Friday, May 19, 2017

Pakistan Caught in the Middle As China’s OBOR becomes Saudi-Iranian-Indian Battleground (R)

SOURCE:
https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.in/2017/05/pakistan-caught-in-middle-as-chinas.html






            Pakistan Caught in the Middle

                                   

                                     As 

                China’s OBOR becomes

       Saudi-Iranian-Indian Battleground

                                               By

                        James M. Dorsey



Friday, May 5, 2017








Pakistani General Raheel Sharif walked into a hornet’s nest when he stepped off a private jet in Riyadh two weeks ago to take command of a Saudi-led, 41-nation military alliance. Things have gone from bad to worse since.

General Shareef had barely landed when Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman dashed the Pakistani’s hopes to include Iran in the alliance that nominally was created to fight terrorism rather than confront Iran.

The general’s hopes were designed to balance Pakistan’s close alliance with Saudia Arabia with the fact that it shares a volatile border with Iran and is home to the world’s second largest Shiite Muslim community. General Sharif’s ambition had already been rendered Mission Impossible before he landed with Saudi Arabia charging that Iran constitutes the world’s foremost terrorist threat.

In a recent interview with the Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting television network, Prince Mohammed, who also serves as the kingdom’s defense minister, has toughened Saudi Arabia’s stance. Prince Mohammed appeared in line with statements by a senior US military official to hold out the possibility of exploiting aspirations of ethnic minorities in Iran to weaken its Islamic regime.

In doing so, Prince Mohammed and General Joseph L. Voltel, head of US Central Command, seemed to raise the spectre of increased violence in Balochistan, a volatile, once independent region that straddles both sides of the Iranian-Pakistani border, as well as in the Iranian province of Khuzestan, the Islamic republic’s oil-rich region that is home to Iranians of Arab descent.

Ethnic and sectarian proxy wars could embroil rivals China and India in the Saudi-Iranian dispute. The deep-sea port of Gwadar in Balochistan is a lynchpin of China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, and a mere 70 kilometres from the Indian-backed port of Chabahar in Iran, viewed by Saudi Arabia as a potential threat to one of the most important sea routes facilitating the flow of oil from the Gulf to Asia.

The risk of China’s initiative as well as its regional rivalry with India becoming a Saudi-Iranian battleground appeared to increase with Prince Mohammed’s warning that the battle between the two regional powers would be fought "inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia."

In his interview, Prince Mohammed not only ruled out talks with Iran but painted the two countries’ rivalry in sectarian terms. The prince asserted that Iran, a predominantly Shiite country, believes that “the Imam Mahdi (the redeemer) will come and they must prepare the fertile environment for the arrival of the awaited Mahdi and they must control the Muslim world…. “How do you have a dialogue with this?” Prince Mohammed asked.

Saudi Arabia had already signalled its support for Iranian dissidents when last July former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States and Britain, Prince Turki al-Faisal, attended a rally in Paris organized by the exiled People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a militant left-wing group that advocates the overthrow of Iran’s Islamic regime and traces its roots to resistance against the shah who was toppled in the 1979 revolution. "Your legitimate struggle against the (Iranian) regime will achieve its goal, sooner or later. I, too, want the fall of the regime,” Prince Turki told the rally.

Since then, General Voltel, avoiding any reference to sectarianism, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee, that “in order to contain Iranian expansion, roll back its malign influence, and blunt its asymmetric advantages, we must engage them more effectively in the ‘grey zone’ through means that include a strong deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and by building partner nations’ capacity… (We) believe that by taking proactive measures and reinforcing our resolve we can lessen Iran’s ability to negatively influence outcomes in the future.,” General Voltel said.

Prince Mohammed did not spell out how he intends to take Saudi Arabia’s fight to Iran, but a Saudi think tank, the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies (AGCIS) argued in a recent study that Chabahar posed “a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states” that called for “immediate counter measures.”

Written by Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, identified as an Iranian political researcher, the study, published in the first edition of AGCIS’ Journal of Iranian Studies, argued that Chabahar posed a threat because it would enable Iran to increase greater market share in India for its oil exports at the expense of Saudi Arabia, raise foreign investment in the Islamic republic and increase government revenues, and allow Iran to project power in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Husseinbor suggested Saudi support for a low-level Baloch insurgency in Iran could serve as a countermeasure. “Saudis could persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian Baluch... The Arab-Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history of the Gulf region and their opposition to Persian domination,” Mr. Husseinbor said.

Noting the vast expanses of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Mr. Husseinbor went on to say that “it would be a formidable challenge, if not impossible, for the Iranian government to protect such long distances and secure Chabahar in the face of widespread Baluch opposition, particularly if this opposition is supported by Iran’s regional adversaries and world powers.”

The conservative Washington-based Hudson Institute, which is believed to have developed close ties to the Trump administration, has also taken up the theme of ethnic minorities in Iran. The institute has scheduled a seminar for later this month that features as speakers Baloch, Iranian Arab, Iranian Kurdish and Iranian Azerbaijani nationalists.

Saudi Arabia may already have the building blocks in place for a proxy war in Balochistan. Saudi-funded ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim madrassas operated by anti-Shiite militants dominate Balochistan’s educational landscape.

“A majority of Baloch schoolchildren go to madrassas. They are in better condition than other schools in Balochistan. Most madrassas are operated by Deobandis and Ahl-i-Hadith,” said one of the founders of Sipah-i-Sabaha, a virulent anti-Shiite group that is believed to enjoy Saudi and Pakistani support.

Although officially renamed Ahle Sunnah Wa Al Jamaat after Sipah was banned in Pakistan, the group is still often referred to by its original name. The co-founder, who has since left the group but maintains close ties to it, was referring to the Deobandi sect of Islam, a Saudi backed ultra-conservative, anti-Shiite movement originally established in India in the 19th century to counter British colonial rule, and Ahl-i-Hadith, the religious-political group in Pakistan with the longest ties to the kingdom.  The co-founder said the mosques funnelled Saudi funds to the militants.

The co-founder said the leaders in Balochistan of Sipah and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a Sipah offshoot, Maulana Ramzan Mengal and Maulana Wali Farooqi, enjoyed government and military protection because their anti-Shiite sentiments made them targets for Iran. He said the two men, who maintained close ties to Saudi Arabia, travelled in Balochistan in convoys of up to ten vehicles that included Pakistan military guards. Policemen stand guard outside Mr. Mengal’s madrassa, the co-founder said.

“Ramzan gets whatever he needs from the Saudis,” the co-founder said. Close relations between Sipah and LeJ, on the one hand, and pro-government tribesmen in Balochistan complicate irregular government efforts to reign in the militants. So does the militant’s involvement in drugs smuggling that gives them an independent source of funding.

Iran has accused the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistani intelligence of supporting anti-Iranian militants in Balochistan, including Jundallah (Soldiers of God), an offshoot of Sipah. Jundallah, founded by Abdolmalek Rigi, a charismatic member of a powerful Baloch tribe, was one of several anti-Iranian groups that enjoyed US and Saudi support as part of US President George W. Bush’s effort to undermine the government in Tehran

Mr. Rigi was captured when a flight he took from the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek to Dubai was diverted at Iran’s request to Sharjah in 2010.  He was executed in Iran. Pakistani forces have at times cooperated with Iran in detaining militants, including Mr. Rigi’s brother, Abdolhamid Rigi, but have often insisted that they are overwhelmed by internal security problems, and could not prioritize securing the border with the Islamic republic. “Our policy has been consistently anti-Iran,” said Khalid Ahmad, an author and journalist who focuses on militants.

Jundullah’s US contact point in the early 2000s was reported to be Thomas McHale, a 56-year-old hard-charging, brusque and opinionated Port Authority of New York and New Jersey detective and former ironworker, who had travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of his work for a Joint Terrorism Task Force in Newark. Known for his disdain for bureaucratic restrictions, Mr. McHale maintained contact with Jundallah and members of the Rigi tribe in an off-the-books operation

Mr. McHale, a survivor of the 1993 attack on New York’s World Trade Towers, had made a name for himself by rescuing survivors of the 9/11 attack on the towers. He played himself in Oliver Stone’s movie, World Trade Center, in which Nicolas Cage starred as a Port Authority police officer.
Jundallah ambushed a motorcade of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 but failed to kill him. 

Mr. Rigi’s boyish, grinning face became as a result of the ambush the defining image of Baluch jihad in Iran. A year later, the group bombed a bus carrying Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Jundallah and associated groups such as Jaish al-Adly (Army of Justice), another Sipah offshoot, have since targeted Iranian border posts, Revolutionary Guards, police officers, convoys and Shiite mosques

General Sharif and Pakistan’s position were not made easier with the recent killing by Jaish al Adl militants operating from Pakistani Balochistan of ten Iranian border guards and with Iran’s expressions of displeasure with the general’s appointment as commander of the Saudi-led military alliance.

US officials insisted in Mr. McHale’s time that government agencies had not directed or ever approved Jundallah operations. The US designated Jundallah as a terrorist organization in 2010, but that did not stop Sunni Muslim militant anti-Iranian operations. In what analysts see as an indication of Saudi influence, Jaish al-Adel issues its statements in Arabic rather than Baluchi or Farsi.

In response, Iran has attacked the militants and raided villages in Balochistan. Arif Saleem, a 42-year old villager recalls being woken in the wee hours of the morning in November 2013 when bombs dropped just outside the mud walls that surround his family compound in Kulauhi, 67 kilometres from the Pakistani border with Iran. Located in a district that is an epicentre of a low-level proxy war with Iran, Kulauhi’s residents survive on subsistence farming and smuggling. “Some buildings collapsed. Luckily, none of the kids were inside those. The blast was so strong, we thought the world was ending,” said Saleem, convinced that Iranian planes from an airbase on the Iranian side of the border carried out the bombing.

The spectre of ethnic proxy wars threatens to further destabilize the Gulf as well as Pakistan. The Baloch insurgency in Pakistani Balochistan has complicated Chinese plans to develop Gwadar and forced Pakistan to take extraordinary security precautions. A stepped-up proxy war could embroil Indian-backed Chabahar in the conflict. The wars could, moreover, spread to Iran’s Khuzestan and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.

Writing in 2012 in Asharq Al Awsat, a Saudi newspaper, Amal Al-Hazzani, an academic who has since been dropped from the paper’s roster after she wrote positively about Israel, asserted in an op-ed entitled “The oppressed Arab district of al-Ahwaz“ that “the al-Ahwaz district in Iran...is an Arab territory... Its Arab residents have been facing continual repression ever since the Persian state assumed control of the region in 1925... It is imperative that the Arabs take up the al-Ahwaz cause, at least from the humanitarian perspective.” Other Arab commentators have since opined in a similar fashion.

Fuelling ethnic tensions risks Iran responding in kind. Saudi Arabia has long accused Iran of instigating low level violence and protests in its predominantly Shiite oil-rich Eastern Province as well as being behind the brutally squashed popular revolt in majority Shiite Bahrain and intermittent violence since. Rather than resolving conflicts, a Saudi-Iranian war fought with ethnic and religious proxies threatens to escalate violence in both the Gulf and South Asia.



Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.









































Conflict in the Middle East threatens Pakistan and lynchpin of China's One Belt, One Road (r)

SOURCE:
[ a ] https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.in/2017/05/conflict-in-middle-east-threatens.html

[b] https://www.academia.edu/33006712/Conflict_in_the_Middle_East_threatens_Pakistan_and_lynchpin_of_Chinas_One_Belt_One_Road


Conflict in the Middle East threatens Pakistan and lynchpin of China's One Belt, One Road

By James M. Dorsey




Increasingly caught up in the Middle East’s multiple conflicts, Pakistan is struggling to balance relations with rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran amid concern in Islamabad that potential US-Saudi efforts to destabilize the Islamic republic could turn its crucial province of Balochistan, a lynchpin in China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, into a battleground.

Concern about Balochistan is buffeted by a sense in Islamabad of problems along its multiple borders. Pakistani officials fear that China may be seeking closer ties with India at Pakistan’s expense, despite its massive $56 billion investment in Pakistani infrastructure that centres on linking the troubled Baloch port of Gwadar, a gateway to the Gulf, with China’s restive, north-western province of Xinjiang.

Pakistani officials see a statement by China’s ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, that China had no interest in being dragged into the Pakistani-Indian dispute over Kashmir, as an indication that Beijing is cosying up to New Delhi at Islamabad’s expense.

Mr. Zhaohui was trying to persuade India to engage with One Belt, One Road on the eve of a summit in Beijing to promote China’s geopolitical ploy in Eurasia. Twenty-eight heads of state, including Pakistani Prime Minister Nawal Sharif, were expected to attend the summit that starts this weekend.

Adding to Pakistani fears are increased tensions with Afghanistan following a clash in early May between Pakistani and Afghan forces in which 15 people were killed and dozens wounded. The clash occurred days after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani rejected an invitation to visit Pakistan conveyed by Pakistani intelligence chief Lt. General Naveed Mukhtar.

Sources close to Mr. Ghani quoted the president as telling General Mukhtar that none of the 48 agreements signed with Pakistan during his 2014 visit to Islamabad had been implemented. The agreements included an understanding that Pakistan would bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. “I spent political capital on that. That was the deal,” the sources quoted Mr. Ghani as saying.

Sources close to the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence said Mr. Ghani’s rejection of the invitation followed two meetings in Norway on January 8 and 18 in the waning days of the Obama administration between an unidentified member of the US Congress, a CIA official, and representatives of the Taliban.

The officials said the meetings focussed on the possible of release of an American-Canadian couple who have been held by the Taliban since 2012. The sources said the talks also explored unsuccessfully ways of negotiating an end to the fighting in Afghanistan. A spokesperson for the US embassy in Islamabad declined comment.

Meanwhile, two attacks in the last 48 hours highlighted mounting tension in Balochistan against the backdrop of thinly veiled Saudi threats to stir ethnic unrest across the Baloch border in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan and among the Islamic republic’s minority Iranian Arab, Kurdish and Azerbaijani minorities.

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) gunmen on motorbikes opened fire on construction workers in Gwadar, killing ten. The attack exploited widespread discontent among Baloch that they were not benefitting from massive Chinese investment in their province that was providing employment primarily for workers from elsewhere in Pakistan. The victims of the attack were from the Pakistani province of Sindh.

"This conspiratorial plan (CPEC) is not acceptable to the Baloch people under any circumstances. Baloch independence movements have made it clear several times that they will not abandon their people's future in the name of development projects or even democracy,” said BLA spokesman Jeander Baloch. Mr. Baloch was referring to Chinese investment in what has been dubbed the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The Islamic State’s South Asian wing claimed responsibility a day earlier for abombing near the Baloch capital of Quetta that targeted Senator Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, the deputy chairman of the upper house of parliament, and a member of Jamiat e Ulema Islam, a right-wing Sunni Islamist political party that is part of Prime Minister Sharif's coalition government. Twenty-five people were killed in the blast that wounded Mr. Haideri.

The two attacks as well as Friday’s US Treasury designation of Maulana Ali Muhammad Abu Turab as a specially designated terrorist highlighted the murky world of Pakistani militancy in which the lines between various groups are fluid, links to government are evident, and battles in Pakistan and Afghanistan and potentially Iran are inter-linked.

Mr. Abu Turab is a prominent Pakistani Islamic scholar of Afghan descent who serves on a government-appointed religious board, maintains close ties to Saudi Arabia, runs a string of madrassas attended by thousands of students along Balochistan’s with Afghanistan and is a major fund raiser for militant groups.

Putting Saudi Arabia on the spot, the Treasury announced the designation of Mr. Abu Turab, a leader of Ahl-i-Hadith, a Saudi-supported Pakistani Wahhabi group and board member of Pakistan’s Saudi-backed Paigham TV, who serves on Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology, a government-appointed advisory body of scholars and laymen established to assist in bringing laws in line with the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet Mohammed, as he was visiting the kingdom and Qatar on the latest of numerous fund raising trips to the Gulf. 

Mr. Abu Turab also heads the Saudi-funded Movement for the Protection of the Two Holy Cities (Tehrike Tahafaz Haramain Sharifain) whose secretary general Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil has also been designated by the Treasury.

After years of flying low, Mr. Abu Turab appeared to have attracted US attention with his increasingly public support for Saudi Arabia as well as Pakistani militants. Mr. Abu Turab regularly shows pictures of his frequent public appearances to Saudi diplomats in Islamabad to ensure continued Saudi funding, according to sources close to him. Mr. Abu Turab called on the Pakistani government in April to support Saudi Arabia and endorse Pakistani General Raheel Sharif’s appointmentas head of the Saudi-led military coalition.

The Treasury described Mr. Abu Turab as a “facilitator…(who) helped…raise money in the Gulf and supported the movement of tens of thousands of dollars from the Gulf to Pakistan.”  The Treasury said funds raised by Mr. Abu Turab, an Afghan who was granted Pakistani citizenship, financed operations of various groups, including Pakistan’s Jama'at ul Dawa al-Qu'ran (JDQ); Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), a Pakistani intelligence-backed group that at times has enjoyed support from Saudi Arabia; the Taliban; and the Islamic State’s South Asian wing.

The Treasury announcement came less than two weeks before Donald J. Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia on his first trip abroad as US president to discuss cooperation with the kingdom and a Saudi-led, 41-nation Sunni Muslim military alliance led by General Sharif in combatting terrorism and isolating Iran.

Any discussion of efforts to destabilize Iran between US officials and the Saudi-led alliance during Mr. Trump’s visit to the kingdom would likely heighten Pakistan’s difficulty in balancing its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran and cast a cloud over Chinese hopes that economic development would pacify nationalist and religious militants in both Balochistan and Xinjiang.

Sources close to Pakistani intelligence and Shiite leaders fear that increased conflict in Balochistan and Saudi and Iranian operations in Pakistan could not only suck it into proxy wars between the two Middle Eastern powers but also rekindle sectarian violence in Pakistan itself.

The intelligence sources said they had noticed that Shiite military officers were becoming more assertive in their empathy for Iran in discussions about regional security.  Pakistan’s Shiite minority is the world’s second largest Shiite community after pre-dominantly Shiite Iran.

The sources asserted further that Iran had recently recruited at least 3,000 Pakistani Shiites into its Xenobia brigade that is fighting in Syria in support of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The sources said that Pakistan had detained in early May a commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who was on a recruiting mission in Balochistan.

They said the arrest marked a shift in Iran’s recruitment strategy that in the past had relied on Pakistani religious scholars and travel agents. “The Iranians have been clandestinely coming to Balochistan since the fall of the Shah (in 1979),” said a retired Pakistani intelligence chief. 

“Tenuous relations have rekindled a latent Iranian interest in furthering its territorial ambitions. Iran has tried hard to mask this latency but Pakistan remains wary of such intent,” added former vice commander of the Pakistani air force, Shahzad Chaudhry.

Pakistani Shiite leaders fear that sectarianism could be fuelled by Saudi funding of militant anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba, a virulently anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian group that since being banned has rebranded itself as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, as well as its various offshoots that target Iran. Like Mr. Abu Turab, both groups operate large networks of religious seminaries in Balochistan.

Sources close to the militants said Saudi and UAE nationals of Baloch heritage were funnelling Saudi funds to Islamic scholars like Sipah’s Balochistan leader, Maulana Ramzan Mengal, and Mr. Abu Turab. They said the money was being transferred through hawala agents operating in the Middle East and South Asia.

Iran’s Tabnak News Agency charged that Mr. Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia was designed to strengthen an anti-Iranian US-Arab alliance against Iran. “The Iranophobic project began a couple of months ago… It appears that the Arab NATO project – which has been under discussion for some time – is entering its implementation stage with American President Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia and the invitation to 17 Arab countries to Riyadh,” the agency said. The agency is believed to be controlled by former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei.

Pakistan’s foreign policy woes appear to have sent its intelligence services into a paranoid tailspin. The services have stepped up in one’s face surveillance, harassment and intimidation of foreigners, prompting some diplomats in Islamabad to lodge complaints with the foreign ministry. Similarly, representatives of Western non-governmental organizations have had extensions of their visas rejected. In some cases, Pakistanis have been interrogated by intelligence agents within the hour of having met with foreigners.



Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author ofnstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the 

The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Creating Franke Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.



















Wednesday, May 17, 2017

ASSESSMENT OBOR South Asia: A Bump in the Belt and Road


SOURCE:
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/south-asia-bump-belt-and-road?utm_campaign=LL_Content_Digest&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=52009364&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9QUqoprw3eAr9MFZg6OBI7mxoh7P8Pood_MAVTIxzT4mGREp3B_DJUenrAtwd1h6vCwNRdeg6fmdi6sk5q9hg7jSpyHQ&_hsmi=52009364

                           SOUTH ASIA
       : A BUMP IN THE BELT AND ROAD

                










SOURCE:
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/south-asia-bump-belt-and-road?utm_campaign=LL_Content_Digest&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=52009364&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9QUqoprw3eAr9MFZg6OBI7mxoh7P8Pood_MAVTIxzT4mGREp3B_DJUenrAtwd1h6vCwNRdeg6fmdi6sk5q9hg7jSpyHQ&_hsmi=52009364







ASSESMENTS



SOUTH ASIA : A BUMP IN THE BELT
                             AND 
                    THE ROAD [OBOR ]






As part of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, China is looking to build new inroads into South Asia. The region is rife with opportunity for Beijing. By establishing new security and economic connections with neighburing South Asian countries, China hopes to quell unrest in remote Xinjiang province. South Asia also offers an easy outlet for China's manufactured goods as the country weathers an economic slowdown. In the long term, moreover, the region would afford Beijing access to new trade routes outside the Malacca Strait and the contentious South China Sea. But of all the projects China has undertaken through its Belt and Road Initiative, its ventures in South Asia are the riskiest. The region's deep geopolitical divisions and security challenges could derail Beijing's plans there. And so long as India opposes China's activities in its traditional sphere of influence, the Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia will amount to little more than a bundle of bilateral deals.












Iron Brothers

China's vision for South Asia includes plans to link up the region through ports in Sri Lanka, a potential railway from Nepal’s capital Kathmandu to Lhasa in Tibet and the nascent Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). So far, though, it has made significant headway only on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC proposes to connect the Chinese city of Kashgar with the deep-water port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea through a network of roads and railways. The plan also includes numerous energy projects and free trade zones. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping clinched the deal with Islamabad in April 2015, the CPEC has moved quickly into the implementation phase, and its first projects will reach completion this year or the next.


The CPEC's rapid progress is hardly surprising. China often refers to Pakistan as its "iron brother," an affinity that traces back to the Cold War, when the two countries worked to balance against India and helped each other's nuclear development in the 1970s and 1980s. The relationship is not free of tension, of course. Nevertheless, Pakistan's isolation in South Asia has made China an indispensible partner over the years. And CPEC is an unequivocal boon for Islamabad. The Pakistani government hopes the initiative, which will focus on building energy and transportation infrastructure along with free trade zones, will remove the barriers to growth and development that have held Pakistan back for decades.
At its signing, the deal was originally projected to entail around $46 billion in spending. Most of that amount — which has since climbed to $51.5 billion — has been earmarked for energy infrastructure, including a $2.5 billion natural gas pipeline to Iran. Pakistan faces an annual energy deficit of around 4,000 megawatts; demand for energy in the country, meanwhile, is growing at a rate of 10 percent per year. Energy shortages cost Pakistan an estimated 2 to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product growth in 2015. Through CPEC, China hopes to remedy this shortfall by adding an estimated 7,000 megawatts by 2018, building eventually to 16,000 megawatts.
In addition, several road construction and rehabilitation projects — also set to wrap up by 2018 — would enhance connectivity in Pakistan's geographic core and parts of its outlying regions. The corridor makes the most of the country's geography, with many of its projects following the Indus River southwest to the coast on the Arabian Sea, where an initiative to expand and connect the Gwadar port will reduce the strain on other maritime hubs in the country. It could also help Pakistan address some of its most enduring challenges. By connecting the ethnically distinct and impoverished provinces of BalochistanKhyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to the country's Punjab heartland, the Pakistani government aims to increase economic opportunity and at the same time quiet unrest.













But Pakistan's geographic and ethnic tensions have already caused problems for the CPEC. Separatist militants in Balochistan have found the plan's infrastructure projects a convenient target to express their grievances. The opposition Pakistan People's Party, similarly, has accused the government of devoting more resources to CPEC initiatives in the country's predominantly Punjab regions. In response to the mounting regional strife, local governments have expanded policing along the corridor, while the Pakistani military has established a special task force and security division to patrol the Gwadar port and a nationwide special security division dedicated to protecting CPEC projects. Still, the militant and political dynamics will become only more complex as the project progresses, and more questions over the project's economic viability will arise.


Overcoming the Partition


Elsewhere in South Asia, Belt and Road will face equally daunting problems, including Afghanistan's continued disarray. The far greater challenge, however, will be securing India's cooperation on the matter. As much as the country wants to project power over its namesake subcontinent and establish strong, secure ties across its borders, it has struggled to do so in its modern history. India's partition in 1947 created lasting rifts with Pakistan and Bangladesh (then known as East Pakistan), which left its orbit after gaining independence. Nepal and Sri Lanka, on the other hand, have each sought support elsewhere to limit New Delhi's influence over their affairs. Despite its rapid growth and position at South Asia's geopolitical core, India has neither the economic clout nor the internal political coherence to overcome its domestic divisions, much less to become a powerful regional hegemon. And China's sway in its periphery threatens New Delhi's prospects for realizing that goal.

China's manufacturing prowess has already made it an important economic power in the Indian subcontinent. Today, the country is the top source of imports for Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as India; between 2010 and 2015, China's exports to Pakistan doubled. By contrast, Bangladesh is the only South Asian country among India's top 10 export destinations, ranking ninth. India simply can't compete with China when it comes to regional trade. Nepal presents a good case study. After delaying for months to consult India, Nepal decided to sign on to the initiative ahead of the May 14-15 Belt and Road Forum. Ultimately, Katmandu said it could not pass up such a massive economic opportunity. Nor has it had much success with development projects in nearby countries. India's Chabahar port venture in Iran, for instance, has foundered while similar Chinese projects in Pakistan and in Sri Lanka have proceeded apace.As China builds inroads through the region as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative, India must decide whether to throw its weight behind the campaign. Beijing would like New Delhi to participate in Belt and Road; in fact, the success of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) partly depends on India's involvement. The plan, originally proposed in 1999 — long before Belt and Road — would connect Kolkata with China's Yunnan province, giving India the access it so desires to lucrative markets in Southeast Asia. By adding India to Belt and Road, China hopes to dovetail with the Act East Policy initiated in 1991, something the country's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has emphasized since it came into power.







But Pakistan's geographic and ethnic tensions have already caused problems for the CPEC. Separatist militants in Balochistan have found the plan's infrastructure projects a convenient target to express their grievances. The opposition Pakistan People's Party, similarly, has accused the government of devoting more resources to CPEC initiatives in the country's predominantly Punjab regions. In response to the mounting regional strife, local governments have expanded policing along the corridor, while the Pakistani military has established a special task force and security division to patrol the Gwadar port and a nationwide special security division dedicated to protecting CPEC projects. Still, the militant and political dynamics will become only more complex as the project progresses, and more questions over the project's economic viability will arise.


Overcoming the Partition

Elsewhere in South Asia, Belt and Road will face equally daunting problems, including Afghanistan's continued disarray. The far greater challenge, however, will be securing India's cooperation on the matter. As much as the country wants to project power over its namesake subcontinent and establish strong, secure ties across its borders, it has struggled to do so in its modern history. India's partition in 1947 created lasting rifts with Pakistan and Bangladesh (then known as East Pakistan), which left its orbit after gaining independence. Nepal and Sri Lanka, on the other hand, have each sought support elsewhere to limit New Delhi's influence over their affairs. Despite its rapid growth and position at South Asia's geopolitical core, India has neither the economic clout nor the internal political coherence to overcome its domestic divisions, much less to become a powerful regional hegemon. And China's sway in its periphery threatens New Delhi's prospects for realizing that goal.
China's manufacturing prowess has already made it an important economic power in the Indian subcontinent. Today, the country is the top source of imports for Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as India; between 2010 and 2015, China's exports to Pakistan doubled. By contrast, Bangladesh is the only South Asian country among India's top 10 export destinations, ranking ninth. India simply can't compete with China when it comes to regional trade. Nepal presents a good case study. After delaying for months to consult India, Nepal decided to sign on to the initiative ahead of the May 14-15 Belt and Road Forum. Ultimately, Katmandu said it could not pass up such a massive economic opportunity. Nor has it had much success with development projects in nearby countries. India's Chabahar port venture in Iran, for instance, has foundered while similar Chinese projects in Pakistan and in Sri Lanka have proceeded apace.


As China builds inroads through the region as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative, India must decide whether to throw its weight behind the campaign. Beijing would like New Delhi to participate in Belt and Road; in fact, the success of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) partly depends on India's involvement. The plan, originally proposed in 1999 — long before Belt and Road — would connect Kolkata with China's Yunnan province, giving India the access it so desires to lucrative markets in Southeast Asia. By adding India to Belt and Road, China hopes to dovetail with the Act East Policy initiated in 1991, something the country's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has emphasized since it came into power.

A Tough Sell

The possible benefits notwithstanding, though, the Belt and Road Initiative also presents major risks for India. With even fewer barriers to trade in the region, Chinese goods could crowd out India's struggling manufacturing sector altogether. For that reason, New Delhi will be careful to keep Chinese imports from overwhelming its consumer market if it decides to join in on the Belt and Road Initiative. India's Cabinet has already passed a proposal mandating the use of domestic steel in state infrastructure projects.

Pakistan's prominent role in the initiative is the another deterrent for India. The rivalry between the two nuclear-equipped nations has become a defining feature of South Asian geopolitics, and it finds enduring expression in the dispute over Kashmir. India claims control of the region in its entirety, though Pakistan and China each administer portions of the territory. And it fears that the CPEC, which runs through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir as well as the Aksai Chin area under Chinese jurisdiction, will change the status quo in the contested region. As it is, the portion of Kashmir that India administers is home to a restive population and an active separatist movement; New Delhi worries that the CPEC will further undermine its authority there.