FOR READY REFERENCE RECKONER ::OROP TABLES : FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF ARMED FORCES OFFICERS/JCOs/ORs/DSC PERSONNEL AND NCsE

SOURCE:
CURTSEYEX-SERVICEMEN WELFARE
http://ex-servicemenwelfare.blogspot.in/

Monday, February 8, 2016

OROP TABLES : FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF ARMED FORCES OFFICERS/JCOs/ORs/DSC PERSONNEL AND NCsE

SL.No	CATEGORY	Table No
	RETIRING/SERVICE PENSION/ELEMENT
1	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	1	Click here
2	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	2	Click here
3	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	3	Click here
4	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	4	Click here
5	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	5	Click here
6	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	6	Click here
7	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	7	Click here
8	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	8	Click here
9	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	9	Click here
	ENHANCED RATE OF ORDINARY FAMILY PENSION
10	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	10	Click here
11	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	11	Click here
12	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	12	Click here
13	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	13	Click here
14	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	14	Click here
15	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	15	Click here
16	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	16	Click here
17	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	17	Click here
18	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	18	Click here
	NORMAL RATE OF ORDINARY FAMILY PENSION
19	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	19	Click here
20	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	20	Click here
21	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	21	Click here
22	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	22	Click here
23	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	23	Click here
24	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	24	Click here
25	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	25	Click here
26	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	26	Click here
27	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	27	Click here
	SPECIAL FAMILY PENSION
28	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	28	Click here
29	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	29	Click here
30	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	30	Click here
31	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	31	Click here
32	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	32	Click here
33	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	33	Click here
34	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	34	Click here
35	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	35	Click here
36	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	36	Click here
	SPECIAL DEPENDENT FAMILY PENSION/2ND LIFE AWARD OF SPECIAL FAMILY PENSION
37	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	37	Click here
38	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	38	Click here
39	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	39	Click here
40	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	40	Click here
41	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	41	Click here
42	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	42	Click here
43	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	43	Click here
44	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	44	Click here
45	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	45	Click here
	LIBERALISED FAMILY PENSION
46	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	46	Click here
47	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	47	Click here
48	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	48	Click here
49	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	49	Click here
50	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	50	Click here
51	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	51	Click here
52	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	52	Click here
53	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	53	Click here
54	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	54	Click here
	LIBERALISED DEPENDENT PENSION/2ND LIFE AWARD OF LIBERALISED FAMILY PENSION
55	Regular Commissioned Officers (Rates for both Parents)	55	Click here
56	Regular Commissioned Officers (Rates for Single Parents)	56	Click here
57	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC (Rates for both Parents)	57	Click here
58	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC (Rates for Single parents)	58	Click here
59	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army (Rates for both Parents)	59	Click here
60	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army (Rates for single parents)	60	Click here
61	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services (Rates for both Parents)	61	Click here
62	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services (Rates for Single Parents)	62	Click here
63	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC) (Rates for both Parents)	63	Click here
64	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC) (Rates for single Parents)	64	Click here
65	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors (Rates for both Parents)	65	Click here
66	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors (Rates for single Parents)	66	Click here
67	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	67	Click here
68	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	68	Click here
69	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	69	Click here
	DISABILITY ELEMENT
70	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	70	Click here
71	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	71	Click here
72	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	72	Click here
73	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	73	Click here
74	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	74	Click here
75	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	75	Click here
76	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	76	Click here
77	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	77	Click here
78	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	78	Click here
	WAR INJURY ELEMENT (DISCHARAGE)
79	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	79	Click here
80	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	80	Click here
81	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	81	Click here
82	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	82	Click here
83	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	83	Click here
84	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	84	Click here
85	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	85	Click here
86	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	86	Click here
87	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	87	Click here
	WAR INJURY ELEMENT (INVALIDED OUT)
88	Regular Commissioned Officers (Excluding Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC/MNS/TA/EC/SSC)	88	Click here
89	Commissioned Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC	89	Click here
90	Commissioned Officers of Territorial Army	90	Click here
91	Commissioned Officers of Military Nursing Services	91	Click here
92	EC/SSC Officers (Other than AMC/ADC/RVC)	92	Click here
93	EC/SSC Officers of AMC/ADC/RVC doctors	93	Click here
94	JCOs/ORs including Honorary commissioned officers	94	Click here
95	JCOs/ORs of DSC in receipt of 2nd Pension	95	Click here
96	JCOs/ORs of Territorial Army	96	Click here
	PRE 01-06-1953 DISCHARGED PERSONNEL ARMY PERSONNEL
97	Ordinary Pension	97	Click here
98	Mustering Out Pension	98	Click here
99	Ordinary Pension to viceroy commissioned Officers	99	Click here
	AIR FORCE
100	Ordinary Pension	100	Click here
	STATE FORCE PERSONNEL
101	Erstwhile State Forces Personnel	101	Click here

(SOURCE-www.goed.in Govt Employees News)

ON ISLAMIC BROTHERHOOD:: How not to deal with the ideology of hate

SOURCE:http://www.dailypioneer.com//columnists/coffee-break/how-not-to-deal-with-the-ideology-of-hate.html

         HOW  NOT TO DEAL WITH THE                    IDEOLOGY  OF HATE

                                       BY 

                                       | Kanchan Gupta |

                                           Coffee Break

Sunday, 07 February 2016



Theological pamphleteering, no doubt well meaning and sincere, is of no consequence to the peddlers of violence and death. The latter's taunting tone is already discernible over the babble vacuous politically correct discourse


At last week’s Counter-Terrorism Conference, organised by India Foundation and themed around the rising tide of global jihad, speaker after speaker waxed eloquent on well-known basics without addressing the core issue: The ideology of hate and how to deal with it. Theological pamphleteering, no doubt well meaning and sincere, is of no consequence to the peddlers of hate, death and destruction. I doubt if Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed caliph of the Islamic State, and Abubakar Shekau, who heads Boko Haram, are remotely impressed by counter-scholarship. That would be equally true of the mullahs of Taliban and the foot soldiers of jihad.


To ignore the ideology that drives Islamism and its resultant violence would be to ignore the real reason behind the continuing surge in transnational terrorism. The barbarians may not be at our gate as yet, but the unstoppable march of  zealots, whom George W Bush described as ‘Islamofascists’, as the civilised world retreats, conceding ground with each passing day, should not go unnoticed. To turn a blind eye, to be indifferent, or worse, to be politically correct and tolerate the intolerable would be to our peril. For let there be no mistake, the taunting tone of those who believe in the inevitability of a homogenous ummah replacing the diverse world we know is already discernible over the babble of ill-informed and vacuous politically correct discourse


Soon after the ghastly London bombings when Islamists blew themselves up with deadly effect, Ed Husain’s book The Islamist was published, recording his disillusionment with radicals who use faith as a cover for their murderous deeds. A particular passage in that book remains indelibly printed on my mind: “Teacher, I want to go London next month. I want bomb, big bomb in London, again. I want make jihad!” “What?” I exclaimed. Another student raised both hands and shouted: “Me too! Me too!” Other students applauded those who had just articulated what many of them were thinking


That’s how Ed Husain records his experience in the Saudi Arabian school where he had taken up a teaching assignment after embracing radical Islam. It was the day after the 7/7 suicide bombings in London that killed 52 commuters. Ed Husain, his faith in radical Islam by then dwindling rapidly after experiencing life in Saudi Arabia, was hoping to hear his students denounce the senseless killings. Instead, he heard a ringing endorsement of jihad and senseless slaughter in the name of Islam. Ed Husain returned to London and penned his revealing account in The Islamist Why I Joined


Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left. Debunking the Left-liberal intelligentsia’s explanation that deprivation, frustration and alienation among immigrant Muslims in Britain are responsible for the surge in jihadi fervour, Ed Husain wrote: “Many Muslims enjoyed a better lifestyle in non-Muslim Britain than they did in Muslim Saudi Arabia... All my talk of ummah seemed so juvenile now. It was only in the comfort of Britain that Islamists could come out with such radical utopian slogans as one Government, one ever expanding country, for one Muslim nation. The racist reality of the Arab psyche would never accept black and white people as equal... I was appalled by the imposition of Wahhabism in the public realm, something I had implicitly sought as an Islamist


So, what does an Islamist seek? The reams of rubbish churned out by bogus activists and windbag columnists desperately seeking to rationalise crimes committed in the name of Islam, ranging from the ethnic cleansing of the Kashmir valley to the Mumbai massacre, from the attack on Parliament House in New Delhi to the destruction of the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, from the horrific assault on human dignity by the Taliban in Afghanistan to the nauseating anti-Semitism of the regime in Iran, and from the unspeakable crimes of the Islamic State in the Levant to the limitless horrors of Boko Haram in Nigeria, cannot explain either the core idea of Islamism or what motivates Islamists. For that, we have to go through the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, the original Islamist and progenitor of the Muslim Brotherhood which now wields power in Egypt, the land of the birth of radical Islam.
Hasan al-Banna’s articulation of Islamism in the 1930s, distilled from complex theological interpretations of Islam, was at once simple enough for even illiterate Muslims to understand and sinister in its implications when seen in the context of what we are witnessing today:
“The Quran is our Constitution. Jihad is our way. Martyrdom is our desire.”
Imagined grievances and manufactured rage came decades later, as faux justification for adopting this three-sentence injunction that erases the line separating the spiritual from the temporal and giving Islam a political dimension in the modern world, thus expanding the theatre of conflict beyond the sterile sands of Arabia.



Hasan al-Banna died a nasty death when he was murdered in 1949, apparently in retaliation of the assassination of Egypt’s then Prime Minister, Mahmud Fahmi Naqrashi, but the seed he had planted in his lifetime was to grow into a giant poison tree, watered and nourished by Sayyid Qutub (whose tract, Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq, was interpreted as treasonous, fetching him the death sentence in 1966) which over the years has spread its roots and branches, first across Arabia and then to Muslim majority countries; so potent is that tree’s life force, its seeds, carried by the blistering desert wind that blows from the Mashreq, have now begun to sprout in countries as disparate as Denmark and India, Turkey and Malaysia, changing demographic profiles and unsettling societies


The world chose to ignore subsequent events and, like those who clamour for a gentler, accommodative approach to Islamism today by pushing for compromise over conflict, ‘enlightened’ scholars and public affairs commentators rationalised Anwar Sadat’s assassination by Islamists on October 6, 1981. Even Egypt erred in setting free scores of conspirators, including a certain Ayman Al-Zawahiri.


Similarly, the ‘Islamic Revolution’ in Iran with its blood-soaked consequences was hailed as a “people’s victory” over Shah Reza Pehalvi’s dictatorial regime. For Europe, long dubbed Eurabia, it was business as usual Iran’s oil swamped out rational analyses. If any country had the foresight to sense the danger signals, it was, and ironically so, Egypt under President Hosni Mubarak who remained wary of Iran, not least because of its export of rabid Islamism. Tragically, the new rulers in Cairo are not riled by Tehran naming a street after Sadat’s assassin, Khalid Islambouli.


It was in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that Islamism acquired a new dimension and a vicious edge when it was coupled with Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia’s severely austere version of Sunni Islam. Arab nationalism, which was unencumbered by Islamism till then, became an expression of faith in radical Islamism. In what passes for Palestinian territories, the intifada was born and reborn, and while the popularity of Yasser Arafat’s largely secular PLO began to decline, Hamas, led by its paraplegic spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, began its murderous march which has culminated with Gaza Strip being declared ‘Hamastan’. Yassin was killed by the Israelis for inspiring young Palestinians to blow themselves up in buses, restaurants and markets, but that has neither shaken Hamas nor weakened its faith in what Hasan al-Banna preached. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah is now facing competition from Fatah-al Islam in Palestinian refugee camps and Syrian dissidents who equally believe ‘Islam is the solution’. In Britain, Hizb ut-Tahrir is seducing young Muslims like Ed Husain with its acid message of intolerance and bigotry. In India, we have the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat. The Deobandis are not to be scoffed at.


To neutralise the three-sentence injunction of Hasan al-Banna, we need more than a ‘War on Terror’. We need to launch an assault on the idea that motivates radical Islamists. There is no scope for accommodation, nor is there any reason to capitulate or strike a compromise. We still have time to mount a counter-assault. But to do that, and do so successfully, we must first acknowledge and debate the Idea of Islamism.

























 

MARITIME INDIAN OCEAN : MILITARY COPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS ITS LIMITS

SOURCE:


 MILITARY COPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS ITS LIMITS
                                  BY
                            Premvir Das



There has been much talk in recent years of the flourishing defence cooperation between India and the USA and future possibilities. Examples of the undoubtedly professional Malabar series of exercises at sea, as also of similar interfaces among the two armies and air forces, are quoted in support of the growing engagement, as well as the purchase of military hardware from American companies now crossing $9 billion. That this has come about through a larger strategic congruence between the two countries is also a given. Add to this the increasingly close interaction in exchange of intelligence relating to terrorism, which is not unrelated to security, and the picture gets bigger. Two visits of the American president to New Delhi in as many years and his bilateral exchanges with our own prime minister in Washington add to this synergy. Positive interactions at Track II levels have further facilitated this process, and the sky would appear to be the limit. Wisdom, however, lies in recognising the ground realities.

Only two decades ago, our military interface with the US was in the pits, literally. Even after the tensions of the Cold War began to recede and India started to see the world and its interests in it through a different prism, suspicions on both sides remained high. In 1995, the two countries signed what was termed a Minute on Defence Cooperation. Then came India's nuclear tests in 1998 and things went back to zero as the US imposed stiff sanctions on this country. From then until now, steady progress has been made in the relationship and defence has been an important driver. Acquisition of sophisticated aircraft for the navy and the air force that provide strategic reach has led the purchase segment even as exercises at sea have given a visible public face to the military engagement. However, the two, while advantageous to both sides in different ways, must, sooner or later, plateau and that may well be happening even now for reasons that are not difficult to understand.

Defence cooperation between two countries essentially requires a strategic base. For the Americans, such relationships have primarily flowed from politico-military alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) across Europe and two other earlier groupings, Cento covering South West Asia and Seato in South East Asia - both now defunct but in most cases replaced by bilateral arrangements - are some examples. Add to this close military interfaces and bases around the world, and the mosaic is complete. In short, America's defence engagement has always been focused on and with its 'allies'. Through this network, which includes transfer of military hardware and technologies, the US seeks to maintain the status quo, in which it remains the unchallenged leader. To quote President Obama in his recent State of the Union address, "America is the strongest power in the world, period."

India's world is somewhat different. From being a relatively docile nation hesitant to play any leading role in global affairs other than by professing its non-alignment, it is now moving to a stage where it seeks to be more proactive in its interfaces and in its region, the Indo-Pacific in particular. This means engagement, including in defence relationships with several participants, without becoming the alliance partner of any. So, while the US is a country with which India shares many common interests, it is not the only one. Similar synergies exist with other players, of which Russia (with which India has had a strong military relationship for decades), Japan, France, UK, Australia, Israel, Vietnam, Iran, South Africa and littorals of the Indian Ocean region and South East Asia are only a few. It has such cooperation arrangements with several countries and it is not surprising that as many as 54 are represented at the International Fleet Review being hosted by the Indian Navy in Visakhapatnam. One or more of these nations might also be America's allies but their aspirations are not the same as ours, or the desire to seek changes in the world order consistent with our own. India's need to seek a new paradigm in international equations runs on a different plane, if not counter to the American theme.

So, while healthy and mutually beneficial interaction with the US must be a key objective of our foreign policy, developing advantageous relations with the others is important. In such bilateral interfaces, relations with China have also to be given due weight. As the major Asian power with which India shares a long and disputed land boundary, it cannot be left out of our calculus. In short, there are some fundamental differences in the way the US and India see the emerging strategic environment and their own roles in it. The fact that India is already the fourth largest global economy in PPP terms, and will become the third in less than a decade, gives another dimension to the emerging scenario. To this dissonance should be added the continuing soft handling of our neighbour by the US despite that country's known support of India-focused acts of terror.

As far as the purely military relationship is concerned, levels of suspicion have greatly diminished in the last 15 years but they have not disappeared; one reason for this is the mollycoddling of Pakistan's military establishment by the Pentagon, which is unlikely to be gone anytime soon. To address and overcome the negatives should be work in progress for both sides. As for procurement, some facts need recognition. Several major warships that the Indian Navy operates are of Russian origin and almost every single frontline vessel that is built in India is equipped with some Russian weapons and/or sensors. The SU-30s and MiG-29s are at the forefront of our air strike power, as are armoured vehicles like the T-90 tanks on land. To expect that things will change dramatically in the foreseeable future is unrealistic. The impending induction of Rafale multi-role aircraft from France costing about $10 billion, more than all US purchases so far, will further constrain acquisition of American military hardware.

In recent years, many important American functionaries - among them the present secretary of defence - have actively pursued closer ties between the militaries of the two countries, independent of the fact that India is not and is unlikely to ever be a US ally. This is a positive approach which we must reciprocate. In brief, both countries have to realise that there are limits to our defence cooperation and the relationship has to be developed within the parameters that these will, inevitably, set. Any expectation that this engagement will reach the sky is rather simplistic.