Monday, December 5, 2016

PRESIDENT ELECT TRUMP & SOUTH ASIA :- Where Should Donald Trump Begin in

SOURCE:
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/11/30/where-should-donald-trump-begin-in-south-asia/?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link38-20161205&sp_mid=52919986&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1




    Where Should Donald Trump Begin in

                                   South Asia?

                                        B
                                 Alyssa Ayres
November 30, 2016
 
 
Barack Obama meets with Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)
 
 
Donald J. Trump will assume the U.S. presidency at a time of flux in South Asia. Afghanistan appears at risk of greater instability, Pakistan continues to harbor terrorists that attack its neighbors, India-Pakistan tensions have increased, and India’s growth story has hit a speed bump. China has escalated its involvement in the region, with extensive infrastructure development plans for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The Trump administration’s national security and international economic teams will enter office with both near-term tactical as well as long-term strategic decisions to make about how to approach the region.


At the top of the list, given the U.S. troop presence there, will be Afghanistan. Afghanistan figured little during the presidential campaign, so a Trump policy for Afghanistan has yet to be articulated. He can make a virtue of this fresh approach by calling for an immediate review of U.S. interests there. First on the list: a consideration of the size and scope of the U.S. military deployment in Afghanistan—scheduled earlier for a drawdown to around 5,500 troops by the end of this year, but now stabilized at around 8,400 troops to advise the Afghan army now facing a resurgent Taliban that has made territorial gains.


The Trump team, like the Obama team and the Bush team before it, will need to reach its own conclusion on U.S. national interests in Afghanistan, and develop its approach to counterterrorism and development there. With the benefit of greater hindsight on our longest war, and a more jaundiced sense of what a U.S. presence can achieve, they will most likely focus on what role U.S. forces can continue to play in providing advice, training, and counterterrorism support for Afghans.

Trump has spoken frequently of defeating the Islamic State as a top national security priority, and the rise of pockets of the Islamic State in Afghanistan suggest additional security focus on the country. How he will work with NATO—which maintains a train, advise, and assist presence in Afghanistan, and which Trump disparaged on the campaign trail as “obsolete”—remains an open question.


In Kabul, the Afghan National Unity Government’s uneasy truce—a brokered marriage of rivals—has also grown brittle. Trump’s national security team will need to determine how they will approach diplomatic efforts to assist the fragile government in Kabul. And if that weren’t enough to worry about, the revival of Taliban attacks does not suggest readiness to engage in reconciliation negotiations toward a political solution.


The interlocking puzzle piece next confronting the Trump team will be Pakistan. Trump’s occasional campaign comments about the country suggested his awareness of the challenge. Pakistan’s endless civil-military tensions continue to plague its development, but a newly-appointed chief of army staff allows Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif some scope to attempt once again to better ties with Afghanistan and with India. The Trump team should take advantage of this change in Pakistan by focusing early diplomacy on impressing upon Pakistani civilian and military leaders how Washington has tired of Pakistan’s games. Fifteen years after 9/11, Pakistan continues to openly harbor UN- and U.S.-designated terrorists who, through attacks on Afghanistan and on India, instigate problems in the region and create the possibility of military escalation. The Trump administration should spell out to Pakistan the potential costs to its ties with the United States from its refusal to adequately address terrorism—and be prepared to start making changes.


India-Pakistan ties are at a low point, precisely due to the problem of Pakistan’s unwillingness to curb terrorist groups. Despite the efforts of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to create a better working relationship, terrorist attacks in a series of locations in India (Gurdaspur, Udhampur, Pathankot, and Uri, to name a few) pushed India to a new kind of response this past September. Following a terrorist attack on an Indian army outpost in Uri, in Kashmir, about a week later the Indian army carried out ground-based surgical strikes against what they called terrorist “launching pads” along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. This more heightened situation of tension is cause for concern, given that both countries possess nuclear weapons.

But the regularity of the pattern has one common thread: each cycle of violence and escalation begins with a terrorist attack on India mounted from Pakistan. Breaking the cycle requires tackling the terrorism problem at its source.


These policy concerns will confront the Trump administration immediately, because of the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and the interrelated problem that Pakistan poses for Afghanistan’s success and for peace in South Asia. But the long-term strategic bet for the United States will involve our growing relationship with a rising India.


The U.S.-India relationship has grown significantly over the past two U.S. administrations, and the Trump administration should pick up the baton to carry things forward. Strategic ties have advanced dramatically, with a shared view of the world and a shared sense that Asia should not be dominated by any single power. Counterterrorism cooperation has grown closer. Defense ties have ramped up dramatically over the past four years, and should continue to grow with an uptick in joint exercises, new agreements permitting closer cooperation, and a joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. The arena with some remaining challenges has been trade and economic ties, and a Trump economic team should be able to identify some positive incentives (such as membership in international economic organizations like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or APEC) to discuss with New Delhi.


As India rises on the world stage, it has increasingly sought a larger voice in global institutions. The Indian government will be looking for a clear statement of support on these matters from the Trump team, particularly regarding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Trump should support this bid, as did the Obama administration, but he could take more active steps on UN reform to make this statement more than just words.


Finally, a Trump administration can cast a fresh look at the shape of U.S. diplomacy across the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, and Indian Ocean region. China’s growing economic statecraft efforts—through its “One Belt, One Road” efforts and additional bilateral initiatives with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—indicate expansive ambition. Its work shoring up alternative financial institutions and regional organizations which are not led by the United States or the West has given it other arenas of influence. With the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China has doubled down on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), another Asia-wide trade negotiation which also includes India. (The TPP by contrast did not include either India or China.) The Trump administration should take a look at evolving economic and diplomatic patterns across Asia, a region of central long-term importance to U.S. interests, and step up U.S. involvement to ensure that American influence is not eclipsed. New Delhi will be a good partner for such a discussion, and the Trump administration should consult India actively on larger Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean questions.


Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssaOr like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).


Read more about how the Trump administration should approach U.S. policy toward China (here and here), JapanKorea, and Southeast Asia.


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Saturday, December 3, 2016

Demonetisation, Opposition & Bandh

SOURCE:
http://mrinalsuman.blogspot.in/2016/12/demonetisation-opposition-and-bandh.html




       Demonetisation, Opposition

                              &

                           Bandh

Major General Mrinal Suman

Life is full of surprises, nay shocks. When Manmohan Singh slammed demonetisation as ‘organised loot and legalised plunder’, one did not know how to react. The man who facilitated generation of maximum black money was accusing Modi government of ‘monumental mismanagement’ – some brazenness!

Manmohan Singh virtually pawned national assets to the coalition partners in exchange for the prime ministerial chair. He allowed and abetted open loot of the treasury.  Ministries like coal, telecommunication, aviation, railway and sports had become dens of corruption. He expressed his helplessness, taking shelter under the unscrupulous plea of coalition compulsions. In a way, it was an open admission by him that he would lose his chair if he took action against his corrupt colleagues. Therefore, it was most incongruous for him to talk of loot and plunder.

One does not know why the Congress party fielded him. Did it really think he was their trump card, being a renowned economist and an ex Prime Minister, or was it done in jest to embarrass him? More surprising is the fact that he agreed to speak on the subject. He made a laughing stock of himself with his homilies, inviting sniggers from viewers. His track record both as the head of the government and pragmatic economist is appalling.

Congress party appears to be at its wits’ end. It does not know how to respond to Modi’s initiatives. The party joined the whole country in lauding surgical strikes across LoC. When it realised that Modi was gaining popularity, it started questioning its occurrence. Most ridiculously, it demanded that proof be made public. When scoffed at by the whole country, it started claiming that it had also allowed similar strikes when in power.

Demonetisation evoked similar response. Initial reaction was muted. However, with Modi acquiring iconic status as a crusader against black money, Congress quickly changed tracks. Having failed to find a convincing economic argument against demonetisation, it has started resorting to the dishonourable tactic of disrupting parliamentary proceedings.

Most laughingly, Congress has declined to debate the issue without the presence of the Prime Minister. Yes, it is not satisfied with just a statement from him but wants his presence throughout the debate – an unprecedented and irrational demand.  A new low has been reached in India’s abysmal parliamentary conduct – issues are not important, individuals are. It shows total bankruptcy of ideas and logical thinking.

Taking a cue from the Congress party, other opposition parties have also joined the bandwagon of protests and bandhs. They are expressing their Aakrosh (anger), ostensibly for the discomfort being caused to the common man. Can there be a more ridiculous excuse? Actually, it is the political leadership that is getting discomfited. 

Common man is supporting the decision and is willingly enduring the temporary hardship for he long-term good of the nation. People standing in long queues for hours showed no anger at all. Even leading questions of some infamously shameless media men have failed to evoke negative responses.
 

Responses sought by Modi on his app showed overwhelming support for the step. True to its wont, opposition dismissed it as a contrived poll.  

A survey was carried out by C-Voter (an international polling agency) across different age and income groups on 21 November. It covered nearly half the country’s parliamentary constituencies. Almost 87 percent of respondents supported the move against black money while 85 percent opined that the inconvenience being faced by them was worth the effort. Therefore, which common man’s discomfort is bothering the opposition parties?

Even if the above survey is dismissed as non-representative, how do the opposition parties explain sweeping victories scored by the ruling party in the recent civic elections in Maharashtra and Gujarat? These were held after demonetisation and people had already endured cash difficulties.

The truth is obvious to all. Elections are an expensive business. Political parties had hoarded huge stocks of ill-gotten cash to fight elections and bribe voters. They are feeling ‘cheated’ and their anger is explicable. How will they arrange liquor and other freebies to influence voters? How will they gather supporters for their rallies? Who will pay for the fleets of buses for transporting them, arrange their meals and cash rewards? Hiring of helicopter fleets and cavalcades of vehicles for flitting across various constituencies will become difficult.

Many political parties used to collect huge funds by auctioning party tickets for elections to the highest bidders. Needless to say, such donations were always in cash. Demonetisation has dealt a fatal blow to this trafficking of electoral rectitude. As there is no cash, there are no takers. Any wonder then that many political leaders are shrieking and behaving in such a despicable manner. Their treasure chests have been demolished.  

In addition to the politicians; some builders, traders, smugglers, hawala operators, presstitutes, lawyers, doctors, private hospitable, schools/colleges and such other segments of the society have also been thriving on black money. Therefore, their opposition to demonetisation is understandable.

However, what is not acceptable is their incendiary and inciting agenda. Old pictures of long queues (including those outside cinema halls) are being circulated as of cash starved restless crowds. Every unfortunate death anywhere in the vicinity of a bank/ATM is being attributed to demonetisation. A heart patient died at home while getting dressed for going to the bank. The headline read, “Man dies of fear of long wait at the bank”. Absurdity has no limits.

According to jurisprudence, all decisions taken in good faith must be accepted accordingly. Everyone knows that demonetisation is a colossal step towards ridding India of the menace of black money. The whole country is supporting the government. Exceptions are only two – those who thrived on black money and those who are inimical to Indian interests. As regards the latter, they are incorrigible. Anti-nationalism is a part of their DNA. Every progressive step towards a better India has to be opposed by them; and that is India’s misfortune.*****
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

The Drone Revolution

SOURCE:


BBC Documentary Drone Attack Drones in Military Documentary History Channel  

        [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_tMNAAVxY0 ]

 

                  The Drone Revolution

                Less Than Meets the Eye

"ADDICTIVE AS CATNIP"
 

Friday, December 2, 2016

CAN A PAK ARMY CHIEF CHANGE HIS STRIPES ?

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/view-from-india/330194.html

                            Pakistan’s New Army Chief

                     – PSYCHO Analysis

                                          FOUR OF  'FOUR' PARTS

[A] PART ONE
 http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/11/pakistans-new-army-chief-psycho-analysis_43.html
 
[B] PART TWO
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/11/profile-pakistan-armys-general-qamar.html

[C]  PART THREE
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/pakistans-new-army-chief-general-bajwa.html

[d]  PART FOUR
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/can-pak-army-chief-change-his-stripes.html


CAN A PAK ARMY CHIEF CHANGE HIS                              STRIPES ?






                  Bobby Builds, Bajwa Inherits

                                        By

                 Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (Retd)


Pakistan has a new Army Chief. In Pakistan’s scheme of things, this is a very consequential appointment. Two former Indian army generals (retd.) offer their asssement about the change of guard at the Rawalpindi General Headquarters.








   

INTERESTING FACTS


    Pak has appointed 16 Chiefs including Bajwa but the first two were British.
  •  Gul Hassan was sacked after the `71 defeat. Zia and Asif Nawaz Junjua died in harness. Karamat was eased out.
  • Three took over the reins -- Ayub Khan, Zia and Musharraf. Ayub made himself Field Marshal. Yahya Khan became President after Ayub.
  • All three Pak Army Chiefs who took over the reigns remained COAS, some preferring Army House over President House.
  • The longest tenure was by Gen Zia (12 years) and the shortest by Gul Hassan (less than 3 months).
  • Most were from Infantry with Armored Corps having three (Gul Hassan, Zia and Jahangir Karamat) and Artillery two (Tikka Khan and Mushraff).
  • Nawaz appointed five while his move to appoint Ziauddin  to replace Mushraff was scuttled.
  • Baloch Regiment has given the maximum of four Chiefs(Yahya, Aslam Beg, Kayani and Bajwa)


LITTLE ELSE CHANGES: The incoming chief will adhere to the prescriptions by the Deep State but should avoid personal wars of his own, especially towards the end of his tenure


Nawaz Sharif has the dubious distinction of a fractious relationship with all five Chiefs of Army Staff he has worked with, including the three that he chose himself.


It started with his first handpicked choice of General Waheed Kakar (superseding four senior officers) in 1993 subsequently reneging and pressurising Nawaz Sharif to tender his resignation as the Prime Minister. The next General that Nawaz Sharif had to deal with was General Jehangir Karamat (choice of the previous Benazir Bhutto government), and soon the irreconcilable disagreement between the two flared up, leading to the general’s premature resignation. 


Having burnt his fingers, Nawaz wanted to play absolutely safe. He superseded a ‘pliant’ Mohajir Gen Pervez Musharraf. He soon demonstrated his independent adventurism with Kargil and finally Nawaz Sharif was bumped off and exiled in a bloodless coup. In his third return to power in 2013, Nawaz had to ‘manage’ a cold and unpredictable Gen Pervez Kayani (chosen by his bête noire, Gen  Musharaf in 2007). After he ‘hung his boots as promised (after an  extension), Nawaz quickly pounced upon the opportunity to make his third personal choice in Gen Raheel Sharif.


Bobby (Gen Sharif’s pet name), like the new chief, was not the frontrunner and therefore seemed a ‘safe’ choice who could oblige! Except, Bobby too, would prove otherwise. He had lived his fairly illustrious military life in the shadow of his brother’s legacy, the late Major Rana Shabbir Sharif (recipient of Pakistan’s highest gallantry award, ‘Nishan-e-Haider’ in 1971 war). 


Bobby was always struggling to ‘live up’ to the proud legacy of his elder brother, who incidentally was the batch mate of Gen Pervez Musharraf. Belonging to the proud martial stock of the Janjua clan, Gen Raheel Sharif was the quintessential Pakistani general - barrel chested, plain speaking and perceptibly nationalistic. Soon, he would follow the independent streak that typifies the generals in the ‘Army House’ in the manicured cantonment town of Rawalpindi, as opposed to the despised politicos in Islamabad.


Expectedly, General Raheel Sharif came into his own and decided on the national narrative by taking on homegrown terror (after the Peshawar school massacre) and started defining the contours of foreign policy with dashes to Kabul, Riyadh, Washington, Beijing etc. on briefs that went beyond military matters. A hapless Nawaz Sharif was often left suffering the indignity of  making political retractions (post Ufa summit), policy flip-flops (with India) and getting lectured on domestic corruption (after ‘Panamagate’) by his Chief of Army Staff. 


Today, with the ensuing ‘selective’ war on terror, the ‘Panamagate’ expose and the flaring volatility on the LOC, made the Pakistani armed forces and Gen Raheel Sharif in particular, the real McCoy in Pakistan. By keeping his word on retirement, Gen. Sharif has further strengthened his legacy, and importantly of the Pakistani armed forces. Bobby won all the battles against the politicos, and built-up the relevance and favourable perception of the parallel institution, the armed forces. Bobby ensured that he could indulge in leisurely game hunts, whilst, the institution retains the glint in its bayonets, without having to resort to unnecessary formality and complexities of a military coup d’état.   


Gen Bajwa is the fourth time Nawaz Sharif has made a selection on his own. Unsurprisingly, his supposed apoliticalness and low profile ensured that he too, hopped over four generals. His credentials are eerily similar to those of Gen Raheel Sharif -- both were ‘dark horses’, both were IG (Training and Insp) before elevation, both are of Punjabi stock and supposedly, apolitical. 


However, a careful analysis of the Pakistani military history bears out the deep institutional truth, of a close-knit decision-making network that operates through a guarded and consultative grouping of corps commanders, which toes its own line. The military institution is larger than the individual, and the institution takes care of its own – the brazen freedom afforded on Gen Musharraf is a testimony. Clearly, Gen Bajwa does not carry the operational scars of the Indo-Pak war (he joined the Baloch Regiment in 1980) or suffered a personal angularity like that of Gen Raheel Sharif’s family in the `71 war. However, his familial credentials of military upbringing are impeccable, with both his father and father-in-law having served in the Pakistani Army. 


Gen Bajwa is the veritable inheritor of the well-oiled Pakistani military juggernaut, with carefully selected military men well ensconced in sensitive positions like the NSA (Lt Gen Nasser Khan Janjua) and the ISI chief (Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar) to oversee the seamless continuum of operations.


The present arrangement of an ostensible civilian government, with the reigns firmly in the hands of the burly military men works perfectly fine for the institution of the Pakistani armed forces. No perceptible change of strategic track is envisaged by the strategists in New Delhi. Nawaz Sharif has personally punted thrice before and got it terribly wrong. Gen Bajwa is the fourth time Nawaz has thrown the dice in a perennial power struggle that he has always lost, so far.

The writer is a former Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry









     

             CAN A PAK ARMY CHIEF
             CHANGE HIS STRIPES?

                           View from India

                                     BY

                       Lt Gen KJ Singh(Retd)




 Nov 30, 2016





Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after months of speculation and suspense, has finally made his choice (record fifth time) for the Pak Chief of Army Staff (COAS). He has chosen the ‘dark horse’ and the junior most general as the next Chief. Gen Bajwa has been preferred over the senior most Gen Zubair Mahmood Hayat who has literally been kicked up-s tairs.  The other two in the  probable list included Lt Gen Ishfaq Nadeem Ahmed, GOC of Strike Corps at Multan, who enjoyed wide popularity due to his professional acumen in shaping operational plans and policies leading to successful operations during Raheel’s tenure.  However, his being out spoken and high profile may have gone against him.

The fourth one in the race, an early favorite, Lt Gen Javed Iqbal Ramday, may have lost out despite family ties.  Did it have something to do with the leaking of information to Cyril Almeida? They will have to be  found some sinecures or may resign. This will lead to five apex level changes: Chief of General Staff (CGS), two Corps Commanders, IG Training and Evaluation besides DG ISI.

The current process has also seen some very interesting trends.  


The first one is that the process entailed suspense and even intrigue till the `dark horse’ was nominated, that too after all the mandatory ceremonials of the outgoing incumbent were over. Nawaz, after disregarding seniority, would hope that t he new incumbent will buck the trend and remain loyal unlike his previous appointees. This last minute nomination and secrecy reflects insecurity and may impact continuity especially as the CGS is to be changed.

The choice of Gen Bajwa has led to some Indian Jats suddenly discovering links with Muslim Jats of Sialkot region.  We may recount that Gen Zia was a Mohajir blessed with liberal education at St Stephens. But he turned out to be a “Maulana General” who set the Pak army on the path of Islamisation.  The other Mohajir, Gen Mushrraf tried to prove himself more Punjabi than the real Punjabis. The obvious lesson is not to stereotype Pak generals based on their background. Gen Bajwa may also want to live down his relationship with Ahmadiya relatives though  his connections may have been played up by a rival.  This may also free him of the shackles that Nawaz may have planned to keep him in check.

Another complexity is that their responses are shaped by the deep state including the ISI, driven by its own interpretation of Pak national interests. Every new Chief goes through a  normative process and may even display two to three character profiles depending on the length of his tenure.  Musharraf-I was a hardliner with Kargil as his signature statement, Musharraf-II seemed to be yearning for a place in history and came very close to anchoring a possible solution in Kashmir, wanting to possibly match up to Vajpayee and Manmohan in statesmanship.

Like Raheel, Gen Bajwa steps up from a low profile job, yet brings hands-on experience of 10 Corps  with responsibility of PoK and LoC.  Initial reports of his easy going in style need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Pak media’s attempts to project him as a pro-democracy general seem to be part of  an orchestrated campaign that only the passage of time can validate.  As regards his UN experience  under an Indian GOC, the advice of his erstwhile [Indian] boss that projection in an international environment is different needs to be factored to rule out skewed profiling.





Transformative Chiefs  are becoming rare. Powerful ones have generally tended to be “roguish” and led Pakistan on dangerous pathways.  Gen. Zia’s Islamisation drive and Gen. Musharaff’s Kargil misadventure are two such obvious examples. Gen. Raheel was also set on this dangerous path with BAT actions; one possible lesson is that no general should be allowed to start a private war for his own ends and especially towards the end of his tenure. Let us hope Gen. Bajwa respects civilian hierarchy that will pave the way for cooling down on LoC. Luxury of this window may not be for very long as with time Pak Chief is likely to become more assertive and autonomous.





In sum, there is a now a new movie with a new hero and a new cast. Yet the story and script may remain the same as the deep state remains the ghost writer. The next Pak army chief is likely to remain focused on these interests and more importantly insecurities. Like they say more things change, more they remain the same.  The challenge is to help Pak civilian structures to re-assert their supremacy in this narrow window before the Army starts asserting itself again
.



The writer was former GOC, Western Command, Indian Army





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Thursday, December 1, 2016

Pakistan’s New Army Chief General Bajwa And India’s Futile Speculation

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30112016-pakistans-new-army-chief-general-bajwa-and-indias-futile-speculation-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29







                Pakistan’s New Army Chief

                     – PSYCHO Analysis

 
                                    [https://youtu.be/o_areOPIPRY ]
 
 



Published on Nov 27, 2016
Lieutenant General Qamar Bajwa has been appointed as the Pakistani Army Chief, and he is set to take charge on Tuesday.
Former Indian Army Chief Bikram Singh who worked with Bajwa on an assigment at the United Nations has said that things at the LoC won't change much with Bajwa taking charge, and that Pakistan's aggression will continue.



                           THREE  OF  'FOUR' PARTS
 
Linked To
 

[A] PART ONE
 http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/11/pakistans-new-army-chief-psycho-analysis_43.html
 
[B] PART TWO
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/11/profile-pakistan-armys-general-qamar.html

[C]  PART THREE
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/pakistans-new-army-chief-general-bajwa.html

[d]  PART FOUR
http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2016/12/can-pak-army-chief-change-his-stripes.html
 
 
 

India must learn to recognize that no Pakistan Army Chief ‘controls’ the Pakistan Army even though by virtue of his office he commands it. It is the Pakistan Army which institutionally through its Corps Commanders Collegium that controls the Pakistan Army Chief and Pakistan.


   Pakistan’s New Army Chief General Bajwa        And India’s Futile Speculation –
                                 Analysis


                                                                               By
                                                    Dr Subhash Kapila

Pakistan’s announcement of new Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa on November 24 2016 set in motion a torrent of futile Indian media speculation on positive implications for India in terms of his attitudinal postures.

India must learn to recognise that no Pakistan Army Chief ‘controls’ the Pakistan Army even though by virtue of his office he commands it. It is the Pakistan Army which institutionally through its Corps Commanders Collegium that controls the Pakistan Army Chief and Pakistan.

Strangely, the Indian media and strategic community comparatively never debates such aspects when changes in China’s military hierarchy takes place even though the fact is that China’s policies towards India are conditioned by the Chinese military hierarchy and that China is more decidedly the major threat to India amplified since 2014 by the China-Pakistan Axis.

Before moving on to the examination of the main theme it would be proper to briefly shed light on the external and internal environment that presently dominates Pakistan. The new Pakistan Army Chief cannot operate in a vacuum and Pakistan’s political and security environment that prevails will certainly count for much as General Bajwa’s operational assessments and the policy he crafts when he dons the mantle on November 29 2016.

Pakistan can be said externally to be bereft of support of the United States and Western countries, its traditional supporters. China and with Russia in tow cannot fill the vacuum so caused. China is only an aphrodisiac that excites delusionary military highs in the Pakistan military hierarchy in confronting India

Regionally, Pakistan and the Pakistan Army are at confrontational odds with its two major neighbours, Afghanistan and India. This makes Pakistan Army’s both military flanks troublesome. Within SAARC also Pakistan stands isolated.

On Afghanistan, with Pakistan Army’s fixated obsession of controlling it for strategic depth, Pakistan Army Chief has to confront the new reality that today there is a strategic consensus between India, Iran and Afghanistan and that is at cross-purposes with Pakistan Army’s end-aim.


Internally, the domestic environment is in turbulence not only politically but also militarily. Politically, Pakistan PM has not been allowed to settle down stably on many counts. Militarily, Balochistan and to some extent Sindh and the Western Frontier regions will provide challenges to the new Pakistan Army Chief. These can be serious distractions as General Bajwa confronts the military turbulence on its Western and Eastern Flanks.


Then are the major challenges that could arise within the Pakistan Army hierarchy as in their perceptions the smooth transition of command of the Pakistan Army Chief in a way for the first time opens a window for greater Pakistani civilian control of the Pakistan Army. There could be reverberations as General Bajwa by Pakistani media accounts was not the favoured choice of the outgoing Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif or the Pakistan Army.

Surely, it is an established fact that Pakistan’s policy stances towards India are not dictated by any incoming Pakistan Army Chief’s personal preferences.
It is the Pakistan Army’s institutional mindset on India that prevails ultimately and no new Pakistan Army Chief can afford to shrug that off.


Pakistan Army’s institutional mindset on India is decidedly Anti-India not only because of post-1947 reverses that Pakistan Army has suffered at the hands of the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army’s mindsets are also historically moulded by the nostalgia and hangover that the Pakistan Army are the true heirs of the Islamic Slave Kings and Mughal Empire that ruled India for nearly eight hundred years before the advent of the British.

With that contextual background it can be asserted that the Pakistan Army is in a state of paranoid fixation towards seeking strategic and military parity with India. Since this could not be achieved in the outcomes of Pakistan Army’s four wars with India, the Pakistan Army for the past few decades resorted to asymmetric warfare whose main instruments have been proxy wars and state-sponsored terrorism by Pakistan Army jihadi terrorism affiliates.

With the advent of General Bajwa as Pakistan Army Chief, therefore, nothing changes for India in terms of conflict escalation and military brinkmanship on the LOC and the international border. India must learn to live and not only live but defeat Pakistan Army’s institutional obsessive fixation to downsize India and its military might.

Would General Bajwa as the new Pakistan Army Chief be able to restrain Pakistan’s terrorism and disruptive activities against India and especially in the Kashmir Valley, the answer is in the negative. Unlike previous Pakistan Army Chiefs, General Bajwa has practical hands-on experience and mastery of operational matters all along the LOC and the IB having served many tenures in every rank in Pakistan Army’s X Corps which is the largest Corps in the Pakistan Army whose operational responsibility covers the entire expanse of Jammu & Kashmir. That makes him a General to be reckoned with when it comes to military operations in Jammu & Kashmir.

The Indian media has widely quoted that General Bajwa had once stated that Pakistan faces more internal threats than the threat from India. But that does not imply that the Pakistan Army would isolate/insulate itself from its military adventurism in Kashmir or seek peace and tranquillity on India’s borders. Or, more significantly for India, restrain terrorism against India and other disruptive activities.

Pakistan is currently under great international pressure to defang Pakistan Army’s notorious affiliates the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, as the major powers feel that their activities could provoke India into an escalated armed conflict with Pakistan.


Should the new Pakistan Army Chief succumb to such international pressure, it would not be from any fears of Indian military backlash but out of coercive pressures from Pakistan Army’s erstwhile strategic patrons. The rest of Pakistan Army’s military adventurism against India is unlikely to cease.
The other major ongoing speculation in India is whether Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif having personally selected General Bajwa as the new Pakistan Army Chief could possibly expect him to second the Pakistani PM’s penchant for better relations with India which in the past were over-ruled by previous Army Chiefs.


It would be a flawed assessment that speculates that Pakistani PM’s main determinant in selecting General Bajwa was that the new Army Chief would be more accommodative in promoting Pakistan’s peace dialogues with India. Pakistan’s institutional opposition to such initiatives would ultimately prevail and even if there is no threat of military coups exist but until such time Pakistan Army comes under complete control of its civilian masters, no Pakistani PM can be oblivious to Pakistan Army’s institutional Anti-India fixations.


The ‘China Factor’ has now surfaced as a major factor and determinant in Pakistan’s and Pakistan Army’s policy attitudes towards India with the emergence of the China-Pakistan Axis in more concrete terms. Further, China prefers dealing directly with the Pakistan Army Chief and the Pakistan Army, and not with the elected Government of Pakistan. China can ill-afford any Pakistan Army Chief who displays soft attitudes’ towards India. General Bajwa cannot be expected to be an exception.


Lead editorials in Pakistan’s more prominent dailies reflecting on General Bajwa’s selection as Army Chief in outlining the agenda for the new Pakistan Army Chief have stressed that General Bajwa should focus on the continuation of his predecessor’s aggressive policies which in any case were not India-friendly.


Pakistan seems to be suffering from heightened besieged paranoia where one columnist has gone so far as to suggest that the ‘Trump-Modi Combine’ would be out to destroy Pakistan.
Concluding therefore, the major assessment that surfaces from the above analysis is that India should be under no delusions’ that Pakistan’s policy on India would change for the better with the advent of the new Pakistan Army Chief. A complex mix of external and internal factors may propel Pakistan to greater military adventurism against India on the plea that India threatens Pakistan’s very existence now with no restraining coercive pressures of the United States existent.