Showing posts with label TWO FRONT WAR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TWO FRONT WAR. Show all posts

Thursday, June 10, 2021

Analysis of India’s Ability to Fight a 2-Front War for ‘Blind men of Hindoostan’

 SOURCE :  https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/reviews-of-recent-books-6/


Analysis of India’s Ability to Fight a 2-Front War

Ravi Rikhye



Ravi Rikhye, with almost half a century of experience in South  Asian military affairs, a writer and contributor to many forums, blogs and magazines/journals, is a distinguished author and his expertise in military matters is well known. His earlier books (The War That Never Was: Story of India’s Strategic Failures, Taking Back Kashmir – Operations Brasstacks, Chequerboard, Trident Replayed, Militarization of Mother India, Concise World Armies) have been the subject of much discussion in military circles.

The book invites an eerie feeling of déjà vu

How is it that something which is obvious to all is not seen by the ‘Blind men of Hindoostan’?

  As was to be expected from Ravi Rikhye, he has presented a well researched book that once again leaves the reader wondering whether he has a direct line to the Indian military establishment. Truth is sometimes terrifying, unpalatable and bitter. We are taken through a journey comprising eighteen chapters as the author builds up his case about India’s ability to fight a two front war.  His deductions are an open secret and require no study of rocket science. A two front war? With the present condition of the armed forces, their pitiful and outdated equipment profile combined with the myopic vision of the politician-bureaucrat nexus; the country will be lucky if we can hold our own in a one front war! As the author puts it so succinctly, spending barely ‘1.6% of GDP, we simply cannot meet our two front requirements’. Now to this add an ill equipped force, demoralised and systematically downgraded in the national pecking order, a military in the hands of politicians, bureaucrats and security ‘experts’ who treat it with suspicion and disdain. Forget about modernisation and strategic thought!  Obviously, the national priorities are skewed.

Leaving aside a few inaccuracies in the equipment profile, force structure, orbat and existing deployment of the Chinese, Indian and Pakistani armies, the author has placed the chess pieces very sensibly on the chess board. But why would there be a war — or a two front war for that matter? Simple, all wars are for territory and domination. And as far as Pakistan is concerned, for this country it is make hay while the sun shines. Should there be a Sino-Indian confrontation, this country with ‘magnificent delusions’ will pounce at the opportunity.

As in the (great) game of chess, in all openings there is a struggle for key territory and an effort to deploy pieces and pawns in useful positions. He who plans, anticipates and plays his pieces before the opposing side moves, wins the game – the ‘Kings Indian Defence’. The author cleverly war games most of the moves and all likely scenarios of how a two front war can unfold given the existing and proposed force levels. Firstly, to hold our own if attacked, secondly to hold and then to win if attacked and thirdly to decisively win by starting a war or undertaking an offensive. And all these scenarios cater for a two front war and the force levels to achieve the military goals.

The crux of the authors’ argument is the mathematical working out of what in military jargon is called ‘troops to task’. For purposes of planning, this cannot be faulted. Keeping in mind the current force structure of the Indian Army (IA) (14 corps and 38 divisions), the author quite accurately calculates the force structure needed for a two front confrontation: (a) 43 Divisions for defence, no capability for even a limited offensive (b) 54 Divisions for guaranteed defensive and offensive capability (c) 72 Divisions to win solid victories and/or regain lost territories. Nothing drastically wrong in his calculations, something which is based on very simple planning figures of 1:3 for conventional attack and as high as 1:8 or even 1:10 for mountain warfare. To this, the author has factored in the requirements for a two front war in terms of modern equipment for the army, navy and the airforce vis-á-vis what the two opponents can bring to bear. As the book goes on to discuss the political, economic, military and industrial ramifications and lessons learnt from various wars, including the two world wars, what becomes clear is that mathematical superiority of the force structure alone is not necessarily the formula for military success. Equipment, technology, educational standards of troops, belief in the cause, training, national character and will to carry on fighting in adversity are some of the imponderables which require factoring in. And this is more applicable where you have no territorial ambitions as such; but what you desire is simply to ensure you are not taken lightly by the street bully. You want to have the recognised ability to hold your own, thus forcing the enemy to exercise caution or instil in him the fear of a pyrrhic victory.

With a strong military also goes the requirement of national ethos of ‘not giving up’ and national mobilisation for the war effort. The book discusses as to how the British, the Russians, the Vietnamese, the Americans, the Germans had mobilised the entire nation for one purpose – to build up a military-industrial complex to win the war. Wars are never won or lost by the military. It is the nation and the citizens who win or lose, something which our leadership tends to forget. The book also lays bare the woefully inadequate military spending as compared to other countries and our main adversaries. Keeping in mind the revolution in military affairs and the tectonic shift towards technology in modern warfare (the soldier matters; but now the push button is an integral part of the battlefield), Rikhye dwells briefly on the reconfiguration and rehashing of formations down to brigade and unit level to make the forces leaner and meaner, which incidentally is an ongoing exercise in all progressive armies. Examples of Chinese, American and German models, past and present, have been critically examined. A word of caution, relevant here is to remember that most Asian armies consciously trade technology for manpower in their militaries. The reasons are obvious. Though the author has not openly stated that our threshold acceptance of body bags is higher than, say the US, the inference is there to see. Nonetheless, if we are ready to spend billions on free lunches and populist schemes, surely doubling of our defence spending need not necessarily raise the guns or butter debate. The book also focuses on the rather dismal appreciation of the Indian leaderships’ resolve to modernise its military and to use it as a means of power projection. We have never fought a total war in which the entire nation is involved and in which every citizen is either a combatant or directly involved in the war effort as the very existence of the country is threatened.

The imprescriptible requirements of a two front war are firstly, the availability of militarily acceptable force levels; secondly, the ability to hold one front while you tackle the other and; thirdly, sufficient residual power with the ability to disengage and shift troops/equipment rapidly to the other front. This switching of forces requires road, air and rail capability coupled with interoperability, secure lines of communication, good intelligence, sufficient reserves, leadership, national resilience and foresight. All this is to be planned much before and not once the balloon goes up. You cannot go for ‘panicky’ ammunition and equipment purchases once the front/fronts are activated. Kargil is a case in point discussed by the author. You also require support, backing of friendly and ‘neutral’ countries and a foreign policy which does not leave you isolated while you tackle the twin adversaries simultaneously.

Chapter 10 discusses naval assets and naval strategy not only of India, Pakistan and China but also of the major naval powers and the countries likely to fish in troubled waters. What Rikhye misses is that in the present day context, carrier battle groups are only for sabre rattling and for bullying smaller nations. Gone are the World War II days when mighty carrier groups clashed to dominate the seas.  ( Debateable - Vasundhra A large nuclear powered carrier will not last 48 hours in a hot war, more so against an enemy which has a measure of even moderate missile technology. Irrespective of the size of its escorts or its screen or the EW/ECM cover it enjoys, the carrier is a prime target and its loss will be catastrophic in terms of national prestige and morale. In a hot war scenario, China will never send a carrier fleet to the IOR and India will not send its fleet to the Straits of Malacca. By themselves, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines and New Zealand will not tangle with the Chinese unless the US Navy is there with its firepower. Even then, the carriers will be the most vulnerable high value targets.

Towards the end (Chapter 17), is discussed a very important facet of military and national strategy-‘Intelligence: its collection, its evaluation and misevaluation’. Again, what the author misses here is that for any meaningful operations in the 33 Corps/4 Corps zones, a massive amount of troops and war material are required to be inducted in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). For us, the trigger here is the moment the Chinese start movement by crossing the T’sang Po. And T’sang Po can easily be observed by satellite, aerial recce and UAV’s. Whether we want to begin interdiction before the build-up is completed or wait for them to hit us (it will be too late then), is a political-military decision. It will also depend whether a shooting war has started in the Northern and Central sectors. Even if the Chinese want to address all the sectors simultaneously (as they did in 1962), crossing the T’sang Po is a dead giveaway.( Again questionable PLA managed to cross during DOKLAM almost onobserved - Vasundhra )

Can we depend on other countries to come to our assistance? Perhaps not, there definitely will be no boots on the ground from anyone. Nonetheless, it needs to be added that if China decides to start a war, a lot of infrastructure along the border, and in TAR, will be destroyed. The Indians will use their air power and so will the Chinese. Dams, bridges, railway lines, tunnels will be targeted. Here the Chinese have more to lose. By virtue of our ‘no escalation’ mindset, we will wait for the Chinese to use tactical missiles first. Nuclear weapons will be a no-no. Of course, both nations may do missile and nuclear rattling, both will say ‘we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons’. At some places the Chinese will capture some territory and in some places the Indians will capture some territory.  The UN will go into overdrive. What further could have been highlighted in the book is that American, Australian, Japanese, Filipino and Vietnamese ships will finally have unrestricted access to the China Seas. Will Taiwan with the tacit approval of the Americans declare ‘independence’? Chinese and Indian navies will clash in the Indian Ocean and the Indians will have the advantage of its ‘unsinkable’ aircraft carriers, viz peninsular India and our own land / island bases astride the Indian Ocean. Dominating the Straits of Hormuz will be India’s best bet.

Irrespective of who gets a more bloodier nose, there will be mistrust between India and China for the next thirty years after the war. At every forum, the two countries will try and destroy each other diplomatically and economically. The so called ‘Belt’ will finish once for all and so will the economic corridor. The reader can draw his own conclusions after reading the book. Two more things come to your mind after reading the book. Firstly, irrespective whether Bangladesh remains neutral or not in a Sino-Indian faceoff, the road/railway network of Bangladesh will be ‘commandeered’ by India, by force if necessary. At what stage? Obviously the ‘request’ will be based on the threat perception and the way the war is going. More so in the unlikely event that the Chinese have been able to advance through the Chumbi Valley and/or the Siliguri Corridor is threatened.

This is a book with a lot of facts, figures, orbats, force levels and data duly supported with appropriate citations. Though alright for an individual interested in further research or for purposes of authentication, it does become a bit heavy for the average reader. It would have been prudent to keep a lot of these comparisons, tables and data as appendices so that they could be referred on as required basis. Also, the average reader would appreciate reading the force levels (ie quantity/number of corps/divisions/brigades etc.) rather than the actual identification by tactical numbers. All the same, credit to the author for painstaking research and analysis.

Bobby Fischer, the iconoclastic genius who was one of the greatest chess players the world has ever seen, had once famously remarked, ‘Tactics flow from a superior position’. War and foreign policy are akin to a game of chess. Ravi Rikhye’s book says it all. It is axiomatic that if we are to exhibit our strength – our strategic and tactical prowess-then we must first reach good ‘positions’ where our future moves, long term planning and tactics will favour us whilst placing our opposition in totally untenable positions. Not much different from The Six Fold Policy of the Arthasastra’ enunciated by Kautilya as far back as 300 BC !!  At the present point of time, the analysis of the author is in-disputable. India does not have the capability to fight a successful two front war. We can defend ourselves, we can buy time. 

We may lose territory but there will be no rout, and this will not be because of our political/bureaucratic leadership: it will be inspite of it, solely because of the ethos, leadership and professionalism of our military.

Can we mount an offensive against Pakistan and manage to hold the Chinese with the present force structure? No. But then you need a man like Stalin or Churchill at the helm of affairs to bear in the national effort and mobilise the entire financial, economic, industrial resources for a battle for survival. Your adversary having double or triple your resources does not necessarily mean the disintegration of your fighting capability. It is not the Army, it is the nation that has to fight for existence and for that you require a well equipped, well armed, well trained, fully motivated military proud of its standing with the assured knowledge that it holds a place of pride in every citizens’ eye. That assured, the soldier will then face ‘fearful odds and will be ready to die for the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods’.

An engaging, honest and hard hitting book which does not spare any punches and lays bare the sloth, lack of strategic thought and the sickening mindset plaguing this country as far as our strategic thought is concerned. But does any Indian bureaucrat or politician really care? If we are to be really taken seriously as an ‘emerging’ power with the fastest growing economy, if we are to claim having the world’s youngest work force, if we pride ourselves as the world’s most populous nation and if we claim to have the third largest army, the fourth largest airforce and the seventh largest navy; then we also require to have muscles which can be flexed. Not just a hollow skeleton.

Ravi Rikhye, well brought out, you have said what George Santayana had alluded to a long time back, ‘Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it’ !  This book should not only be read by the Indian military establishment, but by every Indian citizen.

Brigadier DS Sarao (Retd)


Wednesday, December 2, 2020

1971 : The Two-Front War That India Fought - Indian Defence Research Wing

 SOURCE:  https://trendypedia.in/the-two-front-war-that-india-fought-indian-defence-research-wing/

                                                      WARNING

To day 49 years ago Pakistan had the audacity to hit me ( Us ) with thousand pounders at the sun set and read what we did to them what now is a HISTORY, I won't be surprised if Pakistan does not mend its ways than I ( We ) should not be blamed if PAKISTAN gets  VAPOURISED   from the world map. 


The Two-Front War That India Fought - Indian Defence Research Wing




SOURCE: SUNDAY GUARDIAN LIVE

The Pakistan Air Force attacked 11 Indian air bases from Jammu and Kashmir to Rajasthan in a preemptive air strike at the sunset of 3 December 1971. It violated Indian airspace with about 50 Sabre jet fighters. This opened up the second front for India in the Indian Western Theatre, ostensibly, to make the Indian armed forces recoil, which were then preparing to march into East Pakistan, as a response to the genocide being committed by the Pakistan Army on the Bengali Muslims there

. Certain preliminary border actions by the Indian Army had already commenced in November 1971. The western Pakistani Forces, primarily composed of Punjabi Muslims were creating mayhem on their Islamic brethren of East Pakistan, located some 1,600 km away, divided by the brilliance of the British. The country, on partition was unequally divided, with 55% population holding onto one-sixth of land area of the nation in the east as compared to the more influential Western Pakistanis holding large jagirs in the West where only 45% of the population resided.

The reason of the violence was clear—that an inferior Bengali Muslim from the East cannot rule Punjabi dominated West, even though a Bengali (Sheikh Mujibur Rehman) had won an election. This triggered a revolution in East Pakistan, a clear demonstration that religion is not enough to hold a nation together. Pakistan did not want India to come in aid of the Bangla resistance movement and expected that India would suffer the burden of millions of refugees silently. Indian patience was running thin under the increasing threats from Pakistan. On 23 November 1971, Indian Army had penetrated East Pakistan’s borders, with certain elements joining their Bangla allies. Emboldened with certain limited successes of the 1965 war and with American support, Pakistan had a false notion that they would be able to pull off an attack on India on the west and release pressure on their forces in East Pakistan where they were running a “scorched earth” policy of killing, looting and raping the Bengali population in millions.

In April 1971, post the hijack of the Indian Airlines Fokker friendship aircraft by Pakistan, which they also set on fire, India responded by closing Indian airspace to Pakistan, debarring them from flying directly to East Pakistan. Pakistani military garrisons in Dhaka, Comilla, Sylhet, Jessore, Rangpur, Bogra, Khulna, Rajshahi and Chittagong had to be sustained from the sea route. Pakistan had to supply jet fuel for its Sabre jets (F86), gasoline for its Chaffee tanks, ammunition for its guns and wheat for West Pakistan’s army. The supplies had to come via a long route, on Pakistani ships and planes, some needing refuelling in Sri Lanka. In mid 1971, the military requirements of transporting 180,000 tons and 120,000 personnel had doubled after Yahya Khan dispatched two additional infantry divisions from West Pakistan, only to be surrounded by the Indian Army later.

In July 1971, General Yahya Khan, warned India that “total war” was very near. Later, in August, he threatened that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would be given a death sentence, who after winning elections was denied the leadership of Pakistan and was accused of “political betrayal”. He had been put into solitary confinement in Lyallpur. Millions of Bengali Muslim refugees already pouring in from East Pakistan to Indian territory from the beginning of the year, turned into a torrent with Yahya’s announcement. By the end of the year almost 10 million refugees were already in India. India was sympathetic to East Pakistan and could not bear the increasing burden of feeding refugees. Those days vehicles in Pakistan were seen with stickers reading “Crush India”, while in India the stickers on transport read “Liberate Bangladesh”.

The Pakistan Army, facing a backlash, had recruited Bihari Muslims of East Pakistan to kill the Bengali Muslims—a tactic of running a proxy war they had mastered in earlier years. The Indian Army, on invitation and with the tacit approval of the provincial government of Bangladesh (name given during Liberation Struggle), posted some Bengali speaking military officers with small teams in a manner that they could covertly train and equip the Mukti Bahini under the code name of Operation Jackpot. In the wake of India supporting the liberation of Bangladesh, which had already extended assistance to the Bangla refugees, Pakistan threatened India with dire consequences. The then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, had the great challenge of shaping world opinion against Pakistan and support the cause for the creation of Bangladesh. Henry Kissinger made a hurried visit to India to deter, in fact warn India of consequences if India attacked Pakistan. Kissinger then visited Pakistan and from there visited China in Pakistan’s military aircraft on a secret mission asking for Chinese support to Pakistan.

India was certainly in a war-like situation, handling the mass exodus of refugees, a clear case of ethnic cleansing by Pakistan. The world watched this human tragedy quietly. India was frustrated and had no option but to take recourse to military action. General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw, then COAS, a great professional soldier, had his own mind on picking right time to attack Pakistan, even though he was asked by Indira Gandhi to wage a war in the earlier part of the year. Wary of China, he was looking for winters when China could not open the northern front and soil condition would be fit for Indian tanks to operate. Of course, he had many other reasons to delay. This gave time to India to prepare diplomatically as well as militarily. USSR was the only country that offered to support India. The blocs had shaped up where Pakistan, China and US (leader of NATO) were firmly tied to one side, with India standing alone with ten million Bangla refugees, and was leaning on understanding and support of the USSR.

On 3 December, the attack by Pakistani forces in the western sector gave a legitimate cause for India to attack Pakistan. Emboldened by Chinese and US support, Pakistan was surprised at the speed of Indian counter offensive in the west. Indian Air Force went in for air attacks on the entire front, literally paralysing the Pakistani Air Force. Indian Navy, in a swift attack caused heavy destruction of the Karachi port on 4 December with a repeat on 12 December with many ships, infrastructure and fuel dumps going up in flames each time. Indian Army’s ground operations, though more defensive initially in the west, were soon beating them in every battle. Contrary to the previous war of 1965, which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time in the Eastern Sector, strategy adopted by the Indian Army was to undertake a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.
US dispatched its Seventh Fleet with Task Force 74, showing its presence near the Bay of Bengal on 11 December. In its support, the United Kingdom also deployed a Carrier Battle Group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay, on her final deployment. On 6 and 13 December, the Soviets dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers from Vladivostok, who trailed US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by the USS Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.
By the second week of December, Pakistani forces were quickly capitulating and falling apart in the East Pakistan. The morale of the Pakistani Army was abysmally low, even with supplies that could have lasted them for months. Their combat units were more than willing to surrender than fight.

The main Indian objective on the eastern front was to capture Dhaka, and on the western front to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan and dismembering it into different states. My unit 22 Maratha LI was involved right from the preliminary operations in East Pakistan prior to the outbreak of open hostilities. Some members of my unit were working closely with Mukti Bahini for months. For conventional operations, the unit was part of 202 Mountain Brigade, initially in reserve, with Brigade task to clear Hilli, a strong point that had to be cleared before advancing towards Rangpur. Pakistan had built a string of well-fortified strong points to defend the border. The BOPs (Border Out Posts) located ahead were cleared during preliminary operations. The attacks launched by other units of the brigade were suffering heavy casualties, who with sheer grit cleared the initial defences with heavy resistance.

My unit was tasked to launch a “silent attack” through the gaps of Pakistan’s 4 Frontier Force Rifles, taking the enemy by surprise which it cleared after some resistance. Once the surprise was lost, the further attack became intense and bloody, with the wiry Marathas slogging it out against the sturdy Pathans from bunker to bunker. The position was captured with heavy casualties on both sides. Post the capture of Hilli, the advance of the brigade towards Rangpur was resumed with the battalion in the lead. A wide outflanking move was undertaken to contact the Rangpur Defences. The enemy being encircled was petrified and began to surrender. The Indian Army was making such advances from all directions.

The paradrop of 2 Para (now Special Forces) at Tangail helped speed up operations towards final capture of Dhaka. By 12 December, Pakistani units still intact, began to willingly lay down arms in front of an increasing strength of Indian troops. On 16 December, Pakistan surrendered all troops located in East Pakistan. Many Pakistani Air Force officers, to save their lives, abandoned their missions and flew their planes into Burma. Similarly, many Pakistani fighter pilots in the western front also escaped and landed their planes in neighbouring Iran. Certain fighter planes supplied by the Middle East and Arab countries to Pakistan without pilots were left on Pakistani runways without being used. The Pakistan military led by Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, surrendered at the feet of the Indian forces. Over 90,000 Pakistan personnel (mostly from Pakistan Army) were taken prisoners of war (PoW) by the Indian Army. This was the greatest numbers of prisoners taken in the history of war between two countries ever. No wonder the Pakistan Army uses proxy warriors to fight its battles.

On the western front, certain critical areas had been captured by the Indian Army around Turtuk, Kargil and Kashmir, redefining the Cease Fire Line (CFL) into Line of Control (LoC). The Indian forces captured around 15,000 sq km of land in the west. The Shimla Agreement was signed as a gesture of goodwill where India decided to return the territory captured across the International Border. Territory captured in Jammu and Kashmir was retained by both sides and a new Line of Control was defined up to map reference NJ 9842 in the North. All PoWs were returned to Pakistan within five months, and those charged with war crimes were granted amnesty. Pakistan did not reciprocate the goodwill and has not returned 54 Indian PoWs still languishing in Pakistani jails.

Pakistan sought to have a diversified foreign policy, as Pakistani geo-strategists had been shocked that both China and the United States provided limited support to Pakistan during the course of the war, with the US displaying inability to supply weapons that Pakistan needed the most. The US at best encouraged other countries to help Pakistan with hardware.
Today, 49 years later, while the global dynamics around the subcontinent have changed, India continues to have adversaries in Pakistan and China, and have fought five wars with them. The US has realised the worthlessness of having untrustworthy friends; Pakistan has exported terrorism to the world while selling lies on fighting the War on Terrorism (GWOT) in support of the US. The Chinese have hurt US interests by stealing technology and pirating their intellectual property. China has challenged the US in every field, lately even military. Pakistan has become a vassal state of China and does its bidding. US and Russia relations continue to remain strained but are less serious from the years of cold war. In their case deterrence has worked towards keeping them away from a direct military confrontation, albeit taking opposite sides in global conflicts.

The current India-China-Pakistan conflict remains on the edge given their disputed borders and existence of historical fault lines. How these fronts and collusion pan out in the future need deliberate analysis. The current standoff on the LAC is still in the realm of conventional engagement, while “hybrid wars” are at play and are replacing the conventional. Regional peace can be ensured in remaining prepared for war and “securing peace through strength”. The next “two-front war” under a nuclear overhang and based on high technology will be more complex. Such wars would involve and impact every citizen of the countries involved. Devastation would be colossal and unavoidable. Only the maturity of global leaders can save the day for humanity.

                                     _________________________________

Lt Gen P.J.S. Pannu (Retd) is an officer of 22 Maratha LI, who has commanded his unit and Brigade at Uri (J&K), Division on the LAC (Arunachal Pradesh) and 14 Corps in Ladakh. He is also the former DG Infantry and Deputy Chief IDS, responsible for raising the Space and Cyber Agencies and Special Operations Division. He is a distinguished fellow of the USI.