As per plan of Justice Reddy, today on 19 Aug, ESM interacted with Justice Reddy at
105 TA Battalion auditorium. The meeting was attended by more than 10 . These were DIWAVE, UFESM, IESM AIEWA, IESL, AFA, NAVAL FOUNDATION, WAR WOUNDEDORGANISATION, JCOs AND ORs LEAGUE, VOICE FOR ESM, NEXCC, AIVWA and many more organisations and of course JM was represented in large number . There were more than 150 ESM of three services.
The meeting started at 1100h and finished at 1500h. Justice Reddy was assisted by
members of pay cell of three services.
Many ESM expressed their views, following were main speakers who mostly concentrated on anomalies of OROP.
Col Handa of Diwave
Maj Gen Satbir Singh UFESM
Col Inderjit Singh UFESM and AIEWA
Lt Gen Balbir Singh IESL
Wg Cdr Vinod Nebb War wounded association and JM
Brig JS Sandhu JM
Sgt VS Misra NEXCC
Sub Sidhu AIVWA
Sep Sheoran
M/s Sudesh JM
All organisations gave their points and each point was stressed by all organisation. There was complete unity on these points. Some ESM wanted to raise issues which were beyond the purview of the committee, Justice Reddy stopped discussion on these points. The main issues which were discussed and accepted by Justice Reddy are given below
It was very strongly explained that the definition of OROP given to Justice Reddy by the Govt is not the approved definition which has been accepted by Govt in their executive letter dated 26 Feb 2014 and also accepted by NDA Govt in Rajya Sabha on 2 Nov 2014.
Govt letter dated 7 Nov 15 has fixed pensions of past pensioners on the base year of 2013 where as it should be on the base year of 2014.
Govt letter dated 7 Nov 15 has fixed pensions of past pensioners on the average of max and min pensions of 2013 whereas it should be as per highest pension of 2014.
Govt letter dated 7 Nov 15 has fixed pensions of past pensioners has started from 1 July 2014 whereas it should be w.e.f. 1 Apr 2014
Govt letter dated 7 Nov 15 has fixed equalization of past pensions at a frequency of every five years whereas it should be every year. Software programs are available to calculate this on press of a key.
All Hony ranks be given pension of their rank this has been denied to JCOs even after HSC has ruled in their favor.
Pension of widows should not be reduced and she should be paid full pay as pension till the age of 60 years.
All Majors ( numbering only 900) be given pension of Lt Col as officers are not retiring as Majors any more and moreover officers are getting promotion as Lt Col in 11 to 13 years now.
All Lt col be given pension of Min of Col.
All pensions be brought to the level of 31 Dec 2015 before applying multiplication factor of 2.57 for calculating basic pay for 7 CPC.
Pensions of regular Lt and Capt be suitably standardized as tables are giving them pension less than hon ranks.
Tables of OROP need to be corrected as there are many mistakes in them.
There are many cases in OROP tables where pension of past pensioner of senior rank soldier/JCO/Officers has been fixed lesser than junior rank soldier/JCO/Officer retiring in 2014,2015,2016. This anomaly is against essence of OROP.
It was impressed upon Justice Reddy that our widows are living in penury and whatever corrections are recommended they should first take care of widows, soldiers, JCOs and then officers.
It was impressed upon Justice Reddy that award of OROP is a concept in perpetuity and cannot be permitted to be tinkered by the Govt.
Justice Reddy paid full attention to all the points and asked pointed questions to understand the issuest and its implications vividly. Justice Reddy was very receptive and heard ESM with rapt attention. However he firmly rejected the issues which were not in his purview as per terms of reference given to him by the Govt.
Maj Gen Satbir Singh thanked Justice Reddy for listening to the grievances of ESM with rapt attention.
Similar points were given by ESM at Chandigarh, these points are enclosed for information of all.
It is suggested that ESM may please take a note of these points and present it to Justice Reddy during his interaction with ESM in your city.
Gp Capt VK Gandhi VSM Gen Sec IESM
OROP is our right. Dilution in OROP will NOT be accepted.
via false charges, malafide intent : Army Chief Dalbir Singh
In the first instance of a serving Army chief speaking out against a predecessor and a serving minister, General Dalbir Singh, Chief of Army Staff, has accused General (retired) V K Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, of trying to stall his promotion “with mysterious design, malafide intent and to arbitrarily punish” him for “extraneous reasons”.
In an affidavit submitted in his personal capacity to the Supreme Court Wednesday, General Dalbir Singh has said that in 2012 “I was sought to be victimised by the then COAS” General V K Singh “with the sole purpose of denying me promotion to the appointment of Army Commander”.
“False, baseless and imaginary allegations of lapses were levelled against me in the show cause notice” of May 19, 2012 and consequent imposition of an “illegal” discipline and vigilance (DV) ban, the Army chief has stated in his affidavit.
The affidavit was filed in response to a petition moved by Lt Gen (retd) Ravi Dastane who alleged favouritism in Dalbir Singh’s selection as Army Commander, making him next in line to succeed General Bikram Singh.
Dalbir Singh was placed under a DV ban by V K Singh between April and May 2012 for alleged “failure of command and control” after a Court of Inquiry was ordered into an operation carried out in Jorhat, Assam on the night of December 20-21, 2011 by the 3 Corps Intelligence and Surveillance Unit.
Dalbir Singh was then General Officer Commanding of the Dimapur-based 3 Corps. Referring to the Jorhat operation in his affidavit, he has stated “on that day, I was away on part of annual leave and rejoined duty on 26 Dec 2011”.
His promotion as GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, with effect from June 15, 2012 was cleared by General Bikram Singh who reversed the DV ban after V K Singh retired on May 31, 2012.
This delayed promotion, after reserving the vacant Army Commander’s post for 15 days, was challenged by Dastane in the Supreme Court. He contended he was eligible to be Army Commander but was denied the opportunity by General Bikram Singh who favoured Dalbir Singh despite the latter being under a DV ban at the relevant time.
In February 2012, months before he moved against Dalbir Singh, V K Singh had lost his legal battle on the age row in Supreme Court which held that the government’s decision on his date of birth would apply to his service matters, prompting him to withdraw his petition. The court told V K Singh that he could not go back on the commitment he made to abide by the government decision to treat his date of birth as May 10, 1950 and rejected the contention of “prejudice” and “perversity” against him.
In his affidavit in response to Dastane’s petition, Dalbir Singh has mounted a direct attack on V K Singh: “The passing of directions for initiating administrative action against me after about one month of having already finalised the Court of Inquiry smacks of a motivated, biased, arbitrary and malicious intent to punish me which the then COAS executed apparently as planned by him.”
He has underlined it is now “revealed clearly that the imposition of DV ban and issue of show cause notice to me by the then COAS was illegal and premeditated”.
“Despite their being no evidence against me at the Court of Inquiry, the show cause notice was issued malafidely. no material whatsoever of attendant circumstances was provided to me. The show cause notice issued, beside suffering from vagueness, was premeditated and also against the principles of natural justice,” his affidavit states.
He has pointed out that V K Singh, in his order on April 23, 2012, recommended “action against some officers of the Eastern Command without recommending any action to be taken against Respondent No. 3 (Dalbir Singh)... how and on what basis he had changed his mind on 18.05.2012 is not forthcoming
Stating he was “victimised for extraneous reasons”, he said the “illegal imposition of DV ban” could not be made a basis for Dastane to challenge his appointment as Army Commander. “In fact, it is the answering respondent (Dalbir Singh) who is the victim and not the appellant (Dastane),” his affidavit states.
Referring to the reply filed by the Ministry of Defence in June 2014, Dalbir Singh’s affidavit states “it is now clearly established that the authorities, including the Government of India, Ministry of Defence were satisfied of gross injustice meted out to me and my honour and military reputation including my innocence...”.
The Ministry, in its affidavit, had not only rejected Dastane’s challenge but also censured the manner in which V K Singh had placed Dalbir Singh under the DV ban saying “the entire exercise to issue show cause notice was premeditated and as per records, the directions issued in this regard, including imposition of the DV ban and issue of show cause notice, were found to be illegal”.
The one-man Judicial Committee comprising Justice L Narasimha Reddy set up by the Central Government to look into the implementation of “one rank, one pension” (OROP) formula for the ex-servicemen and address anomalies arising thereof held its first public hearing at the Chandimandir Military Station today. Ex-servicemen contended that major points of discord were not included in the committee’s terms of reference. A large number of retired armed forces personnel across all ranks attended the hearing to present their views and opinions before the committee, which is scheduled to submit its reports to the government in December. Justice Reddy is a former Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. Ex-servicemen said major points of discord that did not form part of the committee’s mandate included the definition of OROP, not equalising the pension annually, not fixing pension according to the highest rate for the particular rank and instead basing it on the average rate of the rank, fixing the date of implementation and base year for calculations. Veterans said unless these key issues were resolved, OROP would lose its real essence. It would not only deprive them of full benefits, but also lead to more disparities later on. This, they claimed, would lead to more unrest and bad blood.
In my sustained effort to help others understand the news, there is one important area that really must be addressed, both because this is an election period and because some of these words are so widely confused and conflated in modern journalistic usage they now have little to no meaning. Specifically, I am referring to what we know as the "Levels of War," and the way that terms like "tactics" and "strategy" and "campaign" (and several other related concepts) are thrown around as though they are synonyms. They are not; and how they are used, both by reporters and the candidates themselves, appears to be a reliable way to separate the wheat from the chafe.
But why does this matter in reporting on—or in speaking/proclaiming about—news coming from the Middle East or any other conflict zone you might want to know about?
Simply put, if a candidate mixes and matches these words in very non-specific ways, it is a pretty clear indicator that both his national security advisors and perhaps even his international relations advisors are either rank amateurs or are flatly ignored by the candidate.
So down to brass tacks: There are four levels of warfare. These are the Political, Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of war. I will use examples from World War II in order to level the playing field and convey these ideas in their most basic (and least confused) form. For our purposes, we will only address three in detail: the tactical level, the operational level, and the strategic level. I believe that the "Political" level is self-evident, but for clarity I will address it briefly. It is perhaps the most important, because decisions at the political level have the ability to directly or indirectly affect the other three.
Tactical Level
A simple definition, though not an ironclad one, of the tactical level of warfare might read (my words):
"The tactical level of warfare is that level where men meet and fight from the individual level through the division. It is the realm of skirmishes, engagements, and battles. Planning at the tactical level starts at 'now' and occurs out to roughly 48 hours in the future, or at most a few weeks. The tactical level of warfare is where one sees the face of battle."
Most weapon systems used in war operate at this level. Knives, bayonets, guns, cannons, bombs, and torpedoes—the actual tools of personal destruction are mostly tactical. (Nuclear weapons, obviously, transcend this area.) Some information systems operate at this level as well. Speed at this echelon is sometimes measured in yards per day, but usually in miles per hour. Tactical combat for infantry on foot rarely moves faster than 2.5 m.p.h., but even jets moving to conduct an individual bombing raid rarely move faster than a few hundred miles per hour. This is the popular conception of war. This is war at the level of Saving Private Ryan. This is fighting by privates and sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and colonels. The battles on the beaches of Normandy in 1944 were tactical.
Operational Level
The operational level is somewhat more difficult to define and understand. Operational level planning occurs with the intent of setting missions and objectives that will bend the enemy to your will in an entire theater of operations. Think of this as the blueprint that helps you build a house from a bunch of bricks. Each brick is a tactical engagement. You put them together to make a wall, and then a house. Operational level plans are known as "campaigns,"and by design each consists of a series of battles and engagements (ie. the 'tactical level') designed to win some larger objective. The operational level of warfare is the realm of generals. Plans begin with the intent that they will start a few days or weeks in the future and may stretch out to cover months of time and thousands of square miles. This level of war deals with the movements of entire corps, armies and army groups, or whole fleets at sea. Again, referring back to June 1944, the overall plan for invading the beaches and the entire province beyond the beaches, Operation Overlord, was an operational level plan.
Strategic Level
Thirdly, there is the strategic level of warfare. Over time there have been various definitions and subsets of this overarching term. There has been "Grand Strategy" and "National Strategy" and "Military Strategy," all of which address slightly different aspects of the same general concept. This level concerns the planning and conduct of the war at the highest levels. Strategic plans aim for objectives that lead directly to, or at least significantly toward, peace. In other words, these plans seek to answer the question, "How will we win this war?" It is easier to understand strategic concepts not by assigning a force level as a definition, but by understanding the level at which decisions occur. Within the U.S. Army, strategic level decisions occur at the highest level headquarters in the field, most often in conjunction and with the approval of the National Command Authority. This is the echelon that approves changes in force structure.
Strategic decisions also determine the allocation of portions of national resources. Decisions about production of material and allocations of raw material and personnel occur at this level. Strategy plans lay out what the lower level campaign objectives should be, allocate forces, and choose the "theaters" in which campaigns occur. The decision that the primary invasion of Occupied Europe in 1944 would take place at Normandy (as opposed to southern France, on the coast of Germany, or up from Italy and around or through the Alps) was a strategic-level decision. The decision to defeat Germany first, and then Japan, might also be considered strategic in nature. Decisions regarding the allocation of resources available to the nation ("Do we build 10,000 tanks and 2,000 planes and 100 ships, or should we devote our industrial base to making 3,000 ships and 1,000 tanks and 500 planes?") are strategic in that they indirectly determine the course and direction of the lower levels of warfare. You cannot fight a land war without land forces, and you cannot win at sea without ships. But you can never have all the things that the different services want, so choices have to be made, and these decisions, by their nature, are strategic.
Most Popular
Political Level
Finally, as I mentioned, there is the political level of warfare. In our society, the civilian government retains control over decisions to go to war, whom to fight, and with whom to ally.
Decisions at this level involve the interrelationships between allies, decisions regarding the factors of production, the national will, and societal issues. And it is here that another profession holds great sway, one that operates in the realm of influencing civilians. Here, one of the most critical tools—"weapon" in all but name—is the power which is held by the press, by reporters.
Obviously, all four levels are interrelated. There was no way to avoid that in the 20th Century, and probably less so in the 21st.
A political decision may directly result in a tactical engagement and even have bearing upon the conduct of that engagement. For example, and to return to our Normandy example, it was a political decision made at the War Department that resulted in a new rule that pulled sole surviving siblings out of combat zones. (Yes, Saving Private Ryan is at least partially based upon a true story.)
A political decision about something like Rules of Engagement or a desire not to seem too militaristic—such as the idea not to send U.S. armored vehicles to Somalia early on—can also have an effect on the nature of these fights. The reverse may also occur; for example, tactical events in South Vietnam pushed President Nixon towards a political decision to conduct bombing operations over Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam. Cross level influence is even more common between adjoining levels, but, in general, these distinctions remain valid as mental constructs with which we may subdivide war for the purpose of discussion, decipher the news, and deconstruct the candidates' statements. The lines between these divisions may blur along the boundaries; this is to be expected.
The separation between tactical and strategic warfare might become confused because these lines depend upon numerous factors, such as forces in theater and the geographic scale of the theater itself. Yet for our purposes, these divisions serve as an adequate starting point.
Now, for some examples of how terms like "Strategy" can be misused.
Donald Trump is often cited by journalists for having an ISIS "Strategy." But what you see, when you look at any of his actual statements, is not a "Strategy" linking Ends, Ways, and Means, but instead a grocery list of things that he thinks should be done. Most of it is quite tactical in nature. A grocery list of military buzzwords does not a strategy make.
Journalists should know better, because words mean things.
Jeb Bush is even more egregious in that he himself uses the word "Strategy" over and over again, without apparently any actual idea about what the term might mean. Here you see him decrying the current President for a "lack of strategy" without ever actually explaining what he means, either in his critique or in his use of the term. Straight from Fox and Friends:
"What I would do is to do what I proposed two months ago at the Reagan Library, which is to defeat ISIS, and to defeat Assad, to bring stability because it's in our national security interest to do it…We don't have a strategy right now. This president is incrementally getting us into a quagmire without having a strategy to defeat ISIS."
We could go on, but now at least you have some ammo of your own to help you knock down the easy targets.
![Dalbir Singh was placed under a DV ban by V K Singh between April and May 2012.]({"default":{"load":"default","w":"73","h":"40","src":"//img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/BBvKsO3.img?h=405&w=728&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f&x=329&y=168"},"size3column":{"load":"default","w":"62","h":"35","src":"//img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/BBvKsO3.img?h=347&w=624&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f&x=329&y=168"},"size2column":{"load":"default","w":"62","h":"35","src":"//img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/BBvKsO3.img?h=347&w=624&m=6&q=60&o=f&l=f&x=329&y=168"}})
