Thursday, April 28, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN 2022 : Can Western Tanks, Artillery, And Missiles Save Ukraine? Don’t Count On It.

SOURCE :

 (A) 1945 mag :  https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/04/can-western-tanks-artillery-and-missiles-save-ukraine-dont-count-on-it/


Can Western Tanks, Artillery, And Missiles 

Save Ukraine? Don’t Count On It.

By

                                                    Daniel Davis







U.S. Marines with Ground Combat Element, Marine Rotational Force – Darwin, fire an M777 during fire missions training at Mount Bundey Training Area, NT, Australia, Aug. 6 2020. The training provided Marines with a unique opportunity to develop new techniques and procedures to integrate direct and indirect fire. The ability to rapidly deploy fire support and employ indirect fire weapons provides the Marine Corps an advantage as an expeditionary forward force deployed to austere environments. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Lydia Gordon)



On Monday, ( 25 Apr 2022 )    Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said one U.S. objective in its support of Ukraine was to “weaken” Russia. Former NATO commander Gen (ret). Wesley Clark recently told CNN that one way to accomplish that goal is to send Ukraine “500 tanks, a couple thousand tubes of artillery and rockets.” And, he added, “we’ve got to get (all those tanks and artillery tubes) moving if we’re going to break” Russia’s offensive in the Donbas

While It May Seem Self-Evident That Ukraine Could Defeat Russia’s Attack If The West Provided Large Numbers Of Tanks To The Front Quickly Enough, The Difficulties And Challenges Of Combat Realities Make Such An Outcome Highly Unlikely. In A Best-Case Scenario For Ukraine, It Would Take The Better Part Of A Year To Be Able To Produce An Armored Combat Capacity Strong Enough To Expel The Russian Army From Ukrainian Territory – And As Explained Below, Even With Such Weapons, Ukraine May Still Not Succeed.



             Current Tactical Situation in Russo-Ukraine War


                     RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S  CURRENT  PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  

GOOGLE  url  TO OPEN 

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg


First, let’s consider the existing military situation in the east of Ukraine today. 

The biggest fight raging at the moment is the Battle of Donbas, in which up to 50,000 Ukrainian troops are defending against reportedly a Russian attack of more than 70,000 troops. Putin’s army is trying to hold the center of a 300-mile front with one portion of its force, attempting penetration of the northern shoulder of Ukraine’s defenses with armored troops that repositioned from Kyiv, and pushing on the southern shoulder with troops recently redeployed from Mariupol.

Russia is waging two efforts to support this main fight, by conducting limited offensives against Kharkiv in the north and in the Kherson region in the south of Ukraine. The intent of these two actions appears to be designed to hold significant Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in place to prevent them from attacking the flanks of Russian troops attacking the Donbas front.  Meanwhile, other contingents of UAF troops are defending the coast near Odesa and near Kyiv to guard against any future incursions from Crimea or Belarus. 

Though the Ukrainian government has placed a strict embargo on its combat losses, in all probability they have suffered similar levels as that of the Russians, which are reported to be upwards of 40,000 dead and wounded. Other than the possibility of holding back some strategic reserve force, in all likelihood Ukraine has its entire armed force decisively engaged throughout the country. 

Second, in order to generate an armoured, mobile striking force of sufficient strength to dislodge Russian troops from their current positions, Kyiv would need to take a number of critical steps. At the top of the list, of course, is to procure sufficient numbers of armoured vehicles: tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, air defense systems, ammunition and fuel carriers, and other related kits. 

To be effective, these weapons must be something close to interoperable, have similar maintenance requirements, and be easy enough to operate that they require minimal training time. Ideally, that would mean getting all types of combat systems that Ukraine has already been using for decades. 

While it may sound good to add some modern U.S. howitzersGerman tanks, and British anti-air systems, for example, trying to graft those platforms into a system designed to supply and maintain a Soviet-era force would be building in challenges and roadblocks, if for no other reason than each would require its own separate trained mechanics to maintain and repair, and separate types of ammunition from all their other systems; no logistics system could adequately accommodate such disparity.

Third, and most significant: Once the challenges of getting equipment that can be operated and maintained by UAF troops, Ukraine would need to generate a new, trained crop of soldiers almost from scratch. As noted above, the entirety of the Ukrainian army is currently decisively engaged in fierce combat throughout the country. Kyiv doesn’t have the manpower to pull those trained troops off the line and send them somewhere to be trained. New forces would have to be generated, out of contact, while the existing troops try to hold the line against Russia’s attacks. That is a far more daunting task than it seems.  Here’s why.

Challenges of Training Ukraine Troops to Use New Heavy  Weapons from the West

As in any military task, it is necessary to start with the desired end-state in mind. To have a fighting chance of eventually expelling Russian troops from its territory, Ukraine will need meaningful numbers of effective mechanized brigades. Each mechanized brigade would consist of some mix of tank, infantry, artillery, and air defense companies (plus maintenance and logistic units, of course). To produce a system of such combat units that can fight effectively, however, the process starts at the individual trooper level.

First, let’s take the tank. Soviet-style T-64 and T-72 tanks, which the UAF has used for decades, are operated by a three-manned crew: the driver, the gunner, and the tank commander. Each of these individuals first hast to learn how to do their job and do it well. The Gunner has to know how to operate the various fire control systems, sights, and techniques for engaging targets. The driver must be proficient at handling the massive vehicle, understand where the tank can and can’t maneuver, how to control the vehicle, and be responsive to the orders of the tank commander.

For his part, the tank commander must know the capabilities and limitations of the tank as well as the driver, must know how to perform the duties of the gunner, and then understand how to “fight the tank” under every environmental circumstance in which the tank may be required to operate. 

Once those individual positions have been mastered, then the tank has to learn to fight as a team, which is crucial for the tank’s performance. The next step in forming an armored unit is to build the platoon, which is the tactical unit that faces the enemy.  It is typically composed of three to four tanks, led by a lieutenant serving as a platoon leader.

Next, the tank platoon has to learn how to fight as part of a tank company, which is composed of three to four tank platoons.  The tank company is usually commanded by a captain. The company commander, joined by his senior enlisted non-commissioned officer and other sergeants, has to fight the platoons as a coordinated team, ensuring that each platoon does its job, but also must know the different tasks he must assign to other platoons so that all work in unison to accomplish a single objective. 

T-80 Tank firing. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

After that, the tank company has to learn how to fight together within the battalion, usually commanded by a Lt. Col. The battalion commander and his staff must know how to fight each of the companies to achieve their mission, and also understand their role in the larger mission, which could be anything from the main effort, a supporting effort, flank support, or as a tactical reserve. The same is then true one level higher with battalions working within a brigade.

Each of these echelons, from platoon to brigade, must be mastered if the battle force is to be successful in combat. As I personally observed in the 1990s as a part of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) which was based in Germany, training a brigade-level unit in peacetime is very time-consuming. 

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the 2nd ACR to deploy to the Middle East, along with hundreds of thousands of other U.S. units. We had to retrain ourselves from European terrain and scenarios to desert and Iraqi scenarios as rapidly as possible. 

We spent six full months firing weapons and training with the equipment and the crews who would fight the war before Operation Desert Storm began on the ground in late February 1991. We executed the final manoeuvre training in the Saudi deserts, at platoon, company, battalion, and finally regimental (brigade) level.

Since testing at U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, the Department of Defense’s lone extreme cold natural environment testing facility, began in January 2020, the M1A2 System Enhancement Package Version 3 main battle tank was driven more than 2,000 miles in rugged conditions across three seasons of sub-Arctic weather, fired hundreds of rounds for accuracy in extreme cold, and underwent testing of its auxiliary power unit.
Though the platform was extensively tested at U.S. Army Yuma Test Center prior to being put through its paces in Alaska, the sub-zero temperatures brought forth glitches that would have been unimaginable in the desert.

All of that was done out of enemy contact, using the equipment we had trained on for years, that was fully maintained, and led by officers and sergeants with decades of combined experience. Even then, I personally observed that not every American unit performed well. Some were nothing short of brilliant in combat, while others were tentative, and still others outright weak. For Ukraine to form an effective fighting force, they will have none of the advantages we had.


The Cold Calculations of Combat Realities

To build its army, Ukraine would have to train new troops not currently engaged in combat. It would be difficult, but definitely doable, to train new recruits at crew-level tasks of operating tanks, artillery, and other combat gear in an accelerated timeframe. Beyond that, however, there comes an increased cost in cutting corners and timelines. 

For example, in the American army, a company commander typically has five to six years’ worth of experience at the platoon level before taking the reins of a tank company. A battalion commander must have at least 16 years of experience, and a brigade commander, 22 years. The Ukrainian Army virtually didn’t exist eight years ago, so no officer will have much more experience than a company commander in the US, but even that understates the challenge.

For the majority of the eight years since 2014, the vast majority of UAF training and operations have been in static, World War I-style trench warfare; few officers or men have experience commanding tank or infantry units in mobile operations. Though officers can be taught many things, experience can’t be conveyed; it has to be earned over a period of years. Consider the ramifications of the monumental task facing Kyiv today.

Zelensky’s government must figure out how to train multiple mechanized brigades while virtually the whole of his army is actively defending his country. That means that Kyiv will either have to curtail every aspect of training and try to simply rush tanks, artillery tubes, and air defense systems into the front lines, while troops are actively fighting, in the hopes that the added equipment enables them to form offensive potential to launch counteroffensives necessary to drive Russian troops off the territory they currently possess.

An M60A1 tank from the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces fires a round at a range in Wadi Shadiyah during a massive military demonstration in front of dignitaries and media.

Or it will require Ukraine to hold the lines against Russia’s attacks throughout the country in order to form a new armoured organization, from scratch, in either a third country or in a relatively safe part of western Ukraine. In that safe location, troops would have to conduct many months of training, even in an expedited way, out of contact with the enemy, so that they could later be brought into the fight at full strength.

Obviously, either of those scenarios couldn’t be started until Ukraine had received a comprehensive set of combat equipment from western countries, had the gear brought up to operational standards, and supplied with large stocks of fuel and ammunition (necessary to sustain the training phase and then a sustained offensive campaign). Just the assembling of the equipment and sustainment would take three to four months, and that only after Western countries had made the decision to provide a specific kit. Only then could the months of individual, crew, platoon, company, and battalion training begin – also measured in months.

There will be the temptation to treat this like a fire brigade: if the house is on fire, you marshal everything you can, throw it all at the fire as it becomes available, and hope you can extinguish the blaze. Many will want to rush every tank, artillery tube, rocket launcher, or anti-air missile to the front as soon as it’s available, to bolster the fighting capacity of the troops right now. While that will be an understandable temptation, such a course would have little chance of success.


T-84 Ukrainian tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

War simply doesn’t work that way. It’s not merely about having a number of tanks or rocket launchers, but about having trained, disciplined troops that know what they’re doing, working as a team of teams, in various combat units working towards a single goal. It’s not unlike a sports team. It is possible to assemble a group of bone fide all-star athletes on a team, but if they don’t train together so that each works together as a team, even all-stars can get thrashed by an opponent that has less talent but works better together.

The Bottom Line

On one level, it is completely understandable that Zelensky would aggressively seek heavy weapons for his forces. But combat fundamentals aren’t impressed by emotions, the rightness of one’s cause, or how earnestly one side may desire a given outcome. If heavy weapons are inserted into the war zone piecemeal and sent to the front lines as they come in, they will add only marginal capacity to the units engaged at the front. 

More importantly, it will be many weeks or months before meaningful volumes of heavy weapons could be delivered to Ukrainian combat units.  Choosing to train new combat units from scratch, out of contact, would give Ukraine a better chance at producing a battle force of sufficient strength that it would have a chance to expel Russian forces, but doing so would take, in all likelihood, nine months to a year from now – and it is not clear Ukrainian troops currently under fire could hold the line that long.

The ugly bottom line is this:   the Battle of Donbas is almost certainly going to be won or lost with the forces engaging on the front lines today, using the equipment they have. It will take too long for Western governments to come up with a coherent equipping plan and then prepare, ship, and deliver the kit to its destination in a time frame that could provide Kyiv’s troops with the ability to tip the balance against Russia in the Donbas.

 

Ukraine may be forced to make a choice between horrible options. Zelensky could roll the dice and try to create a stalemate to hold Russia at bay for close to a year and then mount an offensive with a trained battle force or seek a negotiated settlement on the best terms available to stop the destruction of his army and people.

Trying to force and sustain a stalemate would guarantee Ukraine’s people continue to suffer and die and its economy to remain stagnant for the foreseeable future, and with no guarantee that creating an offensive force would later succeed (and employing it would necessarily spike the casualties again). Agreeing to a negotiated settlement in the near term would likely cement the loss of some eastern Ukrainian territory to Russia or the Russian-speaking population, yet end the destruction in the rest of the country.

War is a horrible crucible that rarely produces any winners, and this one is the ugliest, bloodiest, and cruelest in Europe in nearly a century. Everyone must understand at this point there are not “good” solutions. Ukraine’s leaders must choose among a raft of unpalatable options in search of the least detestable.

I do not envy their task.                     







                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              











Wednesday, April 27, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 26

 GOOGLE  TO  GLIMPSE THE WAR 

(P) TOM COOPER UKRAINE WAR: 

 https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-25-26-april-2022-aa0c1122320e

(Q) RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg


(R)    WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: 

          https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

(S)  (UKRAINE CRISIS COVERAGE:
https://www.understandingwar.org/ukraine-crisis-coverage


SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 


INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

   (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html


RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

     ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:                                        https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

     (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

 (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                                     (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf




ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

                                           APR 26,2022


                   MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS, 

                                              AND

                           KATERYNA STEPANENKO 


                                      April 26, 6:30   pm ET

Russian forces have adopted a sounder pattern of operational movement in eastern Ukraine, at least along the line from Izyum to Rubizhne. Russian troops are pushing down multiple roughly parallel roads within supporting distance of one another, allowing them to bring more combat power to bear than their previous practice had supported. Russian troops on this line are making better progress than any other Russian advances in this phase of the war. They are pushing from Izyum southwest toward Barvinkove and southeast toward Slovyansk. They are also pushing several columns west and south of Rubizhne, likely intending to encircle it and complete its capture. The Russian advances even in this area are proceeding methodically rather than rapidly, however, and it is not clear how far they will be able to drive or whether they will be able to encircle Ukrainian forces in large numbers.

Russian forces on the Izyum axis likely benefit from the absence of prepared Ukrainian defensive positions against attacks from the Kharkiv direction toward Donbas. Ukraine has prepared to defend the line of contact with Russian-occupied Donbas since 2014, and Russian troops continue to struggle to penetrate those prepared defenses—as shown by repeated Russian efforts to take Avdiivka, just north of Donetsk City, or to advance through Popasna, just beyond the original line of contact.

Russian troops continued to attack Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol, including in the Azovstal Plant, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that there is no more fighting in the cityUkrainian forces likely still hold important positions beyond the plant itself, and Russian forces continue to fight outside the plant, bomb the plant, and assault positions near the plant. Putin’s order not to chase Ukrainian defenders into the tunnels and catacombs of the facility evidently did not preclude continued efforts to secure at least the entire perimeter of the plant and likely also the important M14 highway that runs along it to the north and northwest.

Russia is staging false-flag attacks in Transnistria, Moldova, likely setting conditions for further actions on that frontThe two motorized rifle battalions Russia has illegally maintained in Transnistria since the end of the Cold War are not likely sufficient to mount a credible attack on Odesa by themselves, nor are the Russians likely to be able to reinforce them enough to allow them to do so. They could support more limited attacks to the northwest of Odesa, possibly causing panic and creating psychological effects to benefit Russian operations in the south of Ukraine.

Russia may also seek to destabilize Moldova itself, however. Comments by the head of the Donetsk People’s Republic and other Russian officials and proxies raise the possibility that Putin might recognize the self-styled Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) in Transnistria as he recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The PMR could then ask for additional Russian protection, and Putin could attempt to send some additional forces or capabilities to Transnistria. Any such activities would greatly raise tensions and fears in Moldova and neighboring Romania, putting additional pressure on NATO, possibly giving Putin a cheap “win,” and distracting from Russia’s slog in eastern Ukraine.

Continued indications that Russian forces intend to hold referenda to establish “people’s republics” in occupied areas of southern Ukraine raise the possibility that Putin intends to unveil an array of new “independent” “people’s republics” as part of a Victory Day celebration. The forecast cone is wide, and there is as yet no solid basis to assess one path as much more likely than another. But the false-flag attacks and Russian and Russian proxy reactions to them are alarming, and it behooves NATO and the West to consider the most dangerous courses of action and prepare to meet them.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces continue to make slow but steady progress south from Izyum and northwest of Rubizhne, but Russian offensive operations elsewhere along the line in eastern Ukraine remain unsuccessful.
  • Fighting continues in Mariupol, where Ukrainian defenders apparently still hold positions beyond the Azovstal Plant.
  • Russia and/or Russian proxies have staged false-flag attacks in Russian-occupied Transnistria, possibly to threaten a (very likely unsuccessful) attack on Odesa, possibly to destabilize Moldova.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued ground and air assaults against remaining Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol on April 26 but were unsuccessful in storming the Azovstal Steel Plant.[1] Donetsk Oblast Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko said that Russian forces launched 35 airstrikes at Azovstal on April 26, which resulted in a fire at one of the plant’s shops.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin nevertheless falsely claimed that all fighting has ceased in “liberated” Mariupol in a telephone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[3] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro  Andryushchenko stated that any Russian claims of humanitarian corridors for evacuation from Azovstal are a ”trap.”[4] Footage of continuing Russian tanks shooting at residential and commercial buildings outside the Azovstal Steel Plant indicates that Ukrainian defenders likely still hold positions beyond the boundaries of the Azovstal plant proper.[5]

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to shell the entire frontline in Donetsk and Luhansk and made marginal advances during ground offensives on April 26.[6] The General Staff stated that Russian efforts are focused on taking Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka, where intense fighting is ongoing.[7] Forces of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militia claimed to have taken control of Rubtsi and Yatskivka, located on the administrative border between Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblasts.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 90th Guards Tank Division of the Central Military District are moving in the direction of Kreminna.[9] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai notably claimed that top-level LNR leadership and collaborator elements were killed in a suspected gas explosion during a meeting in Kreminna on April 25.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally noted that elements of the 12th Separate Guards Engineering Brigade of the Central Military District are operating in the direction of Severodonetsk.[11]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces continued ground offensives south of Izyum in the directions of Barvinkove and Slovyansk.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army, 35th Combined Arms Army, and 68th Army Corps are making measured advances in the direction of Barvinkove, about 50 kilometers southwest of Izyum.[13] A Pro-Russian source claimed that Russian naval infantry units are operating in the direction of Slovyansk, about 50 kilometres southeast of Izyum.[14] The Pro-Russian source additionally claimed that Ukrainian defenders are holding Dovhenke, which is the last settlement in Kharkiv Oblast in the Slovyansk direction. The Izyum- Barvinkove and Izyum-Slovyansk advances are likely meant to drive toward the administrative borders of Donetsk in order to merge offensives south of Izyum with offensives on the territory of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). Barvinkove and Slovyansk are on different roads leading south from Izyum.

The objective of the Russian advance toward Barvinkove is not immediately obvious, as it leads Russian troops further away from their comrades pushing on Slovyansk. The road continues southeast from Barvinkove to the Donetsk Oblast boundary, however, and it is possible that Russian forces from the Izyum axis are meant to take up positions along much of the boundary to support claims that Russia has “secured the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts” even if the Russians have not actually secured the entire oblast itself. These advances could also be intended to conduct a deep encirclement of Ukrainian forces to the east as well, although it is far from clear that the Russian troops assigned to this advance are strong enough to accomplish such a task.

Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army and the Baltic and Northern Fleets maintained a partial blockade of Kharkiv City and continued shelling settlements around Kharkiv City and throughout Kharkiv Oblast on April 26.[15]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to shell the entire line of contact on the Southern Axis and are carrying out ground offensives in the direction of Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih.[16] Russian forces are reportedly forcing residents of Velyka Oleksandrivka (roughly 15 kilometers from the Kherson-Mykolaiv administrative border) to evacuate their homes.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces suffered losses in the towns of Novodmytrivka and Bilousove, both within 20 kilometers of the Kherson-Mykolaiv administrative border.[18] The Russian presence in areas near the border likely indicates preparation for an offensive in the direction of Mykolaiv. Russian missiles hit Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv on April 26.[19] The mayor of Melitopol claimed on April 25 that Russian forces are blocking men from leaving the city and forcing them to mobilize into the Russian army.[20]

Russian forces likely conducted additional false flag attacks in the illegally-occupied territory of Transnistria on April 25-26. In addition to the grenade attack on the Transnistrian Internal Affairs Ministry that ISW reported on April 25, explosions were reported in Percani and Maiac on April 26.[21] Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic Denis Pushilin claimed that the explosions necessitate the next stage of the Russian military operation for the benefit of Transnistria and similar Russian border regions.[22] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed on April 26 that Russia is likely preparing an attack on Transnistrian civilians and that the explosions were planned provocations by the Russian FSB to ” instil panic and anti-Ukrainian" sentiment.[23] The GUR stated that Russia may wish to involve Transnistria in the war in Ukraine either to capitalize on Transnistrian reserve forces or to launch attacks on Ukraine from the Transnistrian territory.[24] The recent activity in Transnistria is consistent with earlier reports that the airbase at Tiraspol was likely preparing for Russian aircraft on April 6 and 7.[25]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

Russian forces shelled areas in Sumy Oblast near the Russian border between April 23 and 26. The Ukrainian Border Guard reported that Russian forces fired over 15 times at five different settlements in Sumy on April 26.[26] Head of the Sumy Regional State Administration Dmytro Zhyvystkyy previously stated that Russian forces carried out “provocative shelling” of communities on the border with Russia on April 23.[27]

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka or another axis.
  • Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate.
  • Russia may continue false-flag attacks in and around Transnistria or might move to generate a more serious crisis in Transnistria and Moldova more generally.

 

References

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507; 

https://t.me/andriyshTime/494

[2] https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3157;

 https://t.me/mariupolrada/9382; https://t.me/polkazov/4442;

 https://t.me/mariupolnow/7987; https://t.me/mariupolnow/7969

[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/68283

[4] https://t.me/andriyshTime/494

[5] https://t.me/mariupolnow/7962; 

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7967; 

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7974; 

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7982; 

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7983

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7984;

 https://t.me/mariupolnow/7985; 

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7992;

 https://t.me/mariupolnow/7996; 

https://t.me/mariupolnow/7999;

 https://t.me/mariupolnow/8000

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507;

 https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1518916291570159618;

 https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2026; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553;

 https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3150?single; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553; 

https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1518916291570159618; 

https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2026; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507; 

https://hromadske dot ua/posts/62-j-den-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijni-rosiyi-proti-ukrayini-tekstovij-onlajn; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507; 

https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3150?single

[8] https://twitter.com/islamicworldupd/status/1518809054168158208; https://www.facebook.com/groups/142215299746724/posts/1016313802336865/https://twitter.com/GalinkaMk/status/1518112870436851712

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553

[10] https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1518641558295355398; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=963506630991812

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553; https://t dot me/sashakots/3179

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553

[14] https://t dot me/sashakots/31791

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553;

 https://t dot me/milinfolive/82039; 

https://t.co/0EItFP8ghz

https://twitter.com/kharkiv_warnews/status/1518865044817203201;

 https://t.me/synegubov/2984; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507

[16]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303378655308553;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507;

 https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2041788719325704; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507; 

https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2041393416031901; 

https://t dot me/stranaua/38605

[17] https://t dot me/denisovaombudsman/5457

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303029115343507

[19] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518943772834422786; 

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518918784261795841

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1518932445600563201; 

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518942800469008385;

 https://t.me/starukhofficial/3070; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/738;

 https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/739; https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2041788719325704;

 https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2041393416031901;

 https://t dot me/stranaua/38605; https://t dot me/stranaua/38549

[20] https://www dot ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3467251-russia-intends-to-forcibly-mobilize-men-in-ukraines-melitopol.html 46.85599080336098, 35.3628264302217;

 https://iz dot ru/1326428/2022-04-26/pushilin-prizval-uchest-pridnestrove-pri-sleduiushchikh-etapakh-spetcoperatcii ; 

https://military.pravda dot ru/news/1702502-dnr_pushilin_specoperacija/

[21] https://twitter.com/black_cerber/status/1518694551992610816;

 https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1518695474068344832; 

https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1518846724546215937; 

https://hromadske dot ua/posts/u-neviznanomu-pridnistrovyi-povidomili-pro-vibuhi-ta-poshkodzhennya-dvoh-anten-zmi 

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1518876584865935361

https://twitter.com/rianru/status/1518845867884789760

[22] https://iz dot ru/1326428/2022-04-26/pushilin-prizval-uchest-pridnestrove-pri-sleduiushchikh-etapakh-spetcoperatcii ; 

https://military.pravda dot ru/news/1702502-dnr_pushilin_specoperacija/

[23] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/299489785695... 

https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/298929585751802

[24] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/298929585751802

[25] https://www dot mvdpmr.org/povyshaia-professionalizm-zk/37574-ucheniya-v-sobre-terroristy-obezvrezheny.html; 

https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2022/04/6/7337692/;

 https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/rus/news/2022/04/6/7137359/; 

https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3451503-ukrainska-ppo-zbivatime-vijskovi-litaki-rf-pri-sprobi-potrapiti-do-pridnistrova-genstab.html

[26] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/325847486320795

[27] https://t dot me/Zhyvytskyy/1759


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