Wednesday, November 8, 2017

CASTEISM OR KHICHRI OF RIFLES & AMN SYSTEM WITHIN INFANTRY : Infantry to get Foreign Rifles, others to get ‘Made in India’

SOURCE:




                    Ajai Shukla
             Business Standard. 


5th Nov 17








The army’s highest levels have arrived at a vital decision that could open the doors to buying new rifles for the entire army, while remaining within a strained procurement budget.


The decision is to equip infantry soldiers with a world-class assault rifle, while non-infantry soldiers would get a cheaper, less effective, indigenous rifle.


Earlier, the army had planned to procure some 800,000 state-of-the-art assault rifles from the global market, each costing about Rs 200,000. That would have cost about Rs 16,000 crore – significantly more than what the army can afford.


Now, army chief General Bipin Rawat has decided to buy only 250,000 assault rifles from the international market, and issue them only to combat infantrymen – the frontline foot soldiers who are directly in contact with the enemy.


The remaining 550,000 army soldiers who are authorised rifles but serve mainly in non-infantry arms and services will get a new indigenous rifle. The army will choose between the INSAS-1C, designed by the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO); and the Ghatak, designed by Ordnance Factory, Kirkee. These are less lethal than the infantry’s assault rifles, but also significantly cheaper, at about Rs 50,000 apiece.


My thinking is: Since a state-of-the-art assault rifle will cost about Rs 200,000 each in the global market, let us issue these only to frontline infantry soldiers who confront the enemy armed only with their rifles,” Rawat told Business Standard. “Let us provide a cheaper indigenous option to other soldiers, for whom the rifle is not a primary weapon,” he added.


The chief explains the army has evaluated two different weapons philosophies. The assault rifle it has chosen for the infantry is a weapon optimised for conventional war, with a longer range and a larger bullet that kills or completely incapacitates the enemy soldiers that it strikes. It is also equipped with a night vision sight. The second type of weapon, which will arm non-infantry units, is optimised for counter-insurgency operations, being lighter and with a smaller bullet that a soldier can carry in larger numbers



* * * *

A variation of this debate played out in the Indian Army in the 1970s, when it was looking to replace its old 7.62 millimetre self-loading rifles (SLRs). At that time, it was argued that the army should get a 5.56 mm rifle, since that would not just be lighter, but it would also injure, rather than kill, an enemy soldier. That would take out of battle not just the enemy who was shot, but additional enemy soldiers who would be tied up in evacuating the casualty.

This resulted in the army equipping itself with the 5.56 mm INSAS-1B1, manufactured by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). However, the army was unhappy with the INSAS-1B1, complaining that it was prone to stoppages, and that jihadi militants (and Pakistani soldiers in the Kargil conflict) who were shot by its lighter bullet did not always get incapacitated.

“We would shoot a militant with the INSAS and he would just keep coming at us. That is why we have always preferred to use the 7.62 mm AK-47 in Kashmir, rather than the INSAS,” says Lieutenant General VP Singh, a recently retired officer who has served multiple tenures in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

Notwithstanding this, only the infantry is going back to 7.62 mm calibre rifles. The bulk of the army will get 5.56 mm rifles, which means that the stock of older AK-47 rifles, which equip specialist Rashtriya Rifles counter-insurgency units, would have to remain the mainstay of operations in J&K and the Northeast.


Rifle Economics

The army currently fields 382 regular infantry battalions, 28 mechanised infantry battalions, 23 Guards battalions and nine Vikas and Scouts battalions, adding up to 442 battalions of infantry and its equivalent.


Even within an infantry battalion, not every one of its 800-odd soldiers will be issued a 7.62 mm assault rifle. These will go only to soldiers who can expect to be in direct contact with the enemy: its four rifle companies and the commando platoon (called Ghataks), totalling up to about 565 persons per battalion. The remaining personnel would be issued other weapons such as 5.56 mm carbines and rifles. At 565 rifles for each of these infantry units, the total adds up to 250,000 rifles.



At Rs 200,000 for each foreign assault rifle, equipping these 250,000 infantrymen will cost Rs 5,000 crore. For the remaining 550,000 non-infantry soldiers, their indigenous rifles – INSAS-1C or the Ghatak rifle, whichever is chosen – would be priced more cheaply at Rs 50,000 each, totalling up to Rs 2,750 crore. This foreign and indigenous mix of 800,000 rifles adds up to Rs 7,750 crore – saving Rs 8,250 crore, or more than half the Rs 16,000 crore cost of buying foreign assault rifles for the entire army.



The Ghatak and INSAS 1C both remain works in progress, with the army chief confirming to Business Standard there were minor problems during trial firing in summer, including stoppages that exceeded permissible limits. “However, there are significant improvements in those indigenous rifles too, and we expect the OFB and DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) to improve them quickly to meet our expectations,” Rawat said.


“We will not delay any further on the procurement process. I have passed orders for the RFP (Request for Proposals, as the tender is called) to be issued by the end of this year,” Rawat added.


The Rs 2 lakh cost of a state-of-the-art 7.62 mm assault rifle includes the cost of “reflex sights” and “night sights” that make it easier to aim and shoot with a high degree of accuracy, including at night. Without these add-ons, an assault rifle is fired with the help of its in-built sights – the soldier aligns a “rear sight” and “fore sight” on the rifles barrel with the target before squeezing the trigger. This requires a degree of skill and is tiring to the eye. With a reflex sight, which is fitted onto a small rail on the rifle (called a Picatinny Rail), the soldier only has to look towards the target through a small telescope, and align a red dot in the sight with the target before firing.


A modern reflex/night sight today costs as much as the rifle on which it is fitted – up to Rs 100,000.



F-INSAS

For years, the Indian Army approached the acquisition of personal weapons, such as rifles and carbines, as part of the expansively named “Future Infantry Soldier as a System” (F-INSAS) programme. This aspired to integrate a soldier, along with his personal weapons and communications equipment, into a digitally networked battlefield management system. With this proving too ambitious, the army has now split the F-INSAS initiative into two distinct parts – the acquisition of personal weapons and, separately, a digitisation project termed the “Battlefield Management System” that is being pursued as a “Make” project in India.

* * * *

Infantry weapons and equipment have seldom received the attention that is lavished on more glamorous and expensive weaponry like aircraft, warships, submarines or tanks. However, with the infantry constantly engaged in live operations on the Line of Control with Pakistan, the Line of Actual Control with China and in counter-insurgency operations in J&K and the Northeast, there is a growing recognition of the need to upgrade the infantry soldier, particularly his personal weapon, says Lt Gen Singh.

The need for infantry modernisation is especially urgent in India’s operational milieu, where rugged mountain and jungle terrain limits the applicability and effectiveness of support weapons and air power, making the infantryman the final arbiter of battle.

The role of India’s infantry has remained largely unchanged since independence: to close in with and destroy the enemy. In defensive operations, the infantry physically holds ground against all forms of enemy attack. The infantry is trained and tasked to fight to the end, firing rifles and machine guns and, when ammunition runs out, fighting hand to hand with bayonets – a long knife attached to the rifle.

In an attack, while tanks often lead and the artillery provides fire support, eventually it is the infantryman – no women are allowed yet into this most physical of combat arms – who must physically occupy the enemy’s positions, charging at them in the face of their firing. All he can rely on with certainty is his personal weapon – the rifle or the LMG.

The basic simplicity of the infantry’s role and the tenacity needed to discharge it eminently suits the Indian soldier. In active service around the world, including through two World Wars, the Indian infantryman has earned a formidable reputation for tenacity and courage.

“The defence ministry can spend Rs 58,000 crore on just 36 Rafale fighters. But it finds it difficult to spend Rs 16,000 crore on giving modern assault rifles to 800,000 soldiers. Sitting on our border posts at 15,000 feet, we marvel at these priorities,” says the commanding officer of an infantry battalion, talking over the phone.























































Tuesday, November 7, 2017

J&K: Operation ‘All Out’ And Prospects For Winter 2017 (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/06112017-jk-operation-all-out-and-prospects-for-winter-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29








 



A soldier guards the roadside checkpoint outside Srinagar International Airport in Jammu and Kashmir, India. Photo by Jrapczak, Wikipedia Commons.






J&K: Operation ‘All Out’ And Prospects For Winter – Analysis

                                By

      Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain*




Monday, November 6, 2017

DEGRADATION OF ARMED FORCES :Neo-liberal Agenda - A Death Knell for the National Military

SOURCE:
http://nindi19.blogspot.in/2016/08/death-knell-to-military.html




















Worth a Read . The critics of our Armed Forces ( Media & Politicians of ever hue) would do well to read this article and realize how they are  destroying the one organization in our country that is  truly the bedrock of statehood.























Neo-liberal Agenda
 - A Death Knell for the National Military


The international dynamics and related internal politics that is causing the present day strain in Civil Military relations.


Strategic Affairs

Atul Bhardwaj

The Indian soldier is in a state of stupor. The civil–military relations in the country are in crisisThe Government’s policies are aggravating the situation, alienating the Armed forces by lowering their status and salaries in comparison to other arms of the stateNeo-liberal forces are using the crisis as an opportunity to introduce military transformation that would splinter the national military and replace patriotism with profiteering.

The Indian Armed Forces are in a state of shock. The irony is that the nationalist political party considered most sympathetic to their cause is administering the shock therapy. The expectations of the Military on pay and pension have been belied. In 2015, the veterans were forced to take to the streets demanding the implementation of One Rank One Pension (OROP)The Government unleashed the police on protesting veterans.

After vacillating on the issue, a distorted version of the OROP was announced in November 2015. Contrary to the accepted understanding of the annual revision and equalisation of pensions, the Government fixed equalisation to once in five years. Initially, officers who sought premature retirement after completing the 20-year mandatory pensionable service were precluded from the OROP scheme. Later, the government relented and all Officers who had taken premature retirement up to the date of issuance of the Government notification were included in the OROP scheme. However, the future premature retirees are denied the OROP benefits.

The deliberate attacks on the dignity of the armed forces did not stop after the OROP fiasco. The latest Seventh Pay Commission award has further enraged the Armed Forces community. The Government has conveniently ignored the long-standing grievance of the Armed Forces on the issue of “non-functional upgradation” (NFU). The military has once again been denied NFU pay, which is enjoyed by the Group A central servicesThe Military has been deliberately lowered in protocol terms. This reshuffling of the order-of-precedence in the Government has aggravated the feeling of alienation among the Armed forces. The seething rage is strewn all across social media.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi kickstarted his election campaign with an ex-servicemen rally at Rewari in Haryana on 15 September 2013. After becoming the Prime Minister, Modi has been a mute spectator to the sight of the Armed Forces lurching from one crisis to another as the bureaucracy imposes cut after cut in pursuit of the holy grail of fiscal prudence.

It is intriguing that the affront to military self-esteem is being spearheaded by the ruling dispensation that claims to be nationalist. Perhaps, there is a larger cause for which Modi is inflicting pain to the Armed Forces.

Penchant for Neo-liberal Solutions

Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine (2007) helps us understand why the Indian military is being subjected to persistent shocks and continuous crisis. Klein explains how neo-liberalism either uses a crisis or manufactures it to soften the public for radical free-market reforms. Klein bases her argument on Milton Friedman’s theory of “economic shock therapy,” which “advised politicians that immediately after a crisis, they should push through all the painful policies at once, before people could regain their footing” (Democracy Now 2007). The question is, what are these reform ideas “lying around” for which Prime Minister Modi is “inducing regression of the personality” in the national military?

Outsourcing defence functions or handing them over to private military corporations (PMCs) is the big Anglo-Saxon contribution to the post-Cold War disruptive ideas basket. The PMCs go beyond privatisation or 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) in defence manufacturing. This involves the remaking of the national military, splintering it to create a niche for the PMCs to be directly involved in battlefield management. It entails outsourcing defence logistic functions to private contractors, making the “corporate warriors” directly responsible for functions ranging from providing rations to missile maintenance.

In the West, privatising defence functions started immediately after the demise of the Cold War. If Agent Orange is the legacy left behind by the Vietnam war, then the introduction of PMCs to modern warfare is what the Iraq and Afghanistan wars will be remembered for. A couple of years ago, the British government went to the extent of handing over the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) entire defence procurement functions to a private company named GOCO (Economist 2013). The programme was shelved only after it indicated to the world the shape of things to come.

Privatisation of warfare is about handing over critical defence infrastructure to private playersIt is about replacing the state insignia from the shoulder-badges on a soldier’s uniform with a corporate label. It is mercenarisation of the profession of arms, shearing off the nobility associated with it. It is about making private corporations consume a large chunk of the defence revenue budget. It is the fruition of this very idea for which Modi is aiming. And, this premeditated design is the cause of the collective trauma experienced by the Armed Forces.

The process of shaping the discourse on the Armed Forces revenue budget began immediately after the Modi government took over in 2014. When Arun Jaitley was the DMfence minister, India Today carried a cover story “Chinks in the Armour” (Unnithan 2014). Besides the usual rants about the tardy process of defence procurement and non-performance of defence public sector units (DPSUs), the newness in the story was the discussion on internal reforms in the fiscal management of the revenue budget of the MoD. It was argued that almost 60% of the ₹2.2 lakh crore defence budget is spent on manpower costs. Citing the MoD finance reports from 2011, the article advanced the logic that there was a wastage of more than ₹5,400 crore each year due to manpower costs involved in defence logistics. It gave the instance of the Army Service Corps (ASC) that “buys food worth ₹2,122 crore but spends ₹1,500 crore on manpower, an acquisition cost of 70%. (Food Corporation of India [FCI] has an acquisition cost of 16%.)” (Unnithan 2014).

Examples of the government’s fiscal mismanagement are often used to begin the privatisation debate. The article did exactly that by comparing the FCI’s acquisition costs with that of the ASC. However, the ASC’s manpower is not just involved in food procurement, it performs many other functions, one of them is being directly involved in disaster relief operations.

The “transformation study” of the Indian Army was initiated by General V K Singh when he was the Eastern Army Commander in 2009. The proposals included setting up of a Strategic Command, synergising the Army’s offensive capabilities, and outsourcing many administrative and logistic functions. This effectively meant retaining the core combat role for the state soldiers and privatising the functions performed by four corps of the army: ASC, Ordnance, Electronics andMechanical Engineer, and Engineers.

A pattern of splitting the combatants from non-combatants is apparent in the other recent decisions of the government. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s first major decision was to challenge the Armed Forces Tribunal’s (AFT) decision to strike down the army’s discriminatory promotion policy of 2009 in the Supreme Court. The 2 March 2015 verdict of the AFT ruled that promotions to the rank of Colonel were biased in favour of the infantry and artillery. The 2009 policy helped 60% of infantry and artillery Lieutenant Colonels to become Colonels, while reducing the promotion opportunities for Officers from other Arms and Services to below 30%. A group of nearly 200 serving Army Officers went to the Supreme Court with a plea to uphold the decision of the AFT. The Supreme Court’s verdict, in the beginning of this year, upheld the army’s “command and exit” policy, while making provisions for additional vacancies for the support arms and services. The judgment helped the army headquarters soothe the internal division within the army without making alterations in their promotion policy.

When the OROP agitation was at its peak in 2015, the government came out with figures to prove that the burden of pensions was too huge for the government to bear. It showed that the military pension budget of ₹75,000 crore was higher than the combined budget of the navy and air force.The argument against OROP was that it hampers military modernisation by making less money available for buying equipment from foreign vendors.

Accelerating Military Reforms

In May 2016, the Government appointed an 11-member committee under the stewardship of retired Lt Gen D B Shekatkar to suggest pruning of “non-operational flab” of the three Services, a euphemism for privatisation and corporatisation of the Indian Armed Forces. The discourse in the mainstream and social media is largely in favour of the government’s effort to rectify the “teeth to tail ratio” of the Army by “downsizing” the 13 lakh strong standing ArmyThe arguments, rooted in neo-liberal ideology, question the very purpose of pensions. The MoD’s annual pension bill, which stands at ₹60,000 crore, is cited as the main reason for reducing the size of the army. The large army—once considered the pride of India—is now an eyesore. Unfortunately, the reverent on-screen attitude towards the soldier vanishes when their pay and pensions come into picture.

Men are dispensable because more money is required to be spent on foreign war-fighting machines. Traces of class bias are evident in the arguments put forth by the supporters of privatisation of the Indian defence forces. A former senior finance official grumbling about the high pension bill writes condescendingly:

The contemporary emphasis is on educated soldiers fighting a technology-driven war with modern gadgets and machinery. The Indian soldier, representing the rural gentry, is semi-educated and deployed in the traditional warfare system (Singh 2016).

A senior defence journalist advocating “root and branch reforms,” nonchalantly writes,

Military salaries and lifetime pensions are paid to legions of ‘combatant tradesmen’ who wash, sweep, cook and cut hair. In an equipment-heavy ArmouredDivision, every sixth combatant is a mechanic, performing a role that civilians can discharge more cheaply and better. Other soldiers supply rations, clothing, spare parts and fuel, jobs that most Armies have privatised almost entirely. Today, even a waiter in an officers’ mess is a full-time soldier, entitled to pay and pension for life (Shukla 2014).

The underlying ideology in Shukla’s argument is that the Government cannot determine salaries and disrupt markets. Soldiers coming from poor backgrounds cannot be paid more than civilians engaged in similar jobs. Such class biases against the opportunities for upward mobility that state-care provides to the marginalised are becoming more pronouncedParadoxically, nationalists who admiringly share pictures of martyr’s wailing wives and daughters on social media go into mute mode when the son of an army cook is awarded the “Sword of Honour” at the Indian Military Academy.

Bailing Out Bourgeoisie

There are two big reasons for privatising the defence support services. First, to bail out the debt-ridden Indian capitalistsSecond, to facilitate the entry of multinational PMCs from the United States (US) and the United Kingdom to Indian shores. The 100% FDI in the defence sector leaves little scope for Indian industrialists to hone their manufacturing skills. The capital expenditure will continue to fatten foreign arms manufacturers. Indian companies that have the capacity to provide support services to combat Formations are likely to be the biggest gainers from the downsizing of the ArmedForces.

The Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) that India is on the verge of the signing with the US will pave the way for foreign PMCs to establish their roots in India. According to David Isenberg, the author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (2009), US military contractors are also key to the maintenance of CSLs (Collaborative Security Locations), where the US uses a host country’s existing military bases … The contractor rents military facilities from the host nation’s military, and charges a fee for the US military’s use of the facilities (Isenberg 2012).

India suffered for centuries at the hands of the East India Company, an unarmed trading company that metamorphosed into a private military company. We are now laying the ground for fully-armed multinational companies working under the charter of the US government to set up shop in our countryIt is indeed a sad commentary on Indian security and strategic studies that there is no informed debate on this important issue of national concern.

The Armed Forces are the bedrock of statehoodThat the Forces need to avoid wasteful expenditure cannot be denied. However, to hand over many of their roles and missions to corporations is the ultimate assault on the very idea of the nation state. The right wingers must understand that. privatisation of defence and. nationalism cannot coexist. “You can be a patriot or a profiteer ... But you can’t be both”



Press Conference - Unity Of Veterans Is Our Strength

SOURCE:
E-MAIL



                 Press Conference
 - Unity Of Veterans Is Our Strength



 
KIRAN KRISHAN
06  NOV  201710:05 AM


Under the aegis of IESM Tricity, All India Defence Brotherhood, and ESM (North Zone), a Press Conference will be held on Tuesday, 07 November at 11 a.m. at the Press Club, Sector 27 B, Chandigarh. This is to protest against atrocities committed by the Delhi Police on gallantry medals awardees, aged military veterans, Veer Naaris, ladies, and disabled veterans on 30 October,  and again on  02 November at Jantar Mantar, New Delhi. All are requested to make it convenient to attend. Ladies are most welcome to attend. The event would be followed by High Tea.

With regards,

Brig Kiran Krishan, SM
Convener, IESM, Panchkula
Mobile: 9876116898