Tuesday, September 29, 2015

INDIAN NAVY (CULCUTTA CLASS) : INS KOCHI Inside India's New and Deadliest Warship

SOURCE  :
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/inside-indias-new-and-deadliest-warship-1224090





                      Active Indian Navy Fleet - 2015

Published on Oct 18, 2013
FRIENDS, Please see this updated version.
Click on the link in the video.

The active Indian Navy Fleet along with the ships that will be joining shortly.
This excludes the Kamorta-class Corvettes.
*Other Vessels of Kolkata Class Destroyer - INS Kochi, INS Chennai







                     Indian Navy Ships (2015-2025)HD

Published on Apr 11, 2015

Updated Version of the Indian Navy's Fleet is here!









Inside India's New and Deadliest Warship


Inside India's New and Deadliest Warship




Written by Vishnu Som | September 29, 2015 16:27 IST













(Vishnu Som was given access to the Kochi. Having examined its features and technology, he presents here a possible naval scenario involving the Rs. 3,900 crore-ship.)

On a dark moonlit night, an Indian warship pierced the waters of the South China Sea at a brisk 25 knots. (In pictures)

The only sound to be heard was of waves slapping the sides of her sleek hull.  

To the untrained eye, she was all but invisible. Her sleek silhouette and her grey paint scheme ensured she blended in with the sea around her. And her distinct, angular lines were meant to make it difficult, if not impossible, for enemy radars to track her - she was, after all, a stealth warship.

But tonight would be different. Tonight, INS Kochi, a state-of-the-art Indian Navy destroyer, built in India over a decade, would be challenged by a worthy adversary.

Another stealth ship - a Type 052D destroyer of the Chinese Navy, the Changsha.

Commissioned just a month ahead of the Kochi in August 2015, the Changsha represented the pinnacle of Chinese Naval design and engineering, carrying a world class load of surface to air and anti-ship missiles.

Inside the Kochi, there was tension. Men moved around purposefully and silently. They had been briefed about the situation they were in.

For several days, the Kochi and two ships of the Indian Navy including the frigate Shivalik and the fleet tanker INS Shakti had been repeatedly challenged. Unlike the Kochi and the Shivalik, the Shakti was not armed but her role in this mission was essential - she would refuel the Indian task force through the course of their journey.

"You have entered Chinese waters," said the radio transmission broadcast on an international maritime alert frequency. "Please change course. You are now in Chinese waters.  Alter course now or you will be challenged."

And on the instructions of the Indian fleet Commander, an Admiral on board the INS Kochi, the Indian Navy had replied, politely but with a firm resolve.

"We are operating in international waters enroute to Japan for joint exercises It is our intention to remain on course."

But the Indian task force commander knew that he was being monitored. His long-range Russian-built surface search radar, had picked up intermittent contacts - at least two of the contacts matched the profile of Chinese warships.  But no one could be sure.  

The contacts were at the very end of the radar's range. For now, the Indian task force Commander would wait and watch.


The Kochi's 76mm Super Rapid Gun mount in the foreground with the large Israeli built MF-STAR phased array radar visible on top of the mast of the Kochi.


Who would blink first in this game of high stakes Naval brinkmanship? The Chinese Navy, which considered much of the South China sea as its personal fiefdom, or the warships of the Indian Navy, now operating far from their own waters?

The answer would come soon.

Deep inside the Kochi, several decks below her bridge, her Commanding Officer, his XO (Executive Officer) and 15 of his most skilled weapons and sensor experts manned their stations in the Operations Centre of the 7,500-ton destroyer.

The Kochi was at battle-stations, alert to any hostile Chinese presence, her leading officers using radars and sonars to search for hostile contacts - enemy aircraft, missiles or submarines.

Spread across 17 metres, the width of the entire warship, the Ops Centre was the nerve centre of the Kochi, a rectangular, windowless, black room dimly lit by blue lights that added to the illumination of more than a dozen colour multi-function displays.  

Officers scanning the airwaves for electronic emissions from enemy warships manned the Electronic Warfare (EW) suite. Equipped with an Indian EW suite called the Ellora, the Kochi's sensors mounted on her mast behind both sides of her Bridge had two primary functions - Electronic Support Missions (ESM) to try and detect faint radar emissions from ships in the area and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) used to  jam the signals of enemy aircraft, incoming anti shipping and cruise missiles if they were detected.  
Next to the ECM crew, a gunnery officer was checking the status of his 16 anti-ship Brahmos missiles, among the fastest and most lethal weapons in its class - a missile designed to fly at close to three times the speed of sound to penetrate the defences of enemy warships 300 kilometres away.










The Kochi's 76mm Oto-Melara Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM) being tested ahead of the ship being commissioned.



With her massive warhead, a single Brahmos missile would blast through the hull of an enemy ship, causing an explosion which could sink a relatively large frigate or destroyer in minutes.

But at the moment, the Commander of the ship and his First Officer, monitoring all of the ship's sensors and systems from their station in the middle of the Ops Centre, had a more immediate concern.

Ellora, the Electronic Warfare suite, had picked up emissions from the same area where the Kochi's surface search radar had earlier detected a contact. And the news was getting worse. Ellora had classified the threat. It was indeed a Chinese Type-052 D destroyer, a ship of the same class as the Kochi and the pride of the Chinese Navy.

Seconds later, a loud buzzer sounded. "Incoming missile!" shouted 'SAMs' - the Officer manning the Surface to Air Missile console.  Far above him, electronic beams from the Israeli built MF-STAR (Multi-Function Surveillance, Track And Guidance Radar) had homed into a clear and present threat.

The Chinese destroyer had fired a long range YJ-18 'Eagle Strike' missile directly at the Kochi. "Second missile incoming!" shouted SAMs, as the radar began tracking a second and then a third Chinese subsonic missile headed straight in Kochi's direction.

But INS Kochi had an answer - the Barak-8 LR-SAM, a long range Surface to Air Missile system jointly developed by Israel and India.  

Kochi had 32 missiles onboard, missiles designed to deal with exactly this threat.

"Another missile inbound. That makes it four missiles inbound!" - this was a worst case scenario - a saturation attack. The fate of the 390 Officers and Men on the Kochi was now effectively in the hands of a highly-automated weapon system.

Now in full-auto mode, the first Indian Barak 8 blasted off its vertical launcher ahead of the bridge of the destroyer. Accelerating quickly to four times the speed of sound, the missile shot straight up before arching in a parabola in the direction of the enemy missile it was assigned to intercept. The missile was not flying blind.  

Critical data indicating the direction, speed and location of the incoming Chinese anti-ship missile was being fed to the Barak, enabling it to lock on to the first Chinese missile precisely.

In the final few seconds of its flight, the Barak, now being directed by data from its own radar, dove down towards the Chinese missile.  In moments, its warhead would detonate, activated by a proximity fuse triggered when the distance between the Barak and the incoming enemy missile was no more than a few feet.  The first Chinese Eagle Strike missile had been destroyed more than 70 kilometres away from the Kochi.


But with the Chinese destroyer launching its missiles in quick succession, the second, third and fourth Eagle Strike missiles, some flying different trajectories than the first, closed in on the Kochi.  

The Kochi kept firing as the incoming missiles closed in, the automatic system assigning two missiles each to the final two missiles.
 





The Kochi's RBU-6000 anti-submarine rocket launcher, Barak missile silos and main gun visible from the Bridge of the Kochi.



Inside the Ops Centre, the Commander of the Kochi focussed straight ahead at a large LCD screen that dominated the Ops Centre. On it, critical data from 'SAM's' console was now being shown. And as they tried their best to focus on their individual systems, different officers manning other systems would glance up at the big screen to get an idea of what was happening. They all knew that this was life or death. And they all knew there was nothing really left for them to do. Unless they chose to deliberately intervene, the system was completely automated - Barak 8 surface to air missiles would keeping shooting off the fore and aft deck of the Kochi until every last incoming missile was destroyed. Or every last Barak missile had been fired.

And if the Eagle Strike missiles weren't intercepted, Kochi would still keep fighting.  Two of four Russian-designed AK-630 anti-missile guns onboard the Kochi would collectively spew out 10,000 rounds per minute, creating a wall of lead between the Eagle Strike and the Kochi. The incoming missiles, it was hoped, would be obliterated as they tried to pierce this wall. And even as the missiles approached, there were other defensive systems on board the Kochi.

Ellora, the Electronic Counter Measures system would try and jam the radars of the incoming Eagle-Strike while 'Kavach', an indigenous system would fire aluminium chaff in the area to confuse the sensors of the Eagle Strike and make the missile veer away harmlessly from the ship.

In the end, none of this would be required. The Barak system was up for the challenge and every one of the subsonic Chinese anti-ship missiles were destroyed, the last one just 10 kilometres away from the Kochi, her explosion easily visible to the naked eye on this dark night.

This was now a Naval war. A frontline Indian asset had been attacked in international waters. The Indian fleet were bound to respond and that process had already begun.

As Kochi defended herself, critical targeting data was being constantly shared between Kochi and the Shivalik, the frigate accompanying her. They were linked through the Indian Navy's tactical network, a communications highway routed through the Navy's own satellite, the Rukmini.  

For Indian ships deployed over large parts of the Navy's area of interest, the Rukmini gives a cohesive and heavily encrypted tactical picture - the location of other ships in their area, details of what their sensors are tracking, the ability to talk, transmit video and even access the internet. The two warships and also the unarmed fleet tanker accompanying them were sharing data of the battle through a secure tactical network operating through encrypted radio transmitters.

As she warded off the enemy missiles, the Kochi had provided Shivalik with the exact coordinates of the enemy Chinese warship, data which was fed into the Shivalik's Brahmos missiles, two of which were ripple-fired even as Kochi fought off the enemy missiles heading her way.  

Blasting off her launch tubes on the deck of the Shivalik, the Brahmos missiles quickly accelerated to Mach 2.8 and headed towards the Changsha nearly 300 kilometres away.  
Ill-equipped to take on a weapon as fast and maneuverable as the Brahmos, the Chinese destroyer fired off her defensive guns, and her own chaff-dispensers.  

But by then, it was too late.  The writing was on the wall.

The scenario described above is not entirely unrealistic.


The Machinery Control Room (MCR) onboard the destroyer Kochi.



In 2011, INS Airavat, an Indian amphibious assault ship was challenged by the Chinese Navy at a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea by a caller identifying himself as Chinese Navy. The Airavat continued on course,  ignoring the challenge which said, "You are entering Chinese waters."

India continues to have significant commercial interests in oil and gas in association with Vietnam, one of the countries involved in a heated maritime dispute with Beijing. And Vietnam, incidentally, has close Naval ties with India, which is known to have trained Vietnamese sailors.

And this is where a ship like the INS Kochi comes in. The second of a class of three advanced 'Kolkata' class destroyers, the 7,500 ton Kochi is a perfect example of how the government's mantra of Make in India can be realised.

The product of decades of experience in Naval ship design and manufacture, the Kochi, which is being commissioned into the Indian Navy on September 30, incorporates the best Naval technology available anywhere in the world, technology customised and delivered to the state-run Mazgaon Docks Limited (MDL), Mumbai, which has integrated these systems onto an Indian-built hull.

Unlike most other warships of its class in the Indian Navy, the Kochi is large. There are no cramped gangways here, typical of other warships.
There are abundant spaces and crew comfort, unlike in the past, is a real priority. 'Hot bunking' where sailors share the same bunks as colleagues when they are on another shift is a thing of the past.

Instead, every sailor has a bunk and adequate locker space. The sailor's dining area is large and the galley is highly automated and includes, among other systems, an automated dosa maker.

The Kochi can speed along at more than 30 knots, close to 56 kilometres per hour, and be deployed in the open seas for several weeks if need be. Her Indian-built generators provide enough power to run a small town indefinitely. The generators are crucial in powering the air-conditioning systems on board. The Kochi needs 200 tons of cooling to ensure that her delicate electronics and weapon systems remain operational in our intensely hot and humid conditions.  

While Machinery Control Rooms (MCR) of previous warships featured manual controls and analogue dials, the MCR onboard the Kochi is completely automated.  Officers here monitor firefighting systems, propulsion and auxillary systems, power generation, the ship's stabilisers, her airconditioners and four large Reverse Osmosis Plants that provide the ship and her crew with abundant fresh water.     

The data provided by the MCR's systems are part of the Ship's Data Network (SDM), the backbone of what is an information highway onboard the ship. Data from the SDM can be tapped across the ship on a need to know basis. A key part of the Ship Data Network System is the Combat Management System (CMS) which processes data from the sensors (radars, sonars and electronic warning systems) and the weapon systems. All of this is primarily routed to the Operations Centre of the warship, though in the event of damage to the Ops Centre during a battle, can be accessed from several stand-alone consoles spread across the ship.

Though she is being commissioned, the Kochi and her sister ship the Kolkata are yet to become battle-worthy. The Long Range Barak 8 surface to air missile, one of her primary weapons is presently being tested on board Israeli warships. NDTV has learned that there are no major hurdles in the development of this new generation weapon which will be installed on the INS Kolkata, the INS Kochi and their yet-to-be-commissioned sister ship, the INS Chennai within the next few months.  
Captain Gurcharan Singh, the man who runs the Kochi, has a glint in his eye when he tells us that he has been lucky enough to have been a part of the commissioning crew of three warships entering the Indian Navy, a rare feat for any sailor anywhere in the world.  

At 46, he has the awesome responsibility of commanding 40 officers and 350 sailors onboard the Kochi. According to the Captain, "Its a wonderful experience. For us as a commissioning crew, its a great opportunity to take charge of a warship. We are very proud of the ship for two reasons. For one, the ship is a very potent and powerful platform and secondly, this ship is an outstanding example of our indigenous ship-building capability."

































































IAF : TEJAS - Despite Flaws, India to Induct Tejas Mark-1A Fighter Aircraft

SOURCE  :





     Despite Flaws, India to Induct 

     Tejas Mark-1A Fighter Aircraft












COMMENTS
Despite Flaws, India to Induct Tejas Mark-1A Fighter Aircraft
Each squadron of the Tejas Mark-1A will have about 
16 to 18 aircraft.
NEW DELHI:  The government has decided to induct at least seven squadrons of the made-in-India Tejas Mark I-A Light Combat Aircraft or LCA into the Indian Air Force, to make up for a shortage of fighters.


The Tejas Mark 1-A is slightly more proficient than the first-cut home-made LCA, the Tejas, but the aircraft still has some flaws. For one, there are doubts about its ability to carry the required payload of weapons. 


Also, its Indian-made radar needs to be replaced with an Israeli radar.


The IAF has agreed to induct the Tejas Mark 1-A as it urgently needs more than 120 lightweight fighters to be used for air defence and to intercept enemy aircraft. A squadron has about 16 to 18 aircraft each.

It had earlier agreed to induct 40 Tejas', an aircraft that India's national auditor CAG said had severe flaws with 

  

  BRANDED NEW FLYING BULLOCK CART  COFFINS

"shortfalls in meeting the engine thrust 

and other parameters such as weight of 

the aircraft, fuel capacity, pilot protection 

from front against 7.62 mm bullets."



The IAF agreed to induct the flawed aircraft to keep the Tejas programme alive. DID THEY!!!!!!!!!

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and defence public sector unit Hindustan Aeronautics Limited or HAL, who are manufacturing the LCA have promised a more agile Mark 1A.

Sources, told NDTV that changes will be made in the ballast and the landing gear making the Tejas Mark-1A about 1000 kg lighter than its 6500-kg predecessor. 
Delivery can begin next year. [TEJAs R 1000 KG OVERWEIGHT ]

Defence Ministry sources told NDTV that "the IAF needs to have a minimum number of aircraft at all times. Till the time the indigenously built Tejas Mark II is ready this is best option available."

The Tejas Mark-2, expected to address the flaws in the Mark-1A, will not be ready for induction or series production before 2024-2025.

The Air Force will find itself very short of fighters after it decommissions three squadrons of its MiG 21 and one MiG 27 squadron this year; it will lose the rest of its 10-odd squadrons of the vintage Russian-made MiGs by 2022.
 
The government is buying 32 Rafale fighters from France to be delivered in the next five years.


Story First Published: September 29, 2015 18:08 IST

BHARAT MATA KI  JAI




















OROP : THE BEAT OF THE BUSH TELEGRAPH























                        OROP  : THE BEAT 
                                      OF 
                 THE BUSH TELEGRAPH




'Vinod Gandhi' via IESM_Group iesm_group@googlegroups.com

8:17 PM (5 minutes ago)


to IESMVCtbrigadierBrigMohanVVselfcolonelOROPJMRohitAtulColindianveterans




Dear Col Nair
We are seriously working to flood the Social media and have made a special cell to attack social media. Our reach is increasing by the minute. You seem to have misunderstood my message. You will be surprised that because of my mail of exorbitant cost of short film making, I have received offers from our own fouji kids and fouji brothers to help make films free of cost. We are exploring the possibility. 
At the same time we are also exploring the impact of fouji kids of bollywood visiting JM in support of  OROP.
We wish to tap all resources available to us

Regards
Gp Capt VK Gandhi VSM
Gen Sec IESM
Flat no 801, Tower N5
Narmada Apartments
Pocket D6 
Vasant Kunj
Nelson Mandela Marg
New Delhi. 110070
Mobile   09810541222


OROP is our right. Dilution in OROP will NOT be accepted.
IF YOU SEE SOMEONE WITHOUT A SMILE GIVE HIM ONE OF YOURS.


  



Subject: Re: [indianveterans] Re: Fwd: {Thirteenians} RE: OROP-New Strategies to bring awareness and attention.


Dear Gen Secy-IESM,

Ref Your ;"We had been attempting to bring in bollywood and fouji kids to support our agitation.".

We have our own Children fighting for us by creating awareness alround through The F B Page called ;"DEFENCE SERVICES KIDS" about which I had sent a no of mails to both Veterans Gp and Tri- - - Gp. 

From our side much notice does not appear to have been given to it. They , on their own are going from Str to Str and have already crossed 2.5K mark in membership in less than 3 (Three) weeks, which incidently incl a few Lt Gens & a No of Maj Gens & equivalents who themselves are Def Kids. It is AN 'ALL RKS KIDS'GP' and are very active.

We Veterans  are trumpeted to be over 3 Million incl Veer Naris and it is safe to assume every family could be counted to have min 2 Kids which make it 6 (Six) Million Kids!!. Imagine the Force they can be particularly in the Social Media, if we were to request all our kids to join in this Gp. 

It is sad that we are NOT (NOT) willing to give them a fillip but are  suck on star gazing by latching on to Beauty Queens & Movie stars. Efforts in That Direction  should also go on but do give our own Children also a push to help them help us. I can't but feel we are treating them the way  the Babus are treating us, for Petre's Sake!!

May I request you to exhort ALL MEMBERS OF OUR GPS TO ASK THEIR Children TO JOIN UP as also post the news in their further respective gps like Gunners and the like please.

Fraternally Yours,

Col K V C Nair
__._,_.___

Posted by: Col K V Chandrasekharan Nair chandrasekharan nair <colkvcnair@gmail.com>

PLA : China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese PLA

SOURCE  :
http://www.defensegroupinc.com/cira/pdf/doctrinebook.pdf





       China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs:

                          Emerging Trends
 
                                     in
 
             the Operational Art of the Chinese

                People’s Liberation Army


                                       PROLOGUE

                           David M. Finkelstein
 

The decade of the 1990s was a period of tremendous change for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On nearly every front, this massive defense establishment was engaged in a myriad of reforms aimed at making it a more professional force in a corporate and institutional sense as well as a more operationally capable force. These changes affected every facet of the PLA—force structure, equipment, personnel reform, and yet another rectification of the defense research and development establishment, to name just a few.
 

Of particular significance, the 1990s was also a decade of tremendous doctrinal ferment. Having just spent the decade of the 1980s refining its approaches to combined arms operations, the PLA, throughout the 1990s, found itself impelled by observing external military events to rethink its own approaches to the operational art and the prosecution of campaign-level operations.
 
 
In particular, the performance (both successful and otherwise) of U.S. military forces and coalition partners throughout the 1990s, and the challenges faced by various developing militaries in the face of high-technology warfare helped to crystallize and refine the PLA’s conceptualization of what it terms “Local Wars Under Modern Hightech Conditions” (and with the publication of its December 2004 defense white paper, what they now refer to as “Local Wars Under Modern Informationalized Conditions.”) So too did the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs,” much written about in the West and subsequently in China, also give PLA operations professionals and theorists cause for pause and self-reflection. Clearly, the emergence of a new type of warfare required a new type of operational doctrine.

At the same time, China’s changing assessments of its external security situation provided added impetus to the need for doctrinal change. China’s perception of it own changing security landscape during this period was highlighted by the need to enhance its ability to deter Taiwan’s drift away from the mainland. It was also influenced by an increasing distrust of U.S. intentions toward China, concerns about India’s ambitions as a rising regional power, increasing uncertainty over Japan’s evolving role in regional security and military affairs, as well as unresolved competing claims for maritime resources in the South China Sea with various Southeast Asian nations. All of these concerns and uncertainties underscored the need for a reexamination of PLA war fighting concepts in an age of high speed, high lethality, and high technology warfare.
 

Driven by these aforementioned capabilities-based and contingency-based requirements and assessments, the PLA set about to adjust its approaches to the conduct of operations. In 1999, after nearly a decade of study, research, and presumably experimentation in the field, a new and apparently large corpus of officially promulgated doctrinal guidance was issued under the collective title of “The New Generation
Operations Regulations” (xin yidai zuozhan tiaoling, 新一代作战条令).
 
 
 
As a result, it appears that the PLA intends to change how it thinks about the conduct of
campaign-level operations and adjust other supporting activities such as field training regimens, the curricula at institutions of professional military education, force structure organization, and personnel requirements.

 
 
In recognition of the ongoing “revolution in Chinese doctrinal affairs,” a two-day conference on the PLA’s changing approaches to the operational art was co-hosted by The CNA Corporation and The RAND Corporation in December 2002. The timing was right for a conference focused exclusively on changes in PLA doctrine on two accounts. First, by the year 2000, the potential significance of what had transpired doctrinally in the PLA was becoming evident to serious students of Chinese military affairs. Second, for most of the previous decade the PLA itself had generated a tremendous amount of professional literature on the subject, thus providing a more than adequate amount of data to justify serious explorations of the subject. The chapters that follow are the results of the conference.
There is still much that is not understood about the PLA’s ongoing doctrinal paradigm shift. However, as a body of scholarship, the papers in this volume offer a rich source of insight into the initial outlines of the PLA’s changing approaches to the conduct of operations. All of the authors used a body of professional materials published by the PLA in the original Chinese that represent some (but clearly not all) of the key writings to come out of this period of doctrinal reexamination. The papers likely represent the most current thinking on the PLA’s changing operational doctrine as can be found anywhere to this point in the English language.
What is unique about this volume is that it focuses on PLA doctrine at the operational-level of warfare—the very level of conflict at which the PLA itself has put its own emphasis in its new doctrinal literature. It is this level of warfare—the realm of campaigns—that provides the operational linkage between the strategic objectives of a conflict (the desired political-military end state) and the battles and engagements that define the tactical level of combat. It is at this level of conflict at which the operational art is practiced, at which campaign design is paramount, and at which the highest order of generalship is required to take carefully crafted and complex operations plans from the drawing boards to the various battle space dimensions and into contact with the enemy.
Of special note, we were especially fortunate, and honored, to have as our conference’s keynote speaker General Donn A. Starry (U.S. Army, Retired), former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and one of the U.S. Army’s most prominent and influential doctrinal experts. As one of the “Founding Fathers” of AirLand Battle doctrine, and the driving force behind the Army’s watershed 1982 Field Manual, Operations (FM 100-5), General Starry provided much appreciated insight into the real world issues associated with what it takes to change a military’s doctrine as well as thoughtful commentary on the philosophical and intellectual aspects of thinking through such a complex endeavor.
 
It is our hope that the readers of this volume will come away with a greater appreciation for the sea changes that are underway in PLA operational thinking, an appreciation for PLA military science researchers and operations specialists as professionals in their own right, and an appreciation for the art of the possible in the field of Chinese military studies in the first years of the 21st Century.
                TO READ THE FULL TEXT 
                                 PLEASE
               CLICK THE LINK BELOW

                     http://www.defensegroupinc.com/cira/pdf/doctrinebook.pdf
 
 
 







































 

Monday, September 28, 2015

7 CPC : PRE 7CPC Now, Its AFS Versus Civil Bureaucrats ‘Remove Anomalies’ is the Demand

SOURCE :
http://www.gconnect.in/news/now-its-armed-forces-versus-civil-bureaucrats.html




Every IAS or IFS officer reaches apex scale because of NFU, the rules are different in armed forces. 99 per cent of military officers do not make it to the apex scale. For them, each pay commission would separately deter mine smaller pension raises.

    Now, Its AFs Versus Civil Bureaucrats

         ‘Remove Anomalies’ is the Demand

                                        By

                        

 

   September 22, 2015

Now, Its Armed Forces Versus Civil Bureaucrats – The armed forces want at least five “core anomalies” in their salary structures to be resolved to establish the “correct baseline” for recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission.

The still unresolved, one rank one pension (OROP) agitation has exacerbated the lack of trust between the military, on the one hand, and politicians and bureaucrats, on the other. In a double defeat for the government on the One Rank One Pension (OROP) issue, the Government will shell out at least Rs 18,000-22,000 crore for a settlement, but still leave most ex-servicemen grumbling.

Not to be left out, now the serving armed forces officers have approached the 7th Pay Commission again, to consider their demands. The armed forces want at least five “core anomalies” in their salary structures to be resolved to establish the “correct baseline” for recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission.

One of their main demand and grievance is the ‘Non-functional financial upgradation’ (NFFU). The IFS and IPS officers, as also those from organized Group A civil services, now get NFFU after the 6th Pay Commission like IAS officers. But the armed forces have been kept out of it, and they demand, ‘Give us NFU or remove the anomaly’.

A senior officer of the armed forces had this to say
 “This adversely impacts the morale of serving military officers. It also creates command, control and functional problems because even organizations that work closely with the military like DRDO, Border Roads Organisation, Military Engineer Service and the like get NFU, then why we are denied?”


Another officer on condition of anonymity had this to say, ” Every IAS or IFS officer reaches apex scale because of NFFU, the rules are different in armed forces, only a minuscule percentage of officers do reach the apex scale, say one or two per cent, is it justified?”  IAS and IFS keep getting promoted, regardless of merit and performance, he added.

Another demand is the placement of all Lt-Generals in the HAG+ (higher administrative grade) pay-scale like directors-general of police. As of now, only 33% of Lt-Gens are in the HAG+ scale. The status of all Lt-Gens with that of DGPs must be restored.
The other anomalies deal with the grant of “uniform grade pay” and proper “initial pay fixation” of Lt-Colonels, Colonels and Brigadiers. There is also the need for all JCOs (junior commissioned officers) and soldiers to get “common pay scales”, in the backdrop of the ones recruited before January 2006 not getting them.

Another senior officer said, “The civilian Bureaucrats have the advantage of NFU and they automatically get OROP. It’s high time the historical and traditional parity was restored”.

Will the 7th Pay Commission heed to their demand? Given the circumstances, it is a very big question!  The civil Bureaucrats by virtue of having by far the highest percentage of superseded personnel, say that it makes poor economic sense. They feel that the armed forces keep on making more and more demands when they already get a lot of privileges from free rations to hugely-subsidized canteens. “Military officers and jawans already get ‘military service pay’ for their tougher working conditions. The demand for NFU is unrealistic,” said a senior bureaucrat.

However, the armed forces are undeterred. They are now making a last-ditch attempt to get the anomalies rectified by the 7th Pay Commission.

Source: The Times of India