Make In India: Transfer Of Technology Dreams Versus Reality – OpEd

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/05122016-make-in-india-transfer-of-technology-dreams-versus-reality-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29





     Make In India: Transfer Of Technology                   Dreams Versus Reality

                                     By
                  Vishakha Amitabh Hoskote


December 5, 2016 

Make in India logo.


India and Russia recently signed deals for S-400 air defence missile program, Kamov 226T helicopters, etc.

 The question remains what about the transfer of technology?

For several experts in the field of National Defence and Security, ‘Make in India’ has been more than just a mere slogan, and an amalgamation of all the ongoing projects, procurements and forward planning in India’s security sector.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his bid to transform the otherwise lackadaisical approach of India’s Defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Defence Research and Development Organisations (DRDOs) as well as Private Companies envisioned a progressive approach strongly backed by a strategy built on the ethos of credibility and immediate deliverables, job creation, thus adding strength to India’s indigenous defence industry under his mission “Make in India”.


Marred by project delays and issues of Request for Information (RFI), Request for Proposals (RFP) and Transfer of Technology (ToT), licensing issues with Russia, United States, India’s defence sector is currently undergoing massive transformation, a natural corollary to Modi’s frequent visits to other countries and subsequent discussions with his counterparts on defence and security.

The revised Defence Procurement Policy is also being projected as the game changer. However financial, political and strategic investments in projects meant to modernise India’s defence industry exhibit a very uneven path. Whether it is the MMRCA, Tejas or AWACS statistics reveal that India is yet to achieve a great breakthrough in defence, compared to China or Pakistan as in the case of AWACS.

The Cabinet Committee on Security has time and again sanctioned several projects, but uneven investments have often defeated the very purpose of rapid military transformations, to tackle new asymmetrical threats. If statistics provided by the defence ministry are to be believed, India has signed five deals of more than Rs 2,500 crore since May 2014.  (a) Projects for Tactical Communication Systems  (TCS), (b) Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) (worth $ 7.5 billion) for the Indian Army, (c) construction of seven Shivalik class frigates (Project 17 A) for the Navy, by Mazagon Docs Limited and Garden Reach Steel Industry, amounting to Rs 45201 crores are currently under consideration(d)Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is currently in the process of building basic trainer aircraft HTT 40 and Sukhoi MK 1 aircraft in line with the 272 target set for 2018 by the Indian Air Force. There are several such deals being planned, but deadlock over(d) Rafale continues to make headlines.


Meanwhile, reacting to the commercial deadlock over Rafale prices with Dassault, other players such as Lockheed Martin (F 16), Saab (Gripen) are now streamlining their business strategy, to meet the requirements of the Indian industry under Make in India. Saab is willing to partner with Indian companies, giving India complete software control to build the Gripen fighter in India. Saab is also keen on setting up an aeronautic training academy in India.


For a strong indigenous defence industry both outside support and internal political commitments are very crucial. Integral to any development program, is the need to provide a conducive socio-economic and political environment where any proposed idea can take roots. The liberalisation of the FDI Policy in Defence, which shifted the fulcrum of indigenisation from ‘state of the art technology’ to ‘modern technology’ was indeed a welcome change.


The buzz word, Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured’ (IDDM) now stands at 30:70, (Imports 30%) focus remaining on indigenisation. The FDI policy was revised to fill critical gaps in technology aiding job creation and growth if Indian industry. Despite the very obvious reports on project delays, falling production targets in the case of the Ordnance Factories, and sudden inflow of private players such as Reliance and Mahindra for example in the defence arena, ‘Make in India’ is a progressive move aimed to strengthen India’s defence industry.


However, there is no systematic explanation for India’s dialogues with Russia and the US over defence procurements and projects. The very crucial aspect of Transfer of Technology (ToT) especially nuclear propulsion (for example, in the case of nuclear supercarrier) has often caused unnecessary delays in signing of agreements between Original Equipment Makers (OEM’s) and India. Offset policy (2012) allows Joint ventures through the non-equity route.


Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar recently stated that the real impact of Make in India will be seen in 2017. Parrikar stressed on the need to outsource certain products in order to maintain a healthy production chain. So the question remains: Can private players deliver better? Is the budget enough to meet the requirements of Make in India? Will the dynamics of a Russia- US power play (add China for good measure), affect India’s position as a strong defence power in South Asia and subsequently on the global stage? It was in 2001 when private players first entered the defence domain, with a 26% FDI bid. But terms and conditions laid out by the government were so stringent, that deliverables were far from being met. Technical education lagged behind affecting human resource availability.
One very important aspect of defence modernization is the ongoing Research and Development (R&D) in the field of security that has been crafted to meet the requirements of the modern day battlefield. Advancement in information technology and the changing nature of threats, whether man-made or accidental, on land, sea, air and even the virtual space now coerces one to assess the outcomes of procurements, acquisitions and mergers, in defence manufacturing sector.


The pace with which technology is becoming obsolete is a real problem. Defence preparedness calls not just for military modernisation but also reforms, which are capable of accelerating the R& D processes in the field of security. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that no one player or OEM can fully manufacture critical equipment. Several components are now procured from various producers, making the procurement procedure lengthy and complicated. These can cause unnecessary delays too. Another point of view currently attracting a lot of attention is that opening the doors of the security sector to foreign players will jeopardise India’s position as a strong defence power.

That foreign players are still not fully convinced with the idea of ‘Make in India’ especially shifting their production bases to India, a market which has inherent haphazard supply chain structures, is a different question altogether. Lastly, more than flooding the market with success stories, the focus should be on the needs of the defence forces and on the operational efficacy of equipment manufactured under Make in India. Positive market trends have indeed widened the horizons of defence manufacturing in India but India still needs a little more political and financial push to achieve a higher degree of self-reliance in defence technology.

TOPICS:

Economics  Foreign Policy  India  Russia  SouthAsia  Trade

 

 

 

 

 

 

Why the Indian Navy Is Unhappy With Its Carrier-Based Light Combat Aircraft Project

SOURCE:http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/has-the-indian-navy-canceled-its-carrier-based-light-combat-aircraft-project/



             Why the Indian Navy Is Unhappy
                                   With Its

Carrier-Based Light Combat Aircraft Project
                                       By
                             Abhijit Singh for The Diplomat

 

India’s chief of naval staff reiterates reservations about the Tejas’ suitability for carrier operations

December 03, 2016

 

Ahead of Navy Day celebrations on December 4, Admiral Sunil Lanba, India’s chief of naval staff (CNS), caused a minor flutter in the media by suggesting that the Navy was doing a rethink on the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, India’s premier light fighter jet program. At a press conference, Lanba remarked that the navy was looking for a temporary replacement jet from a source abroad for carrier-operations as the LCA (Navy) wasn’t “yet up to the mark.” Even though the navy chief did not go as far as to suggest the project was being scrapped, he was categorical about the navy’s dissatisfaction with the naval variants under production.

Lanba’s admission is likely to have placed many officials in the Ministry of Defense (MoD), as well as the Defense Research and Development Organization, in a spot of bother. After a slow start in the early 1980s, the LCA struggled for over three decades before showing progress in the past few years. Having obtained operational clearance in 2013, the aircraft has now been officially integrated into the Indian Air Force. Oddly, the naval chief’s statement came only a day after the ministry cleared an order for 83 LCA Mk 1As from the government-owned defense manufacture Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) for the IAF.


This isn’t, of course, the first time that a naval chief has publicly expressed reservations about the LCA program. In 2012, Admiral Nirmal Verma, then CNS, in an interaction with the media chided the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) for frequent cost and time overruns in the development of the naval version of the aircraft.

The Navy, he suggested, was beginning to lose faith in the project.


Now, as then, the problem with the LCA remains the same:

 its inability to take off with its full weapon load from a carrier top.

Naval sources point out that since 2013, the LCA has consistently failed the test of flight from a 200-meter deck with full weapons load. In a series of trial sorties at a Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF) in May this year, ADA officials claimed that the aircraft had made the cut by successfully ascending from a short deck with two R-73 close combat missiles. But naval managers clearly weren’t impressed.


The Navy’s real problem is that it believes that the LCA is a largely air force-centric program that isn’t essentially geared to meet aircraft carrier-operations. At many points during its evolution, naval managers are said to have emphasized the need for aircraft systems to be reconfigured to meet the requirements of carrier take-off and landing, but the ADA never reportedly made a serious attempt to undertake the necessary modifications.

Naval aeronautical engineers believe that the LCA’s naval variant is slightly but “significantly” different from its air force version, not least on account of a major modification needed in the aircraft’s landing gear that enables arrested landings on a carrier deck. Unfortunately for the Indian Navy, the ADA hasn’t ever fully committed itself to developing a modified undercarriage. As a consequence, the suspicion of an institutional indifference toward the Navy’s specific needs of carrier operations has only grown stronger.


Another concern has been the lack of a reliable air-to-air refueling system. Despite renewed efforts, the complex integration of the aerial refueling probe on to the Tejas fighter hasn’t been properly accomplished. The absence of reliable “hot-refueling” implies a restriction in aircraft mission ranges, which maritime managers have been unwilling to accept.


Why, however, must the Indian Navy be fussy about an aircraft that is only meant to supplement the Mig-29K? Aircraft carrier experts say middle and light category aircraft have different peacetime roles profiles. Given India’s geostrategic interests in the Indian Ocean region, it is important for the Navy to project both hard and soft naval power. High-end combat aircraft like the Mig-29K are meant to exert hard military influence by signaling coercive intent. Equally important, however, is the need for a carrier-borne aircraft to showcase the Indian Navy’s prowess as reliable security agent in the littorals. Indigenous medium-capability assets help in creating a circle of trust, owing to their utility in joint multinational operations. With a leading role in regional forums such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Milan, the Indian Navy has come to be known as a friendly maritime agency. Its low-end light combat aircraft aids in the cultivation of a benevolent image. In addition, the aircraft’s export to friendly countries would help in the forging of strong working-level partnerships.


Misgivings about the LCA program, however, go beyond the perceived disregard for specific functionality. In an article in July this year, Admiral Arun Prakash (retd.), a former chief of naval staff, outlined three reasons why the military leadership was apprehensive about the project. Firstly, Prakash pointed out that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the huge public sector firm manufacturing the LCA, is a monolithic, indolent giant with a work ethos that “struck dread in the hearts of air-warriors.” The company’s unionized employees were a cause for low productivity and poor production engineering standards that created many maintenance and inter-changeability problems on aircraft. Secondly, there was a high failure rate of HAL manufactured components and systems that didn’t inspire confidence among military aviation managers. And lastly, Prakash pointed to the suboptimal production support, which often left “HAL customers high and dry.”


Scrapping the LCA (Navy) program, however, will not be without consequences. For one, the Indian Navy will need to start afresh in the search for a foreign source for a new light combat aircraft. Given the stringent provisions of the Defense Procurement Procedures (DPP), especially the need for a domestic manufacturer, this implies a substantial delay in the project. Besides, having invested considerable funds in the LCA program since 2009, the Indian Navy will need to explain losses, as well as the wisdom of investing in a new project. Not only will it push back delivery of the platforms by a few years, the work-load on the Mig-29K will dramatically increase with involvement in both low-end and high-end missions.


For the moment, the critics of the LCA program will feel vindicated. At least until the Indian Navy clarifies that its chief’s statement is being misinterpreted.

Abhijit Singh is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Fellow in New Delhi

 

NUKES :Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program

SOURCE:

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program

The Beginning

If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - 1965

 
                       Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
 

SOURCE:
https://news.usni.org/2016/06/29/pakistans-nuclear-weapons

Document: Report to Congress on Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

June 29, 2016 8:57 AM • Updated: June 29, 2016 5:14 PM

The following is the June 14, 2016 Congressional Research Service report, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.

 

CLICK / GOOGLE TO OPEN THE pdf DOCUMENT

Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons - USNI News

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Jun 29, 2016 - Document: Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons ... Close. via fas.org ... Get USNI News updates delivered to your inbox.

 

SOURCE:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/did-donald-trump-just-raise-the-odds-of-war-between-india-and-pakistan-with-one-phone-call/

The Debate

Image Credit: Flickr/ Gage Skidmore

Did Donald Trump Just Raise the Odds of War Between India and Pakistan With One Phone Call?

                                    By

                          Ankit Panda

Let’s talk about Donald Trump’s first phone call with Pakistan’s prime minister.

Panda

 for The Diplomat

December 01, 2016

U.S. President-Elect Donald Trump’s first phone call with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif — three weeks into the presidential transition in the United States — gives South Asia watchers cause for concern.

As a Pakistani readout of the call shows, if there’s anywhere Trump would be better off speaking to world leaders with a State Department briefing in hand, it would be in the Indian subcontinent. Here’s the full text of the Pakistani Press Information Department’s readout:

Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif called President-elect USA Donald Trump and felicitated him on his victory. President Trump said Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif you have a very good reputation. You are a terrific guy. You are doing amazing work which is visible in every way. I am looking forward to see you soon. As I am talking to you Prime Minister, I feel I am talking to a person I have known for long. Your country is amazing with tremendous opportunities. Pakistanis are one of the most intelligent people. I am ready and willing to play any role that you want me to play to address and find solutions to the outstanding problems. It will be an honor and I will personally do it. Feel free to call me any time even before 20th January that is before I assume my office.

On being invited to visit Pakistan by the Prime Minister, Mr. Trump said that he would love to come to a fantastic country, fantastic place of fantastic people. Please convey to the Pakistani people that they are amazing and all Pakistanis I have known are exceptional people, said Mr. Donald Trump.

It’s easy to get pulled into the absurdity of the typically over-the-top Trumpian language at play here, but these two short paragraphs could easily have the effect of snowballing into an early diplomatic crisis in South Asia for the Trump administration. First, for Pakistan, after more than a decade without a U.S. presidential visit (George W. Bush visited President Pervez Musharraf in 2006), here you have a U.S. president-elect accepting an invitation to visit. Second, Trump’s declaration that he is “ready and willing to play any role that you want me to play” will give cause for celebration in Islamabad and cause for concern in New Delhi.

India’s reaction to this statement will be as important as Pakistan’s. Though it hasn’t dominated headlines in the United States, tensions between India and Pakistan across the Line of Control in Kashmir have been consistently high since a September attack on an Indian Army camp by militants killed 19 Indian soldiers, the highest casualty attack against the Indian Army in more than a decade. Moreover, days before Trump and Sharif spoke, seven more Indian soldiers were killed by militants in Nagrota in Kashmir. Though neither side has directly escalated since India claimed to have carried out “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control, the possibility of a conflagration between the two nuclear-armed neighbors remains very real. (India and Pakistan last fought a conventional war as armed nuclear states in 1999.)


For India, despite Trump’s well-known tendency to reverse course on issues, there is no option but to take the Pakistani readout of the Trump-Sharif call as a literal suggestion of what Trump plans to do. Betting on the alternative — that Trump was simply trying to satisfy another interlocutor by saying what he thought Sharif wanted to hear — cannot become a basis for national-level policymaking.

Based on the call, India has to be ready for the possibility that the next U.S. administration will not only stay away from directly condemning Pakistan for deploying militant proxies on the Indian side of Kashmir, but that Trump may be gearing up for a return to treating Pakistan like any other U.S. major non-NATO ally. The trend line in the Obama year suggested gradual distancing from Pakistan and rapprochement with India, with New Delhi potentially having factored in continuity in U.S. policy post-2016. Indeed, India would have preferred if Trump had stuck with his thoughts on Pakistan in 2012, when he tweeted the following:

When will Pakistan apologize to us for providing safe sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden for 6 years?! Some ‘ally.’

Vipin Narang, a nuclear weapons and security studies expert and professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told the The Diplomat that “the one thing that would give [the Government of India] an aneurysm is any US effort to ‘mediate’ Kashmir, which is, it sounds like, what Trump was offering–or at least it was vague enough that India could interpret it that way.” Narang’s right that a U.S. offer to mediate between India and Pakistan is the last thing that would interest New Delhi given repeated incidents of militant violence in Kashmir since September. “On the heels of Uri and Nagrota, this is probably the last thing India wanted to hear. Phone calls like this where [the president-elect of the United States] goes off-script can create problems for US policy and global security — in a volatile nuclear-armed region — where one previously did not exist.”





“This could literally start a nuclear war,” Narang added.


Of course, Trump, once he’s adequately briefed on the situation in South Asia and on the trajectory of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2011, may come to realize that the promises he laid out in his call with Sharif are probably untenable. That realization won’t in itself be a positive development, since any move to pull back will unnecessarily strain ties with Pakistan. Even if the civilian leadership in Pakistan understands that Trump’s effusiveness on the call was his characteristic brand of insincere exaggeration, public opinion and even the Pakistani military’s view of the new U.S. president may force the relationship downwards.

Is there a way to fix the damage that may have been done as a result of this call? Trump could attempt to walk-back his ad hoc signaling by delivering a teleprompter-based policy speech crafted by knowledgeable staff on South Asia, but even then, the commitments laid out to the Pakistani prime minister here are now an on-the-record fact of what the next U.S. president has said he intends to do. That, regardless of what comes next, will play a part in determining outcomes in U.S. diplomacy with India and Pakistan.

Trump must understand that the stakes are exceptionally high in South Asia given the persistent and real threat of nuclear exchange. And while the United States’ position doesn’t directly affect tactical decision-making by Indian and Pakistani leaders on when and if to escalate, both sides do consider the likely U.S. reaction to escalation in their evaluation of the available options.

Since the immediate aftermath of the Uri attack, South Asia watchers have wrangled with the question of whether it’s likely that India and Pakistan will once again go to war over Kashmir. Trump’s phone call to Sharif suggests that this debate won’t end anytime soon and may indeed persist through the next four years.


Update: Later Wednesday evening, the Trump transition team released its own, less-detailed read-out of the call:

President-elect Trump and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Nawaz Sharif spoke today and had a productive conversation about how the United States and Pakistan will have a strong working relationship in the future.  President-elect Trump also noted that he is looking forward to a lasting and strong personal relationship with Prime Minister Sharif

 

PRESIDENT ELECT TRUMP & SOUTH ASIA :- Where Should Donald Trump Begin in

SOURCE:
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/11/30/where-should-donald-trump-begin-in-south-asia/?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link38-20161205&sp_mid=52919986&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1

    Where Should Donald Trump Begin in

                                   South Asia?

                                        By 

                                 Alyssa Ayres

November 30, 2016

 

 

Barack Obama meets with Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

 

 

Donald J. Trump will assume the U.S. presidency at a time of flux in South Asia. Afghanistan appears at risk of greater instability, Pakistan continues to harbor terrorists that attack its neighbors, India-Pakistan tensions have increased, and India’s growth story has hit a speed bump. China has escalated its involvement in the region, with extensive infrastructure development plans for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The Trump administration’s national security and international economic teams will enter office with both near-term tactical as well as long-term strategic decisions to make about how to approach the region.


At the top of the list, given the U.S. troop presence there, will be Afghanistan. Afghanistan figured little during the presidential campaign, so a Trump policy for Afghanistan has yet to be articulated. He can make a virtue of this fresh approach by calling for an immediate review of U.S. interests there. First on the list: a consideration of the size and scope of the U.S. military deployment in Afghanistan—scheduled earlier for a drawdown to around 5,500 troops by the end of this year, but now stabilized at around 8,400 troops to advise the Afghan army now facing a resurgent Taliban that has made territorial gains.


The Trump team, like the Obama team and the Bush team before it, will need to reach its own conclusion on U.S. national interests in Afghanistan, and develop its approach to counterterrorism and development there. With the benefit of greater hindsight on our longest war, and a more jaundiced sense of what a U.S. presence can achieve, they will most likely focus on what role U.S. forces can continue to play in providing advice, training, and counterterrorism support for Afghans.

Trump has spoken frequently of defeating the Islamic State as a top national security priority, and the rise of pockets of the Islamic State in Afghanistan suggest additional security focus on the country. How he will work with NATO—which maintains a train, advise, and assist presence in Afghanistan, and which Trump disparaged on the campaign trail as “obsolete”—remains an open question.


In Kabul, the Afghan National Unity Government’s uneasy truce—a brokered marriage of rivals—has also grown brittle. Trump’s national security team will need to determine how they will approach diplomatic efforts to assist the fragile government in Kabul. And if that weren’t enough to worry about, the revival of Taliban attacks does not suggest readiness to engage in reconciliation negotiations toward a political solution.


The interlocking puzzle piece next confronting the Trump team will be Pakistan. Trump’s occasional campaign comments about the country suggested his awareness of the challenge. Pakistan’s endless civil-military tensions continue to plague its development, but a newly-appointed chief of army staff allows Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif some scope to attempt once again to better ties with Afghanistan and with India. The Trump team should take advantage of this change in Pakistan by focusing early diplomacy on impressing upon Pakistani civilian and military leaders how Washington has tired of Pakistan’s games. Fifteen years after 9/11, Pakistan continues to openly harbor UN- and U.S.-designated terrorists who, through attacks on Afghanistan and on India, instigate problems in the region and create the possibility of military escalation. The Trump administration should spell out to Pakistan the potential costs to its ties with the United States from its refusal to adequately address terrorism—and be prepared to start making changes.


India-Pakistan ties are at a low point, precisely due to the problem of Pakistan’s unwillingness to curb terrorist groups. Despite the efforts of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to create a better working relationship, terrorist attacks in a series of locations in India (Gurdaspur, Udhampur, Pathankot, and Uri, to name a few) pushed India to a new kind of response this past September. Following a terrorist attack on an Indian army outpost in Uri, in Kashmir, about a week later the Indian army carried out ground-based “surgical strikes” against what they called terrorist “launching pads” along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. This more heightened situation of tension is cause for concern, given that both countries possess nuclear weapons.

But the regularity of the pattern has one common thread: each cycle of violence and escalation begins with a terrorist attack on India mounted from Pakistan. Breaking the cycle requires tackling the terrorism problem at its source.


These policy concerns will confront the Trump administration immediately, because of the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and the interrelated problem that Pakistan poses for Afghanistan’s success and for peace in South Asia. But the long-term strategic bet for the United States will involve our growing relationship with a rising India.


The U.S.-India relationship has grown significantly over the past two U.S. administrations, and the Trump administration should pick up the baton to carry things forward. Strategic ties have advanced dramatically, with a shared view of the world and a shared sense that Asia should not be dominated by any single power. Counterterrorism cooperation has grown closer. Defense ties have ramped up dramatically over the past four years, and should continue to grow with an uptick in joint exercises, new agreements permitting closer cooperation, and a joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. The arena with some remaining challenges has been trade and economic ties, and a Trump economic team should be able to identify some positive incentives (such as membership in international economic organizations like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or APEC) to discuss with New Delhi.


As India rises on the world stage, it has increasingly sought a larger voice in global institutions. The Indian government will be looking for a clear statement of support on these matters from the Trump team, particularly regarding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Trump should support this bid, as did the Obama administration, but he could take more active steps on UN reform to make this statement more than just words.


Finally, a Trump administration can cast a fresh look at the shape of U.S. diplomacy across the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, and Indian Ocean region. China’s growing economic statecraft efforts—through its “One Belt, One Road” efforts and additional bilateral initiatives with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—indicate expansive ambition. Its work shoring up alternative financial institutions and regional organizations which are not led by the United States or the West has given it other arenas of influence. With the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China has doubled down on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), another Asia-wide trade negotiation which also includes India. (The TPP by contrast did not include either India or China.) The Trump administration should take a look at evolving economic and diplomatic patterns across Asia, a region of central long-term importance to U.S. interests, and step up U.S. involvement to ensure that American influence is not eclipsed. New Delhi will be a good partner for such a discussion, and the Trump administration should consult India actively on larger Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean questions.


Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).


Read more about how the Trump administration should approach U.S. policy toward China (here and here), Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

Posted in

 

 Afghanistan, Campaign 2016, India, India-Pakistan, Pakistan, Trump and Asia Share

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Demonetisation, Opposition & Bandh

SOURCE:
http://mrinalsuman.blogspot.in/2016/12/demonetisation-opposition-and-bandh.html




       Demonetisation, Opposition

                              &

                           Bandh

Major General Mrinal Suman

Life is full of surprises, nay shocks. When Manmohan Singh slammed demonetisation as ‘organised loot and legalised plunder’, one did not know how to react. The man who facilitated generation of maximum black money was accusing Modi government of ‘monumental mismanagement’ – some brazenness!

Manmohan Singh virtually pawned national assets to the coalition partners in exchange for the prime ministerial chair. He allowed and abetted open loot of the treasury.  Ministries like coal, telecommunication, aviation, railway and sports had become dens of corruption. He expressed his helplessness, taking shelter under the unscrupulous plea of coalition compulsions. In a way, it was an open admission by him that he would lose his chair if he took action against his corrupt colleagues. Therefore, it was most incongruous for him to talk of loot and plunder.

One does not know why the Congress party fielded him. Did it really think he was their trump card, being a renowned economist and an ex Prime Minister, or was it done in jest to embarrass him? More surprising is the fact that he agreed to speak on the subject. He made a laughing stock of himself with his homilies, inviting sniggers from viewers. His track record both as the head of the government and pragmatic economist is appalling.

Congress party appears to be at its wits’ end. It does not know how to respond to Modi’s initiatives. The party joined the whole country in lauding surgical strikes across LoC. When it realised that Modi was gaining popularity, it started questioning its occurrence. Most ridiculously, it demanded that proof be made public. When scoffed at by the whole country, it started claiming that it had also allowed similar strikes when in power.

Demonetisation evoked similar response. Initial reaction was muted. However, with Modi acquiring iconic status as a crusader against black money, Congress quickly changed tracks. Having failed to find a convincing economic argument against demonetisation, it has started resorting to the dishonourable tactic of disrupting parliamentary proceedings.

Most laughingly, Congress has declined to debate the issue without the presence of the Prime Minister. Yes, it is not satisfied with just a statement from him but wants his presence throughout the debate – an unprecedented and irrational demand.  A new low has been reached in India’s abysmal parliamentary conduct – issues are not important, individuals are. It shows total bankruptcy of ideas and logical thinking.

Taking a cue from the Congress party, other opposition parties have also joined the bandwagon of protests and bandhs. They are expressing their Aakrosh (anger), ostensibly for the discomfort being caused to the common man. Can there be a more ridiculous excuse? Actually, it is the political leadership that is getting discomfited. 

Common man is supporting the decision and is willingly enduring the temporary hardship for he long-term good of the nation. People standing in long queues for hours showed no anger at all. Even leading questions of some infamously shameless media men have failed to evoke negative responses.

 

Responses sought by Modi on his app showed overwhelming support for the step. True to its wont, opposition dismissed it as a contrived poll.  

A survey was carried out by C-Voter (an international polling agency) across different age and income groups on 21 November. It covered nearly half the country’s parliamentary constituencies. Almost 87 percent of respondents supported the move against black money while 85 percent opined that the inconvenience being faced by them was worth the effort. Therefore, which common man’s discomfort is bothering the opposition parties?

Even if the above survey is dismissed as non-representative, how do the opposition parties explain sweeping victories scored by the ruling party in the recent civic elections in Maharashtra and Gujarat? These were held after demonetisation and people had already endured cash difficulties.

The truth is obvious to all. Elections are an expensive business. Political parties had hoarded huge stocks of ill-gotten cash to fight elections and bribe voters. They are feeling ‘cheated’ and their anger is explicable. How will they arrange liquor and other freebies to influence voters? How will they gather supporters for their rallies? Who will pay for the fleets of buses for transporting them, arrange their meals and cash rewards? Hiring of helicopter fleets and cavalcades of vehicles for flitting across various constituencies will become difficult.

Many political parties used to collect huge funds by auctioning party tickets for elections to the highest bidders. Needless to say, such donations were always in cash. Demonetisation has dealt a fatal blow to this trafficking of electoral rectitude. As there is no cash, there are no takers. Any wonder then that many political leaders are shrieking and behaving in such a despicable manner. Their treasure chests have been demolished.  

In addition to the politicians; some builders, traders, smugglers, hawala operators, presstitutes, lawyers, doctors, private hospitable, schools/colleges and such other segments of the society have also been thriving on black money. Therefore, their opposition to demonetisation is understandable.

However, what is not acceptable is their incendiary and inciting agenda. Old pictures of long queues (including those outside cinema halls) are being circulated as of cash starved restless crowds. Every unfortunate death anywhere in the vicinity of a bank/ATM is being attributed to demonetisation. A heart patient died at home while getting dressed for going to the bank. The headline read, “Man dies of fear of long wait at the bank”. Absurdity has no limits.

According to jurisprudence, all decisions taken in good faith must be accepted accordingly. Everyone knows that demonetisation is a colossal step towards ridding India of the menace of black money. The whole country is supporting the government. Exceptions are only two – those who thrived on black money and those who are inimical to Indian interests. As regards the latter, they are incorrigible. Anti-nationalism is a part of their DNA. Every progressive step towards a better India has to be opposed by them; and that is India’s misfortune.*****

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SOURCE:


BBC Documentary Drone Attack Drones in Military Documentary History Channel  

        [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_tMNAAVxY0 ]

 

                  The Drone Revolution

                Less Than Meets the Eye

                                    By

                Lawrence D. Freedman

 

 

 

It is a measure of how much the United States’ security has improved since the more dangerous moments of the Cold War that the most troublesome issues in the military field today concern not weapons of mass destruction but targeted killing.

 

 

The power that comes with access to the nuclear codes, of course, remains foremost when considering a presidential candidate’s fitness for office. Yet no American leader has authorized the use of nuclear weapons since 1945. The last two U.S. presidents have regularly authorized the elimination of alleged Islamist terrorists.

 

 

The U.S. government has assassinated jihadists through a variety of means, including Special Forces and attack helicopters. But drones have become its new weapon of choice. This has prompted a large body of literature exploring the ethical, legal, and strategic dilemmas that these weapons pose. Some of these books, such as The Drone Debate, by the political scientists Avery Plaw, Matthew Fricker, and Carlos Colon, and Drones, by Sarah Kreps, also an academic, provide admirable overviews of the debate.

 

 

Objective Troy, meanwhile, by the New York Times reporter Scott Shane, presents a gripping account of the hunt for Anwar al-Awlaki, the charismatic New Mexico–born preacher and senior al Qaeda operative who, after a drone killed him in Yemen in 2011, became the first U.S. citizen to be assassinated since the American Civil War. The Assassination Complex, by the investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill and the staff of The Intercept (and which includes a foreword by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden), amounts to a searing indictment of the U.S. drone program. Other commentators are more gently critical, such as the anthropologist Hugh Gusterson, in Drone, his thoughtful examination of the dilemmas this new weapon poses.

 

 

Although these books differ in style and focus, they cover a similar set of issues and are drawn to the same set of sources. Underlying them all is the claim that drones represent a new era of warfare, or at least of counterterrorism. It is true that with drones, governments can eliminate political leaders and activists with relative ease. And perhaps one day, fully autonomous military systems, once programmed, may be able to decide whom to watch and then eliminate. Yet for now, at least, drones are just another weapon in the military’s arsenal. Winning a war requires controlling territory, and that will always necessitate supporting ground forces. Drones are an important innovation, but they are not revolutionary.

 

 

"ADDICTIVE AS CATNIP"

 

Unmanned aerial vehicles have existed since the early days of airpower. The first was developed but not used during World War I, for target practice. But it was the Israeli engineer Abraham Karem, who had been working on drones to confuse Arab air defenses in the 1970s, who realized that with new technologies, drones could provide real-time intelligence. In his enthralling history of the U.S. drone program, Predator, Richard Whittle tells Karem’s story. After immigrating to the United States, Karem failed to convince the Pentagon of his idea, and in 1990, he went bankrupt. But General Atomics, a California-based defense contractor that had been developing drones of its own, saw the potential of his designs. Together, they built the Predator