WHY IS CHINA PESSIMISTIC ? LT GEN P R SHANKAR (R)

 SOURCE :

(   )  Russo-Ukraine War - 2024 :https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/russo-ukraine-2024.htm

(   ) Russo-Ukraine War - 2024:Russo-Ukrainian War - 04 February 2024 - Day 710 - https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/russo-ukraine-2024-maps.htm

                 Russo-Ukraine War - 2024

A number of claims and counterclaims are being made on the Ukraine-Russia conflict on the ground and online. While GlobalSecurity.org takes utmost care to accurately report this news story, we cannot independently verify the authenticity of all statements, photos and videos.

On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]

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The United States continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. This includes Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative [USAI] and Ukraine Presidential Drawdown Replenishment. DoD Components provide estimations for valuing assets provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). Excess Defense Articles [EDA] are provided to partner nation at a reduced price (based on the condition of the equipment) or as a grant once the Military Departments identify excess equipment.

Two years after Russia decided to invade Ukraine, Putin's attempt to swiftly conquer Ukraine has clearly failed. But Russian invaders continue their assault on the front line in Ukraine's east and south. Putin's forces continue to target innocent civilians across Ukraine with missiles and drones. But the more Putin tries to impose his imperial vision through violence and aggression, the more Ukraine resists and the more Ukraine's allies and partners come together. The Kremlin has isolated itself. It is left to seek weapons from ally -- from the likes of Iran and North Korea. Failure to counter Putin's war of choice will mean aggressors and autocrats worldwide will be emboldened.

"We have heard reports from the Ukrainian government that they have concerns -- from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and general staff that they are concerned that they believe that units are not -- do not have the stocks and the stores of ammunition that they require, and that is one of the reasons we have been focusing on the need to answer Congress's questions so that they are able to move forward on a decision to pass the supplemental." Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said 24 January 2024.

Wallander said "we are able to provide ammunition and interceptors that were contracted for in 2022 and 2023 under USAI, but those levels are not -- are not at the same level when we were able to provide on a regular basis ammunition and interceptors and other capabilities funded both by PDA and by USAI. So without USAI, we're not able to sustain the same levels of provision of capability to Ukraine."

The Biden administration and House Republicans failed to reach a funding deal that would have included an additional $60 billion in security assistance for Ukraine's military effort. In an interview 16 January 2024 with ABC News, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba said that this money would potentially allow Ukraine to avoid a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, in which American troops would be forced to intervene. "Even if we run out of weapons, we will fight with shovels. Because the existence of this nation is at stake for Ukraine," he told ABC News during an interview in Kyiv.

The "prospects for passing any deal on immigration policy and Ukraine aid in the Republican-led House are near zero... House Speaker Mike Johnson, who is beholden to his right wing and to former president Donald Trump.... in a leaked call with GOP members, Johnson went further, saying he wouldn’t accept any Senate deal and that he doesn’t think the border issue can be solved until a Republican becomes president.... Johnson has no political motivation to move against his right wing and defy Trump to support a Senate compromise. Why give President Biden a win on the border going into the general election? Setting extremist standards for immigration reform was part of MAGA’s plan to kill both efforts all along." wrote Josh Rogin in The Washington Post 19 January 2024.

Despite the huge American and Western aid amounting to more than $100 billion during 2023, its counterattack - which was much promoted - ended in great disappointment after Russia repelled it, and the Ukrainian army did not succeed in regaining the territory controlled by Moscow, which is estimated at a fifth of Ukrainian territory. If Kiev receives a large boost of US aid in 2024, as President Biden hoped, it may still have to consolidate its power and absorb the relentless Russian attacks.

The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center noted that Russia commenced 2024 with the biggest air and drone strikes since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, attacking civilians and infrastructure in cities including Kyiv and Kharkiv, as ammunition for Western-provided air defense ran out and debates continued in Washington on whether to provide more. With deflated expectations on territorial progress by Ukraine, and attention shifted to the Israel-Hamas war, international media has largely deemed the ongoing counter-offensive a failure and the war on Ukraine a stalemate.

However, contrary the expectations of pessimists, Ukrainian strikes into the Black Sea and the Russian navy headquarters in Sevastopol crippled Russian naval efforts in the region and broken the long-standing blockade on Ukrainian trade. As recently as late December 2023, Ukrainian drone and missile strikes hit and destroyed key Russian warships and landing craft in occupied Crimea. Additionally, the Ukrainian military continued to repel Russian forces in cities in the east and south, inflicting possibly unsustainable manpower and equipment attrition on the Russian military.

The dubious framing of the war as a stalemate had become an argument against further Western support for Ukraine and led some to push for negotiations with the Kremlin. Such narratives discount the substantial successes Ukraine enjoyed in the Black Sea and ignored the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin had shown no real indication of moving away from his maximalist war aims for conquest of Ukraine and imposition of a New Europe. Nor had Putin shown the political will to conscript the army needed to realize such ambitions.

The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center proposed the key quesitns for the new year - What does Ukraine need to succeed in 2024? How did the media narrative of the failed counteroffensive form, and how can Ukraine’s Western allies best maintain international support for continued aid? What is the true danger of accommodating a continuously aggressive Kremlin?

Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba stated 25 January 2024 that the gross domestic product of Ukraine and its allies is 21 times higher than that of Russia and its allies. The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported this in an interview with Foreign Affairs. "If you take the states that militarily support Ukraine and those that militarily support Russia, the combined GDP of our state and allies is 21 times greater than that of the Russian "coalition," Kuleba said. The minister emphasized that, "according to this, the world has enough resources for Ukraine's victory even in a war of attrition."

Kuleba emphasized that even when analyzing the ability to create coalitions, Ukraine exceeds the capabilities of the Russian Federation in this regard. "And it's funny, because Ukraine is not a member of the G7, and yet the G7 is much more united in helping Ukraine protect its interests. Russia is one of the founders of BRICS, but BRICS is much less supportive of the Russian Federation, even though it is supposedly a member of their families," said the minister.

Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’

 SOURCE : 

(   ) Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’ :  https://jamestown.org/program/beijing-grows-assertive-as-chinese-private-military-companies-come-out-of-the-shadows/#:~:text=The%20article%20suggested%20that%20Beijing,Russia%20and%20the%20United%20States.

(   )  China’s Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road :https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-private-army-protecting-the-new-silk-road/

(   )  The Rapidly Growing Market for Chinese Private Security Contractors in Africa : https://youtu.be/og1P4exF5lQ

Dec 19, 2019 The China in Africa Podcast

The recent kidnapping of three Chinese miners in the southwestern Nigerian state of Osun highlights the vulnerability that confronts the Chinese in many parts of Africa. Chinese companies are well-known for being willing to work in highly volatile regions, even amid civil wars in places like the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Mali among others. Until recently, Chinese companies opted to not invest in security measures or contracted with international firms like G4S who've been active on the continent for many years. That's now starting to change as Chinese private security contractors see an opportunity to provide protective services to companies all along the Belt and Road including Africa. In light of China’s “going out’’ policy, the need to support China’s State-Owned Enterprises that are investing in high-risk areas has expanded the Chinese market for security services," according to Dr. Alessandro Arduino, Co-Director of the Security & Crisis Management International Centre at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. "Risk assessment and mitigation in the African countries participating in the BRI requires a wide range of security services along both the maritime and land routes," he added in a recent column written for the China-Africa Research Initiative. Dr. Arduino joins Eric to discuss the growing market for Chinese protective services in Africa and the risks confronting these security contractors who are operating in new, unfamiliar territory.

 

 Beijing Grows Assertive as Chinese Private Military Companies ‘Come Out of the Shadows’

                                  By: Paul Goble

(Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

January 11, 2024 

For more than a decade, China has been using its own private military companies (PMCs) to guard Chinese facilities abroad, preferring to use them rather than rely on protection from local firms or PMCs from other countries. On occasion, Beijing will employ PMCs to put pressure on governments in other countries (see EDM, March 25, 2021). Until now, it has always done so without much fanfare. Chinese officials typically deny that PMCs play a role greater than merely defending Chinese interests. Beijing often chooses to call these entities by various other names to hide their true nature (Window on Eurasia, August 25, 2022, December 28, 2023). This approach has led Western analysts to stress the limited and defensive nature of Chinese PMCs in contrast to what they and others admit are the larger and more strategic actions of Russian and American PMCs (Voice of America, March 31, 2023; Sukhankin, “An Anatomy of the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry,” January 3, 2023). In the words of one Moscow commentator, Chinese PMCs have “come out of the shadows.” The analyst referred to a recent meeting in Beijing in December 2023 during which officials from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and officers of various Chinese security companies took part. Discussions during the event alluded to the broader role for these paramilitary forces in taking on a more assertive posture globally (Fondsk.ru, December 25, 2023).

The session in Beijing featured speakers who declared that China has no choice but to deploy even more PMCs around the world. They asserted that this is sorely needed as currently there are more than 47,000 Chinese companies employing 4.1 million people, including 1.6 million Chinese citizens, in some 190 countries. The meeting was followed by the publication of what can be described as a programmatic discussion of Chinese PMCs in the South China Morning Post (SCMP). The article suggested that Beijing plans to expand its use of PMCs to pursue broader political goals (SCMP, December 24, 2023). This public stance indicates that China feels that it can now use PMCs more openly due to the growth of Chinese power abroad and the declining influence of Russia and the United States. This, in turn, suggests that Chinese officials will deploy these entities more frequently and more broadly than in the past, allowing Beijing to defend its infrastructure on foreign soil and put additional political pressure on other countries.

These developments have attracted the attention of Central Asian countries that may become the targets of Beijing’s broader use of PMCs (Inbusiness.kz, December 25, 2023). Moscow is also keeping a close watch, as, in the past, it has seen Chinese PMCs as allies and helpmates. The Kremlin must now confront the very real possibility that these Chinese entities are becoming competitors or even active opponents to Russian PMCs (TASS; Kommersant, December 24, 2023;Vedomosti, December 25, 2023).

China’s recent activities and other powers’ reactions are the outgrowth of developments over the past five years. Mission creep on the part of Beijing has increasingly focused on protecting economic interests, leading those entities deployed to fulfill related objectives to become more involved in political issues. This has elevated the nervousness of outside powers regarding China’s increased willingness to flaunt its growing power.  (On the emergence of these trends, see China Brief, May 15, 2020).  The US reaction has been limited thus far. It will almost certainly intensify in the coming weeks, given rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan, US concerns that Chinese PMCs may threaten American partners, and a growing interest in seeing how Chinese assertiveness may undermine Beijing’s cooperation with Moscow.

Central Asia and Africa represent the two areas where the role of Chinese PMCs appears likely to expand most rapidly in the near term (Sukhankin, “Chinese PSCs: Achievements, Prospects, and Future Endeavors,” November 20, 2023). In these two regions, some governments are weak. Outside groups like PMCs can play a major role at minimal cost, permitting those behind them to maintain a veil of deniability. (On Chinese moves in Central Asia, see EDM, December 7, 2021, and Window on Eurasia, February 15, 2022; on similar moves by Beijing in Africa, see Sukhankin, “The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa,” January 10, 2020, and EDM, June 29, 2021.) As highlighted in the December meeting, given the breadth of Chinese involvement globally, Beijing may use its PMCs in similar ways elsewhere as well—wherever and whenever it senses weakness on the part of host governments or their Western supporters.

In the past, Russian observers expressed confidence that China would move cautiously in using PMCs for any broader political goals, though they were open to the idea that such Chinese actions might benefit Moscow by generating widespread chaos (Ia-centr.ru, March 25, 2021). Western specialists have followed in their wake, assuming that China will invariably take the longer-term view and not take risks when it has reason to believe that history is moving in its direction. This perspective contrasts sharply with Russia, whose leaders have become embroiled in numerous troubles due to overreach in places such as Afghanistan or Ukraine (Voice of America, March 31, 2023). Nevertheless, the words coming out of China regarding PMCs over the past month and Beijing’s actions on the ground suggest that China has decided to change course and that it has concluded now is an appropriate time to press forward and use PMCs in ways experts only a few years ago thought would happen in the distant future (Current Time TV, February 2, 2019).

If that proves to be the case, then Chinese PMCs with names few in the West even know may soon displace Russia’s Wagner Group as objects of primary geopolitical concern. The very public nature of Beijing’s actions suggests that this is highly likely. These entities may prove even more dangerous than Russian PMCs, especially because the rise and expanded use of Chinese PMCs has so often been downplayed until now.

Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation in the Red Sea: What’s at Stake?

 SOURCE : 

(    )Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation in the Red Sea: What’s at Stake?: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/houthi-attacks-and-military-escalation-in-the-red-sea-whats-at-stake/

BACKGROUNDERS 

Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation in the

 Red Sea: What’s at Stake?

By Dr. Scott N. Romaniuk & Professor Christian Kaunert

 January 8, 2024

Since October 2023, the Houthi, an Iranian-backed Zaydi Shi’a militia operating under the alias Ansar Allah, have engaged in violent operations against international shipping in the vital Red Sea trade route using Iranian missiles, drones, and marine vessels. After Hamas’ incursion into Israel and subsequent vicious assaults on military and civilian targets, the Houthi initiated drone and missile attacks from their Yemeni territory, the majority of which were intercepted by Israeli air defenses. Subsequently, the group directed its attacks towards vessels that it claimed had ties to Israel. The attacks have evolved into indiscriminate assaults, which have caused an escalating armed exchange in the Red Sea and its environs, and the potential exists for escalation into a more extensive geographical conflict.

 

The Red Sea and Its Strategic Importance

Shipping routes across the ocean are vital to international commerce. According to the International Chamber of Shipping, sea transport accounts for 30 percent of all shipping containers and 90 percent of all global trade in goods, worth $14 trillion USD. The Red Sea, via the Suez Canal, is not only one of the most travelled commerce routes in the world, but it is also the quickest and shortest sea route between Asia and Europe.

The canal is an essential component of one of the five most significant maritime routes, ranking second only to the English Channel and third after the Panama Canal; the Danish Straits and the Strait of Malacca, on the other hand, are the fourth and fifth busiest routes, respectively. Although the Red Sea is widely recognized as a strategically significant maritime passageway and region, its geopolitical context exacerbates the perilous nature of this choke point.

The Suez Canal facilitates the passage of approximately 17,000 vessels annually, representing approximately 12 percent of worldwide commerce or nearly $1 trillion USD worth of merchandise, including crude and refined oil, electronics, sneakers, wheat, and electronics. According to a 2016 estimate by the Energy Information Administration of the United States (U.S.), an annual volume of six million barrels of oil passed through the Suez Canal and five million barrels through the Bab el-Manded Strait, colloquially referred to as the “Gate of Grief,” a narrow strait between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, slightly more than 17 nautical miles wide.

The blockage of the Suez Canal in March 2021 resulted in a significant disruption to international trade. An estimated $9.6 billion USD (equivalent to $400 million USD per hour) worth of goods remained immobilized for days due to the lengthy queue of hundreds of ships unable to use the canal following the Ever Given mega-container ship’s grounding. The incident brought attention to the vital importance of the waterway and its logistical and infrastructural vulnerability. Similarly, armed conflict, which disrupts the continuous flow of goods through the Red Sea, significantly undermines the economic viability of the Suez Canal.

 

Military Reverberations off the Red Sea

In light of escalating Houthi attacks targeting major commercial shipping through the Red Sea, some major shipping companies have decided to avoid the dangerous conflict zone in favor of much longer and more expensive but comparably safer routes around the continent of Africa.

The length of maritime journeys has been considerably reduced due to the Suez Canal, an artificial waterway that serves as an essential international trade route. As per the Suez Canal Authority, the shipping distance from Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, to Rotterdam via the Cape of Good Hope is 11,169 nautical miles. However, using the Suez Canal, which traverses the isthmus of Suez and provides vital navigational facilities between the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, reduces this distance to 6,436 nautical miles, representing a reduction of 4,733 nautical miles, or 42 percent.

Shipments from Ras Tanura to New York via the Suez Canal cover 8,281 nautical miles, thirty percent less than the 11,794 nautical miles needed to travel around the southern tip of Africa. For instance, transporting goods around the Horn of Africa and through the South Atlantic to their final destinations in Europe and North America necessitates additional fuel and time, which contributes to inflation and further emissions. Despite the failure of many governments to address this issue, the consequences have been severe for the livelihoods of people worldwide.

One of the additional risks represented by other routes around Africa is the growing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere along the coast of southwest Africa. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the Commercial Crime Services (ICC), Nigerian piracy attacks have been on the rise and are at their greatest level since 2008. Of the total 51 reported attacks, 31 occurred in the West Africa region as a whole. This number accounts for 19 percent of all piracy incidents worldwide. According to the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) of the IMB, piracy incidents in Nigerian waters have been surpassed by both Ghana and Angola, with “two-thirds of incidents taking place while ships were anchored or berthed.” The frequency of piracy along the African coast could potentially increase in the event that additional shipping is diverted away from the Red Sea.

Significant financial repercussions have resulted from the Houthi attacks and the responses of businesses. Last year, freight costs increased by 80 percent within a single week. According to the Freightos logistics company, Europe’s rates have increased by 173 percent, while Asia-Mediterranean costs have doubled, and carriers have implemented surcharges per container ranging from $500 to $2,700 USD. As major oil companies avoid the Red Sea, crude oil prices have risen by 3 percent. The situation is further complicated by the recent cessation of oil production at the El-Sharara oilfield, located in the Murzuq basin in the southeast of Libya, which was prompted by protests. International oil and gas corporation British Petroleum, Hapag-Lloyd, the fifth-largest container shipping group globally, and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), the largest shipping line globally, are among the largest multinational companies that have chosen alternative routes for transporting goods. After rerouting their vessels away from the Red Sea in response to Houthi attacks and the prospect of further assaults, other companies, including the Danish freight company Maersk, implemented fees to transport goods.

In late December, Maersk applied a transit distribution surcharge (TDS), which had an instantaneous impact on dozens of trade routes. After announcing that it would resume Red Sea voyages, the company stated that it would impose an emergency contingency surcharge (ECS) on routes beginning in 2024 on the grounds that moving through the Red Sea involves a variety of risks and challenges, as well as disruptions in shipping schedules.

Just before the start of the New Year, an approximate fifty percent of container ships that routinely transit the Suez Canal and pass through the Red Sea avoided the waterway due to the escalating number of attacks. Flexport Inc. reported that hundreds of commercial vessels with a capacity of around 4.3 million containers—roughly 18 percent of the world’s capacity—had altered their courses or intended to do so. The most significant disruption to global trade since the pandemic has resulted from the Houthi attacks and subsequent militarization of the region.

 

A Nexus of Geopolitical Tensions and Threats

The military confrontations in the Red Sea may be interpreted as a continuation of the Israel-Hamas dispute, encompassing significant non-state and state actors in the area and superseding national borders. Functioning as a proxy for Iran, the Houthi group is strategically located in the southeastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. This positioning enables them to effectively target international shipping. Similarly, Hezbollah, which is widely regarded as another proxy of Iran in Lebanon and has established a deep presence and influence within Lebanese society, poses a threat to Israel’s security from the north.

Hezbollah is not merely a proxy of Iran; rather, it is a formidable military force that stands as an equal partner to Iran. It strategically exploits Lebanon as a base of operations and has engaged in many aggressive actions, including launching rockets at Israeli positions, employing anti-tank missiles against armored vehicles, and executing strikes on military targets using explosive drones. In addition to these aggressive actions, Iran has issued a threat that the Mediterranean Sea could develop into a conflict zone should the U.S. and Israel persist in what Iran considers to be crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Although Iran has refuted any role in the Red Sea attacks, the Houthi strikes have become increasingly indiscriminate, engaging in multiple assaults against commercial shipping via anti-ship missiles, drones, and attack craft. In one instance, the group boarded and seized an Israeli-owned ship and its personnel via helicopter. Yahya Sare’e, spokesman for the Houthi military, has confirmed the increasing frequency of the attacks, which were previously sporadic occurrences. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that it is a “time for war” and that the Israel-Hamas conflict will last for “many more months,” he has also referred to it as Israel’s “second war of independence.”

Sare’e has also declared that the “Yemeni Armed Forces affirm their continued support and solidarity with the Palestinian people in consistent with their religious, moral and humanitarian duty.” The Houthis, who are mobilized under the slogan “God is great, death to the U.S., death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam,” have an estimated 100,000 fighters at their disposal. This contributes to the ideological complexity of the conflict, which is still in its nascent phase despite including more states and non-state actors and having the capacity to escalate.

Some states have already initiated a military response due to the imminent risk of further Houthi assaults on shipping. As a result, the geopolitical climate in and around the region of the Red Sea has evolved from a state of tension to a complex dispute and, presently, to a low-intensity conflict.

 

A Multinational Security Initiative

The initial scope and complexity of the Israel-Hamas conflict have undergone a transformation, encompassing not only local but also international aspects. Following the escalation of Houthi assaults and the endorsement of Israel’s activities in Gaza by Western governments, the conflict’s arena in the Red Sea has evolved from targeting merchant ships to warships.

The implementation of the US-led “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” a military-oriented effort involving the coordination of a multinational coalition to counter the Houthi attacks and the growing threats to international shipping and to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, has gone hand in hand with this since December 2023. The operation will “jointly address security challenges in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, with the goal of ensuring freedom of navigation for all countries and bolstering regional security and prosperity,” according to a public statement by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

With variegated contributions, the coalition task force is composed of the United Kingdom (U.K.), France, Italy, Spain, Bahrain, the Seychelles, the Netherlands, Canada, and Greece. The U.K., for example, has sent several destroyers to serve alongside American and French warships. However, the task force has encountered reproach due to the inadequate contributions made by its members. Former Royal Navy commander Tom Sharpe opined that the U.K. should exhibit a greater degree of steadfast commitment to the operations. He emphasized the need for the British government to deploy the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Red Sea, urging Secretary of State for Defence Grant Shapps to “get the carrier out the door.”

The British government, however, has insisted that no additional vessels will be dispatched, citing apprehensions regarding a military escalation. This reluctance may be construed as an inability to comprehend the efficacy of one’s own military forces as well as the challenges associated with managing such complex conflicts while simultaneously alerting Houthi forces and other militant organizations to the constraints of their strategic and tactical options, planning, and implementation.

Other nations, specifically Canada, which is grappling with inherent recruitment challenges that have turned into a member-shortage “crisis”; an ongoing crisis of sexual misconduct; and severe financial constraints amid further defense spending cuts, has only furnished three staff officers whose responsibilities remain uncertain. Amid the escalating naval tensions between China and the Philippines, Australia’s decision via the government of Anthony Albanese to abstain from providing warships has drawn criticism on the grounds that the country does not possess the necessary military capabilities and political competencies to guarantee freedom of navigation in the global litorals. Moreover, Australia has expressed its concerns about impending security demands in the Indo-Pacific. In response to the Houthi threats to Indian maritime traffic, the guided-missile destroyers INS Kochi and Kolkata have been deployed thus far. The deployment of these vessels is not in aid of the coalition force; instead, they are operating exclusively to secure India’s objectives.

 

State (In)action and Conflict Escalation

The Houthi group has advocated for the annihilation of Israel for years prior to the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October, but it took no action in response. In contrast, Hezbollah has characterized Hamas’ assault as “a decisive response to Israel’s continued occupation,” thus regarding it not merely as an initiation but rather as an extension of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, and more specifically as a reaction to how Hezbollah perceived Israel’s indiscriminately violent campaign against the Palestinian people.

In addition to escalating their assaults on ships traversing the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Houthi have continued to target Israel with cruise and ballistic missiles and drones. The frequency of drone attacks perpetrated by Iran-backed militias against U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq, where the United States maintains 900 and 2,500 personnel respectively, has increased substantially since October 7, 2023. As of the first week of January 2024, there have been 115 such attacks. The al-Tanf garrison in Syria, the Bashur airbase in the vicinity of Iraqi Kurdistan’s Erbil city, and the al-Asad airbase in al-Anbar have been among the targets. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Iraqi Shiite militia jointly issued an online statement wherein they claimed responsibility for the attacks on American military installations involving so-called kamikaze drones.

As the frequency of these assaults escalated, the United States responded by augmenting its military presence in the Middle East, dispatching an additional 300 personnel and launching retaliatory airstrikes against various militant groups, including Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), or the Hezbollah Brigades, a radical Iraqi Shiite paramilitary organization. Given the increasing militarization and contestation in the region, it is not implausible that the U.S. and coalition powers will mount a more potent military response than the mere deployment of naval task forces. At present, there are increasing demands on the Biden administration to target Houthi strongholds, which increases the likelihood of both horizontal and vertical escalation.

President Biden has displayed a hesitancy to respond to escalating pressure to launch military operations against Houthi targets located within Yemen. Critics of employing military force against Houthi strongholds in Yemen might potentially contend that such an approach would serve Iran’s interests by enticing the U.S. into a proxy conflict and by heightening the likelihood of another expensive conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, both of which are presently navigating a precarious truce. On the contrary, Washington’s implied acceptance of persistent Houthi attacks sets a precedent whereby they adopt a passive stance and essentially accept militant groups’ attacks without retaliation.

The notion of conflict escalation became increasingly prevalent throughout the Cold War, particularly with regard to the potential for nuclear exchanges between the two dominant global powers. Recent state and non-state interactions, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Israel-Hamas conflict in particular, have caused the escalation of military conflicts to deviate from the established parameters of explicit Rules of Engagement (ROE) and international humanitarian law (IHL). These rules and regulations determine what actions are considered appropriate, acceptable, or unacceptable. The unwillingness of many countries—particularly Western governments—to uphold or abide by international law as well as their inconsistent approaches to resolving international disputes make the problem worse.

Although the October 7th attack by Hamas has not yet precipitated a regional conflict in the Middle East, it has laid the groundwork for the commencement of new phases and arenas of military exchange and operations in adjacent environs. As noted, diverting international shipping to other longer routes that are also highly susceptible to maritime piracy elevates the opportunities for militant groups operating well beyond the Middle East and its peripheral areas, especially given the ever-increasing demand for and attraction of oil as a vital energy commodity. Comparable to the Red Sea, Iran perceives the Eastern Mediterranean as a potential flashpoint region, thereby augmenting the probability of armed confrontation in that area.

The increasing tensions and military engagements in the Red Sea have the potential to attract more nations into the dispute, thereby escalating an already limited military exchange into a more extensive and protracted conflict. This is primarily due to the critical nature of the waterway, which affects all states, albeit to varying degrees, but also because states’ compliance with the U.S. as a de facto security guarantor in the region cannot be guaranteed. This has already been reflected in the refusal of various governments to participate in the joint naval task force, and by their decision in some cases to act externally to the combined operation.

Landlocked Ethiopia, a country of more than 120 million inhabitants—the second-most populous country in Africa—officially disbanded its naval headquarters in Adis Ababa in 1996, and its navy ceased to exist. Its only military watercraft, a tiny patrol boat, operates on Lake Tana. However, like other states in the region, “Ethiopia’s existence as a nation is linked to the Red Sea,” which depends on “balanced mutual sharing,” as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed expressed last October.

The potential for nations to respond in a unilateral, disproportionate, or otherwise unconventional manner, which may incite violent responses from neighboring states and non-state actors in the vicinity. Whenever states act unilaterally and in pursuit of their own national interests, there are inherently perilous consequences, particularly when they conflict with the interests of other nations or actors. As an extension of the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, the developing Red Sea conflict has already demonstrated its potential to act as a perilous precursor to additional destabilizing actions by various geopolitical actors.

Despite the historical significance of de-escalation, economic considerations, the imperative to ensure secure navigation in the Red Sea, and the self-interest of nations may serve as a legitimate justification and pretext for extending military operations into additional regions in the Middle East to counter other militant groups. Such a course of action has the potential to yield unanticipated and exponential effects.

It is plausible to suggest that states vying and competing for control of global supply chains could spark modern power struggles and conflict. While scholars have posited that economic interdependence is crucial for preserving structural peace and stability, as evidenced by the absence of major interstate conflict in the Asia-Pacific comparable to the Second World War, disruptions in interdependence may also fuel great power politics and provide opportunities for desperate competition among states or for some states to ensnare vulnerable parties rendered even more susceptible to supply chain deterioration or the inaccessibility of commodities and critical economic resources. Such economic opportunism and coercion could occur anywhere, as historical evidence demonstrates the existence of instances of this type of power politics. This situation gives rise to additional questions and concerns regarding the potential occurrence of conflict, which may be precipitated by heightened economic competition, further complicated by limited access to global supplies and resources.

 

Pathway to a Wider Conflict?

With the war in Gaza nearing its 100th day, the Houthi assaults on vessels in the Red Sea underscore the intricate nature of this conflict and the need to carefully contain it and prevent its escalation beyond its current boundaries. The regional political landscape and the current security situation have significantly influenced the wider consequences of the Israel-Hamas conflict and Israel’s ongoing military actions in Gaza and against the Palestinian people. These dynamics have revealed the challenging nature of mobilizing Western and international responses, the risks of taking unilateral action, and the limitations, whether due to the willingness or capabilities of national contributions, in resolving the escalating situation.

Furthermore, the U.S. has demonstrated its reluctance and the challenging position it faces as a security provider while being closely aligned with Israel as its primary regional partner, which has exhibited little self-control in its retaliatory actions against Hamas and a tendency to extend its security practices beyond its borders. This is illustrated by the military assaults on Houthi weapons storage facilities in Yemen, which the Israel Defence Force (IDF) is believed to have orchestrated, according to the Saudi-owned Al-Hadath news network. Although every state has an interest in stabilizing the situation in the Red Sea, their influence varies.

Presently, the situation is deteriorating, and while there is a greater sense of urgency to find a solution, the absence of adequate security management and the failure to prioritize the shared security requirements within and beyond the Red Sea region are among the most problematic aspects of the situation.

     ________________________________________

Dr. Scott N. Romaniuk is a Newton International Fellow at the University of South Wales’ Faculty of Life Sciences and Education, the United Kingdom, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Taiwan Centre for Security Studies (TCSS), ROC.

Professor Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, Ireland. He is also Professor of Policing and Security, as well as Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales. In addition, he is Jean Monnet Chair, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence and Director of the Jean Monnet Network on EU Counter-Terrorism (www.eucter.net). Previously, he served as an Academic Director and Professor at the Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, a Professor of International Politics, Head of Discipline in Politics, and the Director of the European Institute for Security and Justice, a Jean Monnet Centre for Excellence, at the University of Dundee.

IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 8, 2024

SOURCE :

 (   ) IRAN UPDATE, JANUARY 8, 2024 :  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2024

(     )  

Iran Update, January 8, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. PIJ released a video on January 8 showing one of its Israeli hostages appealing for a renewed hostage exchange with Israel, which is an effort to pressure the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire.
2. IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari reported on January 8 that the war “shifted to a stage” that will involve fewer ground forces and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.
3. The IDF killed a senior commander in LH’s Radwan Unit, Wissam Hassan al Tawil, in an airstrike on January 8.
4. Tawil’s death in southern Lebanon indicates that LH is not complying with UNSC Resolution 1701, which mandates that LH cannot deploy military forces south of the Litani River. UNSC Resolution 1701 ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.
5. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba spokesperson Hussein Moussawi stated that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted an attack targeting Haifa, Israel, on January 7 to signal to Israel its ability to attack targets “beyond [Haifa].”
6. An Iraqi official close to the Shia Coordination Framework claimed on January 7 that the framework recently “authorized” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss the removal of US forces from Iraq with the US Government.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias are continuing to report attacks in the northern Gaza Strip to their higher headquarters after their fighters return to rear areas. The delays in reporting may indicate a loss of command and control over some units that are engaged with Israeli forces, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[1] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed on January 8 that its fighters “returned from the [frontlines in northwest Gaza City]” and reported that they fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Engineering Corps armored personnel carrier.[2] These fighters' inability to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas means that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters engaged with the IDF. These possible difficulties in command and control extend to other Palestinian militia groups fighting in the northern Gaza Strip. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) military wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, claimed on January 8 that it reestablished ”contact with combat units” and confirmed that its fighters targeted three IDF vehicles with unspecified weapons in Tuffah in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 8. The IDF 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) located a tunnel shaft, weapons, and thousands of dollars in an unspecified area in the central Gaza Strip.[4] The Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) and 188th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) located a weapons production facility in Bureij that the IDF said was the largest weapons facility that Israeli forces have discovered since the Israel-Hamas war began.[5] The IDF reported that the facility included long-range rockets, explosives materiel, drones, light weapons, and tunnel shafts 30 meters underneath the facility. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces that attempted to recover a Hamas-held hostage in the central Gaza Strip on January 8.[6] The Golani Brigade called in an airstrike targeting a weapons depot containing long-range rockets in Maghazi.[7]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (DFLP) military wing, the National Resistance Brigades, was the only militia that claimed attacks on Israeli forces in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 8. The militia said that its forces clashed with Israeli forces with “heavy weapons” northeast of Deir al Balah.[8]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade expanded clearing operations in southern Khan Younis on January 8.[9] Israeli forces searched military infrastructure near civilian homes and uncovered a tunnel shaft in the area of a school.[10] Palestinian fighters fired RPGs at Israeli forces that returned fire with tanks and air support.[11] Israeli special operations forces (SOF) located more than ten Palestinian fighters who were launching rockets into Israeli territory and directed a drone strike on their position.[12] The IDF 55th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) targeted several Palestinian fighters who emerged from buildings in Khan Younis on January 8.[13] The Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes on 30 targets, including underground tunnels and weapons depots, in Khan Younis on January 8.[14]

Palestinian militias continued attempts to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 8. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it conducted four attacks on Israeli infantry and armor in Khan Younis on January 8.[15] The militia detonated an anti-personnel improvised explosive device and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces inside a school in Khan Younis City.[16] The al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli forces using small arms and RPGs as Israeli forces advanced in the northern, eastern, and central areas of Khan Younis.[17] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades fired RPGs at Israeli forces in central and eastern Khan Younis City.[18]

CTP-ISW's map of IDF dispositions is based on Israel Defense Forces public announcements and reports from Israeli military correspondents who have traveled with the IDF into Gaza. 

We do not use information that has not been released by the IDF in these maps. The unit locations on this map are notional, and the map does not attempt to depict any unit’s precise location.

PIJ released a video on January 8 showing one of its Israeli hostages appealing for a renewed hostage exchange with Israel, which is an effort to pressure the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire.[19] Palestinian militias’ demands for a renewed hostage-for-prisoner deal include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and an end to the war, neither of which are compatible with Israeli war aims.[20] Israeli Army Radio reported that the hostage referenced information in recent Israeli media.[21]

IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari reported on January 8 that the war “shifted to a stage” that will involve fewer ground forces and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[22] Hagari’s comments to the New York Times are consistent with the reports of Israeli forces withdrawing reservists from the Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids in the northern Gaza Strip.[23] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told the Wall Street Journal on January 7 that Israeli forces would shift from the “intense maneuvering phase of the war” to special operations.[24] Gallant cautioned that the conflict “will last for a longer time” as Israel has not abandoned its stated war objectives.

The World Health Organization (WHO) halted a medical aid delivery to the northern Gaza Strip on January 7 in the absence of safety guarantees.[25] This marked the fourth cancellation since December 26 of the mission to sustain operations at five hospitals in the north. The WHO said that heavy bombardment, restrictions on movement, and interrupted communications make delivering medical supplies regularly and safely across the Gaza Strip, particularly in the north “nearly impossible.”[26] Israeli forces are clearing areas in Bureij and Nuseirat In the central Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias conducted three rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 8. The al Qassem Brigades fired a rocket salvo targeting Tel Aviv.[27] The al Qassem Brigades have only conducted four rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip since December 21, indicating that Israeli operations have degraded Hamas’ rocket capability.[28] The al Quds Brigades separately fired rockets targeting Sderot and Nir Aam in southern Israel on January 8.[29]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 13 times across the West Bank on January 8.[30] This level of attacks is consistent with daily attack counts in the West Bank over the past week. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces seven times in major cities in the West Bank including Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm.[31] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms at Israeli forces at an Israeli checkpoint in Tulkarm.[32] Unspecified Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Beit Ummar, north of Hebron.[33] The IDF said that it arrested ten wanted individuals and seized weapons during operations across the West Bank.[34]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

The IDF killed a senior commander in LH’s Radwan Unit, Wissam Hassan al Tawil, in an airstrike on January 8.[35] LH-affiliated media Al Mayadeen reported that Tawil was a senior commander and that he is responsible for many attacks against IDF targets on the Israel-Lebanon border since the start of the Israel-Hamas war on October 7.[36] LH said that Tawil assisted in planning and reconnaissance operations in southern Lebanon since 1992. He also participated in the planning for the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers along the Israel-Lebanon border, which sparked the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.[37]Tawil was involved in LH weapons manufacturing and oversaw the Radwan Unit’s operations in southern Lebanon, according to Israeli and Western reporting.[38] LH denied that Tawil was the commander of the Radwan Unit.[39] LH's Radwan unit was established by the IRGC Quds Force and is the group’s special operations forces unit focused on infiltrating Israeli territory.[40] Israeli media reported that the IRGC Quds Force, particularly the Sabeerin Commando Battalion, provides the Radwan Unit with military and financial support.[41] The Sabeerin Battalion specializes in military intelligence.[42] Anonymous LH officials told the Wall Street Journal that LH transferred Tawil from Syria to southern Lebanon approximately one month ago.[43] The IDF did not confirm if Tawil was the target of an Israeli airstrike.

Tawil’s death in southern Lebanon indicates that LH is not complying with UNSC Resolution 1701, which mandates that LH cannot deploy military forces south of the Litani River. UNSC Resolution 1701 ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.[44] Multiple senior Israeli officials have said that Israel seeks a diplomatic agreement to implement UNSC Resolution 1701 and push LH military units north of the Litani River.[45] These officials have said that they will resort to military means if diplomatic means fail.[46] Israeli media reported in late December that LH began withdrawing its Radwan Unit from the Israel-Lebanon border, and some IDF officials reported that the IDF believed that airstrikes targeting LH fighters had forced LH to withdraw some of its forces northward.[47] Tawil’s presence in southern Lebanon suggests that at least some elements of the Radwan Unit, including senior leaders, remain in southern Lebanon to plan and execute attacks against Israel.

Iranian-backed fighters, including LH, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 8.[48] LH targeted Israeli military infrastructure and soldiers with anti-tank guided munitions, rockets, and other unspecified weapons.[49] The IDF reported it intercepted a "suspicious aerial target” that crossed from southern Lebanon into Israeli airspace near Kiryat Shmona.[50]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria on January 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted US forces stationed at the Rumaylan Landing Zone in Syria.[51]

The IDF said on January 8 that it killed a Hamas commander in Syria responsible for launching rockets from Syria into northern Syria.[52] The IDF targeted Hamas commander Hassan Akasha in Beit Jin, Rif Dimashq Governorate, Syria. This strike demonstrates that Hamas has the necessary infrastructure and personnel in southern Syria to target Israel.

Western media reported on January 8 that Israel intensified its air campaign in Syria over the last three months, killing 19 LH members there.[53] Reuters reported that the number of LH members killed in Israeli airstrikes over the last three months is double the amount of LH members killed during the rest of 2023 combined. Israeli media reported on December 28 that recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria targeted IRGC and IRGC-affiliated actors facilitating Iranian weapons shipments to LH.[54] Israeli media added on December 30 that Iran accelerated its weapons transfers to LH in anticipation of a wider war with Israel.[55] An Israeli airstrike targeting the IRGC’s military headquarters in Sayyidah Zainab, Syria, on December 25 killed a senior IRGC commander who oversaw Iranian materiel shipments to LH.[56]

President Ebrahim Raisi re-emphasized the Iranian regime narrative that the United States and Israel created ISIS at a meeting with the Speaker of the National Assembly of Tajikistan Rostam Imam Ali on January 8.[57] Raisi said that fighting terrorism, organized crime, and drugs is one of the “requirements” of Iranian-Tajik cooperation.[58] Raisi added that Iran and Tajikistan face “common issues” as neighbors of Afghanistan. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), claimed responsibility for the Kerman terrorist attack on January 4.[59] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry said on January 5 that one of the two bombers responsible for the attack was a Tajik national who traveled from abroad to conduct the attack.[60] An ISKP member and Tajik national conducted a separate terror attack targeting the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province in August 2023.[61] Iran opened a drone production facility in Tajikistan in May 2022 as part of its counterterrorism and security cooperation with Tajikistan.[62]

IRGC-affiliated media reported that Iranian security forces killed a purportedly Jaish al Adl-affiliated individual in Bampur City in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 8.[63] IRGC-affiliated media linked the individual to the December 15 Jaish al Adl attack on a police headquarters in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[64] Jaish al Adl was also likely responsible for an IED attack near Zahedan on December 19.[65]Jaish al Adl also attacked a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in July 2023.[66]

A UK-based, Middle East-focused outlet reported that LH Representative to Iraq Mohammad Hussein al Kawtharani traveled to Baghdad on January 5 to “coordinate an escalation in operations” against US forces in Iraq.[67] The outlet reported that Kawtharani told Iranian-backed Iraqi factions that the Axis of Resistance should do everything possible to remove the United States from Iraq. Kawtharani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5 marks his first trip to Iraq in two years.[68] His visit also coincides with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on January 5 in which Nasrallah called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to expel US forces from Iraq.[69] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Kawtharani in August 2013 for promoting LH’s interests in Iraq, including LH’s efforts to provide “training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi sectarian armed groups.”[70] The US State Department announced in April 2020 that Kawtharani “facilitates the actions of groups operating outside the control of the Government of Iraq that have violently suppressed protests, attacked foreign diplomatic missions, and engaged in wide-spread organized criminal activity.”[71]

Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba spokesperson Hussein Moussawi stated that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted an attack targeting Haifa, Israel, on January 7 to signal to Israel its ability to attack targets “beyond [Haifa].”[72] Moussawi made this statement in an interview with LH-affiliated outlet al Mayadeen on January 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on January 7 that it conducted a long-range cruise missile attack targeting Haifa.[73] Moussawi claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to disrupt US “plans” in the Middle East and Israeli “occupation efforts” in the Gaza Strip. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has previously claimed attacks on targets outside of Iraq and Syria. The group claimed an unspecified attack targeting a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea in late December 2023, for example.[74] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Axis of Resistance more broadly were signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.[75]

An unspecified source told Iraqi media on January 7 that many “armed Iraqi factions” have vacated their headquarters and military sites in urban areas following the January 4 US self-defense strike that killed a senior Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) official.[76] “Armed Iraqi factions” very likely refers to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, given the context of the January 4 US strike that killed a senior HHN official. The unspecified source also told Iraqi media that some Iraqi militia leaders are periodically changing their place of residence to avoid being targeted. The United States reported that the HHN official, Mushtaq Jawad al Jawari, was “actively involved in planning and carrying out attacks against US personnel.”[77]

An Iraqi official close to the Shia Coordination Framework claimed on January 7 that the framework recently “authorized” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss the removal of US forces from Iraq with the US Government. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Members of the framework have increasingly pressured Sudani to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in recent weeks. This statement is noteworthy given that the Shia Coordination Framework does not have the authority to direct Sudani’s actions.

Two unspecified small craft approached a commercial vessel 50 nautical miles southeast of Mokha, Yemen on January 8. Mokha, Yemen is controlled by the UAE-backed, pro-Yemeni government National Resistance Forces. The two boats did not display any weapons and did not engage the commercial vessel.[78]

---

References

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2024

[2] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1271

[3] https://t.me/kataebabuali/10592

[4] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744252547114606847

[5] https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1744422381278376189; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1744416458669523405; https://www dot timesofisrael dot com/on-gaza-civilian-evacuation-road-idf-uncovers-largest-hamas-rocket-factory-to-date/

[6] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1265

[7] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744252694007562348

[8] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4056

[9] https://www.idf dot il/170258

[10] https://www.idf dot il/170258

[11] https://www.idf dot il/170258

[12] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744252108801511642

[13] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744252108801511642; https://twitt... https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744252547114606847

[14] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744251829993570351

[15] ; ; ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1269

[16] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1268

[17] https://t.me/sarayaps/17168

[18] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5469

[19] https://t.me/sarayaps/17172

[20] https://www.axios.com/2024/01/01/hamas-israel-hostage-deal-proposal-reje... https://t.me/pflpgaza1/13667; https://t.me/pflpgaza1/13666

[21] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1744381171088199836

[22] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/08/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news...

[23] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1743717767386222615; https://www.idf dot il/170066; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/as-2024-begins-idf-releases-5-brigades-from-gaza-but-says-fighting-likely-all-year/

[24] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-yoav-gallant-we-are-fighti...

[25] https://twitter.com/WHOoPt/status/1744101166294663637

[26] https://twitter.com/WHOoPt/status/1744101166294663637

[27] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1264; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1272; https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-0...

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2024

[29] https://t.me/sarayaps/17174

[30] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5466; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2717; ... https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2725

[31] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5466; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2717; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2718; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2720; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2721; https://t.me/AymanGouda/5914; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2725

[32] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/5466

[33] https://t.me/QudsN/354921

[34] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744310424500093145

[35] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-middle-east-partners-start-tal...

[36] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84---%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85

[37] https://web.archive.org/web/20061117204541/http://www.upc.org.uk/hasann1... ; https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84---%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85

[38] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-middle-east-partners-start-tal...

[39] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84---%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85

[40] https://israel-alma dot org/2023/01/05/the-radwan-unit-radwan-force-unit-125/ ; https://web.archive.org/web/20200827064407/https://www.washingtoninstitu...

[41] https://israel-alma dot org/2023/01/05/the-radwan-unit-radwan-force-unit-125/

[42] https://blogs.timesofisrael dot com/the-rise-of-radwan-unit-hezbollahs-new-firepower/

[43] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-middle-east-partners-start-tal...

[44] https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701

[45] https://twitter.com/gantzbe/status/1741121494304911713 ; https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1740825405198606549

[46] https://timesofisrael dot come/liveblog_entry/gallant-well-push-hezbollah-beyond-litani-river-before-residents-of-northern-israel-return-home/

[47] https://www.jpost dot com/arab-israeli-conflict/article-779390 ; https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-01-08/ty-article-live/israeli-army-strikes-in-south-lebanon-blinken-set-to-arrive-in-israel/0000018c-e702-d765-ab9d-f77fb8fe0000?liveBlogItemId=637715318

[48] https://t.me/C_Military1/43551 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43563 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43559 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744349676915057096 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744349676915057096

[49] https://t.me/C_Military1/43555 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43557 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43583 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43585 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43584 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43587

[50] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1744349671336665134

[51] https://t.me/elamharbi/214

[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1744412606796812629?s=20 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-781302

[53] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-shifts-deadlier-strikes...

[54] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/b1awrz2d6

[55] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/b1awrz2d6

[56] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202209203504 ; https://amwaj dot media/article/inside-story-airstrike-kills-iran-s-most-influential-commander-in-syria

[57] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021018000723/

[58] https://president dot ir/fa/149328

[59] https://twitter.com/AliHussainiBBC/status/1742938751301804051?s=20

[60] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/643040

[61] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/05/25/2941633

[62] https://www.al-monitor dot com/originals/2022/05/iran-opens-drone-factory-tajikistan

[63] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/18/3019785/

[64] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/12/15/3006805

[65] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-19-2023

[66] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-militants-attack-police-station-...

 

[67] https://amwaj dot media/article/exclusive-hezbollah-rep-returns-to-iraq-ahead-of-expected-escalation

[68] https://amwaj dot media/article/exclusive-hezbollah-rep-returns-to-iraq-ahead-of-expected-escalation

[69] https://t.me/C_Military1/43370

[70] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm546

[71] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iraq-hezbollah-idUSKCN21S233/

[72] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1--%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86--%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B8%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7---%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1

[73] https://t.me/elamharbi/212

[74] https://t.me/elamharbi/167

[75] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-23-2023

[76] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B0%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9

[77] https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense/2711163/us-confirms-re...

[78] https://twitter.com/UK_MTO/status/1744303249681793090

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