Pakistan Army Chiefs’ Adventurism 2016 And India’s Options – Analysis

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/21092016-pakistan-army-chiefs-adventurism-2016-and-indias-options-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29




  Pakistan Army Chiefs’ Adventurism 2016
                                       And
                 India’s Options – Analysis
                                        By 
                          Dr Subhash Kapila
By SAAG

Pakistan's Raheel Sharif. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Steven Schneider, Wikipedia Commons.

 

 

 

September 21, 2016

 

  

Pakistan Army Chiefs have compulsively resorted to Kashmir-centric military adventurism against India based on flawed and misconceived assessments on Kashmir Valley being ripe for secession from India and a misreading of firmness of resolve of Indian political leaders in responding to their military adventurism


The Pakistan Army supported and facilitated terrorist attacks against the Indian Army have increased for over a year now during the incumbency of the General Raheel Sharif, the present Pakistan Army Chief due to retire in November 2016. In case of General Raheel Sharif what requires to be noted is that his adventurism is not confined only to military adventurism against India but also extended to political adventurism in Pakistan’s domestic politics. For all practical purposes, he had carried out a ‘soft coup’ against Pakistan’s duly elected PM Nawaz—reflected in one of my papers of that time. Having carved a larger than life domestic political image with his disputable counter-terrorism offensive in frontier regions, General Raheel Sharif seems to be having second thoughts on living upto his January 2016 public announcement that he will not seek extension. What better way to get out of his commitment than to escalate tensions with India and thereby facilitating an extension to be thrust on him. Be as it may, what is of concern to India as to what impelled the Pakistan Army Chief to indulge in conflict-escalation with Kashmir Valley-centric contours?



Once again like in 1965 and thereafter, yet another Pakistan Army Chief has grossly misread that the Kashmir Valley is ripe for secession from India based on the intensity of the Pakistan Army incited unrest. Blame for this misreading has to be shared by the Indian policy establishment in its permissive toleration of Kashmir Valley separatists like the Hurriyat leaders openly declaring their loyalties to Pakistan. Greater share of such blame needs to be apportioned to India’s ‘intellectual terrorists’ of Indian opposition parties, media elites and academics propagating ‘dialogue’ with seditionists. Such Indian manifestations seem to have fed Pakistani Army Chief’s perceptions that India was adopting appeasement policies to Kashmir Valley seditionists out of fear of loss of the Kashmir Valley because the people of Jammu and Ladakh hate Pakistan.


Against such a contextual background, three questions emerge which need to be answered initially and these two questions are (1) Has India lost control of the Kashmir Valley? (2) Is the Kashmir Valley ripe for secession from India and (3) Are the Indian Armed Forces incapable of stemming and defeating Pakistan Army’s Kashmir Valley-centric military adventurism?


The answers to all of the above three questions is in the negative. India has not lost control of the Kashmir Valley because what is in play is the Indian democracy’s tolerance of dissent within certain reasonable limits. The Indian State is strong enough to exercise strong and effective control over the Kashmir Valley seditionists paid by Pakistan.


Media reports tend to sensationalise that the Kashmir Valley is ripe for secession from India and that the Valley populace is alienated from India, The truth is that the vast silent majority in Kashmir Valley is a hostage to the terrorising and violence inflicted on them by Pakistani and some Kashmiri terrorists. If the Kashmir Valley had been ripe for secession then why did the Valley register nearly seventy percent voting in the last Assembly elections despite the threats of the terrorists and seditionists?


The answer to the last question is that the Indian Armed Forces ever since 1947 have not only stemmed and defeated Pakistan Army’s military adventurism against India more notably the 1971 War which besides leading to the creation of Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) but also led to 96,000 Pakistani Army Prisoners of War being in Indian Army custody.


The Uri terrorists attacks by Pakistan Army affiliated Jaish-e Mohammad brings to a head the crucial question as to how long India can bear Pakistan Army’s strategy of a ‘Thousand Cuts’ without strong reprisals against Pakistan and Pakistan Army in particular? This too in an environment when India today is counted as a an emergent major power and when Pakistan Army’s repeated military adventurism has incensed Indian public opinion to a feverish pitch demanding strong retribution. What are India’s options now?


The Indian electronic media has been alive for the last three days with panel debates and TV anchors giving out military solutions to reflect India’s strong reprisals. But then war is so serious a matter to be left to arm-chair strategists, former diplomats and Army Generals and so -called academic strategic experts

When it comes to planning and executing strong Indian military reprisals, this domain is strictly and exclusively for the Indian Armed Forces professionals who have spent their lifetime dealing with Pakistan Army’s military adventurisms credibly and with success. Indian military responses and their operationalisation to put an end finally to Pakistan Army Chiefs propensity for Kashmir Valley-centric military adventurism should be left to the trustworthy hands of the Indian Armed Forces hierarchy without interference by civilian bureaucrats and intelligence officials.


The Indian debates over the last few days have focussed on diplomatic and economic options with the former being highlighted more and being gloated upon as India’s diplomatic strikes in ‘Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation’. True, Pakistan stands diplomatically isolated but then in international relations such developments are transient by themselves and they also denote an Indian dependency on external powers to execute policy initiatives that India should put into effect on its own standing as a regional power and emergent global power.
If India wants to bring about complete diplomatic isolation of Pakistan and which should be highly visible in South Asia, then it should give a lead in the boycott of the SAARC Summit scheduled in November 2016 to be held at Islamabad.

Afghanistan and Bangladesh have advocated such a course. Sequentially, as advocated in my last SAAG Paper a week back before the Uri attacks that SAARC should be disbanded and India should strive for a new regional cooperation organisation minus Pakistan and with no ‘observer status’ for powers external to the Indian Subcontinent.


The next notable Indian reprisal against Pakistan is that India should itself designate officially Pakistan as a ‘Terrorist State’ and apply economic, cultural and social sanctions. India should not as a supplicant been seen pleading major powers to control Pakistan’s terrorism against India. Even if US pressures come in the wake of such a step, they must be firmly resisted. Or, if the US is so concerned to bail out the Pakistan Army then why has it not secured rendition of Hafeez Saeed and Massod Azhar carrying sizeable US bounties on their heads?



More telling and something that would force the Pakistani public at large to curse the Pakistan Army is for its military adventurism against India is to forthwith abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty which was thrust on an unsuspecting Nehru as Prime Minister by United States and World Bank pressures. India is not the India of five decades ago. India has a salience today in the global power balance which major powers cannot ignore just to side with Pakistan. Release of waters from rivers flowing through India need to be regulated in direct proportion to Pakistan Army Chiefs amenability to control terrorism against India emanating from Pakistani territory and disbandment of its Islamic Jihadi surrogates.


On the above count Pakistan’s strategic patron China would have no standing or moral voice to protest Indian actions since China itself has been regulating and diverting waters of the mighty Brahmaputra River flowing into India from the Tibetan Plateau.



Countering Pakistan Army Chief’s propensity for Kashmir Valley-centric military adventurism against India has never received due attention of ‘Psychological Warfare Operations’ to highlight the damage the Pakistan Army Hierarchies over decades has inflicted on Pakistan’s nation-building. In the last decade I had written a couple of Papers on the subject of “Pakistan’s Democracy is a Strategic Imperative of India”. This should be a special focus beamed at Pakistan to highlight as to where India has reached since 1947 economically and where Pakistan too could have reached had it not been for the Pakistan Army constantly subverting democracy in Pakistan.
The Uri terrorist attacks will not be the last of such Pakistan Army inspired attacks against India in the Kashmir Valley or elsewhere in India. The “Kashmir Mantra” is the magical potion that ensures Pakistan Army’s survival as the dominating force in Pakistan’s domestic dynamics, chiefly by stoking fears of ‘Hindu India’ domination and destruction of Pakistan. To deny this mantra to the Pakistan Army, India needs to fully integrate the State of Jammu, Kashmir Valley and Ladakh as an integral and inviolable part of the Indian Union with no Special Provisions. The people of Jammu and Ladakh demand full integration with the Indian Union. Let here be no Indian ‘Doubting Thomases’ advocating tinkering with the unanimous Special Resolution of the Parliament 1992.


Concluding, it needs to be observed that while India is rightly incensed and Indian public opinion demands reprisals against the Pakistan Army as the patron-saint of all terrorism against India, this crucial response must be left exclusively to the Indian Armed Forces professionals and not become an over-kill analysis by TV anchors. In the same vein, to make this task of the Indian Army easier, the Indian Government cannot be seen parleying with Kashmir Valley separatist leaders who ruminate and preach anti-India hatred as Pakistan Army’s fifth columnists.

TOPICS:Foreign Policy  India   Military    Pakistan    South Asia

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Creating Frankenstein :: The Saudi Export Of Wahhabism

SOURCE:
http://www.defencenews.in/article/Creating-Frankenstein-The-Saudi-Export-Of-Wahhabism-7655



                    Creating Frankenstein
            : The Saudi Export Of Wahhabism

 

There has long been debate about the longevity of the Saudi ruling family. My initial conclusion when I first visited Saudi Arabia exactly 40 years ago was: this can’t last. I would still maintain it cannot last even if my time line has changed given that the Saudi monarchy obviously has far greater resilience than I initially gave it credit for. One major reason for the doubts about the Al Saud’s viability is obviously the Faustian bargain they made with the Wahhabis, proponents of a puritan, intolerant, discriminatory, anti-pluralistic interpretation of Islam. It is a bargain that has produced the single largest dedicated public diplomacy campaign in history. Estimates of Saudi spending on the funding of Muslim cultural institutions across the globe and the forging of close ties to non-Wahhabi Muslim leaders and intelligence agencies in various Muslim nations that have bought into significant elements of the Wahhabi worldview range from $75 to $100 billion.

The campaign is an issue that I have looked at since I first visited the kingdom, numerous subsequent visits, when I lived in Saudi Arabia in the wake of 9/11, and during a 4.5-year court battle that I won in 2006 in the British House of Lords. It is an issue that I am now writing a book about that looks at the fallout of the campaign in four Asian, one African and two European countries.

The campaign is not simply a product of the marriage between the Al Sauds and the Wahhabis. It is central to Saudi soft power policy and the Al Saud’s survival strategy. One reason, certainly not the only one, that the longevity of the Al Sauds is a matter of debate is the fact that the propagation of Wahhabism is having a backlash in countries across the globe. More than ever before theological or ideological similarities between Wahhabism or for that matter its theological parent, Salafism, and jihadism in general and the Islamic State in particular are under the spotlight.

The problem for the Al Sauds is not just that their legitimacy is wholly dependent on their identification with Wahhabism. It is that the Al Sauds since the launch of the campaign were often only nominally in control of it and that they have let a genie out of the bottle that now leads an independent life and that can’t be put back into the bottle. That is one major reason why I argue and will do so in greater detail in these remarks that the Al Sauds and the Wahhabis are nearing a crunch point, one that will not necessarily offer solutions, but in fact one that could make things worse by sparking ever more militant splits that will make themselves felt across the Muslim world and in minority Muslim communities elsewhere in multiple ways including increasing sectarian attitudes in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

The recent shooting in the southern Philippines of a prominent Saudi Wahhabi cleric whose popularity is evident in his following of 12 million on Twitter suggests that it is not just the government but the ulema who are becoming targets. And not just ulema who are totally subservient to the Saudi government. Sheikh Aaidh al-Qarni is a product of the fusion between Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood that produced the Sahwa, a Saudi Salafist political reform movement. While Philippine investigators are operating on the assumption that IS was responsible for the shooting, Saudi media were quick to report that Saudi authorities had warned the Philippines days earlier that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were planning an attack.

Let’s take a step back to paint a framework in which the Saudi funding campaign should be viewed. For starters, one has to realize that while it all may be one pot of money the goal of the campaign differs for different parties. For the Wahhabi ulema it is about proselytization, about the spreading of the faith. For the government it’s about soft power. At times the interests of the government and the ulema coincide, and at times they diverge. By the same token, the campaign on some levels has been an unparalleled success, on others success is questionable and one could go even a step further to argue that it risks becoming a liability for the government.

It may be hard to conceive of Wahhabism as soft power but fact of the matter is that Salafism was a movement that had only sprouted miniscule communities in the centuries preceding the rise of Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab and only started to make real inroads into Muslim communities beyond the Arabian Peninsula 175 years after his death. By the 1980s, the Saudi campaign had established Salafism as an integral part of the‎ global community of Muslims and sparked greater religiosity in various Arab countries as well as the emergence of Islamist movements and organizations. The soft power aspect of it certainly in relation to the power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran has paid off, particularly in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan where sectarian attitudes and attitudes towards minorities and Iran are hardening.

Let me illustrate this with an anecdote. The man who was until recently deputy head of Indonesian intelligence and deputy head of Nahdlatul Ulema, one of the world’s largest Islamic movements that professes to be anti-Wahhabi is a fluent Arabic speaker. He spent 12 years in the Middle East representing the Indonesian intelligence service, eight of those in Saudi Arabia. This man will profess in the same breath his dislike of the Wahhabis and at the same time warn that Shiites, who constitute 1.2 percent of the Indonesian population and that includes the estimated 2 million Sunni converts over the last 40 years, are one of the foremost domestic threats to Indonesian national security. This man is not instinctively anti-Shiite, but sees Shiites as an Iranian fifth wheel. The impact of Saudi funding, Wahhabism and Salafism is such that even Nahdlatul Ulema or NU is forced to adopt Wahhabi language and concepts when it comes to perceptions of the threat posed by Iran and Shiites in the Islamic republic’s wake.

Wahhabism’s proselytizing character served the Al Saud’s purpose as they first sought to stymie Arab nationalism’s appeal and later that of Iran’s Islamic revolution, tectonic developments that promised to redraw the political map of the Middle East and North Africa in ways that potentially threatened Saudi Arabia’s rulers. Both developments were revolutionary and involved the toppling of Western-backed monarchs. Arab nationalism was secular and socialist in nature. The Islamic revolution in Iran was the first toppling of a US icon in the region and a moreover involved a monarch. The Islamic republic represented a form of revolutionary Islam that recognized a degree of popular sovereignty. Each in their own way, posed a threat to the Al Sauds who cloaked their legitimacy in a religious puritanism that demanded on theological grounds absolute obedience of the ruler.

Ultimately, the Saudi campaign benefited from Arab socialism’s failure to deliver jobs, public goods and services and the death knell to notions of Arab unity delivered by Israel’s overwhelming victory in the 1967 Middle East during which it conquered East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s early rupture with the non-Salafist Muslim Brotherhood led many Brothers to join the stream of migrant workers that headed for the Gulf. They brought their activism with them and took up positions in education that few Saudis were able to fill. They also helped create and staff organizations like the Muslim World League, initially founded to counter Nasser’s Pan-Arab appeal.
The campaign further exploited opportunities created by Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat who defined himself as “the believing president.” Sadat in contrast to Nasser allowed Muslim groups like the Brotherhood and Salafis to re-emerge and create social organizations, build mosques and found universities.

The rise of the Brotherhood in the kingdom sparked a fusion of the group’s political thinking with segments of the Wahhabi and Salafi community but also accentuated stark differences between the two. Saudi establishment clergy as well as militants took the Brotherhood to task for its willingness to accept the state and operate within the framework of its constrictions. They also accused it of creating division or fitna among Muslims by endorsing the formation of political groups and parties and demanding loyalty to the group rather than to God, Muslims and Islam.

The Saudi campaign was bolstered by the creation of various institutions including not only the Muslim World League and its multiple subsidiaries but also Al Haramain, another charity, and the likes of the Islamic University of Medina. In virtually all of these instances, the Saudis were the funders. The executors were others often with agendas of their own such as the Brotherhood or in the case of Al Haramain, more militant Islamists, if not jihadists. Saudi oversight was non-existent and the laissez faire attitude started at the top.

Let me give you an example. The National Commercial Bank when it was Saudi Arabia’s largest financial institution had a department of numbered accounts. These were all accounts belonging to members of the ruling family. Only three people had access to those accounts, one of them was the majority owner of the bank, Khaled Bin Mahfouz. Khaled would get a phone call from a senior member of the family who would instruct him to transfer money to a specific country, leaving it up to Khaled where precisely that money would go. In one instance, Khaled was instructed by Prince Sultan, the then defense minister, to wire $5 million to Bosnia. Sultan did not indicate the beneficiary. Khaled sent the money to a charity in Sarajevo that in the wake of 9/11 was raided by US law enforcement and Bosnian security agents. The hard disks of the foundation revealed the degree to which the institution was controlled by jihadists. In one instance, the Saudis suspected one of the foundation’s operatives of being a member of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad. They sent someone to Sarajevo to investigate. The investigator confronted the man saying: ‘We hear that you have these connections and if that is true we need to part ways.’ The man put his hand on his heart and denied the allegation. As far as the Saudis were concerned the issue was settled until the man later in court testimony described how easy it was to fool the Saudis.

It took the Al Qaeda bombings of 2003/4 rather than 9/11 to persuade the Saudis to really take control by banning charity donations in mosques, putting the various charities under a central organization, controlling the transfer of funds abroad and working with the United States and others to clean out some of the charities or like in the case of Al Haramain close them down.

The problem is that by that time it was on the one hand too late and on the other the soft power slash proselytization campaign still served a purpose. Let me start off with the purpose. The Saudi campaign shifted into high gear in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis that left the kingdom flush with cash. It allowed King Faisal to pay back a debt to the ulema for their support in his rivalry with King Saud. But more importantly it was an important tool in countering the appeal of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.

I want to dwell for a little bit on the Saudi Iranian relationship because it is a key driver of Saudi Arabia’s soft power strategy not only then but up until today. Underlying the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is what is from the Saudi perspective an existential battle that is sharpened by uncertainty about the kingdom’s relationship with the United States. US officials for much of their country’s relationship with Saudi Arabia have insisted that the two countries do not share common values, that their relationship is based on common interests. Underlying the now cooler relations between Washington and Riyadh is the fact that those interests are diverging. The divergence became evident with the eruption of popular revolts in 2011 and particularly US criticism of the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain to squash a rebellion and hesitant American support for the toppling of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. It is also obvious in the US persistence in reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran that is returning the Islamic republic to the international fold despite deep-felt Saudi objections.

The result of all of this has been with the rise of the Salmans, King Salman and his powerful son, deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, a far more assertive foreign and military policy. Make however no mistake, Saudi Arabia’s new assertiveness is not a declaration of independence from the United States. On the contrary, Mohammed Bin Salman made that very clear in a recent Economist interview. It is designed to force the United States to reengage in the Middle East in the belief that it will constitute a return to the status ante quo: US support for the kingdom in the belief that it is the best guarantor for regional stability. The Saudis appear to be operating on the basis of Marx’s Verelendungstheorie: things have to get worse to get better. That is the part of the backdrop of the stalled military intervention in Yemen, Saudi moves in Syria and credible sources most recently suggesting that the ongoing multi-nation military exercises in the kingdom are a stepping stone for Saudi intervention in Iraq to counter Iran-backed Shiite militias.

To be clear, Saudi government leaders in contrast to Wahhabis do not necessarily hate Shias so much as that they see them as an Iranian fifth wheel and a tool for countering Iran by motivating Sunnis to fear and resist Iranian influence. Anti-Shiite sectarianism helps Saudi Arabia mobilize both Muslims to take up arms as part of the kingdom’s struggle with Iran for regional hegemony. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly accused Iran of fuelling sectarianism by backing Shia militias who have targeted Sunnis in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria. The Saudi allegations notwithstanding, a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that anti-Shia rhetoric was much more common online than anti-Sunni rhetoric.

Fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia had real concerns in the immediate wake of the Iranian revolution. The fall of the autocratic pro-US regime of the Shah made place for a regime that was revolutionary and keen on exporting its revolution to the Gulf. Iran made no bones about it. The headquarters, for example, of the Islamic Liberation Front of Bahrain was initially housed in the diwan of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri. Revolution not Shi’ism was what Iran hoped to export. It took however less than a year for nationalism to trump revolution in Iran. The process was accelerated by the Saudi-backed Iraqi invasion of Iran and the eight year-long bloody Iran-Iraq war which together with the soft power campaign marked the beginning of a largely covert war that has been ongoing now for almost four decades despite periods in which relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran temporarily improved..

The Saudi determination to counter the Iranian revolutionary threat by defeating rather than containing it has ever since shaped Saudi policy towards the Islamic republic and towards Shiites. To be sure, Iran repeatedly took the bait with the creation of Hezbollah, political protests during the haj in Mecca, the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, to name just a few of the incidents.

Nonetheless, much like the Al Saud’s Faustian pact with Wahhabism the kingdom’s handling of relations with revolutionary Iran was certain to ultimately backfire and position the Islamic republic as an existential threat. Rather than embrace its Shiite minority by ensuring that its members had equal opportunity and a stake in society and countering discriminatory statements by the clergy and government institutions, the kingdom grew even more suspicious of Shias who populate the country’s oil-rich Eastern Province. In doing so, they provided Iran with a golden opportunity to forge closer ties to disgruntled Shia communities in the Gulf.

Middle East expert Suzanne Maloney predicted that “the most important variable in the stability of states with significant Shia minorities — such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan‎ will be the overall tenor of these states’ domestic politics, particularly on minority rights issues.” A Kuwaiti Shiite businessman who visited Tehran shortly after the 1979 toppling of the Shah saw the revolution as opening the door to a new era. “We are citizens of Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia. We are Shiites, not Iranians. What happened in Iran is good for everyone. It will persuade our governments to treat us as equals,” the businessman said at the time. It was an attitude that was manifested in the fact that up to a million Shiites died in the Iran-Iraq war defending Iraq against Iran.

The businessman’s words went unheeded. Instead of acknowledging legitimate grievances, the kingdom accused Iran of Interference in its internal affairs and those of its allies. It relied on autocratic minority Sunni leaders to keep a grip on majority Shia populations in Iraq and Bahrain.

The US effectively thwarted Saudi policy with its 2003 invasion of Iraq, which brought majority Shiites to power. In Bahrain, the Sunni minority rulers retain power through harsh repression. Saudi decisions in February and March 2016 to cancel $4 billion in aid to the Lebanese, ban Saudis from visiting Lebanon and outlaw Hezbollah as a terrorist organization constitute an attempt to deny Lebanese Shiites opportunities that come with constituting a majority of the country’s multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society. Saudi leaders failed to recognize that Tehran’s perception of itself as Shia Central was no less legitimate than Riyadh’s insistence on being Sunni Central or Israel’s claim that it is the centre of the Jewish world.

As a result, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq that brought the Shiite majority for the first time to power left the Saudis incredulous. “To us, it seems out of this world that you do this. We fought a war together to keep Iran from occupying Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait (in 1991). Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason,” Saudi Foreign. Minister Prince Saud al Faisal told an American audience in 2005.

Similarly, the perceived Iranian threat to Saudi dominance prompted Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, for decades a key player in the shaping of Saudi security policy and the kingdom’s relations with the United States, to warn Richard Dearlove, the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, already more than a decade ago that: “the time is not far off in the Middle East, Richard, when it will be literally ‘God help the Shia’. More than a billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them. As recently as October 2015, Saudi TV Host Abdulellah Al-Dosari celebrated uncontested the death of some 300 Shiite Iranians, including Iranian diplomats, in a stampede during the haj in Mecca. “Praise be to Allah, who relieved Islam and the Muslims from their evil. We pray that Allah will usher them into hell for all eternities.”

The Saudi approach created the seeds for intermittent domestic unrest and repeated tit-for-tat attempts to weaken and undermine the legitimacy of the other, it set the stage for a global effort to ensure that Muslim communities across the globe empathized with Saudi Wahhabism rather than revolutionary Iranian ideals, and with Saudi support for Saddam Hussein’s bloody eight-year long war against Iran poisoned relations despite occasional attempts by the two states to paper over their differences.

The poisoning was evident in the will of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose anti-monarchical views were rooted in the oppression of the imperial regime of the shah that he had toppled. “Muslims should curse tyrants, including the Saudi royal family, these traitors to God’s great shrine, may God’s curses and that of his prophets and angels be upon them,” Khomeini ordained.

The execution of Nimr al Nimr in January was not simply designed as many analysts maintain to send a message to domestic opposition, nor was it simply intended to send a message to Iran. The message, ‘don’t mess with me,’ has long been loud and clear. The execution was part of a deliberate strategy to delay if not derail implementation of the nuclear agreement and Iran’s return to the international fold. Iranian hardliners played into Saudi hands with the storming of the Saudi embassy. It is the hardliners that Saudi Arabia failed to strengthen in last week’s elections in Iran for parliament and the Assembly of Experts, the council that eventually will elect Iran’s next spiritual leader.

The strategy makes perfect sense. Saudi regional leadership amounts to exploitation of a window of opportunity rather than reliance on the assets and power needed to sustain it. Saudi Arabia’s interest is to extend its window of opportunity for as long as possible. That window of opportunity exists as long as the obvious regional powers – Iran, Turkey and Egypt – are in various degrees of disrepair. Punitive international sanctions and international isolation long took care of Iran.

And that is what is changing. Iran may not be Arab and maintains a sense of Persian superiority but it has the assets Saud Arabia lacks: a large population base, an industrial base, resources, a battle hardened military, a deep-rooted culture, a history of empire and a geography that makes it a crossroads. Mecca and money will not be able to compete, and certainly not with Wahhabism in control.

And that may prove to be the Al Saud’s second existential challenge. I would argue that increasingly the domestic, foreign policy and reputational cost of the Al Saud’s marriage to Wahhabism is changing the cost benefit analysis. Visitors to the kingdom in the 1990s would see the slogan of “progress without change” plastered all over the place. Fact of the matter is that change today more than ever is the key to progress.

Tumbling commodity and energy prices are forcing the Saudi government to reform, diversify, streamline and rationalize the kingdom’s economy. Degrees of change are already obvious with the cutting of subsidies, the raising of prices for services, the search for alternative sources of revenues and moves towards a greater role for the private sector and for women. Cost cutting is occurring at a time that Saudi Arabia is spending effusively on efforts to counter winds of political change in the region not only with regard to its new military assertiveness but also with massive financial injections into regimes like that of Egypt that have yet to perform. Reduced income, cost cutting and reform will ultimately change the country’s social contract that promised cradle-to-grave welfare in exchange for a surrender of political rights and acceptance of the pact with Wahhabism and repression. Reform that enables the kingdom to become a competitive, 21st century knowledge economy is difficult if not impossible as long as it is held back by the strictures of a religious doctrine that looks backwards rather than forwards, and whose ideal is the emulation of life as it was at the time of the prophet and his companions.

Saudi Arabia was shell shocked on September 11 2001 when it became evident that the majority of the perpetrators were Saudi nationals. Saudi society was put under the kind of scrutiny the kingdom had never experienced before. The same is in some ways happening again today in the wake of the execution of Sheikh Nimr. The Saudis expected human rights criticism. The criticism goes in one ear and out the other. What they didn’t expect fuelled by the emergence of the Islamic State was that the focus would be on Wahhabism and Salafism itself.

As a result, the cost is beginning to become perhaps too high as Saudi Arabia finds itself being increasingly compared to the Islamic State. Not unfairly. Wahhabism in the 18th century and at the beginning of the 20th century with the creation in 1932 of the second Saudi state was what the Islamic State is today. Saudi Arabia is what the Islamic State will become should it survive. Saudi clerics despite their denunciations of IS as a deviation from Islam admit this.

Adel Kalbani, a former imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca was unequivocal. “Daesh (the Arabic reference to IS) has adopted Salafist thought. It’s not the Muslim Brotherhood’s thought, Qutubism, Sufism or Ash’ari thought. They draw their thoughts from what is written in our own books, from our own principles…. The ideological origin is Salafism. They exploited our own principles that can be found in our own books… We follow the same thought but apply it in a refined way,” Kalbani said. Mohammed Bin Salman summed up the Al Saud’s dilemma when he told The New York Times in November: “The terrorists are telling me that I am not a Muslim. And the world is telling me I am a terrorist.”

One can question the effectiveness of the Saudi soft power effort on multiple levels. True the, Islamic Conference Organization recently backed Saudi Arabia in its conflict with the Islamic republic. But only four countries broke off diplomatic relations with Iran following the storming of the Saudi embassy in Riyadh. All four – Bahrain, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia – were dependent on the kingdom. None of the other Gulf states did so although some lowered the level of their diplomatic representation in Tehran. Only the move by Sudan had more than symbolic value. It threatened to disrupt Iranian logistics in the region. Sudan was rewarded with a pledge of $5 billion in military aid, funds that included money originally earmarked for Lebanon. Similarly, the Gulf states similarly followed Saudi Arabia in advising their nationals not to travel to Lebanon because of Hezbollah, the Shiite militia.

Nonetheless, the potential risk of Wahhabism and Salafism’s identification with the Islamic State or at the least as a breeding ground for more militant, more violent strands of Islam is increasing.

Two major political parties in the Dutch parliament recently asked the government whether there was a legal basis for outlawing Wahhabi and Salafi institutions, schools, academies, social services that are funded by Saudi and Kuwaiti institutions. The question arose as a result of graduates of those institutions increasingly refusing to interact with Dutch society and allegations that a minority had joined IS in Syria. The government has yet to respond to the questions. Nonetheless, imagine a scenario in which the government did move to a ban that would likely be challenged in the courts and imagine that the ban would be upheld in the courts. The next step would be the banning of Saudi funding and ultimately the expulsion of the Saudi embassy’s religious attaché. It’s not a development that the Saudi state can afford.

The Al Saud’s risk was also evident late last year when German vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, in a rare attack on Saudi Arabia by a senior Western government official while in office, accused the kingdom of financing extremist mosques and communities in the West that constitute a security risk and warned that it must stop. “We have to make clear to the Saudis that the time of looking away is over. Wahhabi mosques all over the world are financed by Saudi Arabia. Many Islamists who are a threat to public safety come from these communities in Germany,” he said.

Changing international attitudes towards Saudi sectarianism and the fighting of proxy wars against Iran are evident in a quiet conclusion in Western intelligence and policy circles that the crisis in Syria is in part a product of the international community’s indulgence of Saudi propagation of Wahhabism. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director John Brennan unsuccessfully tried in 2011 as peaceful anti-regime protests in Syria descended into violence to persuade Saudi Arabia at a meeting in Washington of Middle Eastern intelligence chiefs to stop supporting militant Sunni Muslim Islamist fighters in Syria. ‎An advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recounted that the Saudis ignored Brennan’s request. They “went back home and increased their efforts with the extremists and asked us for more technical support. And we say OK, and so it turns out that we end up reinforcing the extremists,” the advisor said

In sum, the complex relationship between the Al-Sauds and Wahhabism creates policy dilemmas for the Saudi government on multiple levels, complicates its relationship with the United States and its approach towards the multiple crises in the Middle East and North Africa, including Syria, IS and Yemen. Historian Richard Bulliet argues that Saudi “King Salman faces a difficult choice. Does he do what President Obama, Hillary Clinton, and many Republican presidential hopefuls want him to do, namely, lead a Sunni alliance against the Islamic State? Or does he continue to ignore Syria, attack Shias in Yemen, and allow his subjects to volunteer money and lives to the ISIS caliph’s war against Shi‘ism? The former option risks intensifying unrest, possibly fatal unrest, in the Saudi kingdom. The latter contributes to a growing sense in the West that Saudi Arabia is insensitive to the crimes being carried out around the world in the name of Sunni Islam. Prediction: In five years’ time, Saudi Arabia will either help defeat the Islamic State, or become it.”

The Al Sauds problems are multiplied by the fact that Saudi Arabia’s clergy is tying itself into knots as a result of its sell-out to the regime and its close ideological affinity to more militant strands of Islam. Saudi scholar Madawi Al-Rasheed argues that the sectarianism that underwrites the anti-Iran campaign strengthens regime stability in the immediate term because it ensures “a divided society that is incapable of developing broad, grassroots solidarities to demand political reform… The divisions are enhanced by the regime’s promotion of an all-encompassing religious nationalism, anchored in Wahhabi teachings, which tend to be intolerant of religious diversity… Dissidence, therefore, centres on narrow regional, tribal and sectarian issues.”

The knots are also evident in approaches towards Syria. A Saudi royal decree banning Saudis from granting moral or material aid to groups including Islamic State and al Qaeda’s official offshoot in Syria, the Al Nusra Front, was countered more than a year later by a statement of more than 50 clerics that called on Sunni Muslims to unite against Russia, Iran, and the regime of Bashar Al Assad. The statement described groups fighting the Assad regime as “holy warriors” in what was widely seen as an endorsement of jihadist groups.

By the same token, Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen in a bid to defeat Houthi rebels, the only group to have challenged Al Qaeda advances in the country but that also threatened to undermine the kingdom’s dominant role in Yemeni politics, has effectively turned the Saudi air force into the jihadists’ air wing as Al Qaeda expands its reach in the country.

Whether Bulliet is right or not in his prediction, Wahhabism is not what’s going to win Saudi Arabia lasting regional hegemony in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, as long as Wahhabism is a dominant player in the kingdom, Saudi Arabia is even less likely to win its battle for hegemony. At the end of the day, it is a perfect storm. The stakes for Saudi Arabia are existential and the kingdom may well be caught in a Catch-22.

Iran poses an existential threat, not because it’s still projects itself as a revolutionary state, but simply by what it is, the assets it can bring to bear and the intrinsic challenge it poses. But equally existential is the fact that Wahhabism is likely to increasingly become a domestic and external liability for the Al Sauds. Their future is clouded in uncertainty, no more so if and when they lose Wahhabism as the basis for the legitimacy of their absolute rule.

Thank you

The above article was a lecture presented at the Institute of South Asian Studies

PAK THE TERRORIST HEAVEN : GUNS CHEAPER THAN SMART PHONES IN PAKISTAN

SOURCE :


       PAK THE TERRORIST HEAVEN

GUNS CHEAPER THAN SMART PHONES                           IN PAKISTAN

Gunfire echoes through a dusty northwest tribal town, the soundtrack to Pakistan's biggest arms black market, where Kalashnikovs welded from scrap metal are cheaper than smartphones and sold on an industrial scale.

Darra Adamkhel, a town surrounded by hills some 35 kilometres (20 miles) south of the city of Peshawar, was a hub of criminal activity for decades. Smugglers and drug runners were common and everything from stolen cars to fake university degrees could be procured.

This generations-old trade in the illicit boomed in the 1980s: The mujahideen began buying weapons there for Afghanistan's battle against the Soviets, over the porous border.

Later, the town became a stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban, who enforced their strict rules and parallel system of justice -- infamously beheading Polish engineer Piotr Stanczak there in 2009.

Now Darra is clean of all but the arms, yet the gunsmiths in the bazaar say the region's improved security and authorities' growing intolerance for illegal weaponry are withering an industry that sustained them for decades.

"(The) Nawaz Sharif government has established checkpoints everywhere, business is stopped," said Khitab Gul, 45.

Gul is known in Darra for his replicas of Turkish and Bulgarian-made MP5 submachine guns, one of the most popular weapons in the world, widely used by organisations such as America's FBI SWAT teams.

The MP5 can retail for thousands of dollars. Gul's version, which comes with a one-year guarantee, costs roughly 7,000 rupees, or $67 -- and, he claims, it works perfectly.

Gul then puts on a demonstration, test-firing his MP5 in the small outer yard of his workshop -- first the single shot mode, then firing in a burst.

A Darra-made Kalashnikov, Gul says, can sell for as little as $125, cheaper than most smartphones. "The workers here are so skilled that they can copy any weapon they are shown," he explains.

"In past 10 years I have sold 10,000 guns, and had zero complaints," he claims.

In Gul's sweltering workshop, employees shout over the roar of electrical generators as they expertly cut and drill through metal brought from the shipyards of Karachi, far to the south on the Arabian Sea.

The main bazaar which cuts through the town used to hold nothing but tiny gun shops crammed together, their gleaming wares displayed openly on racks as customers test-fired into the air above.

Trade was illegal, unlicensed and unregulated, but long tolerated by authorities with little power in the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where militants once operated with impunity.

Residents, for their part, viewed the market as legitimate in an area dominated by Pashtun traditions, where gun culture is deeply embedded in male identity.

But in recent years, the military has cracked down on extremism, particularly in the tribal areas, and security is the best it has been since the Pakistani Taliban were formed in 2007.

Every second or third shop in Darra now sells groceries or electronics instead of weapons, the gunsmiths lament. The Wild West atmosphere is fading as the town embraces modern conveniences.

Before the crackdown Gul's workshop -- just one of hundreds in the town -- could produce more than 10 weapons a day, he says.

Now they only produce four. "Demand has decreased," he says.

Gunsmiths put the blame squarely on the Pakistani government and military, particularly checkpoints on the way to Darra halting customers who once travelled to the town openly.

Foreigners have been banned for security reasons.

The military has not yet objected to the gun market in Darra directly, but residents say they have had to give sureties that they will not harbour militants, and a half-hearted attempt at licensing is now also being made.

"I have been working here for 30 years but now I have no work to do," says Muzzamil Khan, sitting idle outside his workshop. "I am ready to sell my lathe machine."

Muhammad Qaisar, making cartridges at his shop in the main bazaar, said at one point there had been up to 7,000 shops there -- but now almost half have closed.

If the government does not change its policies, he says, "I fear... Darra will be finished".

Darra trade union leader Badam Akbar confirmed that some 3,000 shops have closed, and said skilled workers are attempting to learn new trades. "Nothing is left in this bazaar now," he says.

Hundreds of gun shops still cram the narrow streets around the bazaar and the sound of gunfire still pierces the air -- albeit intermittently -- but the gunsmiths say it is not enough.

"We have no electricity, no water, no business," Akbar warns. "Life has became very difficult"





















 

7 CPC & ARMED FORCES VETERANS : RECAPITULATION TILL AS ON 21 SEP 2016

SOURCE : CURTSEY SIGNALS -PARIVAAR 
http://signals-parivaar.blogspot.in/2016/09/7-cpc-mod-resolution-issued.html


PCDA CIRCULAR 555 OF 4.2.16 ON OROP DETAILED ORDERS
http://pcdapension.nic.in/6cpc/Circular-555.pdf


                **********************************

         

   PLEASE POST YOUR COMMENTS HERE

http://signals-parivaar.blogspot.in/2016/09/7-cpc-mod-resolution-issued.html


 

                THIS IS ONLY AN INTERMEDIATE STAGE. BE  PREPARED  FOR CHANGES : 
       EITHER GOOD , BAD OR UGLY


          RECAPITULATION AS OF 21 SEP 2016


     7 CPC - MOD RESOLUTION ISSUED

7 CPC -  As most of the Veterans ae aware the three Services have decided not to implement the 7 CPC award till anomalies are rectified by the Govt.
7 CPC -  EXPECTED ARREARS (DEF) AND FIXATION.

 On issue of the MOD resolution the PCDA circular will follow to all the Banks to pay us the revised pension based on the Def Matrix place in this post by taking into acct the basic pension as on 31 Dec 2015. Since the OROP pension has been our basic on that day, speculations in some quarters are set to rest that we may not get 7 CPC benefit. While the final fitment and fixation of the pay & pension based on your length of service in the last rank, and related fitment factor will take time the Govt has decided to immediately fix the 7 CPC enhancement for all personnel with 2.57 irrespective of their fitment factors of 2.67 or 2.72,
With this, our expectations can be calculated by primary class maths without tears using normal calculator in your mobile without any computer tools. We have derived here 
Arithmetical Multiplication Factors (AMF) as usual for all our earlier posts. Follow the example below using your own basic salary or pension:-


(a) Note your basic pen / pay as on 31 Dec 2015 = say Rs 36130 (Cols 33 Yrs).

(b) Your 7CPC Basic pension - AMF = 2.57 hence 36130 X 2.57 = Rs 92854/-

(c) Difference per month -         AMF = 0.32 Hence 36130 X 0.32 = Rs 11562/-

(d) Arrears Jan to Jun -             AMF = 1.92 Hence 36130 X1.92 = Rs 69370/-

(e) Arrears from Jul to Oct 16 - AMF = 0.979 Hence 36130 X 0.979 = Rs 35371/-
         Total Arrears      Add (d) & (e) above  = 69370 + 35371 = 104741/-  (Plus Minus 10 only)

     Well friends that's what is now pl shout for your grand child to get the calculator and sit with you, 
We will bring out further details once the final fixation orders with relevant enhancement and fixation is announced .


   FOR COMPUTER SAVVY - EXCEL TOOL MADE BY OUR MEMBER FOR AUTO CALCULATIONS   -  CLICK HERE


   
MOD RESOLUTION -  7 CPC  - HIGH LIGHTS

       BASIC PAY AS ON 31 DEC 2015 TO BE MULTIPLIED BY 2.57 AND MSP OF 15500 ADDED TO ARRIVE AT THE PAY OF A SERVING OFFICER. THE PENSION OBVIOUSLY WILL BE 50% OF THAT. ARREARS TO BE PAID WEF 01 JAN 2016 DURING THE CURRENT YEAR.                         

MSP WILL BE COUNTED ONLY FOR DEARNESS ALLOWANCE AND PENSION

PAY MATRIX - DULY UPDATED

The entire text of the MOD Resolution is given below

(TO BE PUBLISHED IN PART-I SECTION -3 OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA (EXTRA.ORDINARY)
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
New Delhi, the 5th September, 2016 RESOLUTION
No. 1(6)/2016/D (Pay/Services)

1. The Seventh Central Pay Commission CCPC) was set up by the Government of India vide Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) Resolution No. 1/ 1/2013-E.III(A) dated 28th February, 2014. The Commission submitted its report on 19th November, 2015. The report covered among other things, matters relating to structure of emoluments, allowances and conditions of service of Armed Forces personnel. Government has given ca:-eful consideration to the recommendations of the Commission relating to these matters in respect of Officers of the Armed Forces and have decided that the r:ecoomendations of the Commission on the aforementioned matters in respect of these categories of Defence personnel shall be accepted as follows. Some of the major points in respect of Defence Personnel (Officers) are as mentioned below:-

(i) Implementation of the revised pay structure will be w.e.f 01.01.2016;

(ii) Pay related Matter;  (Its given Above)

a) The existing system of Pay Band and Grade Pay has been replaced with separate Pay Matrices for both Defence and Military Nursing Services personnel.

b) Fixation of pay of each employee in the new Pay Matrix as on oi.01.2016 would be done by multiplying his/her basic pay by a factor of 2.57.

Note-1 With regard to fix. ation of pay in the new Pay Matrix as on 01.01.2016 the existing pay (Pay in Pay Band plus Grade Pay) in the pre revised structure as on 31.12.2015 ­shall be multiplied by a factor of 2..57 . The fig so arrived at iw to be located in the level Corresonding to employee’s Grade Pay in the Pay Matrix. If a cell identical with the fig so arrived at is available

in the appropriate Level, that Cell shall be the revised pay; otherwise the next higher cell in that Level shall be the revised pay of the employee.

Note-2 After fixation of pay in the appropriate Level as specified in Note-1above, the subsequent increments shallbe at the immediate next Cell in that Level.

c) General recommendations on pay recommended by the Commission have been accepted with the following exceptions in Defence Pay Matrix, namely:

i. The index of Rationalisation of Level 13A (Brigadier) in Defence Pay Matrix may be revised upward from 2.57 to 2.67.

u. Additional 3 stages in Levels 12A (Lt. Col), 3 stages in Level 13 (Colonel) and 2 stages in Level 13A (Brigadier) may be added appropriately in the Defence Pay Matrix.

(iii) Increase in Military Service Pay (MSP) of Officers Rank from Rs. 6000/- to Rs. 15500/- p.m. and for Military Nursing Service (MNS) Officers from Rs 4200/- to Rs 10800/- p.m. MSP would be counted only for Dearness Allowance (DA) and Pension purposes;

(iv) There will be two dates for grant of increment viz. 1st January and 1st July of every year, instead of existing date of 1st July. However, an employee will be able to avail annual increment only on one of these two dates depending on the date of appointment, promotion or grant of financial up-gradation;

(v) Recommendations on Allowances (except Dearness Allowance) would be referred to a Committee comprising Finance Secretary & Secretary (Expenditure) as Chairman and Secretaries of Home Affairs, Defence, Health & Family Welfare, Personnel and Training, Posts and Chairman, Railway Board as Members. The Committee would submit its report within a period of 4 months. Till a final decision on Allowances is taken based on the recommendations of this Committee, all Allowances would continue to be paid at existing rates in existing pay structure, as if the pay had not been revised w.e.f. 01.01.2016 i.e status quo would be maintained;
(vi)..Arrears of Pay would be paid during the current financial year;

(vii) Recommendations not relating to pay and allowances and other administrative issues specific to department/ cadres/ posts would be examined separately as per the Transaction of Business Rules/ Allocation of Business Rules.

2. Other instructions on Pay Fixation and increment not specifically covered in these instructions will be as in the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) Resolution No. 1-2/2016-IC dated 25th July, 2016.

3. The decisions taken by the Government accordingly on various recommeridations of the Commission in respect of Officers of Armed Forces are indicated in the statement

at Annexure-I to this Resolution. New Pay Matrix for Defence Service officers is at Annexure-II and for MNS Officers is at Annexure-III. ;.

(V.Anandar Rajan)
Joint Secretary to the Government of India

THE GAZETTE NOTIFICATION (01 sep 2016)

ANALYSIS

Analysis of the Gazette Notification on 7 CPC for def officers.

in the Gazette Notification there is nothing new. It has only published what has been approved by the cabinet. Just a formality. The implementation will take time, may be a year. However the Govt has planned to pay you immediately your basic pension into 2.57 /2.67/2.72 times. They will pay you arrears after they are able to finally fix your pension as per the matrix.

 

PAK NAVY : China to Supply Pakistan With 8 New Stealth Attack Submarines by 2028

SOURCE:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/china-to-supply-pakistan-with-8-new-stealth-attack-submarines-by-2028/

PAK NAVY: China to Supply Pakistan With

   8 New Stealth Attack Submarines by 2028

                                 By

                   Franz-Stefan Gady

 

 

Four of the subs will be constructed in China and the remaining four in Pakistan.

 for The Diplomat

August 30, 2016

China will provide the Pakistan Navy with eight modified diesel-electric attack submarines by 2028, the head of the country’s next-generation submarine program told the Pakistan National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Defense during the committee’s visit to the Naval Headquarters in Islamabad on August 26, according to local media reports.


The Pakistani senior naval official’s statement in front of the committee members provides official confirmation that the program is moving ahead, although it is still unclear whether a contract has been signed. In April, a senior Pakistan Navy official announced that Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KSEW) had secured a contract to produce four of the eight submarines, which will be fitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems.

The defense deal is valued at $4 to $5 billion and China is expected to extend a long term loan at a low interest rate. It has not officially been confirmed what type of submarine will be supplied to the Pakistan Navy by the China Shipbuilding Trading Company (CSTC) and there has been considerable speculation on the subject in the past
(See: “Confirmed: Pakistan Will Buy Eight Chinese Subs”):

[T]he Wuhan-based China State Shipbuilding Industrial Corp (CSIC) supposedly had already signed a contract in April 2011 to deliver six Type 032 Qing-class conventional attack submarines by 2016/2017. (…) [O]ther media sources report that Islamabad will build submarines under license based on the Qing-class vessels displacing 3,000 tons: “Pakistan will also build two types of submarines with Chinese assistance: the Project S-26 and Project S-30. The vessels are to be built at the Submarine Rebuild Complex (SRC) facility being developed at Ormara, west of Karachi.”


The majority of analysts speculate that the new submarine will be a lighter export version of the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s Type 039 and Type 041 Yuan-class conventional attack submarine, excluding the sub’s AIP system, which might be procured independently.

According to IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, the Type 041 Yuan-class is “a diesel electric attack submarine (SSK), potentially with Stirling air-independent propulsion, that is armed with YJ-2 (YJ-82) anti-ship missiles and a combination of Yu-4 (SAET-50) passive homing and Yu-3 (SET-65E) active/passive homing torpedoes.”

It purportedly is one of the quietest subs in the PLAN’s inventory. The scaled-down 2,300-ton export version is designated S20. The first four submarines are expected to be delivered by the end of 2023; the remaining four will be assembled in Karachi by 2028. The new subs are expected to form the the sea-based arm of Pakistan’s burgeoning nuclear second-strike triad.

The Pakistan Navy is in middle of upgrading its undersea warfare capabilities. In June, Turkish state-owned defense contractor STM won a contract for the mid-life upgrade of three Agosta 90B-class (aka Khalid-class) diesel-electric attack submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion systems.

















 

7th Pay Commission : FAUJ KO GUSSA KIO AATA HAI - EXPLAINED (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/dear-7th-pay-commission-babus-work-9-5-army-men-dont-

As a last word, the need for expenditure
 for the safety  security of the country cannot                              understated.

    If that is an unproductive cost so be it.                       Sovereignty is non-negotiable.



                       7th Pay Commission
         FAUJ KO GUSSA KIO AATA HAI
                         - EXPLAINED

                                     BY

                                                  Col Anil Kaul, VrC




Comparisons are odious. However, in our context, this aspect has become a thumb rule with the dubious requirement of its connection to a government official's place in the pecking order - another manifestation of the "Lal Batti Culture", a trend which has crossed all limits in the recommendations of the 7th Pay Commission wherein even the vexed subject of OROP (One Rank One Pension) has been extended to all central government employees without considering why OROP was demanded by the military in the first place.

To begin with, in 1947, this country inherited amongst other things a standing Army, Navy and Air Force from the British. With the British gone and with no territorial or hegemonic ambitions, it was felt that what we had was more than sufficient to assist at best in restoring some internal disturbances or helping out in a natural calamity. A rude awakening came within three months of Independence with the outbreak of the war in J&K. Two long years of bitter fighting brought home a few lessons; then the next setback of 1962 rattled the establishment. In all these years, despite the setbacks, the pre-eminence of the military as seen under British times was whittled away as a factor of civilian control, implying political control restricted to strategic thought and policy on one hand, and provisioning of necessary wherewithal on the other hand. The military was to conduct its own affairs in respect of tactical handling and day-to-day functioning within laid-down parameters. Somewhere down the line, this equation has got convoluted and everything and anything that the military does has been strait jacketed under "Bureaucratic Control". The takeover is so complete that a recent headline in a leading daily screamed, "Babus to get Bonanza" thereby clubbing the armed forces of this country with the scores of file-pushers ensconced in their offices on a strict 9-5, five-day work-week routine. The 1965 Indo-Pak War and the spectacular victory in 1971, the successful completion of scores of tasks in aid to civil authority both at home and abroad, as also the stellar performance of our troops under the United Nations flag across the world prove how different we are from babus.

The second major cause for concern is the retiring age of armed forces personnel. Unlike any other government service, where a uniform age of 60 years has been fixed from the lowest to the highest rank, the armed forces' personnel retire from 37 years onwards and only 1% of the 1.3 million remain in service till the age of 60. The discerning reader will note the absence of comparison. Under these circumstances, when you equate pay scales and allowances across the board, toh gussa toh aayega.

The third and most important factor in the increased range of gussa is the quality of an unsettled life for self, family, children, dependent parents and siblings, property (if any) for protracted periods of time and distance under the ubiquitous phrase, "Exigencies of Service".

In most militaries across the world, a 15-20% enhancement in compensation is applicable over and above that of their civilian counterparts. Alas in our country, the 7th Pay Commission has recommended just the opposite. Though the chairman Justice AK Mathur had verbally recommended a 30% addition to military salaries, the figures put out both by the pay commission and now by the government speak quite differently. Once again, the aim seems to be to lower the status of the armed forces vis-a-vis other central government services.  

This country and the powers that be in the last 70 years have not permitted an armed forces representative on the seven pay commissions that have been formed, - one of the reasons why anomalies of the 6th Pay Commission in respect of the military remain unresolved ten years on. Another reason for the gussa.

I could go on and on as the subjects that need direct technical deliberation by the armed forces themselves cover a vast canvas stretching from short service conditions and limited promotions to lateral absorption, disability, and file and many more. Suffice it to say the issues that have raised the hackles of the military towards the babu in the present instance have been summarised in the table below (scroll down to end of article).

The military has conveyed its disappointment in no uncertain terms when the three service chiefs met with government representatives. The Defence Ministry has also conveyed his dismay at the final acceptance. Here is hoping that deliberations will be called for, issues resolved and then the government order be issued to satisfy all stake-holders. As a last word, the need for expenditure for the safety and security of the country cannot be understated.

    If that is an unproductive cost so be it.                 Sovereignty is non-negotiable.

(Col Anil Kaul, VrC is an alumni of the NDA, IMA DSSC & AWC. He served for over 32 years in the Armoured Corps. Decorated with the Vir Chakra for gallantry in combat, he is 80% disabled for life due to combat injuries.)