SOURCE:
https://thewire.in/167884/india-defence-preparedness-china-doklam-pakistan-loc/

There Is a ‘Critical Hollowness’ in India’s Defence Preparedness

                                 BY 
               GURMEET KANWAL 

                                 ON
                        15/08/2017

With attempts at infiltration being made virtually every night and frequent exchanges of small arms and artillery fire, the line of control (LoC) with Pakistan is more active than it has been in the last five years. The number of terrorist attacks in Kashmir has also risen sharply this summer. The stand-off with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Doklam has stretched to two months. The rhetoric being spewed out by the Chinese government-controlled media is getting shriller by the day. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) now under construction will lead to further increase in their military collusion.

The net effect of India’s deteriorating security environment will be that the country will be confronted with a two-front situation during future conflict. With the dogs of war barking in the distance, in July, the comptroller and auditor general (CAG) of India released a disquieting report about continuing ammunition shortages. There are large-scale deficiencies in other important military items of equipment as well. Addressing the inadequacies in the state of India’s defence preparedness, termed as ‘critical hollowness’ by former army chief General V.K. Singh, merits the government’s urgent attention.

Deficiencies in ammunition have an adverse impact on the ability to sustain military operations over the period of time that is necessary. According to the CAG, in March 2013, 50% of the different categories of weapons (including tanks and artillery guns) had stocks for less than ten days of fighting. Since then, there has been some improvement, but for 40% of its weapons, the army still holds stocks for less than ten days of conflict.

The Kargil conflict in 1999 lasted 50 days and we must acknowledge that any future border conflict may also be prolonged. During the Kargil conflict, 50,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery ammunition had to be imported from South Africa. The occurrence of such a critical situation during a time of crisis must be avoided through a prudent replenishment and stocking policy.

The army’s sister services are no better off. While the Indian navy is far from acquiring the capabilities of a blue water navy, the People’s Liberation Army navy is getting ready to sail into the Indian Ocean, and is acquiring bases and port facilities in fast-forward mode. Over the last five years, the Indian navy has had major accidents on board submarines INS Sindhurakshak and INS Sindhuratna. In another accident, submarine batteries that should have been replaced much earlier were still being used due to inordinately long acquisition procedures. Meanwhile, the indigenous production of six Scorpene submarines has been delayed by almost five years.

From its peak at 39 squadrons over a decade ago, the fighting strength of the Indian air force has gone down to 32-33 squadrons, whereas actually 42-45 squadrons will be required to meet future threats and challenges. Obsolescent fighter aircraft like MiG-21s and MiG-27s and vintage helicopters are still in service. The holding of surface-to-air missile systems for air defence operations is grossly inadequate as indigenous research and development projects have been plagued by time and cost overruns. The fortification of forward air bases against terrorist attacks has not yet been completed, despite the attack on the Pathankot air base in January 2016.

The continuation in service of obsolete and obsolescent weapons and equipment also affects the country’s defence preparedness as fighter and bomber aircraft are extremely difficult to maintain towards the end of the life cycle. Modernisation of the armed forces has been stagnating due to the inadequacy of funds, the black-listing of several defence manufacturers and bureaucratic red tape that stymies the acquisition process. However, several pragmatic amendments were approved by Manohar Parrikar, then defence minister, in the new Defence Procurement Procedure to streamline procurement procedures and encourage participation of the private sector in defence manufacture.

Defence procurement projects worth over Rs 1,50,000 crore have been accorded ‘acceptance of necessity’, or approval in principle, by the NDA government, but it will take up to five years before deliveries of the weapons systems begin. And, like in the UPA regime, significantly large amounts of funds continue to be surrendered unspent from the capital budget.

In the army, artillery modernisation has been stagnating. There is an urgent need to acquire approximately 3,000 pieces of 155 mm/52-calibre guns to replace obsolescent towed and self-propelled guns and howitzers. So far a contract has been signed only for 145 pieces of M777 155 mm/45-calibre howitzers from the US.  Another contract for 114 pieces of 155 mm/45-calibre Dhanush howitzers based on the Bofors design is expected to be signed with the Ordnance Factories Board shortly if the gun clears all trials. Air defence and army aviation units are also equipped with obsolete equipment that has substantially reduced their combat effectiveness and created vulnerabilities.

Modern wars are fought mostly during the hours of darkness, but a large number of the army’s armoured fighting vehicles – tanks and infantry combat vehicles – are still ‘night blind’. Only about 650 T-90S tanks of Russian origin have genuine night fighting capability. The infantry battalions need over 30,000 third generation night vision devices, new assault rifles – a soldier’s basic weapon, carbines for close quarter battle, general purpose machine guns, light-weight anti-materiel rifles, mine protected vehicles, 390,000 ballistic helmets, and 180,000 lightweight bullet proof jackets.

The navy is in the process of commissioning an air defence ship at Kochi to replace the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and is building six Scorpene submarines at Mazagon Docks. It is also building 22 destroyers, frigates, corvettes, fast attack craft, landing ships and support ships. However, India’s maritime security challenges are growing and the navy not only needs to modernise but also expand its footprint in the Indo-Pacific region along with the navies of India’s strategic partners.

The modernisation plans of the air force are making progress, but at a snail’s pace. The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft project to acquire 126 fighter aircraft to replace obsolete MiG-21s is stuck in a groove, with the exception of the purchase of 36 Rafale fighters from France. Lockheed Martin (F-16) and Boeing (F-18) have jumped into the fray again with offers to produce their fighter aircraft locally with transfer of technology.

The IAF also requires several additional AWACS early warning aircraft, six mid-air refueller tankers, 56 transporter planes, 20 advance jet trainers, 38 basic trainers, 48 medium-lift helicopters, reconnaissance and surveillance helicopters, surface-to-air missile systems and electronic warfare suites. All three Services need to upgrade their C4I2SR capabilities to prepare for effects-based operations in a network-centric environment and to match ever increasing Chinese military capabilities.

The planned acquisitions are capital intensive and the present defence budget cannot support many of them. The defence budget has dipped to 1.56% of the country’s projected GDP for 2017-18 – the lowest level since the disastrous 1962 war with China. It must be progressively raised to 3.0% of the GDP if India is to build the defence capabilities that it needs to meet future threats and challenges and discharge its growing responsibilities as a regional power in Southern Asia.

The government has recently sanctioned some funds and delegated financial powers to the three services to acquire the wherewithal necessary for combat readiness. However, unless the remaining deficiencies in weapons, ammunition and equipment are also made up quickly, the management of the defence budget improves by an order of magnitude and the defence procurement process is streamlined further, thoughts of critical hollowness in  defence preparedness will continue to haunt India’s defence planners.

Gurmeet Kanwal is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.

INDIAN NATIONAL FLAG

SOURCE:
http://missiontelangana.com/the-truth-about-who-designed-the-indian-national-flag/












                                     INDIAN NATIONAL FLAG

For several decades, crores of Indian’s were led to believe that Pingali Venkaiah from Vijayawada designed the Indian National Flag. Now, new research by Capt. L. Panduranga Reddy proves that this is yet another half-truth propagated by our Andhra leaders. Truth is that the current Indian National Flag had evolved over several decades of independence movement. Pingali Venkaiah was merely a contributor to one of the versions of the flag. Even the flag designed by him, was not his idea, but Venkaiah just implemented the idea of  Lala Hansraj and Gandhiji.  Capt. L. Panduranga Reddy’s research proves that it is a Hyderabadi woman named Suraiyya. who actually designed the final tricolor!

Read on:

Read on:

—

Hyderabad Woman made the National Flag

- Capt. Lingala Panduranga Reddy
President, Voice of Telangana

For many writers, the erstwhile Hyderabad state was a last legatee of the Mughals and a feudal backward state. However, for a few it was a peaceful state known for Ganga-Jamuna tehzeeb where people lived in harmony. The Nizam was known for eclectic views and did not squander state’s finances. In reality, both views are partly correct and in many respects they are wrong. Earlier writers castigated the Nizam belittled Hyderabad people as indolent, indulgent and ingenuous and the affluent hedonists. On the other hand, they not only became nostalgic but also turned apologists. They wrote about buildings, sherwanis – biryanis, khandaan and pandaan, etc. In the process, the real contributions of Hyderabad people were relegated to limbo of history, and the heroes were unwept and unsung.

One such remarkable and incredible contribution was designing the National Flag was by a woman from Hyderabad. Tomes of vernacular and English literature attribute this to Pingali Venkaiah of Vijayawada. It is a factoid – an assumption or speculation that is reported or repeated so often that it becomes acceptable as truth. According to them, in 1921, All India Congress Working Committee meeting was held at Bezawada (present Vijayawada), Venkaiah, a Congress volunteer designed a tri-colour flag and presented to Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi was impressed by it and passed it on to the Working Committee. In deference to the wishes of Gandhi, Congress had adopted it and subsequently it became the National Flag, for which Pingali Venkaiah was hailed and Government of Andhra Pradesh showered encomiums on him. His statue was installed at the Tank Bund of Hyderabad along with other supposedly luminous personalities of Andhra region.

In March 2013, Telangana protagonists organized a “Millennium March” to Tank bund as part of agitational programmes to press for Telangana de-merger from A.P. Some of the protagonists became restive and demolished many statues belonging to Andhras. However, they did not touch the statue of Pingali Venkaiah out of veneration, for they regarded him as a nation builder. That was the esteem Venkaiah held even amongst Telangana people. A section of media reported that Pingali Venkaiah progeny was not only impecunious but also indigent and also appealed to the Govt. to extend financial assistance to his successors and the Government rightly obliged.

Be that as it may, the official history of Congress reads altogether different. The All India Congress Committee Commissioned Bhogaraju Pattabhi Seetaramaiah to write a detailed Congress history. Accordingly, he wrote authentic history of Congress. He writes that – the issue of National Flag was first time ever discussed in the annual conference of the Indian National Congress held at Calcutta in 1923. However, the Home Rule League movement which was started by both Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Annie Beasant in 1916, had already designed a flag and propagated it as the National Flag. Subsequently, the Home Rule League was merged with the Congress. However, the Congress appointed a sub-committee to finalise the flag for India. On this Committee, a noted artist, Avinindranath Tagore was included. The Committee never met and finalized the Flag.

Sitaramaiah further succinctly writes that the Congress included ‘Charaka’ to the earlier Home Rule League Flag and adopted. It was in 1931, original red colour in the Home Rule League Flag was replaced with Ochre colour (Bhogaraju Pattabhi Seetaramaiah, Congress Charitra, All India Congress – Allahabad, Andhra Patrika Printing Press, Chennapuri, 1935, p.207). It should be noted that the History of Congress is a ponderous book of 870 pages and has 86 annexures. Seetaramaiah was a knowledgeable senior national Congress leader from Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh. To this very district, Pingali Venkaiah belonged. However, Seetaramaiah did not make mention of Venkaiah’s name, not even once in this book.

Bal Gangadhar Tilak started the Home Rule League confined mainly to Maharashtra and Karnataka in April 1916, whereas Annie Beasant founded her Home Rule League in September 1916. Activities of both league consisted of carrying out propaganda for the Congress – League agenda of political reforms following the Lucknow Pact. In the year 1917, the 33rd session of the Congress was held at Calcutta, and the first woman President Annie Beasant (Dec. 26th to 29th). As Annie Beasant became the President of AICC, she merged the Home Rule League along with its tri-colour in the Congress. That means, tri-colour came into vogue in 1917 whereas the Working Committee of Congress met at Bezawada only in 1921. In this meeting, Pingle Venkaiah supposed to have presented tri-colour to Mahatma Gandhi. The contemporary newspapers of that period both vernacular English did not make any mention of the flag.

It was in 1957, the Government of India while celebrating the century celebrations of 1857, the first war of independence, had decided to compile a book on the freedom fighters of India and solicited the services of noted historian Prof. Tarachand of Allahabad University. He produced four volumes of authentic history of freedom movement citing primary sources. Curiously enough his book also does not make a mention of Pingali Venkaiah and his much orchestrated tri-colour flag.

Be that as it may, another erudite English historian Trevor Royle in his “The Last Days of the Raj” writes that the National Flag was made by Badruddin Tayabji’s wife.

He writes “By one of those contradictions which run through India’s history, the national flag was designed by a Muslim, Badr-ud-Din Tyabji. Originally the tricolour was to have contained the spinning-wheel symbol (charka) used by Gandhi but this was a party symbol which Tyabji thought might strike the wrong note. After much persuasion Gandhi agreed to the wheel because the Emperor Ashoka was venerated by Hindu and Muslim alike. The flag which flew on Nehru’s car that night had been specially made by Tyabji’s wife.” (Trevor Royle, The Last Days of the Raj, Cornet Books, Hodder and Stoughton, London, pg. 217)

Tyabji was an ICS officer in the Prime Minister’s office in 1947. He was known for erudition and scholarship and his wife’s name was Suraiyya. She was none other than niece of Sir Akbar Hydari of Hyderabad. Her wedding was performed at Hyderabad city. Thus the Indian tricolour was made by a woman from Hyderabad, but history does not record the contribution of Hyderabad people as was done in the case of Maulvi Allauddin, the first 1857 martyr who was transported for life to Kalapani, Andamans and Abdul Hasan Safrani a Hyderabadi who coined Jaihind slogan.

Dramatist Shakespeare is right:

 “when beggars die, there are no comets seen;

    the heaven’s blaze from the death of  princes   

THE DOKLAM TEST

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/the-doklam-test/451617.html


Posted at: Aug 14, 2017, 12:43 AM; last updated: Aug 14, 2017, 12:43 AM (IST)

            THE DOKLAM TEST  

                              By

        Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)



National defence holds low priority





 

 LOOK AT THE  WORN OUT  HEELS OF THE BOOTs,  NO NEED TO ELBORATE.  SOLDIER IS   SINCERELY DOING  HIS DUTY 

UNPREPARED: The country is faced with a war-like situation

THERE appears to be no early solution to the ongoing standoff on the Doklam plateau. China's unilateral action to alter the location of the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China is unexceptionable and violates the 2012 agreement. 

There is a deeper move in this attempt to build a road on this plateau. It not only aims at posing a serious threat to the Siliguri corridor by crossing the Torsa Nala and occupying the Jhamperi Ridge, but also wean away the only country left in India's neighbourhood, where it exercises influence and comes in the way of China's attempt at complete encirclement of India.     

China has been assiduously working to encircle India both on land and sea, with the eventual aim of capturing markets and relegating India to a secondary position. Such a move is reminiscent of the gun-boat diplomacy of the seventeen-eighteen centuries by European countries. Building OROB (One Road one Belt) and CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) is in line with the gun-boat diplomacy of that period, though, through a different format, the sole purpose being to capture markets, in the region and beyond.   

China has succeeded in gaining influence and foothold in almost all of India's immediate neighbourhood, sans Bhutan. This Doklam effort is to draw Bhutan too out of India's sphere of influence. 

India's inability to counter these moves by China bears on our foreign policy and diplomatic skills.

While China's media and government have been making every effort to raise the ante, India's response has been restrained, muted and mature. 


The issue that one needs to be addressed is as to why China is spoiling for a fight with a large country of India's size with equally large defence forces for a minor issue, when seen in the larger context of the region! 

Perhaps, it is somewhat related to the state of the Indian armed forces.


 There has been no attempt at modernising the military during the last three decades. Since the Bofors scandal, deficiencies of ammunition and some other essential equipment have been allowed to pile up. The most unusual step of placing thousands of crores of rupees at the disposal of the Vice Chief of the Army to undertake emergency purchases to meet acute shortages of ammunition, both artillery and armour, and a range of other items points to an alarming situation of shortages with the military. All this leads one to conclude that the state of military's reserves is critical. One need raise the issue as to how this critical situation has come about and who is accountable. 

Who has been sitting on the Army's demands for ammunition and a range of critical equipment as well as its modernization? 

According to some press reports, the country is faced with a war-like situation and desperate attempts are afoot to create reserves of ammunition etc even for a war of duration as short as ten days or so.

Though the Army Chief has been talking of a two and a half front war, where is the wherewithal for a conflict of this scale and spread? 


China has been threatening to enlarge the scope of conflict and may not confine it to the Doklam area, where it is at some tactical disadvantage. 

There is an inherent drawback in emergency purchases of ammunition and certain critical equipment.  Since none of these are available off the shelf and their supply involves undertaking manufacture on demand, and that takes much time, one may end up picking up substandard or time expired items from the sellers' military reserves. 

While these emergency purchases for the military has in the past resulted in being shortchanged in a number of cases, one need quote just two to highlight the pitfalls in letting a situation develop where there may be no alternative to adopting this course. 

During the Indian Army's operations in Sri Lanka, the possibility of employment of parachute brigade came up and it surfaced that while we had a parachute brigade but there were no parachutes! Defence Finance had been sitting tight on the demand for these parachutes for close to six months. Now such items are not available off the shelf, so our military attaches were tasked to explore the possibility of obtaining these from armies of their accredited country. 

Our military attache in France was able to get these from the French army's reserve stocks. We paid the money only to discover that these failed the stress tests in India and turned out to be from the Vietnam war period, where many of these parachutes had blood stains. Thus these could not be put to use. 

The second case relates to tank ammunition. Once we took up the project to up-gun the T-55 gun, the Russians, who did not approve of this, for the first time and out of the blue, offered us APFSDS ammunition for the original 100 milimeter gun of this tank. We purchased 20,000 rounds of this ammunition at a huge cost, which failed two separate sets of trial in India, where I conducted one of these two trials. So such emergency purchases of ammunition and other military equipment without proper trials and care have their own pitfalls.

Unfortunately India has never paid much attention to the vital issue of national security. We have had considerable difficulty in finding a suitable Defence Minister. Parrikar would go about inspecting ceremonial guards of honour wearing slippers, with hands in his pockets and went on to inform the nation that since there has been no war for a long time, the public has lost respect for the Army! During his over two years tenure as Defence Minister there is nothing for him to show which can bring him some credit. Now an already over burdened Finance Minister has been given the additional charge of Defence Portfolio. In some manner this also points to the fact that national defence holds low priority in this country, even when we are surrounded on two fronts by hostile neighbours, who are in league with each other. 

India has never fully understood the inclusive relationship between economics and military power. The country's long history of subjugation by foreign powers bears testimony to this fact. We do not seem to have learnt much from history and appear to commit the same mistakes related to national security. A strong military is not to wage wars but to secure peace and let conditions prevail where nation building and creating economic muscle can go on unhindered and without outside interference.

VETERANS DAY

SOURCE:




                                                        14 AUG 2017

                    PAKISTAN MORADABAD
                    


                                                               VETERAN'S DAY




                                                   TURNING POINT

 

                                    FIRST ANNIVERSARY

                         14 AUGUST 2016

                                 JANTAR MANTAR 2015

                  Colonel Pushpendra Singh  and   Hawaldar Major Singh 

                                 IN MEMORY OF   मेरे मेरे बिछड़े हुए  दिन

THE ART OF WAR : GIVE THE EMPIRE ITS DUE: CAN THE FATE OF THE DEATH STAR TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS?

SOURCE:








                [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhqLn1wKJAw  ]

                 THE ART OF WAR

GIVE THE EMPIRE ITS DUE: CAN THE FATE OF THE DEATH STAR TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS?

NOAH KANTER

APRIL 27, 2016
UPDATED 05 AUG 2017

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Among the legacies of the Cold War is the ability of the United States to use its aircraft carrier fleet to affect strategic deterrence. This strategic deterrence strategy depends on a rather small number of very capable systems (currently there are 10 aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy). Granted, aircraft carriers do not operate alone, but carrier battle groups are based around the unique capabilities of an aircraft carrier. This begs the question as to the viability of strategies and strategic deterrence based on capable platforms fielded in very small numbers. How central is the platform (and its survival) to the ability to deter and also to the success of the strategy itself?  Given the importance of the platform, what risks can be reasonably accepted? What trade-offs can reasonably be made? One way to shed light on this challenge is to look to debates about fictional military capabilities – in particular, the Death Star – to illustrate the issues involved and discuss the interplay of platform and strategy.

The recently released trailer for Rogue One gives us a brief glimpse of the construction of the first Death Star – perhaps the film will also delve into some of the strategic thought behind that construction. Recent articles have criticized the Death Star(s), arguing that the Empire’s strategy was based on singular platforms that kept getting destroyed, which in turn doomed the strategy. After the destruction of the first Death Star, the Empire’s decision to continue to try and achieve deterrence through ultra-low density platforms (i.e. the other Death Star and the Starkiller base) does seem questionable. However, the Empire’s decision to use the first Death Star deserves some reconsideration, as a way of thinking through the potential utility of high-cost assets.

At the end of the Clone Wars, the new Empire was most concerned about internal security.  Even though it lacked a near-peer competitor, the Empire still faced pockets of separatist resistance as well as considerable internal resistance to new Imperial rule. This resistance came both from systems that were originally part of the Republic as well as new systems into which the Empire was expanding.

Accompanying this expansion into new systems was a massive military capacity- building campaign that included the navy, army, and Stormtrooper corps. Grand Moff Tarkin, primary strategic architect for the Empire, consolidated governance of sectors of the galaxy into larger “over-sectors,” placing each over-sector under one executive, or Grand Moff. Each Grand Moff would have assigned forces at their disposal (a loose parallel to the U.S. combatant command construct). However, even within over-sectors, Imperial forces were still beholden to the tyranny of galactic distance (the galaxy being over 100,000 light-years across). Much like the British during the American Revolution, the Empire simply could not have forces everywhere at once to deter and put down threats to internal security.

Given this strategic posturing and reasoning, the Death Star begins to have more merit as a method of deterrence. For the sake of argument I am going to assume that the Empire had sufficient resources to afford the Death Star, but those resources were not infinite. Even with a high price tag, the Death Star ideally would have freed up resources. If planets or systems were afraid to act because of the capability of the Death Star, there would have been less of a need for the Empire to commit resources en-mass to maintain a creditable threat. By not having to garrison troops, station capital ships, and other assets in order to deter potential threats, the Empire could have freed up resources better allocated to other strategic needs. For example, those resources could have been used to expand into new areas of the galaxy, hunt Rebel ships, or to develop needed force capability (a need evidenced by the poor basic blaster marksmanship of the Stormtrooper corps).

Even so, one could argue that the Death Star had such flawed defensive design that it was unreasonable for the Empire to build and use the platform without redesign. For example, the Death Star was not designed to defend against the threat it actually faced in the real world – attacks from penetrating tactical fighters. In Episode IV, the Rebels had few capital ships, and certainly not enough to stage a large-scale attack against the Death Star (which was the threat the Death Star was designed to defend against).

Military history suggests that the Empire was not foolish but perhaps constrained in its choices. Like many acquisition programs, the Death Star was designed to fight the last war. Militaries often have to make acquisition decisions that will affect force structure and capability years into the future. There is often a choice between developing the system as designed, and redesigning the system to better meet emerging threats. The trade-off is between an imperfect system now or a better designed system with delayed fielding.

As a system designed during the Clone Wars, where both sides of the conflict could field significant fleets of capital ships in a large-scale attack, the Death Star was designed specifically to win the last war by defeating capital ships and planets.  Senior Imperial officers and program managers (who started their careers during the Clone Wars) could understandably view the risk of a large-scale attack as the most threatening therefore a fighter-based attack as the “lesser-included.” The Empire was not completely wrong in this assessment of the threat. During the Battle of Yavin,the Rebellion came very close to losing, with only three of the original 30 Rebel fighters surviving the assault.

Frankly, the Rebels got lucky when they destroyed the Death Star. It was a series of improbable events that led to a force-sensitive pilot (albeit one with significant counter-womp rat experience) being able to take part in a coordinated assault and employ his weapon systems on the one flaw of a 120 kilometer- diameter station. Even then, it was highly improbable that the fatal shot should have succeeded, as some observers have noted that the shot was “one-in-a-million.” It is unreasonable to expect the Empire to completely remove the risk of the enemy getting lucky or to account for (as well as redesign and delay for) every possible but highly improbable series of events. And while it is true that the use of the Force also played a significant role in the attack, Imperial designers and planners can be forgiven for not expecting to face a Force-user. This is especially true given the Imperial belief that there were no Jedi (save Darth Vader and the Emperor) left in the galaxy post-Order 66.

Had the Rebels not had their string of luck and had lost the Battle of Yavin, it is unlikely that they would have been able to recover from the loss. By losing at Yavin, the Rebels would have suffered significant material and leadership loss, thereby destroying the Rebellion as a cohesive fighting force. Any systems rebelling against imperial rule would have suffered from a first-mover disadvantage. Rather than joining an already existing force, the rebelling system would be the sole focus of the Empire in that over-sector. Even had the Rebellion somehow managed to survive, there would still be the significant deterrent of planetary destruction as an argument against joining and/or providing aid to the Rebellion.

In the end, though, the Death Star was destroyed. However, this does not mean the platform was a failure.  The Death Star did work as designed in that it could demonstrably destroy a planet, thereby providing a deterrent effect. Moreover, it inspired enough fear to warrant a desperate and costly assault by the Rebellion. At the same time, the Death Star was not the proverbial “all-eggs-in-one-basket” system whose loss doomed the entire Imperial strategy.  The Empire carried on and almost destroyed the Rebellion on Hoth. At least in this fictional example, neither the strategic reliance on a very capable platform, nor the vulnerability inherent in low-density fielding, were the causes of organizational defeat.

This is not say that the lessons of the first Death Star make an argument for strategies based on low-density, highly capable platforms (like aircraft carriers).  What those lessons do allow is a way to decouple the discussions about the loss of platform from discussions about the failure of strategy. The platform does not matter as much as the strategy of which that platform is a part. No single weapon system ever guarantees success or demands failure. More telling are the people behind the platform and whether or not those people are able to set the conditions for the platform to succeed, or recover when that platform fails.

Noah Kanter is the Strategy Lead for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.  He is a former cavalry officer in the U.S. Army with deployments to Kosovo and Iraq.  The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the Empire.