SOURCE :http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/syria/2015/syria-151014-voa02.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1546%2eka0ao00b2h%2e1f4e

Turkey Warns US, Russia

on

Arming Syria Kurds

By

Henry Ridgwell

In-Depth Coverage

October 14, 2015

Turkey has warned both the United States and Russia against arming Kurdish forces in Syria, saying they are connected to what Ankara calls Kurdish terrorists within Turkey. Analysts say the West sees the Kurds as a vital ally in countering the spread of the Islamic State terror group, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

Backed by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes, Kurdish forces in Syria have made territorial gains against Islamic State militants. The U.S. said this week it has parachuted in ammunition — but did not specify which rebel groups it is aiding.

Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu Wednesday warned against arming Kurdish forces in Syria — which Turkey views as terrorists allied to PKK Kurdish separatists.

Davutoglu said Turkey's stance was communicated to the United States and Russia. It means Turkey cannot accept any cooperation with groups waging a war against Turkey, he added.

The alliance between the West and Kurdish authorities in Syria, known as the PYD, is likely to strengthen, said Middle East analyst Ranj Alaaldin.

"They've constituted a very effective, pro-Western, secular force fighting ISIS. At a time like this, with the Russians intervening, with the conflict getting more and more complicated, I think the U.S. and the West in general will keep the PYD onside," he said.

Kurdish commanders told the Reuters news agency they had formed an alliance with Arab rebel groups to launch an assault on the Islamic State group's self-proclaimed capital, Raqqa; but, ethnic rivalries mean a Kurdish-led assault on Raqqa would be problematic, said Robert Lowe of the London School of Economics.

"In Arab-dominated parts there would be considerable opposition to the Kurdish militia controlling their towns – even if it meant getting rid of IS, because there are deep-rooted tensions there between the communities," stated Lowe.

Turkey fears that Kurdish groups in Syria aim to push farther west along the border over the Euphrates River, aided by Russian air support.

"The Turks would like to have the freedom to attack inside Kurdish parts of Syria, but I don't think they currently do," said Lowe. "The wider alliances with international powers make that very awkward."

Turkey said it has evidence linking both Kurdish PKK militants and Islamic State terrorists to Saturday's bombing of a peace rally in Ankara. Many Kurdish groups allege the Turkish government was behind the attack — a claim the government strongly denied.

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SYRIA PEOPLE - KURDS

Estimates of the number of Kurds in Syria vary widely, but they are believed to number about 2 million, about 9 percent of the population of approximately 21 million. Although some Kurdish tribal groups have lived in the country for generations, many arrived from Turkey between 1924 and 1938, when Mustapha Kemal attempted to force his reform programs on the Kurds there.

The Kurds are a fiercely independent tribal people who speak their own language, Kirmanji. Living mainly in the broad, mountainous region of northwestern Iran, eastern Turkey, and northern Iraq, they are a cohesive people with intricate intertribal ties and a deep pride in their own history and traditions. Most Kurds are farmers; some are city dwellers; and others are nomads who drive their flocks far into the mountains in the summer and graze them on the lowlands in the winter.

Roughly 35 to 40 percent of the Kurds live in the foothills of the Taurus Mountains north of Aleppo. An equal number live in the Jazirah; about 10 percent in the vicinity of Jarabulus northeast of Aleppo; and from 10 to 15 percent in the Hayy al Akrad (Quarter of the Kurds) on the outskirts of Damascus.

Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims; a very small number are Christians and Alawis. In addition, the Syrian Yazidis, who speak Kirmanji, are sometimes considered Kurds. Numbering about 12,000, the Yazidis inhabit the Jabal Siman, west of Aleppo; the Jabal al Akrad, north of Aleppo; and a few villages south of Amuda and Jabal Abd al Aziz in the Jazirah. Most of the Yazidis work the land for Muslim landowners.

Syria's Kurds are almost entirely settled, but they retain much of their tribal organization. Although some groups in the Jazirah are seminomadic, most are village dwellers who cultivate wheat, barley, cotton, and rice. Urban Kurds engage in a number of occupations, but not generally in commerce. Many are manual laborers; some are employed as supervisors and foremen, a kind of work that has come to be considered their specialty. There are some Kurds in the civil service and the army, and a few have attained high rank. Most of the small wealthy group of Kurds derive their income from urban real estate.

Kurds who have left the more isolated villages and entered Arab society have generally adopted the dress and customs of the community in which they live. In the Jazirah, for example, many have adopted beduin dress, live in tents, and are generally indistinguishable from the beduin, except in speech. Most Kurds speak both Kirmanji and Arabic, although others, particularly those in Damascus, may speak only Arabic. Kurds who have entered the country in the present generation usually retain much of the language, dress, and customs of their native highlands.

For most Kurds, whether long established in Syria or recently arrived, tribal loyalty is stronger than national loyalty to either the Syrian state or to a Kurdish nation. They are traditionally distrustful of any government, particularly that in Damascus. However, relatively peaceful residence in Syria and gradual assimilation have mitigated their distrust of Syrian authorities.

Citizenship is derived solely from the father, living or deceased. Following the 1962 census, approximately 120,000 Syrian Kurds lost their citizenship. Many of the stateless Kurds had moved to Syria from Iraq and Turkey early in the 20th century, when borders were more porous. Although the Government stopped the practice of stripping Kurds of their citizenship, it never restored the nationality to those who lost it earlier. As a result, those who lost their nationality, and their children, remained unable to obtain passports, or even identification cards and birth certificates.

Stateless Kurds number approximately 200,000, according to UNHCR estimates, a recent Refugees International report puts the number at 350,000 Kurds, the figure commonly used by Kurdish groups. These stateless Kurds - somewhere between one in ten and one in six of the total Kurdsh population - are without citizenship, unable to own land, not permitted to practice as doctors or engineers, denied government employment, ineligible for admission to public hospitals and public universities, without the right to vote, and could not travel to and from the country. They also encountered difficulties in enrolling their children in school, and in some cases, in registering their marriages. Despite the president's repeated promises to resolve the matter of stateless Kurds, there was no progress over the years.

Although the Government contended that there was no discrimination against the Kurdish population, it placed limits on the use and teaching of the Kurdish language. It also restricted the publication of books and other materials written in Kurdish, Kurdish cultural expression, and, at times, the celebration of Kurdish festivals. The Government tacitly accepted the importation and distribution of Kurdish language materials, particularly in the northeast region where most of the Kurds in the country resided.

In March 2004 riots took place throughout Hassekah province, as well as in Aleppo and Damascus, in reaction to Syrian police opening fire on a crowd at a soccer match following clashes between Arab and Kurdish fans. The Government's discrimination against the stateless Kurdish minority resulted in a series of riots in March centered in the Hassakeh province which spread to other parts of the country during which more than 30 persons were reportedly killed by security forces and more than 1000 arrested.

Security forces opened fire with live ammunition on Kurdish citizens during civil disturbances and demonstrations, killing 30 civilians in Hassakeh province on March 12 and between 5 to 8 Kurdish demonstrators in Aleppo on March 16. The following day, crowds rioted in Qamishli and the security forces again opened fire on the crowd. Subsequently, riots and demonstrations spread throughout the towns and villages of the Hassakeh Province as well as to cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. On April 8, media sources reported that Hussein Hamak Nasso, a 26-year-old Kurd, died after being tortured by security forces in the town of Afreen. Security forces reportedly then forced Nasso's family to secretly bury him in their presence. Human rights organizations and Kurdish groups reported that 1,000-2,000 Kurds were detained in the aftermath of the March riots. Most were freed after a few months detention; however, 200-300 Kurds remained in custody at year end.

By 2006 there were twelve Kurdish domestic political parties, each with varying levels of organization and membership. While officially illegal, the government tolerated the parties' existence (like their Arab counterparts) to varying and sometimes dangerously unpredictable degrees. Two loose coalitions exist, the KurdishDemocratic Front (which is aligned with Iraqi Kurd leader Masoud Barzani) and the Kurdish Democratic Alliance (aligned with Iraqi Kurd leader Jalal Talabani) . In addition, there were four independent parties: the Azadi Party, the Yekiti Party, the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union, and the recently formed Kurdish Future Movement. While the two coalitions signed the Damascus Declaration, the Azadi, Yekiti, and Future Movement parties held out, complaining of the emphasis on the Arab and Islamic identity of Syria. Compared to the independent parties, the two coalitions, however, were not nearly as popular in the Kurdish community, as the coalition parties are politically inactive, small, and close to the authorities.

Pro-PKK protests by Syrian Kurds in Northeast Syrian city of Qamishli were met by heavy police repression. On 02 November 2007, Syrian police opened fire in Qamishli on 300 dmonstrators at a rally in support of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) organized by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD - the PKK's politicalaffiliate in Syria. Over 1000 more Kurdish residents of Qamishli joined the orginal PYD demonstration in response to the police shooting. Consequently, approximately 30 minutes later the police opened fire again. The ensuing crackdown caused multiple injuries and the death of at least one Syrian Kurd. There were also several arrests at a pro-PKK rally in the northern border town of Ein al-Arab and security services prevented a pro-PKK demonstration in Aleppo. In the wake of the incident, all major Syrian Kurdish parties released a joint statement that condemned both the Syrian and Turkish governments. Although the Kurds have regularly held rallies in the Northeast of the country since the massive riots of March 2004, the rallies do not usually result in this level of violence.

Restrictions on Kurdish property ownership date back to the 1952 issuance of Legislative Decree 193, wherein Syria created a series of bureaucratic licensing hurdles meant to obstruct Kurdish access to agricultural lands. In order to acquire a license of ownership, an individual submitted requests to the Ministry of Agriculture, which then referred the request to the Ministry of Defense for approval. If approved, the request continued its journey to the Ministry of Interior (MOI), where it passed into the hands of intelligence authorities for review. Refusals of licensing requests were absolute, and no legal recourse of appeal existed. In 2004, Syria issued Article41 to replace Decree 193. While the new article retained most of Decree 193's obstacles to land ownership, it added that anyone circumventing the licensing process could be sentenced to up to two years in prison and/or fined up to 100,000 Syrian Pounds.

Syria issued a legislative decree in September 2008 that restricted property ownership, acquisition, and other land-use rights along Syria's borders. While Syria claims the law applies to all Syrian borders, there is mounting evidence of selective enforcement targeting Kurdish businessmen, landowners, and laborers in northern and northeastern Syria. Kurdish contacts believe this decree is part of a larger Syria n Arabization effort in the region. Syrian police squelched a Kurdish public protest against the law.

While Kurds were quick to enunciate clear goals on resolving the issues of citizenship as well as linguistic and cultural freedoms, they also demand, somewhat more circumspectly, the granting of "national" rights. The definition of "national" rights remained amorphous, focusing more on the need to overcome Arab preconceptions about the Kurdish population of Syria. The Kurdish claim of a long-term historical presence of all Kurds in Syria was debatable; even some Syrian human rights activists found the Kurdish claim exaggerated. The Qamishli riots of 2004 forced the Arab opposition for the first time to pay attention to Kurdish problems and the power that Kurdish forces have.

Arab activists voiced their frustrations with their Kurdish counterparts, whose commitment to achieving democracy seemed consistently overshadowed by Kurdish demands for autonomy, if not outright separation. Arab activists were particularly troubled by Kurds' unwillingness to address the presence of a large Arab population in the Kurdish heartland of Hassekeh Province. Indeed, Syrian Kurds exacerbated these Arab fears by continuing to discuss their ideal of outright independence, while simultaneously throwing back (justifiable) Arab criticisms of these ideals as hateful and xenophobic.

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Democratic Union Party [PYD]

The Democratic Union Party [PYD - Partiya Yekitiya Democrat], the most powerful Kurdish faction in Syria, declared self-rule in November 2013 over the territory it controls in the northeast of the country. The announcement further complicated the civil war in Syria, and presents a complex problem for neighboring Turkey and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq. In recent weeks, Kurdish militia in Syria had ousted Islamist fighters from several villages close to the Turkish border. The victories prompted the main political group of Syria's Kurds to declare autonomy.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces withdrew from Syrian Kurdish regions on Turkey’s border in mid-2012, allowing the Democratic Union Party [PYD] to take control of much of the area. Some Kurdish activists accuse the PYD of collaborating with the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The PYD is affiliated with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), considered a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union. Syrian-Kurdish nationalists with support from Kurdish separatists north of the border formed the PYD in 2003. Though it has been hostile to the Assad government, the PYD militants has been keen to keep other rebel groups out of Kurdish towns.

The Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK, formerly the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, PKK) is a Kurdish separatist group primarily active in part of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. Composed mostly of Turkish Kurds, the group in 1984 began a campaign of armed violence, including terrorism, which has resulted in over 45,000 deaths. In addition to its stronghold in northern Iraq, the KGK’s Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), has increased its presence in northern Syria along the border with Turkey by establishing control in Kurdish areas, resulting in concerns of a heightened threat to Turkey and increased tensions along the border.

Kobani is the third Kurdish city of Syria and was the first Kurdish city to be liberated from the Assad regime on July 19, 2012. Kobani is also the center of one of the three cantons (with Afrin and Cizre) that established themselves in"democratic autonomous regions" from a confederation of "Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmen, Armenian and Chechen" as stated in the Preamble of the Rojava's (name of western or Syrian Kurdistan) Charter. Experiences of self-administrations in these regions are very interesting, particularly regarding the rights of women and religious and ethnic minorities. Some contradictions nevertheless exist, especially regarding the authoritarianism of the PYD forces.

By July 2013 Kurdish fighters had seized control of Ras al-Ain, a Syrian town on the border with Turkey, and were battling Islamist rebel groups linked to al Qaeda for control of the oilfields in the northeast of the country. The fighting was further evidence that the conflict between rebels and President Bashar al-Assad's forces that has engulfed Syria since early 2011 had splintered into turf wars that had little to do with ousting him. Turkey's foreign minister voiced concern over the spillover of violence from the war in neighboring Syria and called again on the United Nations Security Council to act. The alarm stemmed from the fighting near the border between Syrian Kurds and Islamist fighters of the al-Nusra Front.

When Syrian Kurds announced their intention to declare an autonomous state, Ankara reacted with anger and threats and deployed its army along the border. But in a remarkable change in stance, in July 2013 it met with the leader of the Democratic Union Party the Syrian Kurdish group it had earlier labeled a terrorist organization. The Turkish foreign ministry made headlines when it hosted PYD leader Salih Muslim for a series of high-level meetings in Istanbul. Both sides described the meetings as positive.

The fact that it happened at all was significant, because for the longest times, the Turkish government has been keeping the PYD and its leader at arm's length. They claimed the PYD was no different from the PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party] and therefore suggests that they, too, are terrorists. These suspicions were further heightened when the PYD announced plans to declare autonomy in a region that bordered areas populated by Turkey's own restive Kurdish population. The Turkish government had repeatedly warned it would never allow such a move, describing it as a “red line” - a term used to indicate a limit or critical point.

A key factor in Turkey's more pragmatic approach to the Syrian Kurds could be an awareness that it is powerless to stop the PYD. Although the Turkish army massed forces along the Syrian border following the PYD’s announcement it was planning to declare autonomy, Ankara was unwilling to intervene militarily.

The Kurdish capture of Ras al-Ain, on the border with Turkey, was a serious blow for the Al-Qaida affiliated Islamist rebels. The town and its border post are of high strategic importance, allowing whoever is in control to determine what supplies can cross the border. Bribes and taxes also can generate considerable revenue for the group that oversees the crossing.

The Democratic Union Party announced plans in July 2013 to set up a transitional authority in northeastern Syria. Its spokesmen said it was holding talks with rival Kurdish factions about the shape of a local administration and possibleelections in three months’ time. Leaders of the Democratic Union Party denied that transitional self-government for Kurds was part of an effort to establish a separate, autonomous Syrian Kurdish state. They said self-government would merely be temporary. “This is not a call for a separation; it is just that for a year now we have been on our own in our own territories and people have needs, they want some kind of administration to run their issues. They cannot be left like that,” said Saleh Muslim, the PYD leader.

There was an uneasy relationship between Syrian-Kurds and the rebels, though some Kurds have fought alongside Free Syrian Army rebels when their interests coincided. But many rebels – jihadist and secular – complain that the Kurds are only interested in opposing Assad when it fits their agenda. Kurdish relations with the jihadists had been especially fraught.