PART III : India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

SOURCE  :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html

                                                        PART : III






MARITIME DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE 

                       “Shano Varuna”

           (Be auspicious unto us, O Varuna) - Rig Veda
                         


                    Ensuring Secure Seas

  : Indian Maritime Security Strategy-2015 

Click/ google URL below to open & read

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf



 https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf 




&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&





THE PULSE

SOURCE:
https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy/

         India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

                                 By

              Darshana M. Baruah

December 03, 2015

India shifts its focus from ‘using’ to ‘securing’ 

maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

On October 26, 2015, the Indian Navy released its latest maritime strategy, titled “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy.” This edition is a revised and updated version of the previous outlined strategy “Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy,” published in 2007. The title itself is indicative of the changing tone of the Indian navy’s interests and intentions from the 2007 strategy. The previous strategy did not take into consideration the changing geopolitical environment and its strategic implications on India’s maritime interests. The 2015 maritime security strategy addresses this gap by complementing the evolving security dynamics in the Indian Ocean region and reflecting a bold Indian navy with a renewed outlook on India’s maritime security needs.

The security architecture in maritime Asia along with the rise of China is compelling India to define its strategic interests and review its maritime policy. The maritime security strategy precisely does the same. It carries a larger strategic angle than its predecessors and attempts to embody an Indian naval vision for the region.

There are three key points that underpin the shift in India’s naval strategy as per this document.

One, this is the first time that an Indian government document is formally acknowledging the implications of the evolving and increasingly accepted concept of the “Indo-Pacific” on India’s maritime security. The geographic extent of this concept has multiple variations but in the contemporary world, the notion essentially brings the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific — theaters of geo-political competition — into one strategic arc. 


The concept has been formally endorsed by Australia, and Canberra outlines the strategic implications of this region in its 2013 Defense White paper. Regional countries such as the United States, Japan, India, and Indonesia prefer to use the term Asia-Pacific in their official documents but different sections of the leadership from these countries have used the term Indo-Pacific in their speeches and remarks.

Indian Chief of Naval Staff RK Dhowan, underpinning the need to revise the 2007 maritime strategy, writes,

“The shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways.”

India has been adamantly focused on the Indian Ocean and the security changes along its maritime boundaries. As developments beyond this region began to shape the maritime security framework in the Indian Ocean Region, there was a sense of uncertainty among regional navies as to whether India is taking note of these changes and, more importantly, if New Delhi will re-align its policies based on these developments. Nations such as the United States, Japan, and Australia had realized the role India could play in the evolving security architecture, but there was no clarity on New Delhi’s intentions. This edition of the Maritime Security Strategy is putting those concerns to rest, to a certain extent.

Two, the navy’s areas of interest (both primary and secondary) are expanding, reflecting New Delhi’s willingness to play a larger role in the region. The Red Sea, previously a secondary area of interest (as per the revised Maritime Doctrine of 2009), is now an area of primary interest for the Indian navy. Additionally, “the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden and their littoral regions, the Southwest Indian Ocean, including IOR island nations therein and East Coast of Africa littoral regions” now all are of primary interest to India’s maritime security. While Africa and its littoral regions previously were only of secondary importance, the Gulf of Oman, Aden and the South-West Indian Ocean did not feature specifically in either of the areas of interest in the Maritime Doctrine.

The secondary area too has expanded to include the “Southeast Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral regions in the vicinity, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Coast of Africa, and their littoral regions.” The South China Sea continues to remain of secondary importance, but adding to this interest is the specific region of the “East China Sea, Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral regions.”

In defining the areas of interest, the navy’s intention is to outline the geographic extension of its strategic influence and give an indication of its involvement in those areas. Over the years, India’s ASEAN friends have voiced their disappointment in New Delhi’s lack of naval and political presence in the South China Sea, against the backdrop of a rising China. This Maritime Strategy re-affirms India’s resolve to not get directly engaged in the affairs of the Western Pacific and get caught in the U.S.-China power politics dynamic. 

While ASEAN nations have shown a preference for a larger Indian presence in the Western Pacific, regional navies such as Australia and the United States have encouraged India to play a larger security role and be a “net security provider” in the region.

This brings us to the third and a critical development in India’s shifting naval strategy – the role of a net security provider. The Indian Navy in this document has attempted to define what it means to be a net security provider. The strategy outlines: “The term net security describes the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing against the ability to monitor, contain, and counter all of these.” While the navy has not indicated the geographic extent of the region where it aspires to be a net security provider, it has however acknowledged the steps required to be a net security provider. The document does not state whether the navy will be a net security provider and how, but rather outlines the environment conducive to be one. In the backdrop of the region’s expectation for the Indian navy to be a net security provider, the step taken to spell out what the term means is a positive approach. The ‘objective’ for the moment is to “shape a favorable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.”

This links us back to the first point, which is India’s move to acknowledge the changes happening around India’s area of maritime interest — regardless of whether the navy ascribes to them or not — and renew its own strategy keeping in line with India’s strategic interests.

The fact that there has been a shift in India’s maritime strategy and policies was made clear through the navy’s engagement under the Modi government. There was, however, no document per se spelling out this shift. The 2015 maritime strategy not only formalizes the intent of the Indian navy, it also takes a bold tone in narrating the same. Given the emphasis on collaborating with other navies, it is clear that part of the narrative is to build a network of regional cooperation to ensure peace and stability in India’s areas of interest. The document also recognizes the increasing importance of HADR operations for the Indian navy, given the expansion of India’s maritime outlook as well as capabilities.

Be it through the Joint Strategic Vision with the United States, Japan’s inclusion into the MALABAR exercises, new bilateral exercises with Japan, Indonesia, and Australia, or re-engaging with the island nations of the IOR and South Pacific, there is a clear message that India is willing to play a larger role in the unfolding security architecture in the region.

It was only a matter of time before New Delhi acknowledged the changing dynamics within its area of maritime interests. The initiatives taken under the Modi government to re-engage with the navies of the region are much appreciated and this document is a step forward in voicing India’s intentions and concerns regarding maritime security. If New Delhi can sustain the momentum that it has created in the Asian maritime domain, India will emerge as a credible leader and critical player in the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific

Darshana M. Baruah is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

RELATED

[A] Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009

INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE Indian Navy  Naval Strategic Publication 1.1 

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf

 [B] Chapter 4 m India’s Aspirational Naval Doctrine1 Iskander Rehman

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Indias_Aspirational_Naval_Doctrine.pdf

[C] Indian Navy Updates Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009

https://www.academia.edu/23733565/Indian_Navy_Updates_Indian_Maritime_Doctrine_2009

[ D ]  CHAPTER IV INDIAN NAVY’S MARITIME DOCTRINE

http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/22017/14/14_chapter_4.pdf

PART II : DEFENCE & MARITIME BACKGROUNDER TO DISMISSIVE TARDY INDIAN DEFENCE & PREPAREDNESS OBSTACLES

SOURCE :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html






                                  PART II



        BACKGROUNDER  TO  DISMISSIVE 
                                    
            TARDY INDIAN  DEFENCE 
                                    & 
             PREPAREDNESS OBSTACLES

                    The Elephant at Sea:

                  India's Maritime Strategy

[   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

WoodrowWilsonCenter

Published on Jul 30, 2013

Asia Program

In the next decade, India plans to introduce 40 new warships and 400 new aircraft to its naval forces. Such efforts reflect a dramatic maritime transformation now underway in India—one meant to improve India's power projection capabilities at sea and to produce a blue-water navy. On March 9, the Asia Program, with co-sponsorship from International Security Studies, hosted an event on India's maritime strategy and growing maritime power.

______________________________________________________

PART I : What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?(R)

SOURCE:

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-good-are-the-indian-navys-aircraft-carriers-against-pakistan/

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html

                                                                  PART  I

What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?

                                    By

                             Robert Farley

December 12, 2017

Just how useful will India’s carriers be in a potential future war with Pakistan?

The Indian Navy is devoting enormous resources to the development of an effective, multi-ship carrier force. It remains unclear, however, precisely how the Indian Navy would use that force in the event of a rekindled war with Pakistan. A recent Naval War College Review article by Ben Wan Beng Ho sheds some light on the problems that India’s carrier force might have in taking the fight to Pakistan. Long story short, India’s carriers would face enormous risks in undertaking offensive operations, with very uncertain benefits.

Ho argues that the need for self-defense, combined with limited deck space, make it very difficult for INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, either separately or in tandem, to threaten Pakistani land installations. Pakistan’s A2/AD network, including submarines, aircraft, and surface ships, poses a credible threat to the carriers, making their use in offensive operations very risky. Conceivably, Pakistan could even attack Indian carriers with tactical nuclear weapons, if the war developed in that direction. The Indian carriers would struggle to execute a close blockade of Pakistani ports, destroy the Pakistani surface fleet, or do much damage to Pakistani military targets on land.

Ho suggests that the carrier fleet would be better employed as a decisive late-war weapon, after Indian Air Force assets had worn down Pakistani defenses. This would have the benefit of enabling India to bring its entire carrier force to bear. Ho also argues that the carriers could play a productive role in sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, which might also allow them to threaten Pakistani lines of communication.

Ho details the problems associated with small-deck carriers, especially the limited number of aircraft to share offensive and defensive missions.

The need for self-protection is not entirely problematic; Indian carriers will undoubtedly receive a great deal of attention from potential opponents, drawing resources away from other military operations.

Other Indian naval forces could either use this misdirection to conduct offensive operations, or could rely on the defensive umbrella provided by the carriers.

But some core problems remain. Indian naval strategy envisions three operational carrier battle groups undertaking more or less the same tasks. 

But Indian naval procurement has produced a plan to acquire three carriers with radically different capabilities, 

meaning that the actual utility of the 

carrier battle group in crisis

conditions will depend upon which 

carrier is operational at a given time.

We also have no clear idea regarding the reliability of the two existing ships. Vikramaditya is an old Russian hull that underwent controversial late-life transformation into a STOBAR carrier; Vikrant is a purpose-built STOBAR carrier, but will be the largest warship ever constructed in India, with all of the potential reliability issues that this entails. The two ships are similar but not identical, meaning that maintenance and flight procedures will vary in potentially consequential ways. 

This makes sharing aircraft and pilots a dicey proposition.

Moreover, as Ho notes, the reports we have regarding readiness in the naval aviation program are not great. The MiG-29K has been a carrier aircraft for less than a decade, and has never been subjected to a demanding, up tempo set of combat operations. Anecdotes from the Russian experience do not suggest optimism.

While Vikrant and Vikramaditya will provide important opportunities for learning, the Indian Navy may need to wait for the commissioning of INS Vishal, projected in the 2030s, to have a real offensive capability against Pakistan. By that time, however, the lethality of Pakistan’s A2/AD umbrella may have significantly increased.

Topics

Flashpoints

Tags

India-Pakistan War

Indian carrier aviation

Indian Navy

INS Vikramaditya

INS Vikrant

INS Vishal

STOBAR

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Liaoning vs INS Vikramaditya

SOURCE:
 http://defenceupdate.in/chinese-aircraft-carrier-liaoning-vs-ins-vikramaditya/

• INDIAN NAVY

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Liaoning 

                                 vs 

                    INS Vikramaditya

                             BY

               DEFENCEUPDATE ·

 NOVEMBER 27, 2016

Liaoning, is the first aircraft carrier commissioned into the People’s Liberation Army Navy and INS Vikramaditya is the third aircraft carrier commissioned by the Indian navy since independence. India’s first aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was purchased from the United Kingdom in the year 1957.

INS Vikrant played a key role in enforcing a naval blockade on East Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 and was also docked in Karachi Harbour on the 4th of December to symbolize ultimate victory and naval supremacy of the Indian Navy in Pakistani waters.

The entry of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, into service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) attracted considerable attention from both the Chinese press and military observers around the world. For some, the Liaoning was a symbol of China’s global power; for others, it represented a significant first step toward a more muscular and assertive Chinese navy.

Originally built as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” for the Soviet Navy, the ship was laid down as the Riga and renamed theVaryag in 1990. A Chinese travel agency purchased the unfinished hull in 1998, and three years later the ship was towed from the Ukraine to China, where it underwent extensive modernization of its hull, radar, and electronics systems. After years of refits, the Liaoning was commissioned into the PLAN in September 2012 as a training ship unassigned to any of the Navy’s three major fleets. Two months after the ship was commissioned, the PLAN conducted its first carrier-based takeoff and landings. Although it might be several years before a carrier air regiment is fully integrated into the PLAN, it was reported inNovember 2016 that the Liaoning is now combat ready.

The Chinese have made significant progress in developing their carrier program, raising significant questions about theLiaoning’s capabilities and what these capabilities mean for the rise of China as a global power.

Really long March

The reason it took China so long to acquire an aircraft carrier was the Chinese Navy’s sea doctrine, which was – and continues to be – heavily influenced by the strategic thinking of its former patron, the Soviet Navy. The Soviets considered carriers extravagant – and large – targets for anti-ship missiles. According to this line of thinking, if a $1 million missile could sink a $1 billion aircraft carrier, then it was better to have a thousand such missiles instead of a vulnerable carrier. Even if 10 percent of these missiles found their target, the enemy’s carriers were dead in the water.

In 1971 a senior Beijing official told a group of overseas visitors, “Aircraft carriers are tools of imperialism, and they’re like sitting ducks waiting to be shot. China will never build an aircraft carrier.”But if carriers were bourgeois in the seventies, when China was poor, they are hard to resist now that the country has trillions in the bank.

INS VIKAMADITYA

INS Vikramaditya is a modified Kiev-class aircraft carrier which entered into service with the Indian Navy in 2013. She has been renamed in honour of Vikramaditya, a legendary emperor of Ujjain, India.

The carrier was purchased by India on 20 January 2004 after years of negotiations at a final price of $2.35 billion.The ship successfully completed her sea trials in July 2013 and aviation trials in September 2013.On 14 June 2014,Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi formally inducted INS Vikramaditya into the Indian Navy and dedicated it to the nation.

INS Vikramaditya has boast more than two dozen Mikoyan MiG-29K ‘Fulcrum-D’ (Product 9.41) including 4 dual-seat MiG-29KUB aircraft, 6 Kamov Ka-31 “Helix” reconnaissance and anti-submarine helicopters, torpedo tubes, missile systems, and artillery units. These fourth generation air superiority fighters will provide a significant fillip for the Indian Navy with a range of over 700 nm (extendable to over 1,900 nm with inflight refueling). It will also be fitted with the state-of-the-art Indo-Israeli Barak-8 Air defence missile system which will be complemented with additional SAM and CIWS (close-in weapon system).

The heart of the operational network that infuses life into the combat systems onboard the ship is the Computer aided Action Information Organisation (CAIO) system, LESORUB-E. LESORUB has the capability to gather data from ship’s sensors and data links and to process, collate and assemble comprehensive tactical pictures. This state-of-the-art system has been specifically designed for the Indian Navy keeping in mind the essential requirement on the carrier for fighter control and direction.

Aircraft carrier Vikramaditya also boasts of a very modern communication complex, CCS MK II, to meet her external communication requirement. Installation of Link II tactical data system allows her to be fully integrated with the Indian Navy’s network centric operations.

How is the Liaoning different than other countries’ carriers?

The Liaoning differs from the aircraft carriers of other countries in both size and capability. Although its overall capability is hindered by its comparatively inefficient power plant and underpowered aircraft-launching system, the Liaoning represents an important step in advancing China’s ability to project naval power.

When one considers the respective capabilities of aircraft carriers, tonnage and deck-side size are important indicators for the amount of stores, munitions, and aircraft a carrier can bring to a fight. The Liaoning is by no means a small ship, but it is far from the largest or most capable carrier in the Asia-Pacific. The Liaoning displaces roughly 60,000 tons. The Liaoning also boasts a size advantage over the Soviet-built Indian carrier Vikramaditya, with a deck 20 meters longer and weighing approximately 15,000 tons more.

“Already with China’s so-called starter carrier, Liaoning, there is significant potential in the near future to take it overseas for some basic naval diplomacy . . . and this will already have tremendous symbolic and psychological effects.”ANDREW ERICKSON


The Liaoning’s size falls well below the U.S. Nimitz-class carrier USS Ronald Reagan currently stationed with the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Japan, the latter being over 60 percent heavier and 30 meters longer. The Ronald Reagan weighs 97,000 tons fully loaded and spans 333 meters long, far outsizing the Liaoning. The numbers bear out the fact that the Liaoning is neither a lightweight nor a supercarrier like the USS Ronald Reagan.

Chinese naval ambitions

Although it is a welcome development that Indians are now more China-focussed than in previous decades, the flip side is often there is an alarmist outlook. The Liaoning has raised some concerns in India about this impending Chinese “threat”. There was one hare-brained story in a business daily that the Chinese J-31 stealth fighters flying from aircraft carriers could outclass the Indian Navy’s MiG-29Ks. This was especially lame because the J-31 is an experimental aircraft that is a decade away from deployment whereas the 4++ generation MiG-29K is a combat hardened aircraft, which also has the unique ability to ferret out stealth aircraft.

Despite the size of the Liaoning, China’s lack of technical experience with carrier operations suggests it will serve more as a training vessel then a ship for combat operations. Even the Global Times, China’s stridently nationalistic newspaper, quoted a Chinese military expert, who said the carrier “does not have the capacity to handle its tasks as it needs more adaptation to enhance its fighting capacity”.

China does not have enough planes or pilots with the expertise to fully exploit its first carrier. Without experienced personnel, the Liaoning is likely to have limited military utility. Clearly, the “starter carrier” is designed to help the Chinese navy master tactics of naval airpower. And it’s no walk in the park – perhaps the hardest act in the navy is landing a 22 tonne fighter laden with fuel and missiles, on a carrier rolling and pitching in choppy seas at night.

Besides operating an air wing, the Chinese have to provide air, surface, and sub-surface defences for the Liaoning, supply the carrier, and train the personnel to operate it. Once the Liaoning clocks up some miles, the Chinese will surely send it steaming into the Pacific as a status symbol but until then it’ll be years of landings, takeoffs and near misses.

Western defence analysts have set a time frame of up to 25 years before the Chinese are able to launch a serious task force. However, Chinese ability is not to be underestimated. In fact, the speed with which they are able to field new weapons is startling. China cloned the J-15 fighter just eight years after obtaining an unlicensed version from Ukraine in 2004. There’s no reason why it cannot compress the time frame required to field a task force.

What kinds of missions might the Liaoning perform in the region and around the globe?

The physical and operational limitations of the Liaoning and its associated personnel and equipment indicate that theLiaoning might be best suited for regional missions short of high-intensity conflict. As the PLAN improves its capabilities, future missions could take the Liaoning and its accompanying sailors, fleet escorts, and aircraft farther from China’s periphery.

The Liaoning’s lack of an aircraft catapult, inefficient power plant, and the relative inexperience of its aviators and support team do not augur well for sustained high-intensity combat operations—even within waters close to the Chinese Mainland, where the Liaoning could expect support from land-based aircraft and radars. Accordingly, Chinese strategists advocate using the Liaoning for regional missions—including humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR), training exercises with other nations, showing the flag, and asserting Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea—for which the Liaoning appears better suited. Furthermore, the Liaoning has considerable utility as a tool of naval diplomacy—providing helicopter lift for HADR missions and engaging in multinational training exercises will signal to other countries that China is a responsible rising power. Such efforts would complement China’s growing commitment to multilateral initiatives, such as UN peacekeeping efforts.

As the PLAN improves its combined arms capabilities and the Liaoning’s personnel become proficient in higher-tempo operations, the Liaoning’s repertoire could expand to include fleet air defense and maritime and land strike further afield from Chinese waters.

While the Liaoning’s possible mission set remains unclear, the prestige and attention conferred upon the ship during its construction, subsequent fitting-out, and deployment indicate that Beijing considers the Liaoning a symbol of China’s great-power status. Regardless of the Liaoning’s future abilities, the ship commands a degree of political utility as a tool of naval diplomacy through various operations, regional and global

Tags: 

Chinese Navy,  Indian Navy,  INS VIKRAMADITYA,  Liaoning

RELATED

• PREVIOUS STORYWill Pak’s new Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa be as hostile as Raheel Sharif to India?

• NEXT STORYHow Much of an Advantage Is China’s Aircraft Carrier?
• 
  

YOU MAY ALSO LIKE...

• 

  Russia will participate in testing Indian Nuclear Submarines equipped with Ballistic Missiles

  OCTOBER 20, 2016
• 

  Eye on China, Delhi offers heavy torpedoes to Vietnam

  JULY 2, 2016
• 

  PM oks $1bn deal with US for 4 Poseidons

  JULY 2, 2016