Thursday, May 26, 2016

HISTORY : Outline of South Asian history

SOURCE:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_South_Asian_history




                 Outline of South Asian History

               [ CONNECT WITH:
                           http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/05/list-of-wars-involving-india_1.html  ]



The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to the history of South Asia:
History of South Asia – South Asia includes the contemporary political entities of the Indian subcontinent and associated islands, therefore, its history includes the histories of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the island nations of Sri Lanka and the Maldives.


History of South Asia, by period[edit]

Prehistory of South Asia[edit]

Riwatian people[edit]

Soanian people[edit]

South Asian Stone Age[edit]

South Asian Stone Age   (50,000–3000 BCE)

South Asian Bronze Age[edit]

South Asian Bronze Age   (3000–1300 BCE)

Iron Age India[edit]

Iron Age   (1200–230 BCE)

Middle kingdoms of India[edit]

Middle kingdoms of India   (Classical period) (230 BCE–1279CE)

Medieval India[edit]

Late medieval period   (1206–1596)

Early modern period[edit]

Early modern period   (1526–1858)

Colonial India[edit]

Colonial period   (1510–1961 CE)

Other states[edit]

Other states (1102–1947)

Kingdoms of Sri Lanka[edit]

Kingdoms of Sri Lanka

History of South Asia, by region[edit]

History of South Asia, by subject[edit]

See also[edit]

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Notes[edit]


Sources[edit]

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Monday, May 23, 2016

India’s Diplomatic Disarray

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/23052016-indias-diplomatic-disarray-oped/






                      India’s Diplomatic Disarray
                                         By
                                   

May 23, 2016

It is a universal truth that all nations aspire to increase their ‘power’ relative to their neighbours and competitors, although very few manage to achieve this altruistic goal. National power can be described as a combination of soft and hard power that create both tangible and intangible influence built on the total capacity of a nation to enforce its will on other nations.


The basis of national power is fostered on a large number of fundamental components, such as demography, social cohesion and culture, political leadership and processes, foreign policy and international relations, military capabilities, educational system, technological development, geographical factors, physical infrastructure, natural resources etc. The components are numerous but can be clubbed together under four main and overarching elements—diplomatic influence, military capabilities, economic status and information capacity—that form the pillars of national power. A single component could contribute to more than one element of national power. In the contemporary geostrategic environment, the use of brute military force to achieve national objectives is considered politically unacceptable. Therefore diplomatic overtures, firmly based on demonstrated military and economic power is the preferred element of national power that is normally employed. Shaping and influencing the environment, deterrent actions and coercion are all carried out through the diplomatic channels and only as a last resort are military and economic power used to initiate the strategy of punishment and destruction.


The primary role of national power is to ensure that all threats to the sovereignty of the nation are neutralised, preferably before the threat is able to create any damage.

Sovereignty—the quality of being a fully independent nation or state with complete freedom to govern itself and exercise autonomous economic, military and parliamentary power—is ensured by the application of the elements of national power in a judicious manner. There is a subtle nuance to the employment of national power, it requires not only the capacity resident within the elements of national power, but a demonstrated national will to employ them on an as required manner. It is obvious that possession of power by itself cannot be a tool of influence, especially in international politics, but that the national will—an unquantifiable entity, which is a combination of the inherent and inculcated ethos of the people, the political process and national leadership—will be the driving force in spreading national influence. However, national power cannot be exercised without taking into account the international norms that guide its employment, the adherence to which is the only factor that keeps the global comity of nations in a relatively peaceful equilibrium.


A cohesive national will that in turn leads to a focused nationalism cannot be created as an overnight phenomenon. It has to be cultivated and nurtured and comes to the fore only over a period of time in which the nation has been seen as having been powerful and influential in the international arena. Historically it is seen that influential nations have well-established national institutions, whose positions are held sacrosanct and are not undermined by corruption in high places. Further, the separation of the judiciary and the executive and the demonstrated independence of the judiciary seem to enhance the perception of a nation’s power.


Similarly, stable nations understand that the ‘civilian’ control of the elements of national power means that the parliament of the people controls these elements. It is unfortunate that in some democracies, this ‘control’ has been interpreted as civilian bureaucratic control of national power elements, a recipe for gradual erosion of the influence and status of the nation in question. Further, national power will thrive only when sufficient checks and balances are placed on the executive power of the elected representatives, irrespective of the all other systems and processes that are in place. Within this complex situation, the political process is the overarching component in ensuring that the national influence is not allowed to gradually diminish.

In analysing whether or not a nation is influential and powerful, or has the capacity to become a powerful entity, the functioning of the four fundamental elements of national power has to be examined. An unbiased study of these elements and their interrelationship between each other and with the known grand strategy of the nation will provide a clear indication of the progress of the nation towards a position of regional or global power. India is no exception.

India’s Strategic Perceptions

For centuries, the Indian security psyche has been land-centric, conditioned by a long history of invasions from the north-west regions of the country. It is only the last conqueror of the sub-continent, the British, who made their initial approach across the sea. This land-centricity has been further ingrained by all the post-independence conflicts having been predominantly land-based. This has created a flawed strategic security posture for the nation that does not take advantage of India’s maritime traditions and its unique geographical position.

 [ India should consider the dismemberment of Pakistan via sea route  - Vasundhra ] ]]



The global geopolitical and security architecture has already shifted towards being more focused on sea-based power projection. This in turn has led to an on-going economic and political realignment based on control of the seas. In the South and South-East Asian region, this paradigm shift necessitates all nations—big and small—to turn towards a sea-oriented national security stance. This becomes particularly important for India considering the advantages that it can derive from the long coastline of its peninsula, and its ambitions to be accepted as a regional, and then a global, power. India seems to have only now woken up to the fact that the Indian Ocean is geographically its own backwaters, named after it and historically dominated by it. However, Indian strategic autonomy of the Indian Ocean is no longer a matter that can be taken for granted.


National strategic perceptions are anchored on the grand strategy of the nation. While such a strategy is articulated at times, it is generally gleaned from the implicit behaviour of nations in their dealings with others when confronted with national security challenges. In the nearly 70 years since its independence from British colonial rule, India has not demonstrated a steadfast grand strategy that it believes in at the absolute fundamental level. This situation makes it difficult to examine the national security priorities of the nation. Even so, an analysis of the fundamental diplomatic initiatives, and the strengths and weaknesses of its foreign policy will provide an insight into the path that the nation is embarked upon.

India’s Diplomatic Capabilities

It is only in the past three decades or so that India has consciously emerged out of the Nehruvian philosophy of ‘non-alignment’, which had left it unable to either fly with the birds or hunt with the animals. Although a lofty idea, non-alignment as a diplomatic cornerstone was never going to work in a world immersed in power play, especially when the nation(s) espousing the concept were till in their early stages of independent development. Even after a conscious decision was made to move away from this self-defeating foreign policy concept, periodically the Indian diplomatic corps tends to lapse into a state of denial of real politick. This has led to a fundamental failure of the nation’s ability to use its considerable soft and hard power to influence events in its favour


In order to fathom its efficacy, Indian diplomacy must be analysed both within the regional as well as the global context. For past few decades the country has tried to bear the burden of being the ‘big-brother’ in South Asia by prodding, mostly in a gentle manner, the smaller states of the region to align themselves with the Indian viewpoint. However, this big-brother attitude has not always been benign and therefore it has had only limited success. In a majority of cases these overtures have tended to alienate the surrounding smaller nations from India. A case in point is the recent debacle in its relationship with the Maldives.


The Maldives Fiasco.

Maldives has been traditionally an Indian satellite and India seems to have taken the bilateral relationship for granted. In November 2013, Abdullah Yameen became president after a judicially controversial and politically contentious election. This was followed by some controversial actions, at least in Indian eyes—the arrest of the previous president, Nasheed, the revival of the abduction of judge Abdullah case and the concerted improvement of bilateral relations with China. The Indian reaction to these events was to cancel Prime Minister Modi’s visit scheduled for March 2016. Almost as if it wanted to further the diplomatic tensions, India committed a faux-pas by commenting adversely on the arrest of President Nasheed and the treatment meted out to him, which was a completely domestic affair of a sovereign nation. The end result was that the Maldives signed the Chinese ‘Maritime Silk Route’ initiative and accepted high volume Chinese investments in developmental projects. A nation that was attuned and content to being under Indian influence has been moved out of the orbit, not through its own manoeuvrings but by the ineptness of Indian diplomacy. If ever there was a diplomatic ‘own goal’, this was it.


Even a broad analysis of the policies being pursued by the Indian diplomatic corps reveals that it is not tuned to deal with the rapidly changing realities of global political and security environment. It would seem that the Indian diplomat lapses into a default position of embracing the non-aligned concept whenever faced with an unpalatable situation that requires decisive action. Perhaps the fault lies with the excessive bureaucratic control that the Indian diplomatic system exercises across the board in all decision-making processes. In this climate, where promotions and lucrative postings are at stake, individual initiative and calculated risk-taking that would fundamentally keep national interests as the highest priority are the sacrificial offerings.


Further, the diplomatic corps displays a barely concealed disdain for political directives, mostly considering themselves to be above the political agenda of the government in place. This is a manifestation of self-importance within the bureaucracy, who believe that the elected representatives are only temporary masters who need to be humoured, while the really serious business of developing and implementing foreign policy and the conduct of diplomacy is carried out by the ‘professionals’.


Nothing could be more damaging to a democracy than this skewed view of foreign policy. There can be no doubt that the government formed by the elected representatives of the people is responsible for laying down the foreign policy of the nation. If the newspaper reports are to be believed, this dichotomy was one of the primary reasons for the government seeking the premature retirement of the previous Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs.


Narendra Modi, elected prime minister in May 2014, has given a boost to India’s diplomatic initiatives. By December 2015, he had visited 37 countries and placed the Indian viewpoint regarding a host of issues on the international stage. However, the Indian diplomatic train does not demonstrate any tangible change, at least in terms of policy initiatives, continuing to forever react to events and playing catch up when it should have been on the front foot. The highly successful and visible prime ministerial visits have not been capitalised upon by the laid-back Indian diplomacy. For an outside observer it would seem that the notion of national interest being of the utmost priority in the pursuance of diplomatic initiatives has been lost on the Indian diplomatic community. Their priority seems to be domestic turf wars to ensure the ascendancy of the diplomatic corps in relation to the other myriad bureaucratic ‘services’ that function within the Central Government.


Major Power Relations –

 USA

During his visit to India in April 2016, the US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter stated that ‘[US and India were] destined to be strategic partners in this century.’ However, at the same time, some of the actions initiated by the US in furthering its bilateral relations in South Asia seem to be at odds with this high-minded rhetoric.

Two recent actions stand out. First, the US has hyphenated India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue, a move that New Delhi finds hard to fathom. Even so, India is unable to bring to bear any significant influence on the US decision-making bodies and therefore has to be content with voicing murmuring dissent, if at all. Second, the US initiatives to approve a new arms package for Pakistan that includes F-16 fighter aircraft also flies in the face of US approaches to India. The US explanation that the arms package is meant to make Pakistan bring the Taliban to the negotiating table is in itself an abject acceptance of the lack of influence that US has over Pakistan’s policy making apparatus. It is obvious that the US and India are at odds in this sphere, especially since India is totally sceptical, and with reason, about Pakistan’s ability to seriously pursue peace in any place where it is politically involved.


Given these ground realities, it is not surprising that India finds it hard to believe that the US respects or supports India’s strategic interests. The US has been harping on the need for India to be part of the joint naval patrols in the South China Sea to ensure ‘global’ freedom of navigation in that region. However, India has so far baulked at the idea, stating that joint strategic decisions should not be knee-jerk reactions that are politically motivated, but should be bipartisan and beneficial to all concerned. Reading between the lines, it means that India is still not convinced that it should throw its lot with the US in the escalating tensions of the South China Sea.


The US is increasingly aware of the critical role that India can play in maintaining the power balance in Asia. Even though it continues to blindside India in its dealings with Pakistan, the US is also trying to prove to India that it is a preferred strategic partner. This is an impossibility considering the vexed Indo-Pakistan relationship. During the recent visit of the US Secretary of Defence, a preliminary agreement to share military logistics was made. This agreement, when ratified, would have permitted both countries to access each other’s supplies, spare parts and services from military bases and ports, making coordination of actions easier. This could have been considered a small step forward in Indo-US defence cooperation. In combination with the current move in the US Congress to give India the same status as NATO countries for ease of technology transfer and amending the Arms Control Bill accordingly, the ratification of this agreement would have been significant. Further, the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative being advanced could considerably ease the barriers to Indo-US defence trade and cooperation.

These initiatives are however, unlikely to change the bilateral relations in any significant manner. India has an underlying concern that signing even the logistic agreement will somehow compromise its independence and sovereignty, a fear that goes back to the days of a foreign policy based on non-alignment. There is also the inherent fear that opening up Indian facilities to the US would provide the US with too much information regarding Indian capabilities and operational practices. Once again this paranoia has its roots in the Cold War era and the mantra of non-alignment. For reasons that cannot clearly be identified, India has backed away from signing the Logistics Support Agreement in the last minute. A cynical analyst would point to the fact that after the fundamental agreement with the Secretary of Defence Ash Carter in April 2016, the Indian Minister for Defence Manohar Parikkar went on an official visit to China. The flip-flop came immediately after that visit and therefore it will not be illogical to conclude that India succumbed to Chinese ‘pressure’ to desist from entering into such an agreement.

The result of this back-flip has been that India is seen as continually sending mixed messages to the US, as well as to other major powers. This could also be a manifestation of India’s hope to engage with both China and USA on an equal basis. Once again, this aspiration is non-alignment in a new package and bound to fail. The less than focused foreign and security policies that is clearly visible in these manoeuvrings signifies India’s inability to craft national security priorities and enforce them through the use of its considerable national power. The land of Asoka the Great and Mahatma Gandhi, steeped in the tradition of non-violence and non-interference, is reluctant to cast its lot with any alliance that is aimed at ‘containment’ of another major power. India needs to realise that sitting on the fence all on its own, read as a non-aligned foreign policy all over again, is not a viable option in the current geopolitical and security environment.

 Fence sitters traditionally never cultivate any

                     ‘all-weather’ friends

                                   and

                 have no support when they fall.


Major Power Relations – China

The bilateral relations between India and China has never been smooth and continue to be marred by the skeletons of the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1949 and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not been recognised by China and it claims Indian territories and even states as integral part of China. For example the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the far-east is claimed unambiguously by China as a part of its own territory. India has not responded in a strong manner to this claim and its actions have only been reactionary. There has been no independent initiative from the Indian government to repudiate this claim or other diplomatic schemes that China has put in place to further their claims. It is interesting to note that China always refers to Arunachal as ‘South Tibet’ and India does not object! An extreme reluctance to confront China, diplomatically or otherwise, is obvious in all Indian dealings.  [ this is called cowardice of indian diplomacy"  Vasundhra]


China is embarked on a massive infrastructure build-up on the Sino-Indian border with a three pronged objective—to integrate the border regions to mainland China; ensure military accessibility to the LAC; and increase its counter-offensive capabilities. The progress of the build-up is impressive and currently roads, railway lines and fibre optics have been established along the length of the LAC. It is obvious that there is a clear strategy being put in place to ensure quick mobilisation and for the build-up of a strong air defence network. Unlike the Indian reluctance to state the obvious, confrontation is not new in China’s attitude towards any of its neighbours, especially India. India has been cowed down by Chinese abrasiveness and is unable to, or perhaps unwilling to, face up to the reality that the Chinese have been browbeating it for decades and will continue to do so till strong actions are initiated. A bully—of whatever hue—will only understand resolute action.

In complete contrast to the concerted Chinese build-up, infrastructure development on the Indian side is in a dismal state of complete disarray. There is complete apathy that percolates the body politick in India when national security infrastructure is required to be created. Further, the political leadership does not seem to take minor diplomatic intrusions seriously enough and does not realise that insistence of such intrusions, like the claim of Arunachal Pradesh being part of China, will over a period of time become more insistent. Countering these claims will become increasingly difficult as they remain uncontested over time. It is safe to assume that in case of a contemporary Chinese aggression like the one in 1962, which still rankles the Indian psyche, the result would be even more disastrous for India.

China is diligently increasing its naval capabilities and does not hide its territorial ambitions. The assiduous creation of the ‘One Belt One Road’ that would ultimately connect Europe, Asia and Africa to Beijing is an overt manifestation of China’s global ambitions. China is already connected to Myanmar through an oil pipeline and is starting to build a railway line direct to Iran. In the face of these aggressive moves to enhance its influence and stature, India has been caught completely on the back foot and does not have the diplomatic adroitness necessary to turn these events to its advantage by converting the inherent goodwill that it has in these countries.


While it may not be palatable to the nationalistic spirited citizens of India, the fact is that India does not have a clear and firm policy to deal with China; there have been only reactive and defensive actions. The initiative has never rested with India in any of its bilateral dealings with China. India ducks behind the façade of being a responsible and law-abiding international citizen when any confrontational step is initiated by China and is not even able to make its case forcefully in the moribund United Nations. The inherent inexperience in conducting international relations has been the bane of Indian diplomacy—a sad commentary on the foreign policy of the nation after nearly 70 years of independence and pretensions to ‘greatness’.

There is no better illustration that submissive behaviour towards China has become the norm in India than the fact that China presumes to ‘advise’ the Indian Prime Minister not to visit Arunachal Pradesh since it is a ‘disputed’ region and India does nothing to repudiate it. India on its own can claim to be anything, a regional or even a global power. However, if India is to be considered even a regional power by other nations it needs to look beyond the Chinese threats and coercion. It has to shed an inherent reticence in dealing with China brought about through a historic sense of the fear of consequences, stand up to Chinese coercive strategies and discard the China factor that is influencing all its foreign policy initiatives. Nothing else will elevate it in the eyes of other nations to a position of power and influence.

The Pakistan Effect

In terms of size and capability, Pakistan should not have the capacity to create chaos within India at will and checkmate Indian diplomatic initiatives in the international arena. However, it carries out both these activities with ease and monotonous regularity. Pakistan has consistently kept India guessing regarding its own diplomatic efforts, most of the time making India look like a puppet that can be made to dance at will. Every time that India seems to have achieved some sort of diplomatic objective, Pakistan with the active help of China and its veto in the UN Security Council, manages to neutralise any gain that has been made. This is achieved through the blatant use of force in the guise of terrorism that is totally supported from within Pakistan, which provide safe havens and materiel and economic support. India so far has not been able to craft an appropriate response to these activities.

Examples of Pakistan’s devious activities are numerous. Recently Pakistan attempted to create a rift between India and Iran. While India’s initiatives in enhancing its long-standing bilateral relations with Iran was at a critical stage of negotiation, Pakistan released the alleged confession of a person purported to be an Indian spy operating from Iran. The fact that Pakistan is avowedly a Sunni nation fully aligned with the Sunni Gulf Cooperation Council did not make any difference to its actions aimed at currying favour with a Shiite Iran. India did not have any response to this Pakistani effort to befuddle the situation. India has to deal with emerging issues as it sees fit to achieve its pre-set national objectives and not cater for either Pakistan’s or China’s interests. If there is a blow back while doing this, India should be willing to counter it in whatever manner is required. In this context, the option to use military force to counter ‘terrorist’ attacks originating in foreign countries and the option to escalate if necessary should always be on the table. Force must be met with force, not through mouthing platitudes in international forums that carry no meaning.

The lack of focus in foreign policy is evident in the manner in which India is dealing with Iran. India and Iran have shared long term friendly relations, although their individual foreign policies are not similar. Even during the long period of sanctions against Iran, India had maintained reasonably stable economic relations with the country. However, the bilateral relationship is being played out in the turmoil of India’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Even though India was engaged with Iran during the sanction era, the rush of foreign investment into resource-rich Iran after the lifting of the sanctions has once again caught Indian diplomacy on the wrong foot. Iran is crucial to India’s energy security. However, in the wake of more lucrative offers, Iran has terminated a three-year agreement to accept half the payments in rupees, instead demanding that payment, including past dues, to be made in euros. Indian diplomatic failure is writ large on this demand.

It is time for India to realise that it may not be the natural favourite in Iran’s calculations for future development. The development of the Charbahar port is a long term bilateral partnership initiative but it can be assumed that competition in this area will also increase. India has so far not proven itself to be very good at beating diplomatic competition and leveraging national power for its benefit. It would do well to ratify pending agreements before competition and calculated mischief derails them. From a foreign policy perspective, India is walking a tight rope between the Sunni GCC, Shiite Iran and the turbulent Iraq-Syria region. The Shia-Sunni prism colours all relationships in the Middle-East, bilateral or otherwise. India’s ability to pick its way forward within this fractious regional environment will be the acid test for its diplomatic finesse.

Conclusion

For the major part of independent Indian history, its foreign policy has been mired in ambiguity and based almost completely on reactive actions. The concept on non-alignment has been a millstone that has impeded the development of a viable and focused foreign policy. The situation has not been helped by the self-serving attitude of the diplomatic corps that seems to have put the concept on nationalism on the back burner. Further, non-alignment itself has become distorted to mean appeasing both sides of an argument, which invariably leads to a diplomatic debacle. India needs to take stock of the current geopolitical environment, particularly with reference to China and Pakistan and the already entrenched and increasing nexus between the two.


Chinese think tanks and academics, with obvious and tacit support from the government, write regularly and clearly about the long rivalry between India and China, enunciating government policy that places India as a major threat to the security of Western China. They also make common cause with Pakistan in all its attempts to destabilize  India and thwart Indian foreign policy initiatives. In contrast, the Indian strategic think tanks are carefully circumspect in even mentioning Chinese activities, and the government almost apologetic in its reaction. The only way for India to assert itself is for it to expose Chinese double-standards and hypocrisy and by joining the international community in asking China to behave like, and become, a responsible stakeholder within the global security environment. China has to be made to understand that being a maverick will only lead it so far and no more. Does the foreign policy pundits in New Delhi have the gumption to do so? A million dollar question.

Pakistan is immune to any Indian diplomatic initiatives, as it has demonstrated time and again. The most recent episode is the manner in which the attack on Indian Air Force Base Pathankot  was handled by India and Pakistan. India bend backwards to accommodate Pakistan’s refusals to accept their role in the attack and finally succumbed to ‘pressure’ from Pakistan’s well-wishers to even accept a fact finding mission from Pakistan! Nothing could be more illustrative of the unwillingness of the Indian diplomatic establishment to call a spade a spade and initiate clear remedial action. The Indian reluctance to meet force with force is inexplicable.
A nation achieves greatness and influence through the optimised, combined and focused employment of all elements of national power to pursue its legitimate national interests. To achieve this the nation must set itself a goal, an objective, that must be worked towards at all times, unfailingly and without remiss. Unfortunately it has to be accepted that India has not been able to accomplish this concerted effort in its foreign policy initiatives. The clear picture is of the Indian elephant ambling along, marching to nowhere, and that too in no hurry to get to that nowhere point. A sad commentary of a nation that has the potential to achieve greatness, but is only circumventing the nucleus of greatness.


First published at sanukay.wordpress.com

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About the Author

Dr. Sanu Kainikara
Dr. Sanu Kainikara
Dr. Sanu Kainikara is a Canberra-based military and political analyst and Adjunct Professor UNSW, and Distinguished fellow IFRS.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Sunday, May 22, 2016

DEFENSE PROCUREMENT:FOR A CHANGE SHEKAR GUPTA SACH BOLTA HAI


SOURCE:
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shekhar-gupta-guns-thieves-and-ghosts-116050600882_1.html


               FOR A CHANGE SHEKAR GUPTA
                     SACH BOLTA HAI

                               GUNS THIEVES & GHOSTS

We Indians are beyond boring old grandma’s wisdom, like don’t throw the baby out with the bath water. We just throw away the baby and keep the bath water. Take our military acquisitions, for example. Most new acquisitions become scandals. Many are then terminated, leaving our forces with a fraction of the needed inventory, and short of spares and ammunition. Nobody is caught and punished.

Some examples from our times:

1. Bofors is the most storied of our scandals. The Army is left with just the guns bought in the first order. Indigenous production was stalled. Even existing guns are short of spares and ammunition. The Army made distress import of ammunition during the fighting in Kargil which, note, was 17 years ago. India has acquired no fresh artillery in the 30 years after Bofors. Most importantly, nobody was ever punished for the bribery, no money recovered. A classic case of throwing the baby out but keeping the dirty bath water.

2. German HDW submarines, called Type 209, are a scandal of the same vintage. These were to be the Navy’s first SSKs (submarine-to-submarine killers). The programme was scuttled. Only two vessels were bought and two assembled in India, 10 years late. Technology transfer, expansion never happened.

3. This isn’t a military acquisition, but I choose the Indian Airlines purchase of its first Airbus A-320s because it became a scandal at exactly the same time as Bofors and Type 209. Just as the rumours of kickbacks emerged, a new A-320 crashed in Bangalore. It was used to damn the aircraft and the entire lot just purchased, was grounded. The A-320 survived fortuitously. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, India need to airlift tens of thousands of its citizens out of Kuwait and Akshay Kumar was not available in real life to carry out the airlift. The spare Air India and IAF strength was inadequate. Then Prime Minister V P Singh was left with no choice but to de-mothball the A-320s. And once they resumed flying, there was no going back. Indian Airlines never recovered from the financial loss of grounding that fleet. Again, nothing was proven, nobody was caught or punished.

The setback and humiliation of Bofors led to our most vicious political blood feud. The Congress found its opportunity with the Tehelka sting. The NDA cried entrapment, but Bangaru Laxman and George Fernandes lost their jobs (the latter only temporarily).  None except Laxman, who actually had nothing to do with any real defence deal, was punished by law.

The Gandhi family saw bitter revenge in Tehelka because it damaged not just the BJP but also Mr Fernandes, the noisiest Rajiv-baiter on Bofors. But, since Mr Vajpayee’s credibility and popularity, and dumping of expendable Laxman helped Mr Fernandes recover, the revenge remained incomplete. A fresh bid was launched towards the later years of the NDA with what was called the “coffin scam” though nothing was eventually proven. As a consequence, however, no major acquisitions took place in Mr Vajpayee’s six years, in spite of a limited conflict (Kargil) and a near all-out war, Op Parakram. Not one significant non-Russian system was introduced as the government was petrified. Even the Israeli Barak missile system for protecting our naval assets from enemy aircraft and missiles was rendered ineffective as its maker was banned, leaving the Navy’s finest ships unprotected. Something similar has happened now with the latest submarine Scorpene entering the seas without torpedoes. The company that makes these, WASS, is a subsidiary of Agusta and covered under the A K Antony ban.

When Congress unexpectedly returned to power in 2004, it was desperate to find something on NDA’s defence “scandals”. But nothing was found and the first UPA Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee was much too wise to launch a witch-hunt. He knew the consequences of perpetuating this feud at the cost of the armed forces. His inability to “discover” any scandals annoyed 10 Janpath. It probably led to his being moved out of defence, making way for loyalist A K Antony. 






 Mr Antony also did not launch a witch-hunt. He saw keeping his own back and hands clean as his most important KRA. His typical response to the first rumours of a scam, even anonymous complaints, was to call in the CBI and ban the supplier. In the process, he became not just India’s longest-serving defence minister but also one who banned so many suppliers that it was no longer possible to find one completely chaste, particularly in this fast-moving environment of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the multi-national defence industry. When he banned Germany’s Rheinmetall in 2012 for example, it also excluded nearly a hundred other western armament companies that the conglomerate now owned. He banned companies from Europe, Singapore, even Israel. The joke in South Block used to be that soon he would ban the Pakistani army and end the problem altogether.
As armed forces got frustrated, I described his approach to defence modernisation as “strapped-in-Latex” and also once called him Indian politics’ answer to cricketer Bapu Nadkarni who was known neither to concede runs nor get many batsmen out and holds the world record for the largest number of consecutive maiden overs (21) that will probably never be broken.

The greatest irony of the AgustaWestland bribery is, it took place in spite of Mr Antony. He had to admit that bribes had been taken, cancel the deal, invoke penalty clauses and order inquiries. It is an indisputable fact that he acted only after Italian authorities had detected wrongdoing and one Indian newspaper and its reporter had broken and pursued the story relentlessly. He continues to do so even today and set the pace for the rest, some of whom then claim retrospective “news-breaks.”

Since it is a incontrovertible fact that bribes have been paid by Agusta, the case must be speedily investigated and the guilty punished. The test, however is, can we have the sagacity to distinguish this scam from the larger issue of modernisation?
We can talk about Make in India. But most “Indian” systems will also depend on large foreign imports for engines, avionics, sensors, weapons, guidance systems and so on. These include the most visible ongoing developments like Tejas, ALH, stealth frigates, even the MBT Arjun, nearly 30 years behind schedule.

India has to opt for one of three possibilities now. The first is, to concede that tender-based, vendor purchases are no longer possible in the murky arms bazaar. All future purchases would therefore be purely on government-to-government basis or what the Americans call FMS (Foreign Military Sales). This is how UPA had ordered the IAF and the Navy’s new C-130s, C-17s and P-8Is. A cruel aside: this forced Mr Antony to do what he detested ideologically, to buy from the US, which became our biggest arms supplier under his watch, for the first time in 65 years. The BJP is now buying two squadrons of the French Rafale through the same route and exploring American artillery. This narrows the buyers’ options and negotiating space but get the commission agents out. The second is to bring in a fool-proof system of purchases which is an impossibility given how broken our politics is. The third is to accept the limitations inherent in our system on timely acquisitions (the need for a so-called VVIP helicopter was first approved in 1999 and we still don’t have it). You then mould your diplomacy and strategic posture accordingly. That, nobody would want. So we will likely keep muddling along, battered by scandals yet shortages, not catching any guilty but getting our soldiers frustrated. In short, keep flushing away the baby and frolicking in the soiled bath water.

Twitter: @ShekharGupta


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Saturday, May 21, 2016

IAF PROCUREMENT : Rafale Deal: How the Air Force Squandered a Procurement Opportunity


SOURCE:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/rafale-deal-how-the-air-force-squandered-a-procurement-opportunity/


         Rafale Deal: How the Air Force
  Squandered a Procurement Opportunity
                                       By
                     Siddhartha Srivastava 
is a strategy consultant based in Cleveland, USA. He has been part of aviation industry for long. He has Masters in Mechanical Engineer, with an MBA from INSEAD, France.

 18 May , 2016
 
VN:F [1.9.16_1159]
 
 
“War is too important to be left to the Generals,” said former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. However, Indian security planners have for long allowed the IAF’s rhetoric of wanting the “best combat jet” to remain unchallenged. India is paying dearly, both in money and in defence preparedness for such dereliction of duty.

The country’s most expensive defence deal in its history will neither lead to a transfer of technology and local manufacturing nor will IAF acquire the required number of jets to enhance the country’s defence.

Ironically, despite the obvious deficiencies India cannot walk away from the deal. This is because we need the jets to make up for numbers badly!



That IAF was losing combat jets to ageing was always known. IAF’s squadron strength is expected to get to 25 in next six years against a sanctioned strength of 42. That is a shortfall of about 200 jets.

The MMRCA tender which was supposed to make up for this gap was a badly designed tender from the get-go. With insipid political leadership at the helm, IAF came to dominate the process.  A holistic approach to defence procurement was the first casualty.


Commercial acumen to keep several bidders competing until price negotiations are concluded was discarded. The IAF’s singular concern was to procure their favourite aircraft.

Instead of setting performance requirements in view of prevailing threats the IAF went for the gold-plated version. The rhetoric of getting the “best plane” got the better of realpolitik. The IAF narrowed down the entire process to a single criterion of best performance.


The approach was similar to a family deciding to buy the best car in the market and checking their bank balance after selecting the Rolls Royce. Fascination with technology reached levels where battle-hardened platforms like the F18 were not good enough for the IAF. Neither was the Eurofighter, which is the primary fighter of several NATO and European Air Forces like Germany and the UK, good enough.


Of all the competing platforms the Rafale was developed last, a good decade after Eurofighter, so it’s not surprising that the Rafale has the latest technology. It’s no wonder that the Rafale won the tender.
The IAF remained unchallenged in selecting Rafale and no second or third winner was announced. The French buoyed by their monopoly promptly withdraw the prior commitments to manufacture in India citing warranty issues. The price now escalated to a point where the plane became unaffordable. The new government rightly cancelled the tender. However, to placate the IAF a compromise purchase of 36 jets was announced.

But the landscape has changed completely. While the MMRCA tender lumbered through the byzantine decision-making process in India, the Rafale won orders from Qatar and Egypt. Dassault’s, the company which produces the Rafale jets, production lines are running at capacity to fulfill these orders. While this deal is urgent for India, the French are in no hurry. The 126 jets in the original MMRCA tender were expected to cost around $12 billion. But today the smaller 36 jets order alone is expected to cost $7- 8 billion. The price has more than doubled. India seems to hold no cards in the face of hard-nosed French negotiations.


 Despite the noblest of intentions, IAF’s objective of getting the best jets for its fleet has not bolstered India’s security. If anything the entire process has caused a massive deterioration in India’s defence preparedness. Hopefully, some lessons have been learnt.
Courtesy: http://swarajyamag.com/defence/rafale-deal-how-the-air-force-squandered-a-procurement-opportunity

 



 

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MODI'S WATERLOO - QUAGMIRE OF BABUS

SOURCE:
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/lLHrswBVokgjNWqUJmGRwI/Modis-window-of-opportunity-to-bring-in-big-reforms-is-clos.html

 
                                          MODI'S WATERLOO

                    QUAGMIRE OF BABUS




Kafka and Weber

This is an illustration of the fiction writer, Franz Kafka, who wrote about bureaucratic nightmares, and the sociologist, Max Weber, who studied bureaucracies.

      ***********************************************************************



Modi’s Window of Opportunity to bring in

               Big Reforms is Closing Fast

                                       By

                       Suvojit Chattopadhyay



The bureaucracy had seemingly abandoned UPA 2 in its last days, and there is no reason why it won’t do the same to Modi
 
 
 
 
 
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed power in May 2014, many analysts debated whether he would follow the footsteps of Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan, leaders who, for better or worse, showed a steely determination in following their chosen path of economic and administrative action. Modi’s admiration for the Chinese model, his homage to Singapore’s former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew were held out as signs of things to come. Long overdue administrative reforms were deemed imminent and the bureaucracy was getting ready for a massive shake-up.

Today, things are a bit different. In spite of the heady adulation abroad (admittedly selective though, now with the Nepal backlash), and the unending electioneering back home, the government seems to be on the defensive. Modi and his advisors are complaining that Indian companies are not playing ball.

Those outside the government (including the industry) are instead complaining about credit constraints, an unpredictable tax regime, lack of labour reforms, the government’s silence over state-owned banks’ non-performing assets, and the forgotten promises of disinvestment. Again, for better or worse, the overwhelming demand is for the government to act decisively, for many would take a sure-footed action-oriented government, and not one that seems frozen in its steps when it comes to concrete reforms. The social sector too—which would have been highly encouraged by the early rhetoric over housing, sanitation, roads and micro-enterprises—has been waiting.


Many of the early promises are linked critically to the maxim of “minimum government, maximum governance” in at least two distinct forms.

One, we need less of the central government—the Government of India needs to cede more to the states and do so fast. On this, we have seen some action, especially on fiscal transfers, but nowhere at the level that was promised. In turn, the states themselves by and large have shown very little in terms of their own ability to leverage this fiscal windfall. But even there, if Narendra Modi had lived up to his promise, a few redundant central ministries should have shut down by now—the ministry of information and broadcasting would be my prime candidate. [ in this include "MINISTRY of DEFENCE" also]

Two, we need governments everywhere to improve governance by establishing a rule-based system, and reducing literally, the size of the government by cutting back on the functions government ministries and agencies are required to perform, and improving the efficiency with which the tasks that then remain, are discharged. However, as this government has discovered for itself, “minimum government” is difficult to achieve in practice, for which many factors are responsible.

Elected leaders prefer the status quo, or even expanding the reach of the state, since this empowers them further in a framework that operates on patronage dispensation. Given the elections calendar in India, we unfortunately have political parties that are always in campaign mode. Thanks to the Bharatiya Janata Party’s campaigning template, Narendra Modi is thrust into electioneering roles that sometimes come at the cost of the responsibilities he is supposed to shoulder in his role as the Prime Minister, and the even-handed treatment of states that should go along with it. The temptation of, say, winning Bihar, will always trump prudent governance and the urgency for reforms.

But even when political leaders want to initiate reforms, the bureaucracy wields an enormous amount of influence in determining the fate of such reforms, and this should be no surprise. It is useful to go back to theory to understand the role bureaucracies were meant play in the first place. In the Weberian model,[ https://www.boundless.com/sociology/textbooks/boundless-sociology-textbook/social-groups-and-organization-6/bureaucracy-56/weber-s-model-for-bureaucracy-352-10202/ ] the struggle between the political leadership and the bureaucrats is an inevitable outcome. Whether as “experts” or as the masters of “processes”, bureaucrats spend their entire careers honing their skills to protect at all times (and expand when possible), the power and prestige of their organisation. Bureaucrats, therefore, will resist overtly and covertly, significant reform proposals.

As researchers Merilee Grindle, John Thomas (both Harvard University) and Francis Rourke (York University) have pointed out, reforms that look to trim the size of government usually impose a high cost of the bureaucracy, either in terms of size (manpower) or their jurisdiction. Further, bureaucracies are not homogenous structures, and as Patrick Dunleavy (London School of Economics) points out, there is a constant tussle between the interests of high-level and lower-level officials. High-level bureaucrats are often more interested in policy work and, therefore, are likely to accept (and sometimes advocate for) trimming large bureaus into smaller elite outfits with enhanced advisory power. In contrast, bureaucrats at lower levels usually resort to collective bargaining strategies to promote their interests, which lie in increasing their discretion on the ground.

Balancing these interests and designing reforms that enhance efficiency is, therefore, a political prerogative and cannot be left to the bureaucracy alone.


Take, for instance, the finance ministry. Whereas Arun Jaitley’s own ability to address the key issues facing the economy are under attack, as a minister he mostly needs only to manage his departments better, and they are certainly not lacking in technical competence. But somehow he runs a ministry where the tax mandarins were running amok (imposing retrospective taxes on foreign institutional investors, an unrealistic black-money hunting expedition, increasing individual tax compliance requirements, etc), and where critical legislation like that on the Goods and Services Tax suffers from fundamentally poor design. Remember that left to its own devices, the bureaucracy has no reason to cut back on its own reach or powers of arbitration, and this comes through very strongly in the functioning of the finance ministry, in particular.


This institutional view of the bureaucracy might be a pessimistic one, but it is also a realistic one.

The onus for pushing reforms, therefore, rests on the political leadership. This is where Narendra Modi faces his biggest challenge.

The longer he goes without initiating big reforms, the harder it will become to get the bureaucracy on board. We will be saddled in perpetuity with a bleeding Air India, an inefficient Coal India, and a predatory tax department, to name a few.

The bureaucracy had seemingly abandoned UPA 2 in its last days, and there is no reason why it won’t do the same to Modi



Suvojit Chattopadhyay works on issues of governance and development. Over the last decade, he has worked with a range of development agencies in India, Ghana and Kenya


Suvojit Chattopadhyay 


Topics:
 Narendra Modi    Arun Jaitley   Economic reforms   Margaret Thatcher    Ronald Reagan

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Wednesday, May 18, 2016

MODI : A MICRO FINANCE MAVERICK

SOURCE:
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/546787/guj-saw-95-pc-crop.html




                                       .3
MODI : A MICRO FINANCE MAVERICK
                                      BY
                            Dhurandar B


Modi is a micro finance maverick. He takes away money in small change from
many people. Adds a 0.5% cess here, a 2 rupee petrol price there, 12
rupees from 20,00,00,000 people and 336 fro  5,00,00,000 people.


And he transfers this small change to his favourite companies. Petrol
and Gas increases to Ambanis and Adanis, Insurance to a plethora of
insurance companies including LIC, which in turn goes out and bets that
money in stock exchanges, gives inter corporate loans and what not.
He has learnt this skill from the Baba's that dot the Indian landscape,
like Asaram Bapu, Baba Ramdev, Sri Sri Sri Ravishankar and many others.

 These baba log have perfected this art over years. They have magic
boxes that convert black money to white. If you need to convert your
money all you have to do is give them the cash and their trust will give
you a loan at an attractive rate of interest. You may never repay the
loan or the interest or you may, it is up to you. The baba log have
already taken out their commission when they used their magic donation
box to convert your black money to white.

Modi being a Hindu and a Nationalist learned this trick a long time back. He knows that if he tries to take a lot of money from you, you will probably throw him out.
So he has devised these small micro finance schemes which transfer a lot
of small money from a lot of people into the hands of a few.
Like the management people say, it is a win-win situation. Except that people are getting shafted all the time.

If you recollect, RBI recently issued instructions that Banks can't
make an account balance negative by applying minimum balance charges
once the balance has gone to zero.

Well, this helps the banks keep the already 'Zero' Balance Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yoga accounts alive.

I am sorry about boring you with these mundane details. I have a bad
habit of reading between the lines and looking for meaning in news when
apparently none exist.
























 
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