Thursday, December 8, 2016

Is India Prepared To Deal With Hybrid War? – Analysis

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/08122016-is-india-prepared-to-deal-with-hybrid-war-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29


Is India Prepared To Deal With Hybrid War?
                                       By
                  Brig Anil Gupta (Retd)*





Samba, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Pampore, Uri, Macchail, about 200 ceasefire violations targeting civilians and now Nagrota — the list is endless and increasing. After every incident, strong statements are made, Pakistan is blamed, provocative debates are held on TV channels, an inquiry is ordered — gradually it fades away from the nation’s memory and things return to square one till we are awakened by another rude shock.
Pakistan remains in the denial mode as usual and indulges in mutual blame game till conclusive evidence is produced of its involvement and even then it has the audacity to continue to harp about home-grown militancy.

In fact, ever since 1947, Pakistan has never ever admitted initially to its involvement in tribal raids in J&K, 1965, 1971, Khalistan movement, Kashmir, Kandhar, Parliament attack, Kargil, and the current unrest in Kashmir. It is part of its strategy.


There is no denying the fact that Pakistan has been using hybrid threats against India since Independence. With the emergence of technology, the threats have become more deadly and potent and have been given a new name of “Hybrid War”.


Hybrid War can best be described as a combination of conventional and sub-conventional threats and can be unleashed both by the state and non-state actors.

China, another adversary of India’s, is also a big proponent of this type of warfare in the 21st century and terms it as “Unrestricted Warfare.”

This type of warfare is characterised by undefined battle space and extends to the flanks and rear as well. In other words, there is no front or rear in the hybrid warfare battlefield and it can manifest anywhere on the borders or deep inside the hinterland


The tools of hybrid war, or the hybrid threats, include conventional warfare, irregular warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, subversion, criminal acts, Special Ops, information warfare or propaganda and violence. In hybrid war, conflicts are as much political as military.


Pakistan continues to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy. A section of Indian elite is also a tool of Pakistan’s hybrid warfare against India. Through its intelligence agencies and Track 2 diplomacy, Pakistan has successfully cultivated a section among India’s political and social elite that is not only pro-Pakistan but also questions the Indian Parliamentary resolution of 1994 claiming the entire state of J&K as an integral part of India.


The Nagrota attack bears the trade mark signature of General Raheel Sharif who was relinquishing office that day. During his tenure as Chief of the Pakistan Army, he ensured that any possible attempt at holding talks with India were nipped in the bud through sensational terror acts using the apparatus of the Deep State.

In the instant case, Raheel Sharif killed two birds with one stone. He not only negated the offer of talks during the proposed visit of Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz for the Heart of Asia Conference at Amritsar but also somewhat restored his military reputation that had been dented badly after the Indian surgical strikes in September.


In fact, the expected response from Pakistan after the surgical strikes was increase in terror activities. We should have been prepared to meet this threat from our adversary.

The stark reality is that we, as a nation, are not prepared to meet the challenges posed by the hybrid threats from our adversaries. Fidayeen attacks and mass casualty terror acts like in Mumbai in 1993, 2006 and 2008 are the manifestations of hybrid war unleashed by Pakistan.


We should have woken up in 1993 and minimised, if not totally eliminated, such threats in our heartland. Alas, we didn’t and had to suffer the ignominy of 10 more such attacks in different parts of the country till we were shocked by the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008.


Sadly, we are a nation of rhetoric. Lot of noises were made after 26/11 but even today, after 8 years have elapsed, can we put our hands on our chest and say that we are fully prepared to meet such threats. If we were, incidents like Gurdaspur, Samba, Pathankot, Pampore and Nagrota would not have happened.


After the 9/11 attack, the US revamped its entire security and intelligence apparatus to ensure the safety of its citizens and went whole hog to eliminate the terror threat from its soil. It raised the Department of Homeland Security with complete mandate and wherewithal to ensure that such threat could not manifest in future and Americans could live peacefully.


The result is there for all to see. Despite several attempts, the terrorists have found it virtually impossible to penetrate the American homeland security system.

 This is how strong nations respond to the challenges of hybrid threats which manifest in the worst form of terrorism.



Regrettably, India has barely addressed the problem post-26/11 and not taken much action to ensure the safety of her citizens from these threats.


Since hybrid threats can manifest anywhere and everywhere, security becomes the responsibility of the entire society and not only that of the security forces or the government.


Security is not merely a thought process but a concept and a lifestyle which has to be understood and implemented by all citizens to make our nation secure. It can no more be treated as a routine activity.


We need to develop a ‘security culture’. Every citizen needs to imbibe security protocol. We have to get used to discomforts and inconveniences that may be caused due to implementation of security procedures.


Even those serving in various security agencies, including police, need to understand its importance and not treat it as a mere job to earn a livelihood.


A cursory look at the security personnel deployed at crowded places like bus stands, railway stations, malls, market places, religious shrines and so on will certainly raise a question in your mind if they are properly equipped, trained, geared and motivated to handle any kind of terror threat? The answer is obvious.-

BIG  ""NO""


That is why terrorists move freely on our highways and travel distances to strike at will wherever they choose to. If that was not so, how did the terrorists reach Nagrota — it is neither located on the Line of Control nor close to the International Border.

We have a plethora of agencies but they lack coordination and cooperation. Turf wars are more important to us than national security and the lives of our citizens.

To counter the challenges of hybrid threats, we need a national response. First and foremost, without wasting any more time, we need a dedicated ministry to look after our internal security. The present MHA is too big and unwieldy to address the issue and don the desired role.


We need to invest heavily in our intelligence and surveillance capabilities. They are nowhere near the optimum level. Coordination and cooperation among the plethora of agencies should form the mandate of the proposed dedicated ministry.
We also need to invest heavily in state police capability-building. From a “Danda Force”, they need to be upgraded to a force capable of acting as a first line of defence against internal threats.

Our airports, coastal areas and highways need to be made impregnable. We also need to change the habit of working in watertight compartments. A greater amount of interaction and consultation between various organs of the state responsible for national security is required. Fortunately, we are no more saddled with highly risk-averse political leadership.


Our information warfare and counter propaganda capabilities need a quantum leap so that they can penetrate deep into Pakistan to exploit the obvious fault lines in that country. At a time when we are moving rapidly towards e-governance, digital world and cashless economy, our cyber warfare capabilities need a thorough re-look and enhancement.


Last, but not the least, we should be militarily prepared for punitive and pre-emptive operations against the terrorists and their sponsors and such operations should form part of our doctrine to combat Hybrid War.

Special Forces form an important component of this doctrine and we need to focus on their capacity and capability building as well as training.


Let us all vow not only to avenge Nagrota but also ensure that it is the last such incident and no more — not through words but dedicated actions. Funds should not be a constraint because national security is paramount to create an environment of peace and development.

*Brig Anil Gupta (Retd) is a Jammu-based political commentator, columnist, security and strategic analyst. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent to editor@spsindia.in

Nandan Nilekani Joins Govt Committee to chart path to less- "CASH SOCIETY"

SOURCE:
http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/newsindia/nandan-nilekani-joins-govt-committee-to-chart-path-to-less-cash-society/ar-AAlicVY?li=AAggbRN&ocid=iehp





               PRELUDE : BLACK MONEY

               [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEzcjbn8EaU ]




Nandan Nilekani Joins Govt Committee to chart path to less- "CASH SOCIETY"



Faced with chaos after eliminating India’s highest value rupee notes, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has roped in a billionaire from the ranks of his adversaries to help.

Nandan Nilekani, a high-profile member of the opposition Indian National Congress (INC) party, has joined a committee to map a path to digital payments. India is trying to end its reliance on cash, especially in rural areas where almost every transaction is done in hard currency. It’s not the first time the former head of outsourcing giant Infosys Ltd has tackled a national project. He also spearheaded the country’s biometrics-based Aadhaar unique identity program.

Designed to eliminate corruption, Modi outlawed existing Rs500 and Rs1,000 notes on 8 November, which wiped out more than four-fifths of the nation’s currency and caused pain for millions, from street hawkers in the south to diamond cutters in the west. The government is trying a Plan B to salvage a situation that Credit Suisse Group AG and Deutsche Bank AG estimate will slow expansion by about 1 percentage point in the year through March.



COMPLETE COVERAGE: War on black money


Nilekani and his 13-person committee are meeting to work out how to get more Indians to adopt digital payments, via everything from their own smartphones to point-of-sale machines in local villages. While the nation has already rolled out its United Payments Interface, with hundreds of millions lacking phones or web access, a multipronged approach is needed to wean the nation of its dependence on cash.


“India has the underlying digital financial architecture in place to get this going,” Nilekani said in an interview after the committee’s first meeting. “How quickly the government can reach everyone is a question of execution and speed.”


Digital Wallets

As presses run all day to crank out new Rs500 and Rs2,000 notes, the committee featuring chief ministers of prominent Indian states as well as the India head of Boston Consulting Group met for the first time last week.

As start-ups such as Paytm, MobiKwik and Freecharge push their digital wallets to a slice of smartphone users, the committee is focusing on two key avenues: getting more merchants to accept the United Payments Interface and procuring more point-of-sale devices.

The interface, rolled out by major banks in April, makes transferring money as easy as sending a text message. With the system already in place, Nilekani says boosting acceptance of the payments interface is achievable in weeks. Getting the estimated one million new POS devices, which would almost double the number in use as of August, would take longer because of the need for a tender.


Rural Impact

“Breaking down the problem into digestible chunks is the first step to solving it,” said Nilekani, who lost a battle for a parliamentary seat in the 2014 election to a key member of Modi’s cabinet.


 Nandan Nilekani says boosting acceptance of UPI is achievable in weeks. Photo: Hemant Mishra/ Mint

India has also made it easier to make digital payments, with the central bank this week doing away with the two-step authentication process for transactions of less than Rs2,000.

The impact of the money ban, known as demonetisation, has been felt the most in the countryside, where cash is preferred for everything from buying clothes and selling produce to paying for weddings. The lack of cash notes has slammed the brakes on business in some areas.

“There is no economic activity, transactions are at a standstill,” said Srikanth Nadhamuni, chief executive officer of incubator Khosla Labs which has funded electronic payments start-up Novopay. The start-up has 40,000 micro ATMs—no more than a smartphone with a fingerprint scanner attached and sometimes a printer - at small street-corner retail outlets called kirana stores.


Adapting Technology

The committee is expected to meet again this week to look at how to approach those with limited access to technology. While India has 250 million smartphone users, there are about 350 million who only have feature phones while another 350 million don’t have a phone at all, Nilekani said.

For feature phone users, the committee recommends India’s existing retail e-payments app be adapted to technology that could be rolled out within weeks. That will be helped by lower charges, with the telecommunications regulator slashing the charges for transactions from Rs1.50 rupees to Re0.50. “Each category has to have a different strategy” said Nilekani.


Big Target

Before demonetisation, digital payments had already been projected to surge. Google and Boston Consulting Group projected India’s digital payments industry to grow to $500 billion and cover half the population only by 2020.

A financial inclusion panel hosted earlier this year by the country’s software products think tank, iSpirt laid out a four-year plan to go cashless.

“It is a big target for four years but government support can shorten the time,” said Sharad Sharma, co-founder of iSpirt and a member of the government-appointed committee. “While it cannot happen in the next few months, it will happen within this decade.”

The real challenge is the 350 million people without phones, many of whom are economically-challenged. The plan is to draw those enrolled in Aadhaar, and quickly enlist the remaining, toward micro ATMs promoted by large Indian lenders such as IDFC Bank and start-ups like Novopay which already have a presence in 130,000 village retail outlets or kirana stores.

“There is a sense of urgency,” said Nilekani. “All the strategies have to be deployed at the same time to aim for universal coverage.”































 

Tuesday, December 6, 2016

Make In India: Transfer Of Technology Dreams Versus Reality – OpEd

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/05122016-make-in-india-transfer-of-technology-dreams-versus-reality-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29





     Make In India: Transfer Of Technology                   Dreams Versus Reality





Make in India logo.


India and Russia recently signed deals for S-400 air defence missile program, Kamov 226T helicopters, etc.

 The question remains what about the transfer of technology?

For several experts in the field of National Defence and Security, ‘Make in India’ has been more than just a mere slogan, and an amalgamation of all the ongoing projects, procurements and forward planning in India’s security sector.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his bid to transform the otherwise lackadaisical approach of India’s Defence Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and Defence Research and Development Organisations (DRDOs) as well as Private Companies envisioned a progressive approach strongly backed by a strategy built on the ethos of credibility and immediate deliverables, job creation, thus adding strength to India’s indigenous defence industry under his mission “Make in India”.


Marred by project delays and issues of Request for Information (RFI), Request for Proposals (RFP) and Transfer of Technology (ToT), licensing issues with Russia, United States, India’s defence sector is currently undergoing massive transformation, a natural corollary to Modi’s frequent visits to other countries and subsequent discussions with his counterparts on defence and security.

The revised Defence Procurement Policy is also being projected as the game changer. However financial, political and strategic investments in projects meant to modernise India’s defence industry exhibit a very uneven path. Whether it is the MMRCA, Tejas or AWACS statistics reveal that India is yet to achieve a great breakthrough in defence, compared to China or Pakistan as in the case of AWACS.

The Cabinet Committee on Security has time and again sanctioned several projects, but uneven investments have often defeated the very purpose of rapid military transformations, to tackle new asymmetrical threats. If statistics provided by the defence ministry are to be believed, India has signed five deals of more than Rs 2,500 crore since May 2014.  (a) Projects for Tactical Communication Systems  (TCS), (b) Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) (worth $ 7.5 billion) for the Indian Army, (c) construction of seven Shivalik class frigates (Project 17 A) for the Navy, by Mazagon Docs Limited and Garden Reach Steel Industry, amounting to Rs 45201 crores are currently under consideration(d)Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is currently in the process of building basic trainer aircraft HTT 40 and Sukhoi MK 1 aircraft in line with the 272 target set for 2018 by the Indian Air Force. There are several such deals being planned, but deadlock over(d) Rafale continues to make headlines.


Meanwhile, reacting to the commercial deadlock over Rafale prices with Dassault, other players such as Lockheed Martin (F 16), Saab (Gripen) are now streamlining their business strategy, to meet the requirements of the Indian industry under Make in India. Saab is willing to partner with Indian companies, giving India complete software control to build the Gripen fighter in India. Saab is also keen on setting up an aeronautic training academy in India.


For a strong indigenous defence industry both outside support and internal political commitments are very crucial. Integral to any development program, is the need to provide a conducive socio-economic and political environment where any proposed idea can take roots. The liberalisation of the FDI Policy in Defence, which shifted the fulcrum of indigenisation from ‘state of the art technology’ to ‘modern technology’ was indeed a welcome change.


The buzz word, Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured’ (IDDM) now stands at 30:70, (Imports 30%) focus remaining on indigenisation. The FDI policy was revised to fill critical gaps in technology aiding job creation and growth if Indian industry. Despite the very obvious reports on project delays, falling production targets in the case of the Ordnance Factories, and sudden inflow of private players such as Reliance and Mahindra for example in the defence arena, ‘Make in India’ is a progressive move aimed to strengthen India’s defence industry.


However, there is no systematic explanation for India’s dialogues with Russia and the US over defence procurements and projects. The very crucial aspect of Transfer of Technology (ToT) especially nuclear propulsion (for example, in the case of nuclear supercarrier) has often caused unnecessary delays in signing of agreements between Original Equipment Makers (OEM’s) and India. Offset policy (2012) allows Joint ventures through the non-equity route.


Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar recently stated that the real impact of Make in India will be seen in 2017. Parrikar stressed on the need to outsource certain products in order to maintain a healthy production chain. So the question remains: Can private players deliver better? Is the budget enough to meet the requirements of Make in India? Will the dynamics of a Russia- US power play (add China for good measure), affect India’s position as a strong defence power in South Asia and subsequently on the global stage? It was in 2001 when private players first entered the defence domain, with a 26% FDI bid. But terms and conditions laid out by the government were so stringent, that deliverables were far from being met. Technical education lagged behind affecting human resource availability.
One very important aspect of defence modernization is the ongoing Research and Development (R&D) in the field of security that has been crafted to meet the requirements of the modern day battlefield. Advancement in information technology and the changing nature of threats, whether man-made or accidental, on land, sea, air and even the virtual space now coerces one to assess the outcomes of procurements, acquisitions and mergers, in defence manufacturing sector.


The pace with which technology is becoming obsolete is a real problem. Defence preparedness calls not just for military modernisation but also reforms, which are capable of accelerating the R& D processes in the field of security. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that no one player or OEM can fully manufacture critical equipment. Several components are now procured from various producers, making the procurement procedure lengthy and complicated. These can cause unnecessary delays too. Another point of view currently attracting a lot of attention is that opening the doors of the security sector to foreign players will jeopardise India’s position as a strong defence power.

That foreign players are still not fully convinced with the idea of ‘Make in India’ especially shifting their production bases to India, a market which has inherent haphazard supply chain structures, is a different question altogether. Lastly, more than flooding the market with success stories, the focus should be on the needs of the defence forces and on the operational efficacy of equipment manufactured under Make in India. Positive market trends have indeed widened the horizons of defence manufacturing in India but India still needs a little more political and financial push to achieve a higher degree of self-reliance in defence technology.

Why the Indian Navy Is Unhappy With Its Carrier-Based Light Combat Aircraft Project

SOURCE:http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/has-the-indian-navy-canceled-its-carrier-based-light-combat-aircraft-project/



             Why the Indian Navy Is Unhappy
                                   With Its

Carrier-Based Light Combat Aircraft Project
                                       By
for The Diplomat

India’s chief of naval staff reiterates reservations about the Tejas’ suitability for carrier operations




 



Ahead of Navy Day celebrations on December 4, Admiral Sunil Lanba, India’s chief of naval staff (CNS), caused a minor flutter in the media by suggesting that the Navy was doing a rethink on the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, India’s premier light fighter jet program. At a press conference, Lanba remarked that the navy was looking for a temporary replacement jet from a source abroad for carrier-operations as the LCA (Navy) wasn’t “yet up to the mark.” Even though the navy chief did not go as far as to suggest the project was being scrapped, he was categorical about the navy’s dissatisfaction with the naval variants under production.

Lanba’s admission is likely to have placed many officials in the Ministry of Defense (MoD), as well as the Defense Research and Development Organization, in a spot of bother. After a slow start in the early 1980s, the LCA struggled for over three decades before showing progress in the past few years. Having obtained operational clearance in 2013, the aircraft has now been officially integrated into the Indian Air Force. Oddly, the naval chief’s statement came only a day after the ministry cleared an order for 83 LCA Mk 1As from the government-owned defense manufacture Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) for the IAF.


This isn’t, of course, the first time that a naval chief has publicly expressed reservations about the LCA program. In 2012, Admiral Nirmal Verma, then CNS, in an interaction with the media chided the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) for frequent cost and time overruns in the development of the naval version of the aircraft.

The Navy, he suggested, was beginning to lose faith in the project.


Now, as then, the problem with the LCA remains the same:

 its inability to take off with its full weapon load from a carrier top.

Naval sources point out that since 2013, the LCA has consistently failed the test of flight from a 200-meter deck with full weapons load. In a series of trial sorties at a Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF) in May this year, ADA officials claimed that the aircraft had made the cut by successfully ascending from a short deck with two R-73 close combat missiles. But naval managers clearly weren’t impressed.


The Navy’s real problem is that it believes that the LCA is a largely air force-centric program that isn’t essentially geared to meet aircraft carrier-operations. At many points during its evolution, naval managers are said to have emphasized the need for aircraft systems to be reconfigured to meet the requirements of carrier take-off and landing, but the ADA never reportedly made a serious attempt to undertake the necessary modifications.

Naval aeronautical engineers believe that the LCA’s naval variant is slightly but significantly” different from its air force version, not least on account of a major modification needed in the aircraft’s landing gear that enables arrested landings on a carrier deck. Unfortunately for the Indian Navy, the ADA hasn’t ever fully committed itself to developing a modified undercarriage. As a consequence, the suspicion of an institutional indifference toward the Navy’s specific needs of carrier operations has only grown stronger.


Another concern has been the lack of a reliable air-to-air refueling system. Despite renewed efforts, the complex integration of the aerial refueling probe on to the Tejas fighter hasn’t been properly accomplished. The absence of reliable “hot-refueling” implies a restriction in aircraft mission ranges, which maritime managers have been unwilling to accept.


Why, however, must the Indian Navy be fussy about an aircraft that is only meant to supplement the Mig-29K? Aircraft carrier experts say middle and light category aircraft have different peacetime roles profiles. Given India’s geostrategic interests in the Indian Ocean region, it is important for the Navy to project both hard and soft naval power. High-end combat aircraft like the Mig-29K are meant to exert hard military influence by signaling coercive intent. Equally important, however, is the need for a carrier-borne aircraft to showcase the Indian Navy’s prowess as reliable security agent in the littorals. Indigenous medium-capability assets help in creating a circle of trust, owing to their utility in joint multinational operations. With a leading role in regional forums such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Milan, the Indian Navy has come to be known as a friendly maritime agency. Its low-end light combat aircraft aids in the cultivation of a benevolent image. In addition, the aircraft’s export to friendly countries would help in the forging of strong working-level partnerships.


Misgivings about the LCA program, however, go beyond the perceived disregard for specific functionality. In an article in July this year, Admiral Arun Prakash (retd.), a former chief of naval staff, outlined three reasons why the military leadership was apprehensive about the project. Firstly, Prakash pointed out that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the huge public sector firm manufacturing the LCA, is a monolithic, indolent giant with a work ethos that “struck dread in the hearts of air-warriors.” The company’s unionized employees were a cause for low productivity and poor production engineering standards that created many maintenance and inter-changeability problems on aircraft. Secondly, there was a high failure rate of HAL manufactured components and systems that didn’t inspire confidence among military aviation managers. And lastly, Prakash pointed to the suboptimal production support, which often left “HAL customers high and dry.”


Scrapping the LCA (Navy) program, however, will not be without consequences. For one, the Indian Navy will need to start afresh in the search for a foreign source for a new light combat aircraft. Given the stringent provisions of the Defense Procurement Procedures (DPP), especially the need for a domestic manufacturer, this implies a substantial delay in the project. Besides, having invested considerable funds in the LCA program since 2009, the Indian Navy will need to explain losses, as well as the wisdom of investing in a new project. Not only will it push back delivery of the platforms by a few years, the work-load on the Mig-29K will dramatically increase with involvement in both low-end and high-end missions.


For the moment, the critics of the LCA program will feel vindicated. At least until the Indian Navy clarifies that its chief’s statement is being misinterpreted.


Abhijit Singh is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Fellow in New Delhi























 

NUKES :Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program

SOURCE:

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program

The Beginning

If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - 1965
 
                       Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
 


SOURCE:
https://news.usni.org/2016/06/29/pakistans-nuclear-weapons

Document: Report to Congress on Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons


The following is the June 14, 2016 Congressional Research Service report, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.

 
CLICK / GOOGLE TO OPEN THE pdf DOCUMENT

Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons - USNI News

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Jun 29, 2016 - Document: Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons ... Close. via fas.org ... Get USNI News updates delivered to your inbox.









 

Monday, December 5, 2016

Did Donald Trump Just Raise the Odds of War Between India and Pakistan With One Phone Call?

SOURCE:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/did-donald-trump-just-raise-the-odds-of-war-between-india-and-pakistan-with-one-phone-call/


Did Donald Trump Just Raise the Odds of War Between India and Pakistan With One Phone Call?
Image Credit: Flickr/ Gage Skidmore

Did Donald Trump Just Raise the Odds of War Between India and Pakistan With One Phone Call?

                                    By

                          Ankit Panda


PRESIDENT ELECT TRUMP & SOUTH ASIA :- Where Should Donald Trump Begin in

SOURCE:
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/11/30/where-should-donald-trump-begin-in-south-asia/?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link38-20161205&sp_mid=52919986&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1




    Where Should Donald Trump Begin in

                                   South Asia?

                                        B
                                 Alyssa Ayres
November 30, 2016
 
 
Barack Obama meets with Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)
 
 
Donald J. Trump will assume the U.S. presidency at a time of flux in South Asia. Afghanistan appears at risk of greater instability, Pakistan continues to harbor terrorists that attack its neighbors, India-Pakistan tensions have increased, and India’s growth story has hit a speed bump. China has escalated its involvement in the region, with extensive infrastructure development plans for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The Trump administration’s national security and international economic teams will enter office with both near-term tactical as well as long-term strategic decisions to make about how to approach the region.


At the top of the list, given the U.S. troop presence there, will be Afghanistan. Afghanistan figured little during the presidential campaign, so a Trump policy for Afghanistan has yet to be articulated. He can make a virtue of this fresh approach by calling for an immediate review of U.S. interests there. First on the list: a consideration of the size and scope of the U.S. military deployment in Afghanistan—scheduled earlier for a drawdown to around 5,500 troops by the end of this year, but now stabilized at around 8,400 troops to advise the Afghan army now facing a resurgent Taliban that has made territorial gains.


The Trump team, like the Obama team and the Bush team before it, will need to reach its own conclusion on U.S. national interests in Afghanistan, and develop its approach to counterterrorism and development there. With the benefit of greater hindsight on our longest war, and a more jaundiced sense of what a U.S. presence can achieve, they will most likely focus on what role U.S. forces can continue to play in providing advice, training, and counterterrorism support for Afghans.

Trump has spoken frequently of defeating the Islamic State as a top national security priority, and the rise of pockets of the Islamic State in Afghanistan suggest additional security focus on the country. How he will work with NATO—which maintains a train, advise, and assist presence in Afghanistan, and which Trump disparaged on the campaign trail as “obsolete”—remains an open question.


In Kabul, the Afghan National Unity Government’s uneasy truce—a brokered marriage of rivals—has also grown brittle. Trump’s national security team will need to determine how they will approach diplomatic efforts to assist the fragile government in Kabul. And if that weren’t enough to worry about, the revival of Taliban attacks does not suggest readiness to engage in reconciliation negotiations toward a political solution.


The interlocking puzzle piece next confronting the Trump team will be Pakistan. Trump’s occasional campaign comments about the country suggested his awareness of the challenge. Pakistan’s endless civil-military tensions continue to plague its development, but a newly-appointed chief of army staff allows Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif some scope to attempt once again to better ties with Afghanistan and with India. The Trump team should take advantage of this change in Pakistan by focusing early diplomacy on impressing upon Pakistani civilian and military leaders how Washington has tired of Pakistan’s games. Fifteen years after 9/11, Pakistan continues to openly harbor UN- and U.S.-designated terrorists who, through attacks on Afghanistan and on India, instigate problems in the region and create the possibility of military escalation. The Trump administration should spell out to Pakistan the potential costs to its ties with the United States from its refusal to adequately address terrorism—and be prepared to start making changes.


India-Pakistan ties are at a low point, precisely due to the problem of Pakistan’s unwillingness to curb terrorist groups. Despite the efforts of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to create a better working relationship, terrorist attacks in a series of locations in India (Gurdaspur, Udhampur, Pathankot, and Uri, to name a few) pushed India to a new kind of response this past September. Following a terrorist attack on an Indian army outpost in Uri, in Kashmir, about a week later the Indian army carried out ground-based surgical strikes against what they called terrorist “launching pads” along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. This more heightened situation of tension is cause for concern, given that both countries possess nuclear weapons.

But the regularity of the pattern has one common thread: each cycle of violence and escalation begins with a terrorist attack on India mounted from Pakistan. Breaking the cycle requires tackling the terrorism problem at its source.


These policy concerns will confront the Trump administration immediately, because of the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, and the interrelated problem that Pakistan poses for Afghanistan’s success and for peace in South Asia. But the long-term strategic bet for the United States will involve our growing relationship with a rising India.


The U.S.-India relationship has grown significantly over the past two U.S. administrations, and the Trump administration should pick up the baton to carry things forward. Strategic ties have advanced dramatically, with a shared view of the world and a shared sense that Asia should not be dominated by any single power. Counterterrorism cooperation has grown closer. Defense ties have ramped up dramatically over the past four years, and should continue to grow with an uptick in joint exercises, new agreements permitting closer cooperation, and a joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. The arena with some remaining challenges has been trade and economic ties, and a Trump economic team should be able to identify some positive incentives (such as membership in international economic organizations like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or APEC) to discuss with New Delhi.


As India rises on the world stage, it has increasingly sought a larger voice in global institutions. The Indian government will be looking for a clear statement of support on these matters from the Trump team, particularly regarding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Trump should support this bid, as did the Obama administration, but he could take more active steps on UN reform to make this statement more than just words.


Finally, a Trump administration can cast a fresh look at the shape of U.S. diplomacy across the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia, and Indian Ocean region. China’s growing economic statecraft efforts—through its “One Belt, One Road” efforts and additional bilateral initiatives with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—indicate expansive ambition. Its work shoring up alternative financial institutions and regional organizations which are not led by the United States or the West has given it other arenas of influence. With the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China has doubled down on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), another Asia-wide trade negotiation which also includes India. (The TPP by contrast did not include either India or China.) The Trump administration should take a look at evolving economic and diplomatic patterns across Asia, a region of central long-term importance to U.S. interests, and step up U.S. involvement to ensure that American influence is not eclipsed. New Delhi will be a good partner for such a discussion, and the Trump administration should consult India actively on larger Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean questions.


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Read more about how the Trump administration should approach U.S. policy toward China (here and here), JapanKorea, and Southeast Asia.