Vasundhra

Wednesday, February 10, 2016

BANGLA DESH ; HOW DEEP IS THE ECONOMIC OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS IN BANGLADESH

SOURCE ::
http://www.newsgram.com/how-deep-is-the-economic-reach-of-islamic-fundamentalists-in-bangladesh/

        HOW DEEP IS THE ECONOMIC
                                    OF
       ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS
                                    IN
                       BANGLADESH By

                                               Amitava Mukherjee

February 9, 2016

Bangladesh is now at the crossroads. The war crimes tribunals, set up to punish those who had committed crimes against humanity during Bangladesh’s liberation war of 1971, have already sent to gallows three leading lights of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) — Abdul Quader Mollah, Mohammed Qamruzzaman and Ali Ahsan Mujahid — while death penalties have been awarded to Motiur Rahman Nizami, the chief of the JeI in Bangladesh. However, the Jamaat’s enormous financial clout has created a dangerous situation for the Awami League-led government.

While the election commission barred the Jamaat from the polls on Bangladesh Supreme Court orders in 2013, several front-ranking Awami League leaders are now demanding its outright ban. But Jamaat has so much financial clout that any attempt to uproot it altogether at this moment may lead to social unrest

According to Abul Barkat, a professor of economics at the Dhaka University, the Jamaat-e-Islami has created a ‘state within a state’ and an ‘economy within an economy’ in Bangladesh. Barkat’s study paints a frightening picture. The JeI is now almost everywhere in Bangladeshi society like large financial institutions, household-level micro-credit organizations, madrasas, mass media, information technology, big trading houses, and non governmental organizations.

Barkat has calculated that Jamaat’s net annual profits from such ventures amounts to about $278 million and the largest chunk – 27.5 percent – of this comes from banks, insurances, and leasing companies. The NGOs contribute 18.7 percent, 10.5 percent comes from trade and commerce, 10.1 percent from pharmaceutical industries and healthcare institutions, 9.4 percent from the education sector, 8.8 percent from real estate business, 7.3 percent from transport, and 7.7 percent from the media and information technology business.

Bangladesh Culture Minister Asaduzzaman Nur has recently alluded to Islamic fundamentalists’ involvement behind a collection of huge funds from mosques and Bangladeshi establishments in London. But the fundamentalists perhaps do not need such collections as nearly 10 percent of Jamaat’s annual profit in Bangladesh goes towards funding the party’s political activities. It has also been calculated that this 10 percent can sustain nearly 600,000 cadres. As the Jamaat controlled economy is showing a higher growth rate – 9 percent per annum – than the mainstream’s growth figure of 6 percent, the fundamentalist bloc can remain assured of a continuous flow of money.

Abul Barkat has calculated that from 1975 to 2012, the Jamaat has earned a profit of $11 billion

Jamaat’s principal financial arm in the country is the Islami Bank of Bangladesh Ltd. (IBBL), an organization which was once penalized for money laundering by the Bank of Bangladesh, the country’s apex regulatory institution for the financial sector.

Mir Quasem Ali, a Jamaat central executive committee member now awarded the death sentence, was once the IBBL director. The beneficiary of IBBL’s alleged illegal acts was no doubt the Jamaat-e-Islami. It is interesting to note that the IBBL was founded in 1975 at the initiative of Fuad Abdullah Al Khatib, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Bangladesh.

The JeI’s penetration into the political economy of Bangladesh is astounding. Apart from the IBBL, Jamaat is in control of 14 other banks which are working mostly in the country’s rural sector. In addition, the IBBL is now widely linked with other powerful financial institutions of the Islamic world. Notable among them is the Al Razee Bank of Saudi Arabia

The IBBL has now become one of the three largest banks in South Asia, with 60 percent of its shares held by Saudi individuals and institutions. Among the rest Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have prominence. Moreover, Jamaat has its presence in the insurance sector also and has entered into a collaboration agreement with the Far Eastern Islamic Insurance Corporation.

If information from across the border is to be believed, the Jamaat has already started taking steps to safeguard its financial interests in the event of a crackdown by the Bangladesh government and line-up the next generation of leaders if Matiur Rahaman Nizami and Mir Quasem Ali are really hung. For over 40 years, Mir Quasem was Saudi Arabia’s ‘money man’ in Bangladesh and it is quite probable that pressures will be mounted by the Islamic world of West Asia and the Middle East to stop his execution. He had taken refuge in Saudi Arabia after the birth of Bangladesh. After coming back in 1974 he immediately got a job in the IBBL and soon became its director.

Mir Quasem Ali is a crucial man in the Jamaat chain of commands that extends up to the Middle East and West Asia. He happened to be the chief of the Islamic Bank Foundation (IBF) too, an affiliate of the IBBL. The IBF acts as the custodian of Jamaat’s money accruing from various projects and foreign donations. Mir Quasem was also the country director of a Saudi Arabia-based NGO named Rabeta-al-alam-al-Islami. Rabeta, along with other NGOs like the Kuwait Relief Fund and the Al-Nahiyan Trust of Saudi Arabia, used to run many projects in Bangladesh.

Economics professor Abul Barkat has calculated that the Islamic fundamentalism controlled economy in Bangladesh amounts to 8.62 percent of the nation’s developmental budget and 1.54 percent of the national exports earning.

In such a situation, the JeI-led Islamic fundamentalist bloc is a reality in Bangladesh and mere hangings of some Jamaat bigwigs may not be enough to wipe it out. (IANS)

(Amitava Mukherjee is a senior journalist and commentator)

Tuesday, February 9, 2016

KASHMIR OPS 1948 ::Gallant Son of Kashmir Brigadier Rajinder Singh's Heroic Action

SOURCE:http://defence.pk/threads/gallant-son-of-kashmir-brigadier-rajinder-singhs-heroic-action.379253/#ixzz3zgk3jerW

KASHMIR OPS 1948 :Gallant Son of Kashmir

Brigadier Rajinder Singh's Heroic Action

The operational situation in the Poonch, Mirpur, and Jammu sectors during the third week of October 1947 was bad enough, but the worst was to follow in the Muzaffarabad sector. By 15 October, many Hindu and Sikh refugees from the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan had entered Muzaffarabad.

These refugees had brought information that the Pakistan authorities had collected a large force of tribesmen, mainly Afridis and Waziris, numbering some six thousand in the area of Abbottabad-Mansehra, with the avowed intention of invading the State. Apparently, the Maharaja was aware of the Pakistan plan even earlier than this, but was confident that his troops would be able to meet the threat, once the arms, ammunition and equipment promised by the Indian Union was received.

In anticipation of such help from India, a plan had been made for the demolition of the Kohala Bridge and portions of the Muzaffarabad-Mansehra road to make them unusable by the potential invaders. The issue of accession to the Indian Union, which held the key to the solution of the problem of security of the State, continued to be obstructed by the uncompromising stands adopted by the three parties involved. While the Union Government insisted that the accession was to be only with the Sheikh’s consent, notwithstanding the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, that conferred this prerogative on the Maharaja, the latter refused to commit himself on the issue till power was transferred to him. The Maharaja, on the other hand, was not prepared to transfer power to Sheikh Abdullah before the accession. In the meantime, the Government of India could have at least supported the State with the arms, ammunition and equipment that it had demanded in the first week of October. But that was also not to be; not, because of a matter of policy, but because no one could push the State’s indent fast enough, in face of obstructions caused by British officers who were still then holding key appointments at the Army Headquarters.

On the fateful night of 21/22 October 1947, the Muslim element of the 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry, located at Lohargali and Ramkot, swept by religious fanaticism, forgot their oath of loyalty toward their ruler and the state, joined hands with the enemy and led him to pre-arranged positions in the area around Muzaffarabad and Domel, in what was to become the most treacherous and dastardly act in the annals of military history. Then before it was twilight, over 5000 tribesmen, stiffened by the regulars from the Pakistan Army, fully armed with modern weapons, and led mostly by Pakistan officers, stormed the sleeping city of Muzaffarabad. In a couple of hours that followed, hell was let loose on the city – arson, loot, massacre, rape and everything else that may be expected of barbarians. Simultaneously, the raiders, guided by the traitors of the State Army, moved out to liquidate the posts of the 4th Battalion around Muzaffarabad by attacking them with overwhelming numbers. The traitors also led the raiders to the Battalion Headquarters at Domel, that was attacked even before the men could reach their weapons, locked up in the Kots.
The news of the invasion was first received at Srinagar on the same morning of 22nd October, when Lt. Col. Narian Singh, an officer commanding the 4th Battalion, spoke to the Duty Officer at the Army Headquarters (State) on wireless and informed him of the catastrophe that had befallen his troops. The Battalion Headquarters was at that time under attack of the raiders and Colonel Narain Singh could not pass any thing beyond an urgent request for reinforcements, before going off the air. Unfortunately however, there was at that time, no reserve with the Army Headquarters that could be sent up. The 8th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry that was being held as reserve in Srinagar, had already been pushed out to Chirala in view of the SOS call received from there in the first week of October, and the 1st Jammu and Kashmir Infantry, that was to come as its replacement, was still stuck up in Poonch. On the other hand, with the fall of Muzaffarabad and Domel a very critical situation had developed, as there was nothing between the enemy and Srinagar, the state capital. The only course open was to seek Indian help, but even that was to take time, and there was now an urgent requirement for keeping the enemy away from Srinagar till such help arrived. Consequently, as much of the man power as was immediately available at the Badami Bagh cantonment was collected, and formed into a strong company, supported by a section of medium machine gun and a detachment of 3 inch mortars, for proceeding to the front. As the task that this little force was to perform was of vital importance to the security of not only Srinagar, but also that of the entire state, the Maharaja entrusted its command to none other than the Chief of the Military Staff, Brigadier Rajinder Singh himself. Three other officers, Captains Prithi Singh and Khazan Singh, and Lieutenant Nasib Singh were also placed under his command.

Brigadier Rajinder Singh left Srinagar at 6.30 PM on 22nd October and reached Uri by about midnight. Uri had been selected as the main defensive position and the force set about to organise its defences immediately. The men worked hard through the remaining part of the night and by morning, the defences were reasonably set. As the enemy was still some miles away, Brigadier Rajinder Singh left his defences to the care of a small party, and moved forward with the major portion of his force to Garhi, to make early contact with the enemy. The first clash with the enemy took place on the morning of 23rd October, when the column was half a mile short of Garhi. In a head-on collision, in which each side was surprised by the other, the enemy, due to his overwhelming numerical superiority, ultimately got the better of the small Dogra force. After a sharp engagement, in which the leading platoon commander, Subedar Duni Chand, was killed and a number of others wounded, Brigadier Rajinder Singh withdrew his force to Hattian, 4 kilometers further back, and took up a proper delaying position there. The action at Garhi, though a short one, had made at least one thing clear that the enemy was in much greater strength and better organised and armed than had been appreciated at the time that Brigadier Rajinder Singh had moved out from Srinagar. It was now apparent that it would not be possible for his force to impose any appreciable delay on the enemy, unless it was considerably reinforced. So while the wounded, who included Captain Prithi Singh, were evacuated to Srinagar, Brigadier Rajinder Singh flashed off a message to Army Headquarters suggesting the following:-

All the other available men in the Cantonment to be formed into units and dispatched to the front immediately.
Additional supporting weapons to be procured from some where and sent up urgently.
One company from Poonch to advance via Hajipir and join up with the force at Uri.
The company of the 4th Battalion located at Kupwara to immediately move down to Baramulla and thence to Uri.

Meanwhile, after taking up another intermediary position between Hattian and Uri, Brigadier Rajinder Singh was forced back to his main position at Uri by nightfall on 23rd October. While the force was preparing for its last ditch stand at Uri, it was joined by reinforcements in the form of a platoon strength of infantry, one section medium machine guns, and one section 3 inch mortars, which was all that could be sent immediately from the Badami Bagh Cantonment in response to the instructions issued by the Brigadier. Captain Jawala Singh, under whom the reinforcements had been sent, while bringing an assurance that action on the Brigadier's other suggestions was on hand, had also brought with him a written order from His Highness, binding Brigadier Rajinder Singh to hold Uri at all costs; even if it meant fighting to the last man and the last round. The reinforcements were no doubt woefully inadequate, but there was nothing more that could be done about it than prepare for a do or die battle, with whatever was available. The men worked the whole night to make their defences as impregnable as possible under the circumstances. Next morning (24th October), even as the defences were being improved and defensive fire tasks were being registered, the bridge over the Uri Nala was prepared for demolition. The bridge was, however, not to be demolished till the last; to allow the maximum number of refugees to cross over to Uri.
Very soon during the day the enemy came hurtling along the road. As soon as he was sighted, the demolition was set off and the bridge was made unusable. Although this must have dampened the spirit of the raiders, the thought that they must reach Srinagar before the arrival of the Indian Army urged them on. In their hurry, they launched a frontal attack, only to be mowed down by the sweeping fire of the machine guns. The 3-inch mortars also took a heavy toll of the enemy and he was compelled to beat a hasty retreat. Having been beaten back thus, the enemy resorted to a tactical move, which was to leave Brigadier Rajinder Singh with no alternative, but to withdraw. Keeping the Dogras engaged frontally, a large portion of the enemy crossed over to the north bank of the Jehlum River by a foot-bridge, (that had fallen in his hands intact), with the intention of re-crossing it near Mahura behind the Uri defences, by another foot-bridge. Another enemy column with a similar aim moved over the hills around the left flank. These were dangerous moves, for now, even if Brigadier Rajinder Singh had stuck to his defences, as ordered, he would not have been able to stop the raiders from getting a free run to Srinagar. Fortunately the enemy moves had been detected, and realising the gravity of the situation, Brigadier Rajinder Singh decided to withdraw to Mahura, to fight the next battle there. The Maharaja’s orders had to be interpreted intelligently and there could be no doubt that the withdrawal was necessary if Srinagar was to be saved – which obviously was the Maharaja’s intention in issuing the order.
The first vehicle of the retreating column reached Mahura at about 10.30 p.m. on 24 October. Mistaking it for the enemy, the staff at the powerhouse cut off the electric supply and the whole of Srinagar was plunged into darkness. That was the Dussehra night, and the Maharaja, in order to prevent panic among the people, was going through the usual practice of holding the Dussehra Durbar as if nothing was amiss. When the lights went off, it was believed that the enemy had captured the Mahura power station. The Maharaja had by then completed the formalities of the Durbar, and the dinner that was to follow was held in the usual manner with the help of the palace generator. Side-by-side negotiations for the accession of the State to the Indian Union were being carried on.
At dawn on 25th October, the enemy caught up with Brigadier Rajinder Singh’s force at Mahura and straightway launched a fierce attack on the hurriedly prepared defensive positions. The attack was beaten back, with heavy casualties being inflicted on the raiders. The enemy then resorted to his usual tactics of outflanking the defences and cutting off the rear. Sensing this, Brigadier Rajinder Singh ordered Captain Jawala Singh and Lieutenant Nasib Singh to destroy the two footbridges across the Jhelum River at Buniyar. This they did, but not before some enemy had already crossed over. By midday, the raiders mounted another massive attack on the Mahura defences, but the little garrison held on tenaciously; once again taking a heavy toll of the enemy. Ultimately however, while over a thousand Pathans hammered at the defences, an equal number once again moved over the hills in an outflanking move, making the position untenable. Thus, by evening, Brigadier Rajinder Singh was once again forced to withdraw to take up a position at Buniyar.
The delay that this small Jammu and Kashmir force was causing must have been very frustrating for the enemy, who was eager to capture Srinagar before the Indian Army could intervene. He caught up with the force at Buniyar by the morning of 26th October and once again, went in straight for the attack. This attack was also beaten back, with the machine guns and mortars taking the usual heavy toll. During the fighting that continued the whole day, the defenders also suffered many casualties but they stood their ground right till nightfall. Brigadier Rajinder Singh now expected the enemy to resort to his usual outflanking move during the night. He, therefore, decided to withdraw during the night, to give the next battle at Seri, short of Baramulla. The withdrawal commenced at about midnight, but as the enemy had by then closed in too near the defences, it became difficult for the Dogras to make a clean break, as they had managed to do after all the previous engagements. The worst was that this time the enemy had already worked his way behind the defences, and established a roadblock a few miles in the rear. When the withdrawing force reached the roadblock they found it effectively covered by enemy fire. As they tried to rush their vehicles through, the driver of the second last vehicle, in which Brigadier Rajinder Singh was travelling, was killed. The Brigadier took the wheel himself, but hardly had he moved the vehicle when he too was shot in the leg making it impossible for him to drive. The vehicle had to be abandoned, while the men dismounted and ran out of the crossfire to safety. We have it on testimony of Captain Khazan Singh, who was in the same vehicle as Brigadier Rajinder Singh, that he and his men offered to carry the Brigadier on their backs but he appreciating that carrying him would hinder the withdrawal, asked them to leave him there, and themselves rush to the next defensive position. That was the last that was seen of this gallant son of Jammu. The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that, unknown to the Brigadier and Captain Khazan Singh, the last vehicle carrying the rear guard was yet to cross the roadblock, when Captain Khazan Singh and his men abandoned their vehicle and took to the hills. When the last vehicle finally arrived on the spot, its commander, Subedar Swaran Singh, steered his vehicle past the abandoned one, and rushed through the enemy fire, without knowing that Brigadier Rajinder Singh was lying wounded some where around.
With the enemy too close on its heels, and the force having got greatly disorganised, it could not take up a defensive position at Seri as planned by Brigadier Rajinder Singh. Instead it rushed past Baramulla to take up a position between Baramulla and Pattan. A little beyond Baramulla it was met by the company of the 4th Battalion under Captain Prabhat Singh, that had just arrived from Kupwara. Thereafter, Captain Prabhat Singh took charge of the operations, while Captain Jawala Singh, himself wounded, carried the dead and the wounded to Srinagar. As it was now not possible to save Baramulla, Captain Prabhat Singh deployed his company and the remnants of Brigadier Rajinder Singh’s force, a little distance to the east of it and waited for the enemy there.

Meanwhile after four days of haggling over the issue, the Indian Government finally accepted the accession of the State to the Indian Union on 26 October 1947. The accession opened the way for the dispatch of Indian troops to Kashmir, and the first batch consisting of two companies of the 1st Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, landed at Srinagar on the morning of 27 October. There is a conspiracy angle to the inordinate delay in the acceptance of the Maharaja’s offer of accession, and the dispatch of Indian troops to Jammu and Kashmir, in which the British involvement is strongly suspected. Interesting though this matter is, it cannot be discussed here as it falls outside the ambit of this article. Suffice it to say that Brigadier Rajinder Singh and his small band of gallant soldiers were able to gain more time for their ruler, for completing the formalities of accession to the Indian Union, than could be frittered away by those trying to obstruct it, as part of the conspiracy to give Pakistan a chance to annex the state by force. The services of Brigadier Rajinder Singh, and the supreme sacrifice made by him, was duly recognised by the Government of India with the posthumous award of the first Maha Vir Chakra of free India.

Author : Major (Retd.) Dr. Brahma Singh (b. 11th April 1931)

Source: http://defence.pk/threads/gallant-son-of-kashmir-brigadier-rajinder-singhs-heroic-action.379253/#ixzz3zgk3jerW

KASHMIR : KASHMIRI PANDIT IS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF KASHMIR PROBLEM

            KASHMIRI PANDIT IS THE KEY
                                   TO
                      THE SOLUTION
                                      OF
              PROBLEM OF KASHMIR

                        THE PROBLEM

                                   ( ? )

   PROCESS TO ANALYSE THE PROBLEM

               Anupam Kher Pays Tribute
                                     To
                     Kashmiri Pandits
                                   On
26th Anniversary of Kashmiri Pandits Exodus

SOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SdKFY3CN1c

A GOOD HEARTFELT OUTPOUR BUT IN WRONG DIRECTION, BEGGARS CANNOT BE CHOOSERS

Published on Jan 21, 2016

Watch Actor Anupam Kher Paying Tribute to Kashmiri Pandits Who Lost Their Lives In 1990 Kashmir Riots.

It's been 26 years and there is no road leading home for Kashmiri Pandits, who were driven out of the valley by the militants. Even after 26 years of exile, political forces didn't let the Pandits return. In an emotional tribute, veteran actor Anupam Kher recalls the Kashmiri Pandits Exodus.

VOICES OF COWED DOWN POPULACE

Where were all those candle gang and where the authors who are returning their awards?? where is all those who daily visiting the Univ of Hyd?? Doesnt these poor kashmiri pandits belongs to India???

Where were all those candle gang and where the authors who are returning their awards?? where is all those who daily visiting the Univ of Hyd?? Doesnt these poor kashmiri pandits belongs to India???

Or you can go to Malda. and talk about integration there because minority(hindus) living in fear and atrocity.. they need you..

We can't change any thing out of or from our History but can work to prevent those mistakes committed by our leaders We are now in 21st century and lithely whole universe is on our finger tip we should compete for improvement in living conditions of our Race .Race of Human Only Race Biological Mammals and Race is Human We should get together to fight with Poverty and provide education to all so everyone should understand the Beauty of Our Planet and Nature We should not fight for superiority of Name God Which is One You can call differently .Stop fighting in the name of God is within everything and visa verse no where

Should be highlighted pain of Kashmiri Pandit

Namaste aur Charan sparsh pranam. What we also need is our culture and motherland. I don't care about God.. What I care about is my country and the culture represented by the 4 Indic faiths. Sir the issue here is about the differential treatment. Countless times Muslims attack Hindus, Sikhs Jains Buddhist but our media and the liberal circle turns up deaf. Recent Malda incident for eg. And did u hear that pathetic comment leave your women and daughters here........bunch of sex hungry savages. And if their God gets happy with that.. Then that God is a real crackpot.

If islam is called as terrorist religion, thats not a mistake of other religion or the one who said it and its not a demeaning comment at all and the history,facts always proved it. Now that doesnt mean we should hate islam for this.. infact we should wish the islam to honour peace values and leave it terror ideologies far from it so to shut the mouths of those who say its terrorists religion. i am wishing i will be proved wrong. we wish islam grow up and prove they are peaceful among al. past is past, we cannot do anything now... still there is a chance for that religion.if still they hate or talk against my comment, then its proved that islam is religion of terror

Aaj kaha he wo log jo tolerance ke baat karte h.

Where are award wapsi gang? Where are congress sons of bitches? Where are pseudo secular chutiyas? Where are so called intellectuals? Where are so called civil society? Where are jokers from United Nations? All these chutiyas kept quite because the victims were Hindus. The so called intellectuals and pseudo seculars are coward Hindus or ex Hindus with Hindu names, or Slaves to non Hindus. IF you see award wapsi gang, there are all leftists who enjoy whenever Hindus get killed by extremists. If any Hindu fights for his rights, the above said gang and presstitutes (forgot to mention) label him as fringe or an extremist. Anupam Kher has been fighting for Kashmiri pandits. The entire presstitutes and award wapsi gang has been abusing him, insulting him, criticizing him. Because he is a Hindu. They say, Hindus dont have rights to raise their voice to ask for justice.

Now it's time to come home... It's painful that govt/media/adarsh liberals were silent on KP's. sir we r wth u Jai Hind

Comunism shud be band in india

India is pseudo secular my friends. Here's my favourite article I ever found on this topic. Pseudo secular India: The only country in the world with 'super minorities' http://www.dailyo.in/politics/minorities-religion-indian-muslims-hindus-constitution-of-india-hajj-awardwapsi-kashmiri-pandits/story/1/7291.html

The exodus of 2 lakh kashmiri pandits was replied with the murder of over 2 lakh kasmiri muslims which is the bigger crime ?

Biggest criminals of the world r in power in India just now! Shame on the whole world !!

if this thing was happened to muslims then now also it is a matter of politics for various political parties like congress ,JDU and other parties that always cried for muslims for thier votes but unfortunately this thing was happened with Hindus..................................

So coward the indians leaders are....not supporting Kashmiri Pandit who live as refugees in their own country

When adnan sami can be given nationality then why not so many Hindus came from Pakistan

Shri Anupam Kherji,

           "GOSPEL TRUTH"

   GOD helps those who help themselves

          ONLY A KASHMIRI PANDIT

                         can help a

                KASHMIRI PANDIT.

          Take the first BABY step.

   MILITARISE THE KASHMIRI PANDITS

LIKE JEWS MILITARISE THE PANDITS

                                                         TO BE CONTINUED.........................

Monday, February 8, 2016

SIACHEN ::MEET THE MAN WHO PLANTED THE FIRST INDIAN FLAG ON SIACHEN

SOURCE ::http://www.abplive.in/blog/meet-the-man-who-planted-the-first-indian-flag-on-siachen

    MEET THE MAN WHO PLANTED THE             FIRST INDIAN FLAG ON SIACHEN

                           Nitin A. Gokhale

Monday, 8 February 2016

           “Pet mein roti, haat mein soti, chaal chhoti chhoti”

“That is the philosophy practiced by us, the Indian army soldiers deployed in the mountains and particularly in Siachen,” Lt Gen Sanjay Kulkarni, currently Direct General Infantry, told me in his cosy sitting room in Leh on a lazy Sunday afternoon in October 2013. “If your stomach is well filled, if you have a stick in hand for support and if you follow the basic rule of taking tiny steps during the climb and not get rushed, you have mastered the art of survival in the mountains,” he says, explaining a routine that he and his mates have followed all their life in the army when deployed in the mountains.

I had specially flown to the capital of Ladakh to visit Siachen and more pertinently to meet Sanjay, then the Chief of Staff or the No. 2 man in the 14 Corps, the Indian Army formation that was raised post the Kargil conflict in 1999, which has an unique task of guarding disputed borders with both India’s adversaries, China and Pakistan.

The ever smiling and weather beaten, Sanjay has mostly served in the mountains guarding the frontiers with China and Pakistan throughout his 37 year career in the army. Nathula, Tawang, Zakhama, Lekhapani, Leh—places in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Assam and Ladakh, that average citizens don’t know much about. That is where he has fought, stood guard and honed his soldiering skills. Mountains are almost like home for this soldier, like many of his contemporaries and juniors commissioned in the Indian Army, post the 1971 war. Delhi, Udhampur and other ‘routine’ places are but an interregnum in between postings to these far off places.

In retrospect, it’s only befitting that on being commissioned, Sanjay Kulkarni was allotted to one of the oldest regiments of the Indian Army, and certainly one of the most decorated–the Kumaon regiment.

So, when young Sanjay Kulkarni finished his training in the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in 1977, he was assigned to the 4 Kumaon battalion, a unit that had in the past produced two Chiefs of the Indian Army—Gen KM Srinagesh (1955-57) and Gen KS Thimayya (1959-1962). This battalion also has the distinction of winning the first Param Vir Chakra, India’s highest gallantry award. Maj Somnath Sharma won it in 1948 for bravery in Kashmir.

But, learning the history of Kumaon regiment was far from my mind.

I was in Leh to understand the events of April 1984, when Sanjay Kulkarni as a young Captain, and his platoon of soldiers were airdropped at Bilafond La signalling the launch of Operation Meghdoot that has now lasted for 32 years, and is easily India’s longest running military deployment!

Even before 4 Kumaon moved to Leh in 1982, Sanjay had already done the basic and advance mountaineering courses in the High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS). In 1981, he had in fact climbed Stok Kangri in Leh, even as Col Kumar and his team were climbing Siachen that summer.

In 1982 and 1983, 4 Kumaon was part of the Long Range Patrols (LRPs) that India sent out to the glacier in the summer months between May and August.

The unit was deployed at Turtuk, ahead of the 26 Sector HQ located at Partapur, then Commanded by Brig. Vijay Channa, a Guards Officer with the reputation of being a bold and unconventional strategist.

In 1984, the 26 Sector (equivalent to a brigade which normally has three battalions under it) was in charge of the Chorbatla-Turtuk-Tyagshi-NJ 9842 portion of the LoC but was short of one battalion. The two battalions assigned to 26 Sector were concentrated in the Turtuk-Tyagshi area. In the summer months, a contingent would carry out the LRP but would invariably return to base by the end of August, since heavy snow and dipping temperatures would make it impossible for the troops to stay on the glacier. Moreover, till then, there was no decision to permanently deploy troops at those forbidding heights.

The Ladakh Scouts, used to be the common factor in every long range patrol that climbed the glacier. Unlike today, Ladakh Scouts only had a HQ and two wings—Karakoram and Indus—to speak of. Being local residents of Ladakh, soldiers of Ladakh Scouts had an inherent advantage. They did not need to acclimatise, nor did they have difficulty in climbing the formidable mountains. So, no matter which unit was deployed beyond the Khardung La, soldiers of Ladakh Scouts were always part of the long range patrols.

As the army turned its attention to the glacier, all incoming units were trained in the craft of mountaineering. “All of us were made to learn ice craft, rappelling, and mountaineering before going for the LRPs. In fact, some of us also learnt skiing,” Gen Kulkarni remembers. Air support was provided by the air force helicopters. He remembers going right up to Bilafond La and Sia La during the summer deployments. The Air Force choppers used to drop soldiers at what is now known as Base Camp, and from there on the soldiers would climb to Camp I, Camp II and Camp III. Then they would walk up to what is now known as Kumar base, named after Col Kumar. From Kumar base, patrols went to Bilafond La and Sia La. But invariably by end-August or September, the patrols would return to base, Gen Kulkarni remembers.

As 1984 dawned, training was continuing apace, but no one except very senior officers had any inkling about the plan to go and occupy Bilafond La and Sia La. Then suddenly, by March, there was feverish activity in the 26 Sector.

Operation MEGHDOOT is launched

As Brig Channa returned from the meeting in Srinagar, he was instructed to launch the Operation only after thorough preparations. Even three decades later, he remembers the months in the run up to the launch of Operation Meghdoot. Sipping his favourite tea in a tall glass, Brig Channa, now an active senior citizen in Delhi’s Greater Kailash I locality, transports me back to those months and explains why the key to success in battle is planning and preparation.

“I would say 90 per cent of the battle is won if we are fully prepared for the task at hand. Personally, I would think that if you are administratively prepared it’s a major start. Of course, the best way is to start living, eating, sleeping day in day out about your next operation. Especially, for an operation at those heights which had never been done before. No one had fought on the glacier at altitudes in excess of 18,000 feet. No one in the world had a clue how to fight a war on the glacier. So, everything that we did had to be beyond the conventional. Everything that we did had to be innovative.

“I had a hunch that something was going to happen ‘up there’. Call it the soldier’s hunch or instinct, I had this gut feeling since taking over as Sector Commander, but more so from the end of 1983. From then on, all that we were doing was to constantly think of the possible operation. Look, I had no executive orders yet (for an operation on the glacier), but one had to be prepared. That build up in the mind was there,” he tells me and also explains why Operation Meghdoot was necessary.

“In my mind this occupation (of Saltoro ridge) was a must. Suppose whatever quantum of troops, even one company of Pakistan troops, had come in and fired on our Partapur HQ, can you imagine the reaction? It is like the whole body feeling the shock, when even a small pinprick troubles your finger. It would have been akin to that. Therefore, to my mind this occupation (of the Saltoro ridge) was a must, to prevent the Pakistanis from threatening the Nubra Valley.

“The decision wasn’t taken in haste. It was a very deliberate, conscious decision taken at the highest level. The Prime Minister was involved in it. My only regret is that they only told me to hold the crest line. They didn’t permit me to go down (towards Pakistani areas). One should have and closed the chapter once and for all. If we had gone down to Gyari, go and hold the area, you didn’t need to occupy the glacier, at all because all routes are blocked by you. But, of course those are all bigger political decisions. I remember pressing for it, though I was a small fry in the whole game. Had we done that, today’s situation needn’t have arisen. Siachen ensures that Pakistan and China don’t link up on top of our head, but also makes sure that Pakistan alone does not create problems for us in the Nubra Valley. You have forestalled all that. Look at Siachen, look at Karakoram Pass and look at DBO,” he points at the map and explains. “As it is, Pakistan has given Shagksham Valley to China. Why do you allow the two adversaries to encircle you,” he asks.

After returning from Srinagar to his HQ in Partapur, Brig Channa got down to selecting his officers and men for the operation. Sanjay Kulkarni was asked to lead the platoon of 4 Kumaon to Bilafod La. Major AN Bahuguna (who retired as a Brigadier and now lives in Dehradun), then with Ladakh Scouts, was to go and occupy Sia La. All these troops had first concentrated at Sasoma, and later moved to Base Camp under the Task Force Commander, Lt Col Pushkar Chand.
Brig Channa meanwhile had a major task ahead: Briefing the officers and men before they went on what looked like a high risk, if not downright suicidal, mission. He had to motivate the troops, not just by pep talk but also by action. “I had always led by example. What is motivation? Motivation is not only merely briefing. Motivation is also about establishing trust with troops and gaining their confidence, making them confident about your ability to lead them to victory. I will give you an example. Just prior to launching Operation Meghdoot, I was staying with 4 Kumaon (battalion). One morning the sentry outside my hut gave an exceptionally smart salute. I replied to his greetings, but simultaneously I kept that in mind. A day later, there was a durbar. I mentioned the smart soldier and his smart salute and as a reward I still remember, I gave them a crate of rum as reward in appreciation of the act. Troops remember these gestures.”

And sure enough, even in the final briefing before the launch of Operation Meghdoot, Brig Channa went beyond the rule book.
“I personally conducted the briefing, broken into three parts: Briefing for officers, the signallers and finally for the men. The officers will tell you how unconventional the briefing was. I had said there would be no time limit for briefing. I wanted all of them to absorb every small little detail of my planned operation. The briefing was in an informal setting. Officers were allowed to smoke, have tea, take off their cap, and take off their belt! I wanted them to be relaxed. When you are relaxed, you absorb more. It wasn’t a one way talk. They were allowed to ask as many questions as possible. And they did. The briefing/interaction went on for three hours but at the end of it, I was absolutely certain that every officer had understood my Op(erational) orders. They had to, because I could not have been with them physically, and then there was to be total radio silence! With signallers, the briefing went on for an hour. We had decided to use the ‘presser switch’ only to convey that all was well, but there was to be no conversation. For the men, all that I had to tell them was: ‘dekho yeh tumhare paltan ki aur desh ki izzat ka sawal hai. Jeetna zaroori hai.’ Briefing over, the troops were now primed for action.
During discussions on the possible D-day and H-hour for the actual launch of the troops, there were several suggestions. Of course, the operation had to be launched in the timeframe of 10-30 April, 1984 set by the Northern Command. The final day had to be chosen by the Sector Commander, Brig Channa. He finalised 13 April. Why? Many have asked him for the rationale behind choosing 13 April. Brig Channa has always kept mum. But talking to me in the winter of 2013, he finally revealed the reasons for deciding to launch Operation Meghdoot on 13 April 1984 although many had said the date ‘13’ could be unlucky.

WHY 13 April?
Brig Channa says: “Well, what I say may sound controversial, but the fact is that both the Pakistani Army and us, follow the legacy left behind by the British. When the British planned, they used to be very cautious in their approach, very slow, erring on the side of caution. They were not prone to take risks. But, in such an operation I had to take a risk. And go up when they (the Pakistanis) least expected it. I was proved right.

“If you read Gen (Pervez) Musharraf’s book, he says India pre-empted us. What does it indicate? That they (the Pakistanis) were preparing to occupy those passes too. I also know that when our team went abroad to buy snow clothing, the Pakistanis were already doing so; when we were collecting quotations, they had already bought the snow suits outright!

“So it was a race against time. You see the operating season on the glacier is generally end-May/early June when they say it is comparatively safe to operate. So, one had to choose that time frame. Pakistani had much shorter distance to cover, had lesser logistical problems. I would say no more. It was one of those intuitions where I said let’s do it early. I was asked about it. When would I like to launch? I mulled over it and thought about Baisakhi (a harvest festival observed with much fanfare in North India, and even Pakistani Punjab). Now, Baisakhi is celebrated equal fervour on both sides. People are in a joyous mood. Their guard is down. It was also the most unlikely date to launch a military operation. So there you are. 13 April it was. I would concede that it was risky. Some called it suicidal. But that is exactly why we had to do that day. Rest is history!”
Once the date was set, Northern Command HQ was informed.
Meanwhile, a snow storm was building up. Fresh snowing had taken place in the higher reaches.
5.30 am, 13 April 1984: The first Cheetah helicopter, carrying Capt Sanjay Kulkarni and one soldier, takes off from the base camp. Then another follows. Then one more.
By noon, 17 such sorties are flown by Sqn Ldr Surinder S. Bains and Rohit Rai. Capt Sanjay Kulkarni, one JCO and 27 soldiers are heli-dropped at Bilafond La.

With this operation MEGHDOOT was officially launched.
Three decades after he jumped from the Cheetah at Bilafond La, to signal the beginning of Operation Meghdoot, Gen Kulkarni vividly remembers the scene. “Four of us jumped one by one, as the first two helicopters hovered just short of Bila around 6 am that day. I remember throwing a 25 kg atta bori (gunny sack full of flour) to test the depth and hardness of the snow. It was quite hard. We jumped and then constructed a helipad of sorts to allow the latter sorties to land for half a minute or so, and then return for another trip,” he laughs and recalls now.

“The most abiding memory of that day is of course of extreme cold. It must have been minus 30 degrees celsius. We were to be deployed by ‘vertical envelopment’ (heli-dropped) at Bilafond La and another platoon led by Maj. Bahuguna was to be dropped at Sia La, but they couldn’t be sent until 17-18 April because the weather turned bad and remained bad for the next three days. Extremely bad weather.

“Within three hours of landing, we had to evacuate our radio operator, one sepoy Mandal, who suffered HAPO (High Altitude Pulmonary Oedema) despite being trained, acclimatised and being fit. So, we had a radio but no radio operator. Of course, it helped since we were supposed to maintain radio silence. So now 29 of us remained at Bilafond La. Within 48 hours, we were down to 28. Another boy died in two days. April, after all is winter on Siachen. Of this lot, 21 of us, I remember got severe frost bites.

“All this despite the fact that all these boys had come with me to the glacier in 1983, and were very familiar with the precautions that needed to be taken on the glacier. And this despite the fact that Gen Hoon had managed to get us imported snow clothing and equipment from abroad, just in the nick of time. I remember they arrived on 12 April evening, barely hours before we were being launched into Operation Meghdoot. Thermal coats, thermal pants, very nice balaclavas, excellent tents, ice axes, goggles, the works were bought from Europe. The weapons however remained the basic Indian Army 7.62 mm SLR. Of course, we had mortars, MMG, missiles, Grad P rockets. Some of the weapons came by air, some came through porters. I remember that at that time we were paying the porters princely sums. They were getting 50 rupees per porter per day, almost equivalent to the porter fee for expeditions to Mount Everest then. But we didn’t mind since they were all local Ladakhis.”

But, getting to Bilafond La turned out to be the easy part. As the day progressed, the “weather packed up,” as military men would say in the mountains. The visibility was down to zero, it started snowing heavily, ruling out any further helicopter sorties.

“The blizzard hit us even as the two-man tents were being set up. It was damn difficult. At that point of time, the higher authorities must have thought that this was a big mistake. We remained out of contact for three days,” Gen Kulkarni recalls.
Amidst the blizzard however, the platoon led by Capt Sanjay Kulkarni planted the first Indian flag on Bilafond La on 13 April 1984!

Operation Meghdoot was now a reality.

But the job was far from done. The other passes had to be secured before the Pakistanis took counter measures, or tried to attack the small platoon level force at Bilafond La.

Down below, at the base camp, slight recriminations had started. The Staff in Northern Command and the Military Operations Directorate were sweating. Sending troops in winter on the glacier now seemed murderous.

Remembers Brig Channa, whose final call it was to send Capt Sanjay Kulkarni and party to Bilafond La on 13 April: “There were many who stared at me with the ‘I-told-you-so’ look. But to be frank, I was still confident that the storm would pass over. And it did.

Three days later. The radio silence worked wonderfully. The Pakis came to know about the operation only after we had established and occupied the post at Bilafond La, that too because Sanjay opened the radio to tells us that one boy had died of hypoxia.”

But, even as Sanjay Kulkarni and his platoon remained out of contact, the ground troops commenced their arduous move on foot from base camp and established Camp I on 13 April itself. Camp II and Camp III were established by 15 April along the route to Bilafond La. Lt Col Pushkar Chand, the Task Force Commander, pushed the Ladakhis and 19 Kumaon to Camp I and then to Camp II. Lt Col Pushkar Chand, who later retired as a brigadier, was a para-commando and a renowned mountaineer. Speaking to me from his village in Uttarakhand where is settled now, he remembers walking to each and every post in the six months that he remained the Task Force Commander in the initial deployment of Operation Meghdoot.

Four days later, on 17 April when the weather improved, the Air Force flew a record number of 32 helicopter sorties with five available Cheetah and two Mi-8 helicopters. That day, Sia La was occupied by a platoon of Ladakh Scouts under Maj Ajay Bahuguna. Troops had to be dropped approximately five km east of Sia la. They had to trudge up the treacherous slopes, which made movement extremely difficult because of heavy snowfall during the preceding days.

As the radio sets opened up—Sanjay Kulkarni had to tell base that one of the soldiers had died of hypoxia—and helicopters started flying again, the Bilafonda La platoon had an unexpected visitor: A Pakistani helicopter overhead!
“When the Pakistanis saw us, they turned. If they had not seen us, they would have probably done exactly the same thing (heli-dropped at Bilafond La). Now they had no chance. They realised we were already at Bilafond La!” Sanjay Kulkarni remembers.

The improved weather meant that the follow up action to consolidate deployment all along the Saltoro ridge was speeded up.

Northern Command records of the time show that the link up force established the FLB (Forward Logistics Base) in the general area of Lolofond and Siachen Glacier on 18 April and camp IV on 22 April. Link up with Bilafond La post took place on 24 April, and on the same day Camp V was established. After establishing of Camp VI on 26 April, the balance force was divided into two parties, one party established the assault camp for Indira Col and Turkistan La on 29 April, and the other party under Maj NS Salaria of Ladakh Scouts linked up with the Sia La post on the same day.
The top brass in Northern Command then took stock of the situation.
By now, Pakistani helicopters and even fighter planes were making reconnaissance sorties over the Saltoro ridge. Indian soldiers were surely visible to them on the key passes. The reaction at GHQ in Rawalpindi can only be imagined! India had beaten them to the top.

A backlash was inevitable.

As a first step, for providing of air defence cover to counter the Pak air threat, two detachments each of SAM-7 (Strella) missiles were inducted at Sia La and Bilafond La on 22 and 24 April respectively. Simultaneously, two Zu-23-2 guns under 2/Lt Manoj Misra of 126 Lt AD Regiment were airlifted by Cheetah helicopters to the FLB. While these guns were being deployed on 23 April when in fact, Pakistani jet aircraft flew over Sia La, Indira Col and then along the glacier to the base camp. They were certainly on a photo reconnaissance mission.
Immediately after Operation Meghdoot was launched, the then Northern army Commander, Lt Gen ML Chibber wrote in an official note: “The two main passes were sealed off. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and an area of approximately 3300 sq km, illegally shown as part of PoK on the maps published by Pak and USA were now under our control. The enemy had been pre-empted in their attempt to occupy the area claimed by them.”

No one, least of all Gen Chibber, would have imagined that the Operation would go down in India’s history as the longest continuous deployment!

Tags: Siachin Army post Operation Meghdoot

First Published: Monday, 8 February 2016 11:54 AM