afghanistan instead became a regional battleground. Still,
even a dependent Afghan government refused to accept
the territorial integrity of its neighbor18 and there was
no change in the Afghan position on Durand Line. Rashid
argues otherwise stating that Durand Line was never a
priority for Pakistan because a fixed border would amount
Strategic Depth as blatant interference in another State.
He further states that even though the UN was inclined to
resolve the Durand Line issue during Geneva talks in 1988,
Pakistan never raised the issue then or during the decade
that Pakistan proxies ruled Afghanistan19. Thus the Strategic Depth policy became the practical manifestation of
strategic interests understood through the prism of Ideological Guardianship of Pakistan military. This policy had
four components; first, an undefined boundary-retaining
the contested Durand Line, second, ensuring a friendly
regime in Afghanistan, third, curbing Pashtun separatism
and nationalism through Islamism, fourth, ensuring a safe sanctuary for training ideological non-state actors for
Pakistan's regional policy objectives.
Although Pakistan's connections with few internationalist Jihadi groups continued because of their convergence
of interest in supporting the Taliban against the Northern
Alliance, they were not a part and parcel of the Strategic Depth framework as conflicting reports appeared in
regards to Pakistan's policy towards Al-Qaeda. On the one
hand, Osama Bin Ladin's training camp 'The Lions Den' in
Afghanistan reportedly also trained ISI linked local Jihadist groups, on the other, Pakistan also repatriated foreign
Jihadists to their countries in 1993.20 Yet, another report
indicates that just before the 1999 military coup the
Prime Minister of Pakistan had agreed in principle to support the American effort to nab Osama Bin Ladin.21
Thus during this period, the Strategic Depth framework
based on the internalization of Ideological Guardianship
within the military and the institutionalization of nonstate actors as a tool for furthering it gained momentum.
Resultantly, there emerged a Jihad Industry with numerous militant organizations, some proxies of the Pakistani
state and others driven by their own independent agenda.
These organizations competed for battlefield success, publicized their ideology and adventures through more than
a hundred publications29 while generating funds through
State patronage, and international and domestic private
contributors30.
Territorial versus Ideological Guardianship: The Aftermath
of 9/11
The dawn of Sept 12, 2001, while changing the strategic
interests of the West did not alter the existing regional
game play where the Pakistan-Saudi alliance backing the
Taliban was pitched against the Iran-India-Russia alliance
supporting the Northern Alliance throughout the 1990s.
Additionally, Afghanistan had become a sanctuary of
global Jihadi groups-- including Pakistani, Arab, Uzbek,
Chechen, Uighur Chinese and others, each pursuing its
own agendas.
Faced with territorial threat from the sole superpower, the
head of ISI agreed to all American demands in Washington. But he was one of the four generals to argue against
pulling out support for the Taliban in favor of America in
the Corps Commander meeting31. While tactically Pakistan
had changed its position to safeguard the home tory, still the military deeply imbued in Strategic Depth
ideology over the last two decades needed time to rethink
its future options in the region now that America had
become an active player. Additionally the Jihad infrastructure created over these years needed just the right
compromise to avoid a blowback. This explained General
Musharraf's defensive speech to the nation supporting the
American "War on Terror", literally abandoning the Taliban, but sheepishly shielding Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons
and the Kashmir Policy, while ensuring that Pakistan was
not declared a state sponsoring terrorism or was encircled
by India. Pakistan accepted most American demands,
breaking diplomatic ties and logistical support for the
Taliban, providing bases, over flight and landing rights,
and sharing of intelligence on key Taliban and Al-Qaeda
leaders among others32. But while getting billions in military and economic aid 33, Pakistan's strategic interests of a
friendly Afghan government through inclusion of moderate Taliban34 (who disown Al-Qaeda) or Hizb-e-Islami35
did not find any ears and instead a Northern Alliance
dominated government was formed in Kabul.
General Musharraf was quick to conduct a military
shakeup rooting out Generals who had disagreed with
his policy shift and disbanding two main units of the ISI
with links to Islamist militants36. Against intense American
pressure, Pakistan moved 80,000 soldiers to the Afghan
border to stem and capture Al-Qaeda operatives entering
into Pakistan. According to Rashid, Pakistani military was
careful not to place security forces at the border adjoining
Warizistan or Baluchistan, implying it allowed Al-Qaeda
operatives' access to Waziristan37. While Pak-US intelligence worked closely to capture Al-Qaeda, Pakistani or
Afghan Taliban who had been furthering Pakistan's policy
objectives in the region were not touched and simply
went home or to the mosque-madrassa establishments
that facilitated them. Furthermore some 500-1000 men
fighting the Americans to a standstill were airlifted from
Kunduz as a personal favor to Musharraf in late November38. A complete strategic re-alignment had yet to come
as the military safeguarded its assets either because its
strategic interests still required them or because it considered the risk to take on the complete ideological network
it had molded for twenty years as too high. Pre-empting
Pakistan's policy agenda, the ideological groups conducted
a master stroke on December 13, 2001 (Tora Bora fell on December 16) with an attack on the Indian parliament
forcing Pakistan to stop troop deployment to the Afghan
border39 and for Pakistan to reflect on who its ally and foe
were as Pakistan army came face to face with the largest Indian troop mobilization since 197140 as more than
1,000 Al-Qaeda operatives slipped through the border41.
The Afghan chess board which was dominated by the
Pakistan-Saudi-Taliban alliance throughout the 1990s was
shuffled overnight following the US and NATO engagement. America initially needed and then supported the
Iran-India proxy-- the Northern Alliance to dominate the
Kabul government. Iran looked the other way as its arch
foe America dismantled Taliban in Afghanistan. India
began making strategic investments worth more than
$1.2bn 42, constructing road infrastructure (connecting
Iranian port Charbahar to Central Asia thus bypassing
Gawadar), telecom facilities which used Indian satellites
and re-opening four consulates especially Qandahar and
Jalalabad close to the Pakistan border 43. Pakistan while
logistically supporting the American "War on Terror" and
capturing Al-Qaeda was unsure of its future course of
action. With the history of American cut and run in 1989,
its own strategic interests unchanged, its rivals gaining
ground and most importantly a society socialized to the
Islamist discourse through twenty years of Jihad propagation and Taliban eulogizing by Army establishment in cahoots with right wing forces, Pakistan dithered to make a
clean break with the Taliban as it would have demanded a
complete reorientation of its ideological strategic outlook.
Policy Ambivalence and the Making of FATA Insurgency
:
2002 - 2006
With the changed post 9/11 scenario, Pakistan could not
keep its Kashmir policy of using non-state actors intact
for too long especially after Kashmiri Jihadi groups were
implicated in the attack on Indian Parliament in december 2001. The attack forced Pakistan to ban Kashmir
oriented Jihadi groups44, however, these groups moved
their training camps to Azad Kashmir or FATA continuing training till at least March 2004 45. The 3000 arrested
members of banned organizations were freed after a
month 46 but continued American pressure forced demobilization of Kashmiri militants in 2003-04 47 and closing of
the intelligence's Kashmir Cell by 2004 without extensive
de-weaponization or rehabilitation. The great majority of
Kashmir centric Jihadi organizations drew their manpower
from Punjab. Most of these groups had trained in AlQaeda camps in Afghanistan where their leaders rubbed
shoulders with Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. While the
ideologically imbued secular institution of Pakistan Army
took its time deciding between its ideological inclination
and territorial necessity, the Punjabi Taliban no doubt
were clear about the ideological basis of their cause. Few
restrained (Lashkar-e-Taiba) under the ISI umbrella, others split (Jaish-e-Mohammad - JeM) or moved wholesale
(Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) into the Al-Qaeda camp. Christian
and American installations were the initial target of these
groups across Pakistan in 2002 till they regrouped in Waziristan. It was only after General Pervez Musharraf came
under attack in December 2003, that Pakistan military
began to review its policy of maintaining connections
with Jihadi groups. This attack clearly indicated a nexus
between the Punjabi Taliban and Al-Qaeda while showing their penetration in the armed forces as more than
fifty Air Force personnel linked to JeM were charged.48
Various senior Kashmir Jihad leaders were picked up and
interrogated further increasing the gulf between the once
partners. This led highly trained guerrillas along with master strategists such as Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade to
join the Afghan war theatre in 2005 49. Although Kashmiri
argued that he would not go against Pakistan's interests,
still the strategic guidance to Punjabi/Kashmiri groups
based in Waziristan was now being provided by Al-Qaeda
rather than the ISI.
On the political front, the Islamist and religious parties
who came together under the banner of 'Defense of Afghanistan Council'50 and later took the shape of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (a conglomeration of Deobandi, Wahabi,
Shia and Barelvi parties but effective power lay with the
larger JUI & JI) came to power in Khyber Pukhtoonkha
(NWFP) and Baluchistan. Several factors contributed to the emergence of MMA—its open anti-American stance,
exclusion of PPP and PML- N leadership from electoral
process (while Azam Tariq, the head of Sipah-e-Sahaba
was allowed to contest from his jail cell), the requirement of a Bachelors degree while accepting madrassa
degrees. All these factors demonstrated that the military
government was falling back on its ideological proxies to
cobble together a pliant government that fit its strategic interests.51 Thus as JUI virtually gave Pashtunabad,
Quetta to the Afghan Taliban, heads of JUI madrassas
along the Quetta-Chaman area met in Quetta with senior
ISI officers for funds and student rotation every month52
and Musharraf made Ijaz-ul-Haq, son of the fundamentalist military dictator the Minister for Religious Affairs,
the MMA reciprocated by supporting the constitutional
amendment to make Musharraf a powerful president.
With ideological godfathers of the Taliban in power, those
who had fought America alongside the Taliban as ministers, and a cadre that considered sheltering Al-Qaeda
leaders a responsibility, the Afghan Taliban and other
militant groups were given a free hand in organizing, mobilizing and propagating their message at the local level
without any threat from the provincially controlled police.
For the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it was a time to regroup.
While Al-Qaeda regenerated in its new high HinduKush
safe haven, the Afghan Taliban prepared their manpower
as expansion of madrassas gained pace along the Quetta
Chaman Highway. Pakistan had no counter-terrorism
strategy other than intelligence and operational facilitation to the Americans in hunting Al-Qaeda members,
while not a single top Taliban was given to the Americans53 who themselves were also least interested, instead
shifting their strategic focus to Iraq. Still the ISI (collusion
with CIA is suggested) did create proxies early on either to keep the Jihad flame burning or to split the Taliban
through the notion of 'moderate' Taliban - the Jamiatul
Khudamul Koran or later Jaish Muslimin condemned Mullah Omar's support for Al-Qaeda while fighting foreign
forces in Afghanistan54. Initially the Afghan government
became concerned about Taliban regrouping in Pakistan in
mid 2003 and later as American casualties in Afghanistan
doubled in 1st six months of 2004 compared to the previous year, American pressure vis-a-vis Taliban changed into
threats. Americans had been pressuring for action in Waziristan since mid 2002 owing to cross border attacks and
hostage taking. Pakistan had initially tried the tribal elder
route to dissuade locals to shelter foreigners or to conduct
cross border attacks but to no effect. It then followed it
up with small scale operations which did not resolve the
problem either. But following the assassination attempt
on Musharraf traced to Warizistan and American pressure
to tackle Al-Qaeda militants in South Waziristan, Pakistan
eventually went for a larger scale operation55 leading to
high military casualties at Kaloosha (See Figure 1). Two
leading Pakistani journalist present varied interpretation
of the operation; Gul calls it a spontaneous reaction and
mobilization of people to defend a comrade leader and a
wakeup call for the military in relation to militants. Rashid
goes a step further terming it an intelligence failure
blaming the ISI, which understood the ground realities in
South Waziristan. This would lead to first of many peace
agreements with FATA militants done from a position of
weakness. The peculiarity of the Shakai Agreement was
that it was done in 'Jamia Arabia Ahsanul Madaris', a
madrassa rather than the usual public jirga thus subscribing legitimacy to the mullah-militant nexus in the eyes of
the local people.56
The terms of agreement required tribal militants not to
attack the Pakistan Armed Forces, conduct cross border attacks or to establish parallel administration while
committing to register foreign militants. In turn the Army
would dismantle check posts in the area, free incarcerated tribal militants and compensate the tribe for damage
done during the operation. While the agreements stopped
attacks on Pakistan military, attacks on NATO forces in
Afghanistan spiked invoking a conflict of interest between
the two partners in the 'War on Terror'. This tactical conflict of interest could have been resolved if Pakistan and
America had the same strategic vision but low trust factor and demonizing of the ISI and America in the Western and
Pakistani press respectively precluded a real partnership
for a troubled relationship instead. Thus a cycle ensued
where America would either sabotage the peace agreement through a drone strike57 making new martyrs or
Pakistan would conduct a haphazard operation coinciding
with a meeting of an American dignitary inflaming a new
tribe, followed by a new peace agreement58.
Source: Interactive Map; Leaders of
Pakistan's Militant Groups.
Center for American Progress
Additionally, the military's air raids, scorched earth and collective punishment practices affecting civilians in trying to kill or capture key militant commanders followed by peace agreements led to enmity with the tribe59 while raising commander's profile in the tribe as often compensation was distributed through his offices. It also gave the militant commander financial strength, while pulling the army back from the areas made it easy for militants to target pro government tribal leaders who had initially invited or acquiesced government's operation. In total 400 tribal Maliks in FATA 60 were killed leaving the militants to run a parallel government where they were the only negotiating partner and decision makers for the tribe while hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. Thus in Waziristan where the Pakistan Army had initially targeted Ahmadzai Wazir militants for harboring foreign elements in 2003, by 2006 the three tribes of Waziristan, the Mehsuds, Wazirs and the Dawars were fighting together against a common enemy for the first time in history 61. Thus while the Pakistani state showed policy ambivalence
similar to the 1990s at a cursory level; in reality it was
still focused on its ideological Strategic Depth policy, the
difference being that two independent players, America
and Al-Qaeda had now joined the fray. Pakistan targeted
Al-Qaeda only to keep America happy while opting for
peace accords with tribal militants to concentrate their
activities inside Afghanistan and not attack Pakistani
forces. America had yet to differentiate between Al-Qaeda
and Afghan Taliban and wanted Pakistan to target both groups rather than sign peace accords. Al-Qaeda wanted
to stay an important player in the Afghan theatre as this
ensured its survival in the Waziristan safe haven primarily because it could be sacrificed for Pakistan's strategic
interests and was the primary reason for American presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan military had misjudged that
Jihadis, especially the lower cadre would also understand
compulsions of state craft where Al-Qaeda was targeted
while Afghan Taliban facilitated. Thus even though Pakistan's strategic interests gained ground as Taliban insurgency flourished in Afghanistan by the summer of 2006, it
had instead managed to spark its own insurgency in FATA
through haphazard military operations being ill-trained
for a highly mobile war, taking responsibility for American
attacks in FATA62, and allowing militants to consolidate
their control. The government had tried but failed to
outbid Al-Qaeda, which was handsomely paying its tribal
hosts for housing and security, and provided ideological
guidance while military's actions alienated tribes and only
enhanced militant hold in other agencies. Additionally
the State negligently allowed shifting of militants from
Kashmir to the Afghan front; not realizing that they could
move under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda enhancing both Al Qaeda's skill set and strike capability within Pakistan.
War Hits Home: The Loss of Internal Sovereignty
2007 - 2008
The spill over effects of policy ambivalence appeared as
the militants' targets increasingly moved beyond the tribal
areas focusing on the State's security apparatus. Mullah Dadullah, the Afghan Taliban Commander in Chief
had earlier brokered a ceasefire between militants and
Pakistan Army arguing that militants should concentrate
their efforts on fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan; while
foreign militants and Al-Qaeda linked groups such as Tahir
Yuldashev, the head of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
disagreed.63 Although there was a short reprieve when Uzbek militants were expelled from Wazir section of South
Waziristan due to infighting and with Army's support of
the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir, they found sanctuary with the Mehsuds. Thus indicating both turf wars and
enmeshed linkages between groups in the tribal areas of
Pakistan.
The situation had aggravated earlier when government
authorities brushed aside the killing of 82 including 12 teenagers at a Tehreek-e-Nifaz Sharia Muhammadi
(TNSM) seminary in October 2006 in Damadola, Bajaur in
an air strike calling them militants, thus provoking TSNM
movement in Swat to openly call for arms 64. But it was the
military's quashing of militants in the Lal Masjid operation
in July 2007 in full media publicity and national public
uproar, when militants finally gave up the possibility of
rapprochement with the military further moving into the
Al-Qaeda camp, leading them to formulate a common
strategy across FATA. Other than a spate of suicide bombings across the country, the affect of Lal Masjid could be
judged from the 'abduction' of 200-250 security personnel
in August 2007 including nine army officers who offered
little resistance 65.
Pakistan lost its key link with the Qandahari group 66, and
leverage over FATA militants with the killing of Dadullah
in March 2007. His death was defining moment as it led
to a shift in the Afghan Taliban leadership, which increasingly came under the control of Haqqani Network, a closer
associate of Al-Qaeda. By this time, militants had carved
out a territory for their command and control centers, more than 100 illegal FM Stations operated in FATA &
NWFP, half of them in settled areas working as their
propaganda arms 67 while Al-Qaeda's media arm Al-Sahab
tripled its Audio Visual production to 58 in 2006 and 89
in 2007 68 for militants' strategic guidance in both Pakistan
and Afghanistan. The year culminated with formation of
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with an estimated strength
of about 40,000 militants 69
As an all out war began in 2008, TTP gained an upper
hand with militants seizing to try to blow up the Kohat
Tunnel cutting off Peshawar's access from the Indus High way unsuccessfully. It overran the Sararogha Fort, South
Waziristan in January 2008 and increased suicide bombings in urban areas leading the government to launch
military operations in a number of tribal agencies followed
by peace agreements. While it seemed that the Pakistani
State had finally woken up to the militant terrorist threat,
the valley of Swat away from FATA proved otherwise as a
small time mullah practically took over the territory with
the help of TTP militants (foreigners included) who had
shifted from FATA to get away from military operations
and more importantly the drone attacks. Though he had
been facilitated by the MMA government and intelligence
agencies70, the 2007 military operation neither closed
down his propaganda radio, nor targeted his headquarters
(Imam Deri) or arms dump, thus allowing the emerging Taliban to increase their control of Swat from 15%
to 70%, eventually leading a Malik (tribal leader) Afzal
Khan Lala to ask if Taliban and the Military were actually
partners?.71
The Americans unable to contain the Afghan insurgency
shifted the blame to Pakistan and its inability to close
down militant sanctuaries in FATA. It's reassessment of
the war shifted the focus on Pakistan to do more in the "War on Terror". America thus supported a negotiated
settlement between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, the
head of a liberal party who could rally public support
and provide the much needed civil political backing for a
complete break with Pakistan's ideological strategy, which
was required to tackle the Afghan Taliban problem along
with Al-Qaeda. But Benazir Bhutto, a strategic threat to
Islamist, Jihadi and the Islamist segment of military establishment became the biggest Pakistani casualty of war.
With momentum shifting to the militants, the insurgency
increasingly over taken by Al-Qaeda linked groups and
under increased pressure from the international community to do more, Pakistan allowed America to setup a
secret CIA base for drone attacks inside FATA in January
2008 72. The drone attacks would strictly be an American
affair, disowned and publicly berated by the Government
of Pakistan allowing it to keep its peace agreements intact
with FATA militants.
The year 2007 was a year of political turmoil in Pakistan
as pro-democracy movement gained speed along side the
TTP insurgency in FATA, specifically denting the army's
morale as it was being criticized by all segments of the
political spectrum - the liberal segments berating it for being in alliance with the Mullah-Jihadi nexus, questioning its will to take on the surging militants while the
Islamists condemned it for bringing the American war to
Pakistan. The political dynamics changed as the new Army
Chief took over followed by the formation of government
by an alliance of secular liberal parties in the Centre and
Khyber Pakhtoonkha in March 2008. Policy formulation now included the civilian leadership which wanted
good relations with the Afghan and Indian governments 73
along with a more independent role for America to tackle
threats emanating from Pakistan but had to convince the
powerful ideological guardians, the military and intelligence establishments. The overtures of the weak coalition
civilian government in regional policy matters were soon
rebuffed and its international credibility ruined with the
attack on the Indian embassy74 and Hamid Karzai in Kabul.
The nail in the coffin was the December 2008 terrorist
attack in Mumbai implicating Lashkar-e-Taiba, the most
disciplined and the only non-state actor which had not
split staying within the ISI umbrella after the demobilization of Kashmir Jihad.75
Table l : Fatalities in Terrorist Violence & Number of Attacks
Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute of Conflict Management. ( http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html ) "Figures calculated in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010
Regaining Governance: Are We Approaching the End
Game 2009 - 2010?
As Taliban control in Afghanistan increased from 30/364 districts in 2003 to 164/364 districts by end of 2008 owing partly to suicide attacks 21 (2005), 136 (2006) and
137 (2007)77, it was clear that the American policy of outright military victory over the Taliban had failed. America
shifted blame equally to corruption in the Afghan government and the double game of the Pakistan ISI arguing
that 80% of the suicide attacks in Afghanistan could be
traced back to Warizistan78 as CIA shared evidence of ISI
links with the Haqqani Network79 which was behind Afghan suicide attacks. The Afghan voices had started arguing in late 2007 that there could be no peaceful solution
to Afghanistan without Hekmatyar & Taliban80, later taken
up by the British Defense Secretary81. Obama laid out his
Afghan Policy (Af-Pak) in March 2009 accepting both a
reconciliation strategy in principle as well as the importance of Pakistan's role in American exit strategy. But
rather than initiating a political dialog with the Afghan
Taliban, the American strategy involved a military buildup
to break the Taliban momentum while using the eighteen month period till July 2011 to articulate a political
strategy followed by draw down of troops. The reconciliation strategy was eventually endorsed by the international
community in the January 2010 London Conference with
even India and Russia giving up their opposition to talks
with the Taliban 82.
Table2: Incidence of Terrorist Attacks/Clashes in Pakistan
1. Including insurgent and sectarian incidents. 2. Operations conducted by security forces against militants.
3. Ethno-political and sectarian.
4. Clashes between security forces and militants.
Source: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.
Referenced in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010
The peak years of war (2008 & 2009) in Pakistan were
years of realignment as well as a movement away from
clandestine to a relatively more open articulation of its
interests. Pakistan had bore the brunt of the "War on Terror" losing 1,211 soldiers by Dec 2007 83 along with excessive collateral damage as suicide bombings jumped from
7 (2006), 54 (2007) to 59 (2008) 84. While the Pakistan
military had formally launched military operations in FATA
on July 19, 2007 85, it still seemed to lack the resolve to
tackle the insurgency holistically either because this went
against its strategic goals in Afghanistan, it was scared of
defections within army ranks due to soldiers subscription
of Al-Qaeda ideology, or because it needed public support
lost during years of military dictatorship. Gul argues that
GHQ finally woke up to the internal threat when the war
came home in late 2008. But more importantly, pressurized from all fronts: by the international community following Bombay massacre; by civil society in Pakistan after
Swat fell to the militants; by the civil government after
militants broke the Swat peace agreement; and by the
Americans invoking security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
and the capital Islamabad, the military conducted a successful large scale operation in Swat with political backing. However, almost all top militant leaders escaped. This
was followed by another successful operation against the
command and control centre of TTP in South Waziristan
in the summer of 2009 while keeping peace agreements
intact with two main Taliban commanders of South &
North Warizistan . This arrested the Pakistani Taliban
momentum in FATA and adjoined areas thus pushing them
into North Waziristan 86, which was outside the writ of the
State. Pakistan's new initiative increased the cost of war
with 76 suicide bombings in 2009 87 (Also see Table 1 & 2)
and then finally the seat of power, the Army General Head
Quarters (GHQ) was attacked in October 2009 while additionally army families were targeted in a mosque attack.
It seemed that the army had finally taken note with a
serving general stating that the army had reached a consensus in principle to go after all groups indiscriminately,
irrespective of their earlier links to military institutions 88.
By now, America had recognized the need to engage Pakistan in a strategic dialogue to influence its policy rather
than solely using it as a client state to try to achieve
American goals in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan still
publicly denied the existence of Quetta Shura and the presence of Haqqani Network in Pakistan89, it picked up
key leaders and incarcerated more than half of the top Afghan Taliban leadership to stall a direct channel between
Karzai and the Taliban without ISI sanction90 as well as to
show its leverage before entering into a strategic dialogue
with America in March 2010. Pakistan finally opened up
regarding its own interests in the Pak-US Strategic Dialog.
America acknowledged the importance of Pakistan's role
in peace talks between Kabul and the Taliban but rebuffed
a civil nuclear deal similar to India's while asking the
army to abandon its 30-year reliance on Islamist militants
for foreign policy objectives91. Additionally, Pakistan and
America were still at odds with specific aspects of their
Afghan strategy, as America wanted to weaken or divide
the Taliban92 through the surge, extension of drone strikes
in Baluchistan and military operation in North Waziristan,
to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of strength.
While Pakistan agreed in principle with the need for a
North Waziristan operation, it excused itself citing overextension. In actuality Pakistan's leverage in Afghanistan
depended on the strength of the Taliban with sanctuaries and nerve centers both in the Quetta-Chaman border
region and North Waziristan. Additionally, the army leadership was unsure of the backlash of such an operation
understanding full well that it would exceed all previous
operations given NW was now a sanctuary of all kinds of
militants groups (Haqqani, Hezb-i-Islami, Al-Qaeda, TTP
and the Punjabi Taliban).
As Pakistan delayed the North Waziristan operation, the
Americans doubled drone attacks to 90-124 93 in 2010. But
the Pak-US perspective differed drastically as independent
Pakistani media reports put casualty figures in terms of
terrorist to civilian ratio at 41:59 94, while an American
journal assessing all drone attacks till June 2010 put the
terrorist: civilians: unknown ratio at 80:4.5:15 95. This provides an apt indication of why America could not relate to
the increasing anti-Americanism in the country. Although
there had been an American presence in Pakistan since
2001, the terms of engagement had been settled with the
Pakistan Army. But since the return to civilian rule and
with it's acquiesce 96, American had increased its footprint
through a $1bn embassy and personnel expansion from
300 to 1,000 including both civilians (for Kerry Lugar Bill's
civilian support) and also covert operatives outside the ISI
domain 97. As American pressure and operation increased leading to the killing of two Pakistani soldiers in Kurram
Agency crossing the red line of cross border operations,
Pakistan closed the Afghan border crossing constituting 80% of NATO's non-lethal supply line for 10 days 98
while more than a 100 trucks were burnt by Taliban inside
Pakistan, further indicating Pakistan's leverage over NATO
forces just a few weeks before the Pak-American Strategic
Dialogue in October. With its enhanced leverage intact,
Pakistan Army, the real power in the country took steps to
limit American covert operations in the country, primarily
those being conducted unilaterally
Thus this period saw America falling back to the original
Pakistani position of negotiating with the Taliban for
peace in Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistan Army practically showed its strength and leverage in all spheres of the
Afghan imbroglio: taking on militant groups within the
country, incarcerating Afghan Taliban leadership, strangulating the NATO supply line, and lastly arresting America's
independent intelligence operations within Pakistan.
Although Pakistan had now acted in all tribal agencies of
FATA except NW, it clearly discriminated between militant
groups targeting the Pakistani state and those targeting
Afghanistan. Thus suggesting that Pakistan's Strategic
Depth policy, which seemed to be in disarray following
9/11, was back on track and Pakistan was well positioned
to negotiate its interests in Afghanistan and the region.
Rethinking Pakistan's Strategic Interests
Afghanistan, a land locked gateway between South,
Central and West Asia has been a confluence of competing interests of regional states (Central Asian States,
Iran, India, China and Pakistan) and international powers
(US, Russia). Pakistan's initial interests in Afghanistan had been based on the territorial security of its unrecognized western border inhabited by 19 tribes 99 living
on both sides of the Durand Line. While America left the
region following Soviet withdrawal, its sponsored Jihad,
the ideological warfare that it had helped groom with
Saudi Wahabi ideology and ISI's logistical expertise was
continued by Pakistan for its own strategic interests in the
region. Although Pakistan had gradually left the secular
ideals of its founder increasingly using Islam for bringing
together a multinational state before the 1980s Afghan
war, the sponsorship of Deobandi-Wahabi ideology mixed
with militancy training and funding facilitation by the
State had created a huge Jihad industry. This industry allowed Pakistan to gain Strategic Depth in Afghanistan and
to keep India bogged down in the Kashmir border conflict
throughout the 1990s but with tremendous internal costs.
As 9/11 brought the West back to Afghanistan primarily to undo the same ideological militant infrastructure
it had helped germinate, it left Pakistan's regional policy
executed through ideological non-state actors in tatters while also threatening Pakistan's territorial security.
Musharraf allayed the territorial threat by joining the
American "War on Terror" but America's expedient policy
framework which excluded the Taliban from the Bonn
process, which Lakhtar Brahimi aptly phrased "the original
sin",100 led to a hostile Kabul dispensation. Further, sensing
America's lack of long term interest in Afghanistan by not
putting needed boots on the ground and more importantly
by shifting strategic priority to Iraq left Pakistan Army
with no choice but to preserve its blood line in Afghanistan, especially when its arch enemy India was closing
its grip by opening consulates near the Pakistan border
and making investments which could bypass Pakistan's
strategic location as the transit trade route for energy
rich Central Asia. As Pakistan's competition for influence
in the region vastly outweighed the country's interests in
the "War on Terror",101 its perceived policy ambivalence
towards militants was in actuality a conscious decision
as Pakistan Army never considered Al-Qaeda, the Afghan
Taliban or the Punjabi Taliban a threat to the State. But a
forced closing of Kashmir Jihad at the threat of war with
India and the incursions in FATA to net Al-Qaeda primarily to show its support for the "War on Terror" to America,
redirected some militant factions to instead focus on the
Pakistani State and security apparatus. Pakistan's elite perceived that targeting of the Pakistani state had been
because of its alliance with US rather than the militants
wanting State power102. Thus Pakistan's implicit policy has
since been to convince all militant groups to concentrate
their energies in Afghanistan while tackling anti-state
groups who fail to understand Pakistan's compulsion visa-vis America103. Taliban still fit Pakistan's interest well
within the Strategic Depth framework, allowing Pakistan's
influence in Kabul following NATO withdrawal, check
Pushtun nationalism, provide access to Central Asia and
facilities for Kashmir bound militants104.
Table3: Pakistan's Burden of War
Source: Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10
Karachi: Social Policy & Development Centre (SPDC) 2010
But does Pakistan want to have the same scenario in Afghanistan as the 1990s when its intelligence agency was deeply linked in an Afghan civil war (along with other regional players) while being diplomatically isolated for supporting the Taliban? The Pakistan Army Chief Kiyani while
subscribing to Strategic Depth defined it as "a border we
don't need to worry about" indicating his interest in a
peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan rather than its
descent into obscurantism105. He has stated that a gradual
transition within the military establishment is under way
while hinting a policy change towards non-state actors,
saying that national defense will not be outsourced106. But
Pakistan still perceives Afghanistan as a battleground for
influence with India as Kiyani told Obama in their meeting
that US was not addressing his strategic imperatives (vis a-vis India)107. This India centric security thinking which
dictates Pakistan's Afghan policy, leading to the support
of the Taliban in Afghanistan and reluctance of the army
to become a counter insurgency force,108 thus following
containment rather than eradication of militants at home
(military refuses to act against Lashkar-e-Taiba till Kashmir and other issues with India are resolved109) is based on
a number of assumptions. First, the reconcilable ideological militant groups can be separated from the irreconcilable, who can then be tackled independently without affecting the relationship with the others. Second, Pakistan
alone has the strength to compete with the interests of
the sole superpower, NATO and regional players who all
now see ideological non-state actors as a threat to their
security in a post 9/11 security environment.
Experts agree that multiple groups constitute the insurgency in Afghanistan and FATA but only Shahzad accepts
that a gulf is possible between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda110. The Qandahari group is less inclined towards AlQaeda111 and its foot soldiers are less ideologically inclined
than the Pakistan based groups. Others argue that Mullah
Omar, although key to reconciliation has little power on
the ground which rests with the neo-Taliban (the new
generation Sirajuddin Haqqani versus Jalaluddin Haqqani)
who predominantly subscribe to the pan-Islamic Al-Qaeda
ideology112; the Haqqani group especially has close ties
with both Al-Qaeda and TTP (Baitullah Mehsud got three
members of the Haqqani family released in a prisoner
swap with Pakistan Army113). Thus most experts dismiss
Pakistan's strategic thinking that homegrown militants
can be crushed while maintaining Afghan Taliban proxy
for final settlement.114
America's war in Afghanistan initially focused on the
elimination of Al-Qaeda but has since evolved into an Af-Pak framework. This includes both a stable Afghanistan devoid of terrorist bases and civil war, as well as a
stable Pakistan, which does not support militant groups115.
America's concern regarding Pakistan, with some terming
it the biggest foreign policy challenge of the 21st century
is because of Pakistan's mix of the fastest growing nuclear
arsenal in the world and being home to a large number
of terrorist organizations116. This concern is now shared
by other European capitals and the change of focus can
be termed from the fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba is now
mentioned alongside Al-Qaeda in most policy reviews.
Mindful of its current weak position vis-a-vis Pakistan,
which enjoys unusually strong leverage with both sides of
the Afghan war, and could jeopardize the American war
through reduction of intelligence cooperation and closing
of NATO's logistical route117, America pursues a carrot
heavy strategic dialogue to encourage Pakistan towards
its own policy interests while strategizing to decrease its
reliance on Pakistan118. America had lost leverage in the
region because of the earlier deterioration of Pak-India,
US-Iran, US-China and Russia-NATO relations119 and
thus roping in China and others to pressure Pakistan or
to defuse regional tension through Pakistan India peace
have not yet borne fruit. But on the contrary, American
policy analysts have also put the option of cut & run
in Afghanistan, putting Pakistan on the list of states
sponsoring terrorism120 and forming a strategic alliance
with India to contain a dangerous Pakistan121 on the table.
Additionally, America is aware of its long-term leverage
over Pakistan as 1/4 of Pakistan exports are US bound, 1/3
foreign investment comes from US, and additionally it has
the power to use IFI's to isolate Pakistan or curtail military
assistance stalling Pak-Army's American made weaponry
for lack of spare parts122.
Thus both assumptions underlying the current policy
framework are weak, but even if they are granted, what
can not be looked over is the internal cost of the Strategic Depth policy framework which discriminates between
good versus bad ideological militants and uses non-state
actors as a key tool for foreign policy objectives. Terrorism cant not be countered when suicide bomber training
camp in Shawal, SW is run jointly by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a
strategic asset for Pakistan Army focusing on Afghanistan
and Qari Hussain123, a hunted TTP militant commander
responsible for most suicide attacks within Pakistan. Such paradoxical security framework is a step up from the
1990s instead making Pakistan the Strategic Depth for
Afghan and international Islamist militants, and leading to
State's loss of sovereignty over vast areas. It has allowed
domestic terrorism for strategic needs in Afghanistan to
the effect that militant's practically gained control over
people's lives in FATA and Swat by eliminating traditional
leadership. But more importantly, it is this subservience
of domestic security to the Strategic Depth framework
that has led to immeasurable costs in the socio-cultural
domain. The continuing need of Deobandi-Wahabi schools
for Jihad has led to increased religious extremism, militarization and criminality in society as other sects have
followed suit in safeguarding their own communities.
Sectarianism and violence earlier restricted to Sunni-Shia
has taken on a new dimension as other than the Ahmedi
and Shia, now the Barelvi sect (Sufi saint mausoleums and
Eid Milad-un-Nabi) is also being targeted while religious
scholars (the ulema), who have passed injunctions against
suicide bombings have been killed irrespective of their
schools of thought124. Since 2001, a total of 2,564 citizens
have been killed while 5,071 125 have been injured in sectarian violence, triple the casualty figure of 1989-2000 126.
Thus a change in Strategic Depth policy is necessary for
Pakistan's internal stability. While Pakistan Army as an
institution is skilled in the realism of international relations, as it forgoes its ideological partner when faced with
a territorial threat; It closes down and reforms sections of
the ISI when faced with internal threat and insubordination; still it fails to understand that its strategic policy
framework is flawed and hurting the country. An important factor in this regard is the civil military power imbalance and a lack of trust between the two institutions. The
army has managed the Afghan and Kashmir policy since
Zia's time leading to a lack of rethinking and reassessment for the last 30 years as policy change is primarily an
outcome of pluralism, opposition and peaceful transfer
of power, the beauty of democracy. It is also perfectly
understandable for a military institution to be strategically trained in a zero sum game with its arch enemy, but
for that to be unchallenged State policy for decades is
anathema to growth and progress of any nation. This can
be judged from the fact that all democratically elected
leaders since the last 30 years have either extended or
accepted peace overtures towards India and Zardari's
foreign policy agenda also includes peace with India, no Taliban safe havens in Pakistan and good relations with
America127. But the civil political leadership has yet to gain
the confidence of the powerful security establishment and
lacks the institutional strength to forcefully make a case
for policy change128, thus the strategic policy role stays
with the military129.
As the end game in Afghanistan nears, Pakistan would
be well advised to understand that the root of its current predicament lies in its undefined borders in the West
and East and thus its leverage should be used towards
these ends. Although Pakistan is in a strong position to
gain strategic space in Afghanistan, the Pakistan military
should understand that this leverage is an outcome of
excessive internal costs and its unaccountability. Pakistan
should not confuse this short-term leverage with longterm influence, which is dependent on internal strength
and strong diplomatic relations based on mutual interests.
For this, Pakistan would need to bury the Strategic Depth
policy framework to explore and exercise the following set
of policy options: First, make a clean break from using ideological non-state actors for its policy objectives. Second,
enhance its diplomatic relations (US, Saudi, and China),
which were built on the foundations of security arrangements with security agenda usually trumping economic
interests,130 to encompass a broad development focus.
Third, Pakistan desperately needs to put its internal house
in order and to that end seeking peace with India, which
is involved in proxy wars with Pakistan and can exploit
its internal troubles131, would be a desirable goal. Finally,
Pakistan needs to evolve a comprehensive counter terrorism and extremism strategy, foremost being integration
of FATA with the rest of the country and strengthening its public institutions to create the 2 million yearly jobs 132
required for its current demographics. This demands a
paradigm shift, which is not possible with a war in its own
neighborhood that has caused 9,410 civilian and 3,325
security agencies fatalities133 while displacing more than 3
million people from their homes (although most have gone
back). Pakistan continues and could leverage in Afghanistan in strategic terms, however, time is running out and
it has already lost the 1st decade of the 21st century with
$43bn134 (Also see Table 3) as the cumulative cost of war
to the economy and additionally reduced public services
spending (due to higher spending on security) leading to
Pakistan most likely missing its Millennium Development
Goals 2015 targets135. Thus there is a growing realization
in Pakistan that a continuation of war in Afghanistan does not serve its national interest.136
End Notes
1. The Durand Line was agreed upon as the border between Afghanistan and British India in 1893 to be in effect for a 100 years till 1993.
2. Haq, Sadr Pakistan General Zia ul. Speeches Vol. 1 5 July - 31 Dec 1977. In the founding address to Council of Islamic Ideology on Sept 29, 1979 he is
quoted “We want
to make Pakistan as experiment in Islam". On July 5, 1977 quoted “Pakistan came into being and will stay for Islam. Islamic System is necessary”.
3. Muneer, Mohammad Justice. From Jinnah to Zia, Lahore: Vanguard Books 1979.
4. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008 p. 384.
5. Haq, Sadr Pakistan General Zia ul. Speeches Vol. 1 5 July - 31 Dec 1977. Zia’s addressed the Pakistan Army as “Soldiers of Islam” in Address to the Nation
27th July 1977.
Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule, Lahore: Vanguard Books 1991. For Zia, Pakistan & Islam were two sides of the same coin. Protection & integrity of
both was the task of military establishment alone.
6. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 373.
7. ibid, p. 375.
8. Riedel, Bruce. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad, The Brookings Institution, July 18, 2011. Last Accessed on March 11,
2011.
9. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007.
10. The Tableeghi Jamaat and Jamiat -Ulema-Islam (JUI) are Deobandi groups while the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) though eschewing sectarian is much closer to
Deobandi, Wahabi groups in ideology than the Barelvi or Shia. Among the Islamists, JUI & JI have primarily influenced State policy as elected government
or through the support of dictators.
11. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 377.
12. Hasan, Mubashir. ‘The Military loses and gains clout’, The Express Tribune, October 26, 2010. Military allowed Benazir slot of Prime Minister on 3 conditions: 1. Military to remain independent in its own affairs; 2. No jurisdiction over nuclear program; 3. Ghulam Ishaq Khan to serve as President, Lt. Gen
Retd. Yaqub Khan as foreign minister and VA Jaffery as head of the finance ministry.
13. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 166.
14. Rana, Amir. Jihad-e-Afghanistan or Kashmir, (Urdu), Lahore: Mashal Publications 2002, p. 20.
15 Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
16. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 27. General Nasir was sacked in May 1993 and some 1100
ISI operative were retired or sent back to their army units.
17. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010. Pakistan supported with logistics and supplies
through ISI offices in Herat, Qandahar and Jalalabad.
18. Khattak, I. Taliban Claim Mohmand Agency. The Friday Times, 11th February, 2001.
19. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 267.
20. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 27. The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Libya had
specifically complained about the Peshawar base for terrorism planning in their country.
21. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 38.
22. Although two purges of the Shia in Parachinar and Gilgit had already taken place in 1988.
23. Jamal, Arif. ‘Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan’, The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor, Volume 9 Issue 8. www.jamestown.org. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.
24. Haq, Zia ul. Speech to the Majlis Shura , 1983. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPkIqd4nNIM. Last accessed Feb. 28, 2011.
25. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 138.
26. Rana, Amir & Gunaratna, Rohan. Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, p. 86.
27. ‘Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/
pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm. Last accessed March 15, 2011.
The sectarian killings were initially restricted to leaders and activists, then state symbols eventually becoming indiscriminate by 1997 according to Zahab,
Mariam. ‘The regional dimension of sectarian conflict in Pakistan’, CERI Paris. Last Accessed March 11, 2011.
The sectarian penetration of body politics could be assessed by the promulgation of two ministers of Sipah-e-Sahaba (the parent party of anti-Shia terrorist
outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and also categorized as the ‘mother’of all Deobandi Jihadi organizations) in the 1995 Punjab Government in Ahmed, Khaled.
Religious Developments in Pakistan 1999-2008. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010
28. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 24.
29. Rana, Amir."Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview", Conflict and Peace Studies, Issue 1 Number 1, Islamabad: PIPS 2008. p. 47.
30. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 138. The ISI facilitated Lashkar-e-Taiba’s fund raising drive by asking traders
to contribute. Additionally LeT’s donation boxes across the country generated Rs. 120 million daily.
31. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 41
32. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010, p. 41. Pakistan provided three bases Jacobabad,
Dalbandin and Shamsi.
33. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007. Economic Aid included $1 bn loan writeoff, $600 million
budgetary support, $12.5bn debt rescheduling.
34. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 45.
35. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Pakistan has its own battle to fight’. The Asia Times June 28, 2010. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011
36. ibid
37. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 148
38. ibid p. 91
39. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 120.
40. ibid, p. 107
41. A Pakistan-India war at this time would have achieved Al-Qaeda’s civilizational war paradigm through an America-India-Israel (the ‘Christian-Hindu-Jew’)
alliance versus a nuclear armed Muslim state. Still, that this later came to dominate the conspiracy theory whirlwind behind terrorist attacks in Pakistan
attests either to the dominance of Islamism in the Pakistani public discourse or to the sponsorship of this discourse by the dominant military establishment.
42. Pakistan Policy Working Group. The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan, September 2008, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.
cfr.org/pakistan/pakistan-policy-working-group-next-chapter-united-states-pakistan/p17413. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.
43. Yousafzai, Rahimullah, ‘A New Proxy War?’, Newsline 19 June 2006.
44. Though Jaish-e-Muhammad initially took credit for it, some authors state that it was instead a Lashkar-e-Taiba operation. These and two sectarian groups
Sipah-e-Sahaba and Tekrik-e-Jafaria were banned.
45. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 165.
46. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 147.
47. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 159.
48. Zahid Hussain. General Sympathy Aiding the Taliban, Newsline, 18 Nov, 2009.
49. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Al-Qaeda’s guerrilla chief lays out strategy’. The Asia Times Oct 15, 2009. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15,
2011.
50. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 173, while Ahmed Rashid calls it a ISI sponsored alliance.
51. ibid, p. 175. While these parties publicly criticized Musharraf’s policies and enflamed the public with Anti-American rhetoric, still they were aligned with
military’s objectives as indicated by the three hour meeting between Musharraf and head of Jamaat-e-Islami on the eve of 2002 elections.
52. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 249
53. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 240
54. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Pakistan has its own battle to fight’. The Asia Times June 28, 2010. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
Jaish Al-Muslim was publicly and officially launched on Sept 17, 2003 in Peshawar.
55. Rana, Amir & Gunaratna, Rohan. Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, p. 71.
56. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010 p. 76. A Lt. Gen went to the militants’ location
and exchanged gifts. He thus accepted the madrassa and associated clergy as the new power in the area while subscribing legitimacy to the militants as
negotiating partner rather than tribal chiefs.
57. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Another deadly blow for Pakistan’. The Asia Times Oct 31, 2006. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. While
Nek Mohammad was killed by a Drone strike in South Waziristan, the Pakistan Army took credit for the killing. Similarly Baitullah Mehsud was targeted
by Drone few days after an agreement with Pak Army. Additionally the Oct 2006 American helicopter gunship strike in Damadola, Bajaur came two days
before Pakistan Army and militants were to sign a peace deal.
58. Rana, Amir & Sial, Safdar & Basit, Abdul. Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2010. Fact Files 2 & 3.
Major military operations which began in South Waziristan (2004), extended to North Waziristan (2005), Swat (2007), Bajaur (2008) and Khyber (2009). In
all but Khyber, military action was followed by a peace agreement with the militants.
59. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Hostage deaths adds to Musharraf’s woes’. The Asia Times October 16, 2004. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15,
2011. Argues that September 2004 bombing by Pakistani planes leading to civilian deaths among the Mehsuds led the Mehsud youth to join the insurgency
which was earlier limited to few Waziri sub-tribes. Even Baitullah Mehsud had earlier disagreed with Abdullah Mehsub in targeting Pakistani forces only to
change his opinion later.
60. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010.
61. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Revolution in Pakistan Mountains’. The Asia Times March 23, 2006. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
62. Pakistan government took responsibility of American attacks on Nek Mohammad and the attacks in Bajaur Agency in 2006.
63. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Warizistan Jihadi wage war on each other’. The Asia Times March 13, 2007. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 20,
2011.
64. Yousafzai, Aqeel. Talibalization, Lahore: Nigarishat Publications 2009, p. 205. Fazlullah’s brother died in the strike leading him to take a militant route.
65. GlobalSecurity.org, “Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan", Alexandria: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ttp.htm Last accessed on April 4, 2011.
66. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘Pakistan makes a deal with the Taliban’. The Asia Times March 1, 2007. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
67. Rana, Amir & Sial, Safdar & Basit. Abdul, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2010, p. 155.
68. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008.
69. Ibid, p. 385.
70. Yousafzai, Aqeel. Talibalization, Lahore: Nigarishat Publications 2009. When trucks full of arms from Dir to Imam Deri, Swat was intercepted by the police,
both SHO and DCO were transferred in 2007. Earlier in a case of Bank Robbery in 2004, when police captured the robbers, three Al-Qaeda men were flown
out by helicopters while the investigation officer linking it to Peochar Camp was transferred at the behest of Intelligence Agencies.
71. ibid, p. 215.
72. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 389.
73. Karzai’s (much criticized for being anti-Pakistan in the media) attended the inauguration of President Zardari signaling government’s intention of good
relations with Afghanistan while PPP-ANP-MQM have long been considered Indophile (India loving) parties by the military establishment.
74. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 163. The Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul on July 7, 2008 had been traced back
to Pakistani intelligence while both Karzai and embassy bombings were carried out the Haqqani group.
75. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 53.
76. Rashid, Ahmed. ‘The Afghanistan Impasse’ The New York Review of Books August 10, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 01,
2011.
77. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 366.
78. Hussain, Zahid. From Suicide to Safety, Newsline Aug 8, 2009.
79. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 161.
80. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. ‘Much ado about nothing’, Newsline September 9 2007.
81. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. ‘More money more problems’, Newsline December 9, 2007.
82. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. ‘Desperately seeking peace’, Newsline February 26, 2010.
83. ‘Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2011’, South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, http://www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011.
84. ‘Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan’. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fiyadeenattack.htm. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011.
85. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 385.
86. Pakistan military’s peace agreements with both Commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan and Mullah Nazir of South Waziristan stayed intact during the South Waziristan operation.
87. ‘Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan’. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fiyadeenattack.htm. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011
88. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 136.
89. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. ‘The long haul’, Newsline November 30, 2009.
90. Rashid, Ahmed. ‘Pakistan and Afghanistan End Game 1’, Yale Global December 3, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
91. Rashid, Ahmed. ‘US-Pakistan Dialog with a difference’, BBC News March 30, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
92. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. ‘Desperately seeking peace’, Newsline February 26, 2010.
93. Sources differ on the number of Drone attacks in Pakistan. ‘Drone Attack in Pakistan: 2005-2011’. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for
Conflict Management. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.htm states 90 attacks while
Mir, Amir. ‘Drones killed 59pc civilians, 41pc terrorists’ The News, Jan 03, 2011 states 124 attacks.
94. Mir, Amir. ‘Drones killed 59pc civilians, 41pc terrorists’ The News, Jan 03, 2011.
95. William, Fricker & Plaw. ‘New Light on the Accuracy of the CIA’s Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan’, The Jametown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor
Volume 8 Issue 41. www.jamestown.org. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011
96. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘All roads lead to Paksitan’. The Asia Times April 7, 2009. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
97. Mir, Amir. ‘Unannounced settlement likely between Pak-US spy agencies’, The News March 07, 2011.
98. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. ‘Still at Odds: Pakistan-US Relations’, Newsline November 13, 2010.
99. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 178
100. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008.
101. Wirsing, Robert referenced in Fair & Crane & Chivvis & Puri & Spirtas. Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure State? Santa Monica: RAND 2010.
102. Fair & Crane & Chivvis & Puri & Spirtas. Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure State? Santa Monica: RAND 2010.
103. Gul, Imtiaz, The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 56. Thousands of Punjabi Taliban were allowed into Wana in late 2006 to fight
against the Uzbeks in allegiance with Mulla Nazir with the commitment that their struggle would only be against foreign forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces would not be attacked even if they conduct a military operation at America’s behest or allow American drone attacks in its territory.
104. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
105. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010.
106. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 127.
107. Riedel, Bruce. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad. The Brookings Institutions Jan 18, 2011
108. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
109. Rashid, Ahmed. ‘US-Pakistan Dialogue with a difference’, BBC News March 30, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011
110. Though
recently even he has raised doubts arguing that the neo-Taliban wholeheartedly subscribe to Al-Qaeda ideology
111. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘War & Peace: A Taliban View’, The Asia Times March 26, 2010. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011
112. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. ‘The rise and rise of the neo-Taliban’. The Asia Times April 2, 2009. http://www.atimes.com. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011
113. ‘Pakistan frees Haqqani relatives under swap deal’, Pajhwok Afghan News, November 13, 2007. Last Accessed on March 25, 2011
114. Rashid, Ahmed, ‘The Road to Kabul Runs Through Kashmir’, Foreign Policy November 10, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011
115. Armitage & Berger & Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010.
116. Riedel, Bruce. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad. A Panel Discussion. The Brookings Institutions Jan 18, 2011. Last
Accessed on March 15, 2011.
117. Armitage & Berger & Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010.
118. Pande, Aparne. ‘Dangerous Games’, The Friday Times. April 22-28, 2011. Russian parliament approved a deal in March 2011 to allow transit for
military equipment & personnel across Russia to NATO forces in Afghanistan.
119. Rashid, Ahmed. ‘Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan’, Routledge October 27, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011
120. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
121. Cohen, Stephen P. Coping with a failing Pakistan. Oslo: The Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre Feb 2011.
122. Armitage & Berger & Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010
123. Gul, Imtiaz, The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 130.
124. Among others, Maulana Hasan Jan, a deobandi (JUI-F) was killed in 2007, Maulana Naeemi, a barelvi was killed in 2009.
125. ‘Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/
pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011
126. Jamal, Arif. ‘Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan’, The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor Volume 9 Issue 8. www.jamestown.
org. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. The penetration of extremism and militancy within society can be perceived by the cheering of the killing of State
Governor by a State security guard belonging to a Barelvi organization formed in response to the Deobandi-Wahabi dominance.
127. Rashid, Ahmed, ‘The Pak-Army’s Political Gamble’, The Daily Beast October 15, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
128. Both placing the ISI under Interior Ministry as well as sending of ISI Chief to India post Mumbai Massacre were rebuffed by the military.
129. Yousafzai, Rahimullah, ‘The fly in the ointment’, Newsline June 11, 2008.
130. Fair & Crane & Chivvis & Puri & Spirtas. Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure State? Santa Monica: RAND 2010.
131. Gul, Imtiaz, ‘It takes two to tango’, The Friday Times April 8-14, 2011.
132. Armitage & Berger & Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010.
133. Figure till end of 2010. ‘Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2011’. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011.
134. Finance Ministry Figures, Government of Pakistan. Referenced in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review
2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010.
135. ibid
136. It seems time is in favor of Taliban, India and Saudi Arabia’s interests. India’s costs in Afghan involvement are negligible while its adversary Pakistan bears
the brunt of war. Saudi Arabia would rather have Al-Qaeda stationed in Afghan-Pakistan border than Yemen. America & West have a falling public support
for war as well as high costs in the time of an economic downturn. Afghan citizens have a war fatigue as Afghanistan has been at war since 1980. Pakistan’s internal governance problems are increasing with insurgency in Pushtun & Baloch areas, its economic disparity vis-a-vis India increasing drastically.
Pakistan needs an end to war for development and for putting its internal house in order.
137. Rashid, Ahmed, ‘Bridging a gap for India and Pakistan’, Washington Post November 25, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
138. ‘Joe Biden: 2014 Afghanistan Pullout is ‘Drop Dead Date’. The Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.com. Last Accessed on Feb. 5,
