Saturday, August 1, 2015

GEO-POLTICS :The Power Of Geopolitical Discourse – Analysis

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/31072015-the-power-of-geopolitical-discourse-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29










Earth. Photo Credit: NASA
Earth. Photo Credit: NASA

The Power Of Geopolitical Discourse – Analysis

By
Friday, July 31st, 2015



Geopolitics, as a discursive practice, should be taken seriously. Unfortunately, sometimes we are so busy with our daily activities and work that we tend to ignore the fact that the media can, indeed, spatialize and geopoliticize a conflict by ‘labeling’ and ‘identifying’, thus creating a sense of ‘pertinence’ amongst us, the ‘audience’; in other words, creating a binary world between ‘us’ and ‘them, the ‘other.’ This said, in order to understand the power of words and images in geopolitics, we must look back and understand how geopolitical knowledge was originally produced and thought of.


Although at first glance, while difficult to prove, the true origin of geopolitical theory may revolve around Darwinism and the rules of nature—I will not delineate the rules of nature according to Darwin but rather I will keep my argument in line with that of geopolitics and discourse. For instance, Friedrich Ratzel (a notable geographer, ethnographer and biologist), the creator of Lebensraum (the need of living space), theorized and compared the state to that of a living organism, in search of augmenting its space to support the carrying capacity of its species under its physical environment. By the same token, Rudolf Kjellen—who was actually the first political scientist to coin the term ‘geopolitics’—viewed the state in a similar manner as Ratzel: as an organic living being, with its own limbs and personality, drawing his metaphors from poetry and prose.



Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) and Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), who were the creators of the German geopolitical school of thought, had something in common: they grew up between the transition of a pre-industrial society (1750-1850) and the beginning of a new industrial society in continental Europe. Eventually, the story is widely known: their theories, alongside Mackinder’s, influenced the aggressive expansionist policies of the Nazis, pushed by Major General Karl Haushofer. (from Machtpolitik to Weltpolitik).


Likewise, another important player and influencer (Sir Halford Mackinder) was born in the 19th century, and meanwhile in 1904 published the most famous geopolitical theory of all, The Geographical Pivot of History; a theory that was taken particularly serious by the Nazi political and military elite and diffused via Haushofer’s understanding of the world. And a theory that, to this day, has been explained and argued in modern-day world affairs books, such as Robert D. Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography and the likes. Without further expanding into academic theoretical grounds, we can conclude as so: Geopolitics had a common European heritage, pioneered by Mackinder, Ratzel and Kjellen, through their biological, geographical, and civilization interpretations of European power-relations of their time.


In that sense, how was geopolitical thought diffused and brought into the Western hemisphere, specifically into the United States, the world latest superpower?


In 1890, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, while stationed in Lima, Peru, published one of the most influential books in the American Naval military psyche: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. It advocated why it was imperative for the American navy to reach total hegemony and control over the seas and oceans of the world. Another important American geographer and advisor to Woodrow Wilson was Isaiah Bowman, whose push for free trade policies vis-a-vis the creation of international institutions, would also become influential in the American neoliberalism and exceptionalism ethos.


Nevertheless, although Bowman and Rear Admiral Mahan were important figures in the American geopolitical mindset, if there was any truly prominent figure in the realm of American foreign policy, it would be Yale’s Nicholas J. Spykman. His influence in shaping the American foreign policy attitude continues to maintain a foothold in the political and military establishments to this day. Amongst many of Spykman’s arguments, he claimed that geography was a leading influencer in international politics—i.e. country size and region location, climate, topography, resources, population, frontiers, and so forth—and that the exertion of power should be the true goal of the American foreign policy apparatus, whose best example is his Rimland concept of the Eurasian landmass; and needless to add, George Kennan’s The Sources of Soviet Conduct and the impact it had on US containment policy.


But under which geographical and political parameters and assumptions did Spykman, Mahan, Bowman, and Kennan view geopolitics? The answer is simple: from a European perception and understanding. All from the continent which, by a vivid expression of the MD Board Chairman prof. Bajrektarevic, “…exhorts its well-off status quo by notoriously exporting its transformative powers of free trade dogma and human rights stigma–a modified continuation of colonial legacy when the European conquerors, with fire and sword, spread commerce, Christianity and civilization overseas.”


Let’s connect the dots. Mahan’s ideas and analogies aroused from the British Royal Navy’s control of maritime commerce, which catapulted them to become one of the most powerful empires in the world; Bowman’s American exceptionalism—egalitarianism, republicanism, democracy, and individualism—ideals, can be traced in the form of Franco-British (e.g. Alexis de Tocqueville and Adam Smith) political and economic thinking; Spykman, whose origin was Dutch, based his Rimland theory out of Sir. Halford Mackinder’s, hence, we could say that, overall, he had a British influence on his geopolitical thinking; and Kennan, who prior to embarking on his Soviet adventure, was trained and educated in a pre-World War II setting, which at the time often involved the diffusion of the German geopolitical school of thought at the University of Berlin Oriental Institute, perhaps influencing the ideas of Kennan concerning the Soviet Union’s territorial expansionism. Henceforth, something is clear: modern-day geopolitical discourse, vision, and imagination was gradually diffused and transferred into the American foreign policy and military elite by European-clouted scholars. Nevertheless, the American geopolitical rationale would evolve rather drastically as opposed to their European counterparts because of their location and place in the world.


Let’s bring it back to the 21st century now. It was the year 2002, a year after one of the most devastating terrorist attacks on US soil. But also, it was the year when then-president George W. Bush, during his famous State of the Union Address, would label and identify the new “axis of evil” according to America’s world view; simply put, America’s new enemies—Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Was this speech a true act of geopolitical spatialization and the creation of a more rigid and tougher, binary world, resembling to the US—vs—Soviet Union days? “What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning,” George W. Bush said as he addressed the entire world. Indeed, we have noticed that during the last decade—and the beginning of this decade—the war against terror has been substantially expanded from Pakistan to the Sahel and from the Sahel to Somalia. Going back to the 2002 State of the Union address, we have observed the urge to spatialize, label, and create a ‘sense of belonging’ amongst different civilizations in the world, which leads to the question: How often does the media spatialize an ongoing conflict, more precisely by further polarizing and transforming the world into an are-you-with-us-or-against-us type of discourse? Is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations more valid than ever before? How often are we indirectly influenced by popular culture, regardless of our nationalities (i.e. television series, books, images, media channels)? Moreover, what are the foundational geographical and political assumptions behind our elites? This the main reason why critical geopolitics is so important in today’s multipolar world.



Leading geographers and critical geopolitics scholars, John Agnew and Gerard Toal, in their superstar essay Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy, suggested that the definition of geopolitics should be ‘re-conceptualized’ as a “ discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ in such a way as to represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and dramas.” Also, according to Agnew and Toal’s understanding, “geopolitics is the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states.” As a result, when we think of the George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ classification, the definition by Agnew and Toal seems more relevant than ever before.



Furthermore, what about the movies and television series we often see for entertainment purposes? For instance, if we take note of the evolution of Liam Neeson’s hit movie Taken, we can remark that he is always fighting an enemy from the Eastern hemisphere. During the first two films, the ex-CIA SAD (Special Activity Division) retired operations officer, Bryan Mills, was fighting the Tropoja-native, northern Albanian criminal organization in Paris, which is a ‘Western’ city. And, who ends up fighting some sort of rich Arab Sheikh—an enemy from the East, moreover, the Islamic world. Also, in the second movie, Bryan Mills, once again, ends up fighting the patriarch’s northern Albanian criminal organization, however, the landscape changes when he is fighting them in an Islamic city: Istanbul. Even if there are many ways to interpret this, in my personal view, I would interpret it as how the Albanian criminal organizations will be the new antagonist stereotype across mainstream Hollywood-made action movies, replacing the Italian criminal organization, and the brave and tough ‘Western’ action hero beating the ‘unknown’ enemies from the ‘East.’ It seems that in accordance to Hollywood’s geographic imagination, the Italian criminal organizations, have been replaced by tougher groups originating in the ‘East’—in this case, more precisely from the Balkans and of Islamic affiliation (at the beginning of Taken 2, we notice an Islamic burial, somewhere around the Albanian alps-type of setting).


As a last observation, what type of antagonist does Bryan Mills battle in his latest movie, Taken 3? Again, an enemy from the Eastern hemisphere: The Russians, though this time, battling a domestic enemy as well (for those that have not seen the movie, I shall stop here). Whatever our personal interpretations might be, we all can conclude with the following statement: The media plays a bigger role in geopolitics than we can imagine, purely by labeling, identifying, and creating the ‘other’.



How much influence does popular culture (e.g. books, televisions series, movies, newspapers, news channels) hold in our geographic imagination and the creation of the ‘other’? When we think of popular American televisions series, such as Homeland, House of Cards, or movies depicting ‘anti-Western’ dictators like The Last King of Scotland and The Interview, in addition to your typical war movies (e.g. Black Hawk Down, We Were Soldiers, American Sniper, Lone Survivor), to what extent can these movies and series further geopoliticize a group of people, moreover, an entire nation? For instance, in the case of Somalia, when we see movies like Captain Phillips, how much do we associate a whole country or diaspora as a group of either pirates or Al-Shaabab supporters? And as a last example, jumping to the other end of the spectrum, in the case of Venezuela’s media networks which are supportive of government repression like Noticias 24, Telesur and Venezolana de Television (VTV), by constantly creating stories about the big, bad and distrustful ‘American Empire’ who is, apparently, plotting a coup d’état against the Maduro regime. In reality, the pro-government Venezuelan media networks are failing to inform the population about the economic crisis and rampant insecurity common Venezuelans are experimenting in the streets of cities like Caracas, Maracaibo and Valencia, thereby just like Hollywood creates the ‘other,’ the same can be said about Venezuela and other authoritarian regimes. No matter what ideological principles a pro-Western or anti-Western government holds, each elite will abide by the same process: to label a group, to identify with a similar group, and to create an ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse.


As a final remark, in order to geopoliticize through words and images, there must be a radically different entity (the ‘other’); put precisely, the creation of an ‘enemy’; an entity, that does not think the same way or hold the same values and ideals like ‘us.’ For the Romans, the ‘others’ were the barbarians; For the Persians, it was the Arabs; for the British medieval kingdoms, it was the Vikings; For the Chinese, it was the Xiognu nomadic tribes; for the Austro-Hungarian empire it was the Ottomans; for the European colonial empires it was the Native Amerindians and African tribes; for the Americans, it was the Soviets; and nowadays the new Mongolian hordes of the 21st century are non-state actors like ISIS and similar groups for the rest of the civilized world. The whole point of this article was to show, how in actuality, words and images can be powerful weapons to geopoliticize entire nations, whilst additionally grasping how the political and geographical assumptions, aroused from a European mindset; when, in turn, geopolitical thinking and reasoning was nothing other than the ‘vision’ that scholars like Mackinder, Kjellen and Haushofer had in mind for the securing vital strategic resources in accordance to their countries’ needs at the time. Consequently, we can firmly state that Western identity and geopolitical discourse have a European legacy.


In his last book, World Order, one of the most influential Europeans in the US, Henry Kissinger quotes an old excerpt of French Travel-writer, Marquis de Custine, who describes Czarist Russia as, “a monstrous compound of the petty refinements of Byzantium, and the ferocity of the desert horde, a struggle between the etiquette of the Lower Byzantine Empire, and the savage virtues of Asia, have produced the mighty state which Europe now beholds, and the influence of which she will probably feel hereafter, without being able to understand its operation.” Now, dear reader, it is up to you to be the judge of Marquis de Custine’s words. Or in popular geopolitical terms, as rapper Eminem would say, “My words are my weapons…”


*Diego Solis, Global South Advocate, Founder and chair of Geopolitical Explorers Consulting Group.

 
 

RUSSO-NATO MILITARY POLITICS :Refund Deal Reached For Undelivered Mistral Warships

SOURCE:






Kremlin Aide Says Refund Deal Reached For Undelivered Mistral Warships

 
July 31, 2015

A top Kremlin aide says Russia and France have reached an agreement on reimbursement for two Mistral warships that Russia purchased for $1.3 billion but whose delivery is on hold to protest Moscow's actions in Ukraine.

Vladimir Kozhin, President Vladimir Putin's adviser for military and technical cooperation, confirmed on July 31 that a refund deal was reached. However, he did not reveal the figure, saying only that the amount will be announced when the contract is cancelled.

'The negotiations are completely finished, everything has already been decided, both the time frame and the amount,' Kozhin told state news agency RIA Novosti.

There was no immediate response from Paris.

Russia's Kommersant newspaper reported earlier this week that France had offered to terminate the contract and pay back about $794 million provided France can re-export the warships.

French President Fancois Hollande said on July 27 that he would decide 'in the coming weeks' whether or not to scrap the contract to supply the two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia.

Russia's state-owned TASS news agency reports that Russian technical specialists will visit the French port of Nantes-St. Nazaire to remove Russian military equipment from the helicopter-carrying ships. The news agency said the equipment was mainly communications equipment that would have been used for directing helicopter operations.

The delivery of the two warships was put on hold by Paris in September 2014 in response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.


The contract, which was signed in 2011 was meant to be the biggest arms sale ever to Russia by a NATO country, with the first of the ships had been due to be delivered to Moscow in 2014, the second in 2015.


Extra Expenses

However, Moscow announced in May that it had decided not to take the ships in response to France's putting the deal on hold. TASS quoted Oleg Bochkaryov, the deputy head of the Military-Industrial Commission, as saying on May 26 'Russia won't take them, that's an accomplished fact.'


'Now there is only one discussion -- about the sum of money that should be returned to Russia.'
Bochkaryov added that Russia planned to construct its own similar vessels but not copy the Mistral, adding that Moscow had a 'slightly different ideology for the endeavor of amphibious assault.'


In April, Putin insisted that the French side reimburse Moscow 'all expenses' if the contract were to be terminated. He said that included not just the purchase price also expenses for training, the building of a new dock for the ships, and even transportation and housing of the crew.


He also downplayed the importance of the warships, saying that Russia had ordered them mostly to help the French shipyard which produces them.

However, the loss may be felt keenly by the Russian navy because the original deal not only was to provide two Mistral ships built in France but also gave Moscow the option to build two more Mistral carriers in Russian naval shipyards. In this way the deal could have helped to modernize Russia's own naval construction industry.

Paris had set as its conditions for delivering the ships a cease-fire and a political settlement in Ukraine. When Hollande announced delivery had been put on hold in September, he said the contract to supply the vessels was neither cancelled nor suspended but that the conditions for delivering the first ship, due to be handed over the following month, did not exist.

France had come under strong public pressure from its European partners and the United States to abandon the deal, which was signed under former President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2011.
With reporting by AP, AFP, Bloomberg, TASS, and RIA Novosti


Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/kremlin-aide-says-refund- deal-reached-for-undelivered-mistral/27162439.html

Copyright (c) 2015. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.




Further Reading



Mistral Class Amphibious Assault Ship

Moscow finally gave up on the Mistral deal. Now Russia and France will dicuss only the sum that Paris should pay Russia for the failed contract. During the negotiations on the Mistral deal Russia and France have discussed only one question — the sum of the compensation. "We switch the conversation to business — give us our money back… We're now discussing just one thing — the exact sum of money France owes Russia," Oleg Bochkaryov, a deputy chairman of the Russian Military Industrial Complex said 26 May 2015.

Bochkaryov told journalists that Russia plans to build its own Mistral-class helicopter carriers to replace the ones not delivered by France. “We have these types of ships planned…but we will build them a bit differently. We’re not going to blatantly copy the [French] Mistral [design] right out,” Bochkaryov said.

According to Kommersant, Bochkaryov was rebuked by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin because Russia has never officially given up on buying the two warships from France and Bochkaryov had never taken part in the negotiations on their delivery.

Russia is capable of building its own equivalent of Mistral-class helicopter carrier equipped with nuclear power engines as Moscow is aware of the design of the French-made ship, deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma's Committee on Industry Vladimir Gutenev told RIA Novosti 27 May 2015. "It will not be difficult from a technical point of view to build something like Mistral especially since we have gained access to the drawing list of the [French] helicopter carriers as a number of our weapons systems are adapted to the military characteristics of these ships," Gutenev said.


Should the Russian Armed Forces need to build a ship similar to the French-made Mistral, it will be a "ship similar in size, but with a nuclear power engine," which will be equipped with "air defense and anti-submarine defense systems."


France suspended “until further notice” the delivery of a warship to Russia because of the Ukraine crisis. The office of French President Francois Hollande said in a statement 25 November 2014 that the "current situation in eastern Ukraine still does not allow for the delivery” of the first Mistral-class helicopter carrier built for Russia.

French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said 01 January 2015 that his country would deliver two warships ordered by Russia only if there were concrete signs of lasting peace in Ukraine. "There needs to be ... a process of ceasefire that is respected and a political roadmap that would lead to the return of peace and calm," Jean-Yves Le Drian told Europe 1 radio station. "I see that efforts are being made, but as long as they are neither tangible nor verifiable, we cannot make a decision," he added.


Moscow initially had no plans to file claims against France over Hollande's decision to put the Mistral warship deal on hold, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said. “No, we are not planning to file any [claims] at the moment,” he said. “Everything is specified in the contract, and we will act under that contract, just like all civilized people do.”


The defense capability of Russia and the Russian Navy will not suffer as a result of France’s decision to put the delivery of the first Mistral-class helicopter carrier on hold, Adm. Vladimir Komoedov, chairman of the defense committee of the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, said 03 September 2014. “This will not undermine our combat readiness because this ‘tin can’ will require a lot of getting used to, and will most likely come without a control system; and we don’t really need a helicopter carrier vessel,” Adm. Komoedov told RIA Novosti. Adm. Komoedov noted that the ship was actually not crucial for the Russian Navy, since Russia had all the necessary technology to build vessels not in any way inferior to their foreign equivalents, especially French ones.


Vladivostok was floated out in October 2013. The second Mistral-class amphibious assault ship built in France under contract with Russia was floated out 20 November 2014. The helicopter carrier, named the Sevastopol, left its dry dock in the French port city of Saint-Nazaire before just a few onlookers.


An article in Le Point weekly magazine in May 2015 stated that if Paris falls back on its promise to give the two vessels to Moscow, the French government could end up having to pay an overall cost of up to €5 billion ($5.7 billion), if it does not fulfill its contractual obligations. “Instead of bringing the French ship building cooperation DCNS a profit of €1.2 billion and those involved in the construction €980 million, the cancellation of the deal could cost France between €2 billion and €5 billion,” the article stated.

The magazine said that talks are ongoing between the respective French and Russian parties, although, “significant differences in regards to the amount of compensation exist.” The publication adds that “France is now looking to return Russia less than the €890 million that Moscow has already paid” for the vessels.

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin ruled out allowing Paris to sell the Mistral warships to a third party without Moscow’s go-ahead. “Without our permission they can’t sell anything,” he said. Rogozin added he had already explained the situation to the French, while Russia has an end-user certificate for the stern parts of the vessels.

The stern parts of the helicopter carriers were built at a shipyard in St. Petersburg before being moved to France for further assembly, he explained. France will also be unable to use the Mistral vessels as part of their fleet because the warships were built to meet the Russian Navy’s specifications, Rogozin also stressed.


CHINA MILITARY POWER : Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015

SOURCE:

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf









Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $92,000 in Fiscal Years 2014-2015. This includes $3,000 in expenses and $89,000 in DoD labor.



ANNUAL REPORT

TO CONGRESS
 
Military and Security Developments

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015
 
Office of the Secretary of Defense



Annual Report to Congress:
 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015
 
A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2000
 
Section 1246, "Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China," of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report "in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future."


                               
        Executive Summary

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve its armed forces’ capacity to fight short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the focus and primary driver of China’s military investment; however, the PRC is increasing its emphasis on preparations for contingencies other than Taiwan, such as contingencies in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Additionally, as China’s global footprint and international interests grow, its military modernization program has become progressively more focused on investments for a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).

China views modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as essential to achieving great power status and what Chinese President Xi Jinping calls the "China Dream" of national rejuvenation. Chinese leaders see a strong military as critical to prevent other countries from taking steps that would damage China’s interests and to ensure China can defend itself, should deterrence fail. China seeks to ensure basic stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to focus on domestic development and smooth China’s rise. Despite this, Chinese leaders in 2014 demonstrated a willingness to tolerate a higher level of regional tension as China sought to advance its interests, such as in competing territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

China’s military modernization has the potential to reduce core U.S. military technological advantages. China’s officially-disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.5 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms from 2005 through 2014, and China will probably sustain defense spending growth at comparable levels for the foreseeable future. Moreover, China is investing in capabilities designed to defeat adversary power projection and counter third-party —including U.S.—intervention during a crisis or conflict.

During 2014, the PLA continued to improve its capabilities for theater contingencies, including: cruise missiles; short- and medium-range ballistic missiles; high performance aircraft; integrated air defense; information operations; and amphibious and airborne assault. The PLA is developing and testing new intermediate- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, as well as long-range, land-attack, and anti-ship cruise missiles that extend China’s operational reach, attempting to push adversary forces—including the United States—farther from potential regional conflicts. China is also focusing on counter-space, offensive cyber operations, and electronic warfare capabilities meant to deny adversaries the advantages
 
modern, informationized warfare. In 2014, China also started reclaiming land and building infrastructure at its outposts in the Spratly Islands. China will be able to use them as persistent civil-military bases of operation to enhance its presence significantly in disputed areas.




PLA global operations in 2014 included counter-piracy patrols, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, exercises and sea lane security. Highlights include the deployments of the 17th and 18th Naval Escort Task Forces to the Gulf of Aden, PLA Navy frigates escorting cargo ships carrying chemical weapons materials out of Syria, search and rescue support for Malaysia Airlines MH370, participation in UN peacekeeping missions, circumnavigation of the African continent, and the first-ever deployment of a SHANG-class nuclear powered submarine (SSN) and SONG-class diesel electric submarine (SS) to the Indian Ocean.


The Department of Defense (DoD) approach to China is part of a broader U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific region that is focused on building a stable and diversified security order, an open and transparent economic order, and a liberal political order. U.S. policy toward China is based on the premise that it is in both countries’ interests to expand practical cooperation in areas where both countries’ interests overlap, and to constructively manage differences.

Sustaining the positive momentum in the military-to-military relationship supports U.S. policy objectives to encourage China to uphold international rules and norms to contribute to regional and global problem-solving. DoD seeks to continue building a military-to-military relationship with China that is sustained and substantive, while encouraging China to contribute constructively to efforts to maintain peace and stability with the United States, our allies and partners, and the greater international community.

As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it must also continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. In concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment
.
 


 
 



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              READ THE COMPLETE REPORT




http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf




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There are two highlights in the 2015 Pentagon Report on Chinese Military Power.

Firstly, the Pentagon has finally acknowledged that China's DF-5B ICBM is armed with MIRVs.

Secondly, the Pentagon report mentions that China's Gaofen-2 satellite has sub-meter resolution.

Reference:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 | Department of Defense

[​IMG]
This is page 8 of the Pentagon Report on Chinese Military Power. Please ignore the part about 50-60 Chinese ICBMs. The Pentagon has not changed China's ICBM count for 30 years. No one believes the ridiculously low estimate of Chinese ICBMs.
[​IMG]

 
 
 

Confirmed: China Building New Aircraft Carrier... Possibly Nuclear Powered

SOURCE:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2015/china-150731-sputnik01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1484%2eka0ao00b2h%2e1d2w

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cv.htm


Confirmed: China Building New Aircraft Carrier... Possibly Nuclear Powered



 31.Jul .2015



China has confirmed that it is building a unique aircraft carrier, and that it may even be nuclear-powered.


On Thursday, huanqiu.com, the Chinese-language version of local Global Times, published an internal document of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The report states that the company's "priority missions" are to build nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier. It also mentions that progress on these projects has been steady.


"The priority missions of building the aircraft carrier and nuclear-submarines have been carried out smoothly and with outstanding results," the document states, according to a translation provided by Taiwanese media outlets.


The Taiwanese reports go on to say that the document suggests that China's first homegrown aircraft carrier may be nuclear-powered.


Similarly, in January 2014 media reports in China quoted Liaoning party Chief Wang Min as saying that work on China's second aircraft carrier had begun in the city of Dalian, and Beijing is ultimately expected to build four aircraft carriers. These reports, however, were quickly removed by China's censors.


The US Department of Defense assessing Chinese military power noted that, "China continues to pursue an indigenous aircraft carrier program and could build multiple aircraft carriers over the next 15 years."


The Pentagon report goes on to mention that China's home-based carriers "would be capable of improved endurance and of carrying and launching more varied types of aircraft, including electronic warfare, early warning, and anti-submarine, thus increasing the potential striking power of a PLA Navy 'carrier battle group' in safeguarding China's interests in areas outside its immediate periphery," media reports.


Assuming it remains online, the Global Times' publication of the internal CSIC document is therefore the closest confirmation that China is currently building a homegrown aircraft carrier.



Further Reading



Aircraft Carrier Project




The Chinese colloquial abbreviation for aircraft carrier, hangmu, is also used extensively to describe flagship enterprises and other great achievements. China's navy will develop a new generation of warships and aircraft to give it much longer-range capabilities, its commander-in-chief said in comments published Thursday April 16 2009. Admiral Wu Shengli told the state-run China Daily newspaper the Chinese navy wanted to develop hardware such as large combat warships, stealth submarines with abilities to travel further and supersonic cruise aircraft. More accurate long-range missiles, deep-sea torpedoes and a general upgrade of information technology were also in the pipeline, according to Wu. "The navy will establish a maritime defense system that corresponds with the need to protect China's maritime security and economic development," Wu said. The English-language China Daily, which the government uses to deliver messages to a foreign audience, printed his comments on its front page and said it had obtained a rare interview with such a high-ranking military figure. It quoted other Chinese military figures as saying that Wu's reference to building large warships referred to highly-publicized plans to build an aircraft carrier, but also other unspecified vessels.


Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie was quoted in state media in March 2009 saying China no longer wanted to be the only major global power without an aircraft carrier. China will not remain the world's only major nation without an aircraft carrier indefinitely, state press 23 March 2009 cited the nation's defense minister as telling his Japanese counterpart. Liang Guanglie made the remarks to visiting Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada on Friday, the Oriental Morning Post said, in discussions that took place after a recent spike in tension in the South China Sea. "Among the big nations only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," the paper quoted Liang as saying, citing Japanese official sources. "China's navy is currently rather weak, we need to develop an aircraft carrier." Liang's comment is the highest-level recent confirmation that China aims to acquire an aircraft carrier, a sophisticated piece of military hardware that can be used to project power far beyond a nation's shores.


On 23 December 2008 Xinhua, China's official news agency, reported that China's Ministry of National Defense had stated that aircraft carriers are "a reflection of a nation's comprehensive power" and were needed to meet the demands of a country's navy. The Chinese government would seriously consider "relevant issues" with "factors in every aspects" on building its first ever aircraft carrier, said spokesman Huang Xueping when responding to a question at a press conference on whether it was a good opportunity at present to build China's aircraft carrier. "China has a long coastline and the sacred duty of China's armed forces is to safeguard the country's marine safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas," he said.


In November 2008 the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, said that "having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power," and "the question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."


The question of China's plans to build aircraft carriers are important for several reasons. Many other countries have aircraft carriers, and little thought is given to Brazil's aircraft carrier, or Argentina's aircraft carrier, when it had one. Unlike other major maritime powers, Japan does not have aircraft carriers, and the Japanese government has regarded this class of ships as being an "offensive" weapon precluded by Japan's peace constitution. Should China acquire aircraft carriers, Japan might reconsider this position, and this might mark the start of a larger reconsideration of Japan's military posture. The United States has twice as many aircraft carriers as the rest of humanity combined, each of which is larger than other country's carriers. China's acquisition of aircraft carriers might be seen as a step towards challenging American preeminence on the high seas. At a minimum, it would mark the acquisition of a power projection capability that would move further afield than the Taiwan scenario, and into the South China Sea and beyond.


China, following the Cold War, continued to have very little in the way of credible power-projection capabilities, though China could project military forces superior to those that Southeast Asian countries could deploy to the South China Sea. The PLA Navy had studied the acquisition of an aircraft carrier beginning in the mid-1980s, followed by persistant reports that China has planned to launch a 40,000 ton class aircraft carrier by 2010, though these reports remained unsubstantiated and appeared to based on woefully inadequate analysis and information.

 
While some in the Navy had lobbied for a carrier for many years, their proposals were continually overruled by the Central Military Commission. This decision could have been motivated by a desire not to be seen to be adding a major new capability to China's maritime forces, with consequent adverse regional reaction. From a purely military perspective, a Chinese aircraft carrier would be expensive to operate, and carrier would be vulnerable to attack by aircraft, fast surface vessels and submarines. An aircraft carrier could enhance China's ability to lay claim to the islands and coral atolls of the South China Sea, an area potentially rich in oil and other resources. An aircraft carrier would make a potent political and diplomatic statement, potentially creating a major change in the strategic balance in East Asia.


In 1992, the Chinese authorities reportedly authorized a program for studying the development of an aircraft carrier. Chinese leaders at various levels did extensive feasibility studies on this project since then. In 1993, senior leaders of the Chinese Navy announced that China would start developing an aircraft carrier. In January 1993, Chinese political leaders decided to step up their carrier program and allocated several billion dollars for the project. At that time, it was believed that China had planned to finish the first aircraft carrier by 2000, but the plan was delayed repeatedly due to lack of carrier technology. Eventually it was decided to advance the carrier program in two stages.


During the first stage, China proceeded to buy several scrapped carriers from overseas in order to study the parts. China had previously pursued similar policies both in defense and other industries. Between 1985 and 2002, Chinese firms purchased a number of vessels, for ostensibly for a variety of purposes. These included for amusement parks, hotels, scrap metal, as well as likely analysis of design and other developmental purposes. China has a long history of aquiring technology for reverse engineering purposes. Of the vessels, the Varyag, an ex-Soviet carrier, contruction of which was never completed, and sold by Ukraine to what appeared to be a Chinese front company in 1998, has been the source of the greatest speculation. After arriving in Dalian, the hull was placed in drydock for a few months and painted in PLAN colors. Subsequently the hull was moored at a cargo warf. Minor work was reported to have been conducted on the hull, delivered without engines or any other equipment, between 2005 and 2008. However, as of August 2008, there was no visible work being done to make the hull seaworthy. Several years of highly visible construction activity, to include the installation of a propulsion plant, would be required to make this hull seaworthy.


Phase 2 centered on the domestic construction of a carrier by China. China appeared to have chosen to build a Chinese aircraft carrier, rather than purchasing one off-the-shelf. Although China's long-term goal was to acquire one or more aircraft carriers and it had an active program to develop a design, it remained unclear whether Beijing had reached a firm decision on the kind of carrier it would have, given budget constraints and naval funding priorities. Since the first reports of Chinese carrier aspirations in the 1980s and 1990s, various sources have claimed that China was building everything from purely training vessels to super-carriers similar to US Navy types.


In June 2005 Zhang Guangqin, the top official overseeing the country's burgeoning shipbuilding industry, denied that China was assembling an aircraft carrier in Shanghai. "I can say it clearly that there's no such thing at all," said Zhang, the vice-minister at the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense, at a news briefing in Beijing. "As to building aircraft carrier or not, related governmental departments will take all factors in consideration."


In October 2006 Lieutenant-General Wang Zhiyuan, Vice Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee in the PLA's General Armament Department stated: "The Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own. aircraft carriers are indispensable if we want to protect our interests in the oceans." Russian press has reported Chinese interest in acquiring Russian Su-33 carrier-borne fighters, a variant of the Su-27 already transferred to China. In October 2006 a Russian press report suggested early-stage negotiations were underway for China to purchase up to 50 such aircraft at a cost of $2.5 billion. However, there has been no subsequent discussion of such a deal.


In March 2007 a Chinese Admiral of the PLAN was quoted as saying that the Chinese shipbuilding industry was actively conducting R&D in aircraft carrier construction and could be ready to build such a vessel by 2010.


The 2008 "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" stated "evidence in recent years increasingly suggests China's leaders may be moving forward with an aircraft carrier program. For example, beginning in early 2006 and with the release of China's Eleventh Five Year Plan, PRC-owned media reported on statements from high-level government and military officials on China's intent to build aircraft carriers - including a March 2007 statement from the then-minister of China's Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)."


As of 2008, Russia was believed to have been providing assistance for several years in the construction of three Chinese-designed aircraft carriers. Some analysts have thus predicted that China could have an operational carrier by 2015, while others have considered 2020 to be a more realistic timeframe. No confirmed work on any shipbuilding project of any size had been observed or reported as of the end of 2008.


In 2007 Liu, Wei-Wei; Qu, Xiang-Ju of the School of Aeronautics Science and Technology, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China, published a paper "Modeling of carrier-based aircraft ski jump take-off based on tensor" in the Chinese Journal of Aeronautics [v 18 n 4 p 326-335].

The Chinese have built a land based replica of the Varyag the Wuhan Naval Research Institute at Yanliang [Janliang] Airfield, which is China's main aviation test facility. As of early 2008 a variant of the Su-27 was being flight tested at this facility.












Friday, July 31, 2015

MARITIME : Diagnosing Somalian Piracy: Symptom Or Disease?

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30072015-diagnosing-somalian-piracy-symptom-or-disease-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29






Pirates offshore Somalia. Photo credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky (Released) Pirates offshore Somalia. Photo credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky (Released)

Diagnosing Somalian Piracy: Symptom Or Disease? – Analysis

                                          By

                                Prerna Bakshi


Thursday, July 30th, 2015
  

While history recounts the plunderous eras when pirates reigned over high seas, sabotaged trade and caused anarchy on land, Somalian piracy materialises this into the grim reality of the 21st century.


What started off in the war torn region of Somalia as a local effort by fishermen to protect their coastline, soon evolved into one of the deadliest installations of modern day maritime piracy with pirates infesting waters as far as 1000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia into the Indian Ocean and as strategic for global trade as the Gulf of Aden.[1]


More than 30,000 vessels annually transit the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and more than 20% of global trade moves through this route.[2] With nearly 4000 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities captured by 2012, 150 ships reportedly ransomed for an estimated $US385 million, and insurance premiums increased by almost 10 fold for ships transiting this route,[3] Somalian piracy exerts its influence on world trade, international relations and global politics and has assumed a ‘pandemic’ status worldwide.


Certainly, this malady of the seas has not gone unnoticed by the international community. In 2009, the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) created the ‘Combined Task Force 151’ with naval forces of multifarious countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, NATO sent two missions in 2008 and EU launched ‘Operation Atalanta’ in 2009, to aid in the difficult issue of tackling pirate activity.[4]


However, these missions seemingly proved ineffective as Somalian piracy levels shot to an all time high in 2011, attributed to over 200 attacks, 700 hostages and 30 boats held in the year. [5] It wasn’t until late 2012 that piracy levels began to wane and were finally brought under control by 2013. This multifaceted episode triggers numerous questions. For instance, did the International community play a role in abetting Somalian Piracy? What role did it play in curbing piracy? Why did the various missions meet with initial failure? Can the era of Somalian piracy really be deemed as over?

In my paper, I attempt to address Somalian piracy with regard to these questions, and analyse whether Somalian piracy is an independent ‘disease’ or merely a symptom of the real ailment on-shore.


Lennox[6] categorises Somalian Piracy into two phases, each of which have a correlation to socio-political events in the country. It is no coincidence that the first phase of Somalian Piracy surfaced in 1991, immediately following the fall of Somalia’s government and supplant of Barre’s regime by clan-based warlords.


The second phase, from 2005 onwards, saw an escalation of piracy in terms of quantity, value and ransom demanded.


This phase correlates to the 2004-2006 famine that scorched Somalia aggravating poverty, limiting access to essential resources and stimulating further clan based conflict. It is evident that the off-shore problem of piracy has on-shore roots, however there is need to analyse the current cause-effect relationship between the two. Piracy is certainly the result of a larger problem in Somalia: of poverty, complete state failure, lack of government and inter-clan conflict.


However, piracy has evolved into and additionally functions as an aggravating factor for its on-shore problem. According to a UNSOM report, pirates and pirate financiers advance and finance other criminal activities as well and have built significant paramilitary capacities on land. They thus possess the potential, resources and motivations to destabilise the region and have effectively been doing so.[7] Hence, given the current scenario, piracy has forged a complex relationship with its roots in Somalia. It not only stems from these roots but has evolved to further cultivate them. Viewing piracy independently as a disease has always been a fallacy; it can more accurately be classified as a symptom that has dangerously metastasised. Treating Somalia’s state failure or Somalian piracy exclusively rather than mutually has limited potential in eradicating either problem.


While the relationship between piracy and civil conflict in Somalia is evident and direct, indirect factors play a substantial role in the creation of this situation. Falling under the purview of global governance, the situation in Somalia can be greatly attributed to several macro factors. In essence, it can be considered representative of neglect, exploitation and poor global governance by the international community.


In 2002, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the president of the Transitional National Government, expressed deep disappointment at the lack of support from the international community for rehabilitation in Somalia. During a press conference in Mogadishu, he said if the international community “keeps neglecting us”, Somalia could become “a safe-haven” for local terrorists who collaborate with international terrorists.[8] His concerns were certainly not unfounded as following the 9/11 attacks Somalia was viewed as a breeding ground for transnational terrorism.


Even after, the restoration of a Somali government became part of a counterterrorism strategy, rather than a way to deal with the root causes of state collapse and conflict. Policies of big players have also been criticised as having played a role in creating the conditions that led to a famine in Somalia in 2011.[9] ‘Al-Shabaab’, the clan based organisation controlling majority of Somalia, withheld aid from local populations and worked primarily towards their own economic and politic motive.


On the other hand, aid agencies were banned from providing assistance in areas where supplies or money might end up in the hands of Al-Shabaab operatives. This effectively created a vacuum where both sides neglected the people of Somalia. Although, it is well established that civil conflict has transnational repercussions, this truth was ignored by the international community for a prolonged period of time. While Wilson,[10] postulates that the stabilisation of Somalia would be the first step to overcoming piracy, Menkhaus,[11] cautions that delayed external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty of state building later; this is exactly what happened in the case of Somalia.


Neglect is not the only adverse contribution of the international community towards the situation in Somalia. Illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping are accused of provoking piracy by inducing local fishermen to protect their coastline at all costs. The United Nations estimated that illegal fishing companies from Europe and Asia rob Somali coastlines of over $300 million a year.

In addition to this stimulus, a private British company, Hart Security, provided military training to Somali fisherman in the 1990’s in an effort to create a “Fisheries Protection Agency”[12].The bulk of training was dedicated towards “how to handle weapons and board boats at high sea”[13] – the exact tactics currently used by Somali pirates.


In fact, Somali pirates are so conditioned that they portray themselves as the nation’s unofficial coast guard, fighting against illegal fishing and waste dumping by foreign corporations. Somalian pirates are also abetted by international sponsors; Somali refugees as far as Canada and the United States contribute money to the cause, in addition to financial backing from sources in Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen and Al Qaeda.[14]


The political structure operational in Somalia also has its roots in foreign intervention. Wais Kassim H. Dahir[15] notes that the militarisation of Somalian government can be attributed to Soviet Union’s post cold war support. He also points out that when the cold war ended, superpowers left behind large amounts of weapons that turned Somalia into an armed camp. Subsequently, every household had more arms than food which kept the civil war going. Thus, it is once again apparent with the case of Somalia that civil conflict is both influenced by and influences the international sphere, re-emphasising the need for good global governance.


Having established the role foreign factors have played in indirectly encouraging piracy, it follows to question why their direct efforts to eradicate the same met with initial failure. One of the major reasons for the growth of piracy despite multinational counter-efforts was the purely naval nature of foreign response.


The initial strategy to tackle piracy seems to be based on the assumption that piracy was the ‘disease’ to be independently remedied and not the ‘symptom’ that it more rightly is. Causes of piracy may have started with grievance and shifted to greed, but the roots of the problem, including poverty and conflict, cannot be addressed with a naval response.[16] It is important to consider that waning pirate attacks in 2012 and 2013 could, in part, be related to the establishment of a government in Somalia.[17] However, spending on capacity-building in Somalia is still only equivalent to 1.5% of piracy’s annual cost.


The need of the hour is for nations to realise that their trade revenue interests go hand in hand with capacity building in Somalia.[18] While Somalian piracy has fallen sharply in the recent years, this may well be a suppression of the problem than its complete eradication. If Somali piracy is going to be combated using solely sea-based tactics it will require a critical mass of warships and air assets to maintain a constant presence in the region.


However, it would be wishful thinking to expect this sort of a presence to continue for any prolonged period given the cost of modern naval deployments.


The GOA is a large body of water, and warships are not a long-term cost effective method of providing commercial vessels with protection from Somali piracy. Without a two-pronged approach it is only a matter of time till the naval forces move out of Somalian waters and Somalia’s poverty and conflict find global expression through piracy or other internationally detrimental means.


The efficacy of a two-pronged approach is implicitly outlined in the UNSOM 2013 report. Among other capacity building initiatives, the report mentions the Security Council’s decision that UNSOM support the Federal Government of Somalia on governance, security sector reform, the rule of law, the disengagement of combatants, maritime security and mine action. It also states the agenda to strengthen the fisheries sector, by creating strong institutions and developing the policy and legal frameworks. In this context, extensive work is being carried out by rehabilitating feeder roads, clearing land for agriculture, and constructing water catchments in Somalia. These efforts are indicative of the dawning realisation for a more comprehensive strategy to address the complex issue.


The complete impact of recent and ongoing capacity building efforts on piracy remains unclear and difficult to determine due to its nascent nature. Conversely, the present situation in Somalia strongly suggests one hard truth. The naval forces may have successfully suppressed piracy but cannot provide a long-term solution. Hence, by no means can 2013 be regarded as the end of Somalian piracy. While the two-pronged approach will prove to be a panacea in the long run, a shift in scope to include targeting not only the perpetrators but also the enablers will help the strategy gain momentum. In addition, it is crucial to establish a sound judicial system to set the foundation of stability. Blanket amnesty, punishment and lustration are all possible ways of addressing such issues, which once dealt with will make the road ahead smoother.


Notes:

 [1] ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2009. London: IMB, 2009. Print.


 [2] Johnson, La’Nita M. “The Consequences of Somali Piracy on International Trade.” Global Tides 8.1 (2014): 5.

 [3] Do, Quy-Toan. The pirates of Somalia: ending the threat, rebuilding a nation. Washington DC: World Bank, 2013.

 [4] Blanchard, Christopher M., et al. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington: Congressional Research Service (2009).

 [5] Malm, Sarah. “European Court Chides France Over Somali Pirate Arrests.” Mail Online. N.p., 2014. Web. 10 Jan. 2015.

 [6] Lennox, Patrick. Contemporary piracy off the Horn of Africa. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008.

 [7] United Nations Assisted Mission in Somalia. Secretary-General’s Report On Piracy And Armed Robbery At Sea Off The Coast Of Somalia. New York: United Nations, 2013. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.

 [8] IRINnews.“SOMALIA: President Disappointed At Lack Of International Support.” N.p., 2002. Web. 14 Jan. 2015.

 [9]Bradbury, Mark. “How Do You Solve A Problem Like Somalia?” Newint.org. N.p., 2012. Web. 13 Jan. 2015.

 [10] Wilson, Brian. “Effectively confronting a regional threat: Somali piracy.” Conflict trends 1 (2009): 11-18.

 [11] Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping.” (2007).

 [12] Al Jazeera, English. “Firms Reap Somali Piracy Profits – Africa.”Al Jazeera English. 9 Sept. 2009. Web. 15 Jan 2015

 [13] ibid

 [14] Kellerman, Miles G. “Somali Piracy: Causes and Consequences.” Student Pulse 3.09 (2011).

 [15]Dahir, Wais Kassim. “Learning The Lessons: The Root Causes Of The Somali Conflict.” Somaliland Times 2002. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

 [16] Hall, Andrea. “Piracy And The Experience Of Somali Women.” Canadian Military History. N.p., 2013. Web. 11 Jan. 2015.

 [17] ibid

 [18]Oceans Beyond Piracy. Latest Oceans Beyond Piracy Report. 2014. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.