PART III : India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

SOURCE  :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html

                                                        PART : III






MARITIME DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE 

                       “Shano Varuna”

           (Be auspicious unto us, O Varuna) - Rig Veda
                         


                    Ensuring Secure Seas

  : Indian Maritime Security Strategy-2015 

Click/ google URL below to open & read

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf



 https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf 




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THE PULSE

SOURCE:
https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy/

         India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

                                 By

              Darshana M. Baruah

December 03, 2015

India shifts its focus from ‘using’ to ‘securing’ 

maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

On October 26, 2015, the Indian Navy released its latest maritime strategy, titled “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy.” This edition is a revised and updated version of the previous outlined strategy “Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy,” published in 2007. The title itself is indicative of the changing tone of the Indian navy’s interests and intentions from the 2007 strategy. The previous strategy did not take into consideration the changing geopolitical environment and its strategic implications on India’s maritime interests. The 2015 maritime security strategy addresses this gap by complementing the evolving security dynamics in the Indian Ocean region and reflecting a bold Indian navy with a renewed outlook on India’s maritime security needs.

The security architecture in maritime Asia along with the rise of China is compelling India to define its strategic interests and review its maritime policy. The maritime security strategy precisely does the same. It carries a larger strategic angle than its predecessors and attempts to embody an Indian naval vision for the region.

There are three key points that underpin the shift in India’s naval strategy as per this document.

One, this is the first time that an Indian government document is formally acknowledging the implications of the evolving and increasingly accepted concept of the “Indo-Pacific” on India’s maritime security. The geographic extent of this concept has multiple variations but in the contemporary world, the notion essentially brings the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific — theaters of geo-political competition — into one strategic arc. 


The concept has been formally endorsed by Australia, and Canberra outlines the strategic implications of this region in its 2013 Defense White paper. Regional countries such as the United States, Japan, India, and Indonesia prefer to use the term Asia-Pacific in their official documents but different sections of the leadership from these countries have used the term Indo-Pacific in their speeches and remarks.

Indian Chief of Naval Staff RK Dhowan, underpinning the need to revise the 2007 maritime strategy, writes,

“The shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways.”

India has been adamantly focused on the Indian Ocean and the security changes along its maritime boundaries. As developments beyond this region began to shape the maritime security framework in the Indian Ocean Region, there was a sense of uncertainty among regional navies as to whether India is taking note of these changes and, more importantly, if New Delhi will re-align its policies based on these developments. Nations such as the United States, Japan, and Australia had realized the role India could play in the evolving security architecture, but there was no clarity on New Delhi’s intentions. This edition of the Maritime Security Strategy is putting those concerns to rest, to a certain extent.

Two, the navy’s areas of interest (both primary and secondary) are expanding, reflecting New Delhi’s willingness to play a larger role in the region. The Red Sea, previously a secondary area of interest (as per the revised Maritime Doctrine of 2009), is now an area of primary interest for the Indian navy. Additionally, “the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden and their littoral regions, the Southwest Indian Ocean, including IOR island nations therein and East Coast of Africa littoral regions” now all are of primary interest to India’s maritime security. While Africa and its littoral regions previously were only of secondary importance, the Gulf of Oman, Aden and the South-West Indian Ocean did not feature specifically in either of the areas of interest in the Maritime Doctrine.

The secondary area too has expanded to include the “Southeast Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral regions in the vicinity, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Coast of Africa, and their littoral regions.” The South China Sea continues to remain of secondary importance, but adding to this interest is the specific region of the “East China Sea, Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral regions.”

In defining the areas of interest, the navy’s intention is to outline the geographic extension of its strategic influence and give an indication of its involvement in those areas. Over the years, India’s ASEAN friends have voiced their disappointment in New Delhi’s lack of naval and political presence in the South China Sea, against the backdrop of a rising China. This Maritime Strategy re-affirms India’s resolve to not get directly engaged in the affairs of the Western Pacific and get caught in the U.S.-China power politics dynamic. 

While ASEAN nations have shown a preference for a larger Indian presence in the Western Pacific, regional navies such as Australia and the United States have encouraged India to play a larger security role and be a “net security provider” in the region.

This brings us to the third and a critical development in India’s shifting naval strategy – the role of a net security provider. The Indian Navy in this document has attempted to define what it means to be a net security provider. The strategy outlines: “The term net security describes the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing against the ability to monitor, contain, and counter all of these.” While the navy has not indicated the geographic extent of the region where it aspires to be a net security provider, it has however acknowledged the steps required to be a net security provider. The document does not state whether the navy will be a net security provider and how, but rather outlines the environment conducive to be one. In the backdrop of the region’s expectation for the Indian navy to be a net security provider, the step taken to spell out what the term means is a positive approach. The ‘objective’ for the moment is to “shape a favorable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.”

This links us back to the first point, which is India’s move to acknowledge the changes happening around India’s area of maritime interest — regardless of whether the navy ascribes to them or not — and renew its own strategy keeping in line with India’s strategic interests.

The fact that there has been a shift in India’s maritime strategy and policies was made clear through the navy’s engagement under the Modi government. There was, however, no document per se spelling out this shift. The 2015 maritime strategy not only formalizes the intent of the Indian navy, it also takes a bold tone in narrating the same. Given the emphasis on collaborating with other navies, it is clear that part of the narrative is to build a network of regional cooperation to ensure peace and stability in India’s areas of interest. The document also recognizes the increasing importance of HADR operations for the Indian navy, given the expansion of India’s maritime outlook as well as capabilities.

Be it through the Joint Strategic Vision with the United States, Japan’s inclusion into the MALABAR exercises, new bilateral exercises with Japan, Indonesia, and Australia, or re-engaging with the island nations of the IOR and South Pacific, there is a clear message that India is willing to play a larger role in the unfolding security architecture in the region.

It was only a matter of time before New Delhi acknowledged the changing dynamics within its area of maritime interests. The initiatives taken under the Modi government to re-engage with the navies of the region are much appreciated and this document is a step forward in voicing India’s intentions and concerns regarding maritime security. If New Delhi can sustain the momentum that it has created in the Asian maritime domain, India will emerge as a credible leader and critical player in the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific

Darshana M. Baruah is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

RELATED

[A] Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009

INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE Indian Navy  Naval Strategic Publication 1.1 

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf

 [B] Chapter 4 m India’s Aspirational Naval Doctrine1 Iskander Rehman

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Indias_Aspirational_Naval_Doctrine.pdf

[C] Indian Navy Updates Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009

https://www.academia.edu/23733565/Indian_Navy_Updates_Indian_Maritime_Doctrine_2009

[ D ]  CHAPTER IV INDIAN NAVY’S MARITIME DOCTRINE

http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/22017/14/14_chapter_4.pdf

PART II : DEFENCE & MARITIME BACKGROUNDER TO DISMISSIVE TARDY INDIAN DEFENCE & PREPAREDNESS OBSTACLES

SOURCE :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html






                                  PART II



        BACKGROUNDER  TO  DISMISSIVE 
                                    
            TARDY INDIAN  DEFENCE 
                                    & 
             PREPAREDNESS OBSTACLES

                    The Elephant at Sea:

                  India's Maritime Strategy

[   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8pBvzHpNPQ ]

WoodrowWilsonCenter

Published on Jul 30, 2013

Asia Program

In the next decade, India plans to introduce 40 new warships and 400 new aircraft to its naval forces. Such efforts reflect a dramatic maritime transformation now underway in India—one meant to improve India's power projection capabilities at sea and to produce a blue-water navy. On March 9, the Asia Program, with co-sponsorship from International Security Studies, hosted an event on India's maritime strategy and growing maritime power.

______________________________________________________

PART I : What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?(R)

SOURCE:

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-good-are-the-indian-navys-aircraft-carriers-against-pakistan/

Refer to 

PART  : I

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/what-good-are-indian-navys-aircraft.html

 PART  :  II

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/defence-maritime-backgrounder-to.html

PART:  III

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.html 

PART - IV

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/indias-carrier-killer-air-launched.html 

PART - V 

http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2017/12/part-v-aircraft-carrier-in-indian-naval.html

                                                                  PART  I

What Good Are the Indian Navy's Aircraft Carriers Against Pakistan?

                                    By

                             Robert Farley

December 12, 2017

Just how useful will India’s carriers be in a potential future war with Pakistan?

The Indian Navy is devoting enormous resources to the development of an effective, multi-ship carrier force. It remains unclear, however, precisely how the Indian Navy would use that force in the event of a rekindled war with Pakistan. A recent Naval War College Review article by Ben Wan Beng Ho sheds some light on the problems that India’s carrier force might have in taking the fight to Pakistan. Long story short, India’s carriers would face enormous risks in undertaking offensive operations, with very uncertain benefits.

Ho argues that the need for self-defense, combined with limited deck space, make it very difficult for INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, either separately or in tandem, to threaten Pakistani land installations. Pakistan’s A2/AD network, including submarines, aircraft, and surface ships, poses a credible threat to the carriers, making their use in offensive operations very risky. Conceivably, Pakistan could even attack Indian carriers with tactical nuclear weapons, if the war developed in that direction. The Indian carriers would struggle to execute a close blockade of Pakistani ports, destroy the Pakistani surface fleet, or do much damage to Pakistani military targets on land.

Ho suggests that the carrier fleet would be better employed as a decisive late-war weapon, after Indian Air Force assets had worn down Pakistani defenses. This would have the benefit of enabling India to bring its entire carrier force to bear. Ho also argues that the carriers could play a productive role in sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, which might also allow them to threaten Pakistani lines of communication.

Ho details the problems associated with small-deck carriers, especially the limited number of aircraft to share offensive and defensive missions.

The need for self-protection is not entirely problematic; Indian carriers will undoubtedly receive a great deal of attention from potential opponents, drawing resources away from other military operations.

Other Indian naval forces could either use this misdirection to conduct offensive operations, or could rely on the defensive umbrella provided by the carriers.

But some core problems remain. Indian naval strategy envisions three operational carrier battle groups undertaking more or less the same tasks. 

But Indian naval procurement has produced a plan to acquire three carriers with radically different capabilities, 

meaning that the actual utility of the 

carrier battle group in crisis

conditions will depend upon which 

carrier is operational at a given time.

We also have no clear idea regarding the reliability of the two existing ships. Vikramaditya is an old Russian hull that underwent controversial late-life transformation into a STOBAR carrier; Vikrant is a purpose-built STOBAR carrier, but will be the largest warship ever constructed in India, with all of the potential reliability issues that this entails. The two ships are similar but not identical, meaning that maintenance and flight procedures will vary in potentially consequential ways. 

This makes sharing aircraft and pilots a dicey proposition.

Moreover, as Ho notes, the reports we have regarding readiness in the naval aviation program are not great. The MiG-29K has been a carrier aircraft for less than a decade, and has never been subjected to a demanding, up tempo set of combat operations. Anecdotes from the Russian experience do not suggest optimism.

While Vikrant and Vikramaditya will provide important opportunities for learning, the Indian Navy may need to wait for the commissioning of INS Vishal, projected in the 2030s, to have a real offensive capability against Pakistan. By that time, however, the lethality of Pakistan’s A2/AD umbrella may have significantly increased.

Topics

Flashpoints

Tags

India-Pakistan War

Indian carrier aviation

Indian Navy

INS Vikramaditya

INS Vikrant

INS Vishal

STOBAR

INDIAN NAVY : Making the Problem & Case for India’s Naval Build-Up (R)

SOURCE:

[ a ] http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/itCxLclcVmVqEu3rbEMaSO/The-problem-with-Indias-naval-buildup.html

[ b ] http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/ASEBsxXh9kcNmv9MZMQWIL/Making-the-case-for-Indias-naval-buildup.html?li_source=LI&li_medium=news_rec

                   

INDIAN NAVY : Making the Problem &  Case for India’s Naval Build-Up

                                       

                    PART ONE of  TWO

   The Problem with India’s Naval Build-Up

                                By

                  Abhijit Iyer-Mitra 

Naval build-ups, because of their capital-intensive nature, are frequently more fatal to the originator than they are to the opposition

Mar 15 2017.

The whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint

Much of the focus of Aero India 2017 was on the navy’s fighter requirement following the abject failure of the MiG-29K and the abandonment of Tejas. However, given that India’s capital acquisition budget will remain plateaued for the foreseeable future, the whole rationale of aircraft carriers for middle-power navies like India needs to be re-examined in the interests of fiscal prudence and the creation of a navy that realistically serves India’s interests, rather than ending up subsidizing dangerous delusions of grandeur.

Naval build-ups, because of their capital-intensive nature, are frequently more fatal to the originator than they are to the opposition. Admiral Tirpitz’s build-up of the Imperial German Navy, for example, contributed to the German defeat in World War I, with no significant returns on the massive investment. Similarly, Admiral Gorshkov’s expansion of the Soviet navy directly contributed to the fall of the USSR.

Both Tirpitz and Gorshkov were tactical geniuses who were unmitigated strategic disasters because they were economic ignoramuses, ignoring the military dictum of economy of effort where every action must extract a disproportionate cost from the opponent. Ominously, the INS Vikramaditya once bore the ill-fated name: Admiral Gorshkov.

The navy forwards three reasons for its carrier craze. First, the Chinese naval build-up and forays into the Indian Ocean; second, to dominate the littoral and project power; third, to protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) and, as a corollary, deny China energy supplies in the event of war. Not one of these reasons holds up to scrutiny.

The vast difference in the economies of China and India means that the former can counter our naval aviation assets many times over. Operationally, China’s naval fighter, the Su-33, outclasses India’s failed MiG-29K. While Western naval fighters like the Rafale or F-18 are undeniably superior electronically, a cost difference of almost 10:1 in the Sukhoi’s favour presents an insurmountable quantitative challenge. To quote Stalin, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” This, in fact, is similar both to World War II, where Russian bulk overcame the Luftwaffe’s vast qualitative superiority, and the Falklands war where Harriers bested superior Argentine Mirages because Argentina failed to mobilize sufficient numbers or absorb high losses against the Harrier. Clearly, the quality-quantity matrix favours Chinese quantity over Indian quality.

Dominating the littoral with carriers is also a problematic proposition. A cursory glance at the Indian Ocean reveals two kinds of states here—very powerful ones and very weak ones. Sending all three carriers against powerful countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore and Australia would be suicidal, with each of these countries possessing the ability to tackle India’s naval fighters effectively. On the other hand, even one aircraft carrier is a farcical overkill against countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Somalia, Mauritius, Mozambique et al. This means the Indian carrier build-up answers a question nobody asked.

Protecting SLOCs, and in wartime destroying China’s energy access, is best achieved by other assets. During peacetime, the best way to police the Indian Ocean is a fleet of cheap offshore patrol vessels. During wartime, the lack of littoral aircraft carriers means frigates with an excellent anti-submarine (ASW) component and air defence missiles are more than qualified to do the job. Yet, curiously, the critical ASW helicopter shortage is something the Indian Navy has dangerously subjugated to its quixotic quest for inutile carriers.

Denying the Indian Ocean to the Chinese navy in the event of war will mean countering two main threats—their nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. Chinese nuclear submarines will, in such a situation, challenge the Indian surface fleet and are best countered by a strong anti-submarine helicopter force for the fleet. Chinese aircraft carriers, on the other hand, are best countered by Indian submarines.

Submarines and anti-submarine components are also an area where India enjoys an advantage. Chinese submarines are noisy and relatively crude, whereas the Western submarines and helicopters that India has access to have superb stealth and electronic capabilities. In war games, conventional Western submarines have routinely sunk US aircraft carriers while avoiding detection. The latest generation of French sonars on British submarines is able to acoustically detect every single ship leaving New York harbour thousands of kilometres away.

While submarines are not cheap, they are much cheaper than aircraft carriers, play to India’s strength and meet our requirement set in a much more affordable, versatile and sustainable way.

In the final analysis, if India wants to change the current situation where it punches far below its weight, a shift to air-centrism is the only answer. However, an ill-planned, operationally inadequate and economically catastrophic air-centrism of the Indian Navy variety will do far more damage to Indian interests, with gains being illusory at best.

Being a serious player requires the ruthless culling of deadweight. And the bellwether for Indian seriousness will be decisions that the country’s strategic managers take on the future of aircraft carriers in lieu of realistic and affordable goals (read frigates, submarines and helicopters) that yield true “bang for the buck” in the short to medium term.

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is senior fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.Comments are welcome at views@livemint.comAbhijit Iyer-Mitra

TOPICS:

 INS VIKRAMADITYA AIRCRAFT CARRIER INDIAN NAVY SUBMARINES MIG29K

                  PART TWO of  TWO

Making the Case for India’s Naval Build-Up

                                   By

                                                           Abhijit Singh

Critics of the aircraft carrier fail to appreciate the political objectives that maritime power is meant to further

Navies regard aircraft carriers—not battleships— as the core of their war-fighting plans. Photo: Abhijit Bhatlekar/Mint

India’s naval establishment has been het up after Abhijit  Iyer-Mitra wrote a scathing piece for this newspaper last week, criticizing the Indian Navy for its maritime modernization strategy (“The problem with India’s naval build-up”). Iyer-Mitra disapproved of the decision to induct aircraft carriers as being fiscally imprudent, serving to subsidize a certain “delusion of grandeur” in the Indian navy, and impeding efforts to modernize the army and air force.

Though seemingly well argued, Iyer-Mitra’s piece reveals a misjudgement of the essence of naval operations, as well as a lack of appreciation of the political objectives maritime power is meant to further. In over half a century of naval development, maritime forces have based their combat strategy and modernization on two principal concepts of operations: “sea control” and “sea denial”. A maritime power either dominates the adversary by controlling the littoral seas or denies their use to the adversary. Sea control is the strategy of choice for an ascendant force but entails a higher operational commitment in dictating the tempo of operations in littoral spaces over prolonged durations. In contrast, a weaker force focuses all its combat efforts in denying the adversary the use of the near-seas—a strategy called “sea denial”.

In peace and in war, there is no platform that provides access to littoral spaces as thoroughly and emphatically as the aircraft carrier. Not only does it allow a superior maritime force to establish effective sea command, it ensures a continuous and visible presence that influences the cost-benefit calculus of the enemy commander and his political masters. The importance of flat-top operations cannot be overstated, because apart from the ability to surveil and strike littoral targets, aircraft carriers enable crucial tactical air-cover, an operational imperative in littoral conflict. Powerful navies the world over, thus, regard aircraft carriers—and not battleships (or submarines)—as the core of their war-fighting plans and power-projection strategies.

But the flat-top is also an article of faith with India’s naval elite because of its ability to alter the psychological balance in the Indian Ocean littorals. A potent symbol of a nation’s pride and power, an aircraft carrier projects strength. It could be replaced by lesser platforms that might do the job, but none can replicate its demonstrative impact. For naval commanders, therefore, the aircraft-carrier debate is more than a question of “utilitarian” value, because the flat-top is the “beating heart” that provides all naval combat effort with its essential vigour.

This is not to say all criticism of the navy’s modernization plans is invalid. The move to induct modern air carriers and other costly platforms has indeed imposed a huge financial burden on the state, slowing investment in other key areas of military development. Yet, the suggestion that air power must substitute naval aviation is patently misplaced, as the air force has shown itself to be an unreliable source of tactical action at sea. It does provide a measure of fleet support but is incapable of crisis response in the far littorals.

As Iyer-Mitra sees it, India might be repeating the “mistakes” of sea-power proponents Alfred Tirpitz and Sergei Gorshkov, who in his opinion contributed significantly to the fall of Wilhelmine Germany (1890-1914) and post-Cold War Soviet Union by ignoring the economics of naval modernization. That assessment is again wide off the mark. Admiral Gorshkov’s singular achievement was that he resisted the temptation to play the near-game with the US navy. By patiently working towards long-term strategic objectives in the post-Khrushchev era, he transformed the Soviet navy from a submarine-dominated force with a coastal and defensive orientation into a blue water fleet that had strategic strike, power projection, and global presence. Gorshkov’s impact on the Russian naval establishment was enduring and continues to this day.

Similarly, German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s folly in the years leading up to World War I wasn’t thoughtless profligacy, but his attempts to build a navy on the cheap—a tactic that lowered the operational efficiency of Germany’s maritime combat power (and one Iyer-Mitra incorrectly recommends for India).

The real dilemma for India’s maritime planners is that their mission set of raising fighting efficiency and interdiction potential in the near-littorals is constantly in competition with the broader strategic objective of expanding regional political influence. The navy’s deployment plans must deter adversaries, but also establish a visible footprint in the far seas to project ambition and influence through presence operations. If particular aspects of the maritime blueprint are found to be lacking—as indeed is the case with the limited success of the MiG-29K aircraft—the navy cannot discard its broader strategy in favour of an ad-hoc plan built around particular assets of relative operational superiority. Indian naval power in the Indian Ocean region would be robbed of its vitality if the aircraft carrier is replaced with a few more destroyers, corvettes and shore-based air power—regardless of the latter’s perceived tactical advantages in battle.

As Gorshkov noted in his thought-provoking and intellectually stimulating treatise The Sea Power Of The State, ideas on the deployment of maritime power need to be grounded in the logic of geopolitics and long-term state interests, and not on any contingent assessments of imminent needs.

Abhijit Singh heads the maritime policy initiative at the Observer Research Foundation and is a former naval officer.

Comments are welcome at theirview@livemint.com

Abhijit Singh

TOPICS: INDIAN NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS INS VIKRAMADITYA ADMIRAL GORSHKOV MILITARY