Wednesday, April 10, 2019

POST BALAKOT AIR BATTLE - ‘THE SLIP BETWEEN THE CUP AND THE LIP’

SOURCE:
https://medium.com/@sameerjoshi73/the-slip-between-the-cup-and-the-lip-9052f1bd7171









A PAF F-16D Block 52 during acceptance check in 2009



                               POST BALAKOT AIR BATTLE

           ‘THE SLIP BETWEEN THE                  CUP AND THE LIP’


                                                                            BY

                                                       SAMEER JOSHI


ANALYSING THE INTRIGUING CASE OF THE ‘MISSING’ F-16 FALCON OF THE PAKISTAN AIR FORCE.


APR 07, 2019
                                                                 
IAF’s shoots down a PAF F-16



Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, an 

Indian Air Force MiG-21 Bison pilot made history

 around 10 AM on 27 February 2019, when he 

targeted a formation of Pakistan Air Force F-16s who

 were engaging IAF Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters with 

their AIM-120 AMRAAM beyond visual range 

missiles; closing in undetected and shooting down 

one of them with a Vympel R-73 heat seeking air to

 air missile over the Lam valley in Nowshera sub

 sector of south western Jammu and Kashmir. 

Abhinandan became the first MiG-21 pilot in

 the world to shoot down a F-16 jet.






Video  MIG 21 BISON viz F- 16







A MiG-21 Bison of the Indian Air Force/ Photo — Angad Singh



Unfortunately Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was also hit by an AMRAAM missile fired by another F-16 as he was heading back towards India, having crossed the LOC in pursuit of the F-16 only tens of seconds earlier. He ejected from the stricken aircraft and parachuted to safety, landing 4 km away from the LOC near Horan Kotla village in POK. He was brutally attacked by civilians, before being dramatically handed over to the Pakistan Army.




His ordeal made him a focal point of the developing crisis, when in gross violation of the Geneva convention, the footage of his battered face was intentionally released on Pakistani television and social media by Pakistan Army affiliates minutes later.
What was clear was that the Pakistan Armed Forces had activated the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) to get the narrative under control.
ISPR — Goebblism Personified



The Inter-Services Public Relations, is the media wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces which broadcasts and coordinates military news and information to the country’s civilian media and the civic society. Under this innocuous looking mandate hides the the real mandate of the ISPR — where the Pakistan Army uses the ISPR as the misinformation medium to escalate and de- escalate a rapidly building information threat to suit its tactical and strategic aim. ISPR is at the tip of Pakistan’s hybrid war effort, embedded well with the complexities of military manoeuvres, political power play and deft disinformation, with sempiternal loyalty only to the Pakistan Army — and the nation it serves be damned!
While the ISPR is known for its notoriety in manipulating the ‘everything of anything’, history has proved on umpteen occasions that even for the smoothest of them operators — there is many a proverbial slip between the cup and the lip.
The ISPR narrative and the Flip Flops

Two interesting events took place post Abhinandan’s ejection on 27 February.
First the Indian Air Force reported through the ANI’s Twitter handle that they had shot down a F-16 over Lam valley. It also acknowledged the loss of one of its MiG-21.
Secondly, Major General Asif Ghafoor — the Director-General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) and chief spokesperson of Pakistan Armed Forces tweeted on the ISPR handle that two Indian jets had been shot down by the PAF in POK, with one pilot arrested by the Pak army and two still in the area. Even as facts were being ascertained and before the IAF could give any info, Pakistani handles on social media started talking about the shooting down of two IAF jets and the arrest of the Indian pilots.


press conference at noon




While addressing a press conference at noon, a good hour after his first significant tweet, Maj Gen Ghafoor said that — another pilot has been arrested. “Our ground forces arrested two pilots; one of them was injured and has been shifted to CMH (Combined Military Hospital) and, God-willing, he will be taken care of,” said the army official and reiterated that “The other one is with us.” Maj Gen Ghafoor also assured all that no F-16 of the PAF had been shot down, since the F-16s were ‘not’ used in combat in that sector at all. Interestingly, the Pak PM Imran Khan also confirmed that Pakistan had two Indian pilots in custody.

Post that press conference, the ISPR chief informed all that the pilot in their custody in the military hospital had died.


















At 6:19 PM in the evening, the last tweet on the subject from Maj Gen Ghafoor clarified that the Pak Army had just ‘one’ IAF pilot in its custody. He was Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.
In the time between his first and last tweet, the social media, particularly on Twitter, spiked up with a virtual war between the Indian and Pakistani sympathisers posting a barrage of messages, videos and photos to bolster their claims. This was nudged by the ISPR’s dedicated campaign to showcase the travails of Abhinandan Varthaman as their POW, increasing in intensity as the day progressed —in a clear effort to shift the focus of attention away from the shooting down of the PAF F-16 and the fate of the other downed pilot.
But Why?



1# Because the loss of a top of the line F-16 aircraft would be counter productive to the morale and standing of the Pakistan Air Force, especially at the hands of an Indian MiG-21 Bison — considered by most experts to be a generation older than the F-16. It was already reeling under ignominy from the day before’s surgical strike by IAF Mirage 2000s on the Balakot JeM camp. Hence the PAF’s psyche would go to any length, including lying — to keep this information a closely guarded secret.
2Because in an evil twist of fate — Pakistani civilians in the Sabzkot area of POK had assaulted an injured PAF pilot, who had ejected out of his F-16 — mistaking him for an Indian pilot. The pilot subsequently died at the CMH, probably due to the wounds received in this manhandling or post ejection. The ISPR lied at the end of the day that it had only one pilot to keep this tragedy under wrap.
3# Because Pakistan’s duplicity on the subject of covering up and not accepting its losses is well known. More than 1000 killed in actions (KIA) of the Pak Army were never officially acknowledged by Pakistan after the Kargil war with India in 1999. Since its partition from India, Pakistan continues to experience a security deficit vis-à-vis India, hence would go all out to hide losses suffered to maintain the so called martial dominance over the Indian military.
4# Because the PAF did not want to reveal to the world that an American made F-16 had been used as part of an offensive operation against India on 27 February, voilating end use agreement on many counts, including use of the AIM-120 C-5 AMRAAM air to air missile — which ostensibly had been given to Pakistan to be used against its war on terror. So Maj Gen Ghafoor resorted to lies, that no F-16s were used that day.
5# Because Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor’s trigger happy tweets and the presser in the first six hours post the aerial clash clearly points us towards the ‘truth’ in the information received by him — Who would believe that in today’s digital age with the Pak Army’s superbly networked communications, the head of ISPR would be battling the fog of war while collating reports about IAF POWs from various Pak formations in the Bhimber region of POK — one reported by a Mujahid Battalion near Horan Kotla and the second by a Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Battalion near Sabzkot.



The DG ISPR was lying all through the day — unfortunately, himself becoming a victim of a half backed truth.
By the time the shenanigans at the ISPR realised their goof 

up and said they had only one IAF pilot in their custody, the 

cat was out of the bag — giving the first tangible lead to the 

Indian Air Force on the possible sequence of events post 

downing of the F-16 and the MiG-21.



Analysing the evidence available on the F-16 shooting


Lets take a look at the OSINT info and the evidence that the Indian Air Force has officially revealed on the shooting down of the PAF F-16.
That F-16s engaged with the IAF near Poonch — Naoshera sub sector on 27 February has been proven beyond doubt by the electronic signatures, as well as various video and visual sightings from both sides of the Line of Control.





Electromagnetic Evidence on the Air Situation


The IAF’s Phalcon AWACS, which while not on station and not controlling the IAF vs PAF air situation — had adequate radar pick up on the aerial engagement unfolding via its powerful airborne AESA radar. In addition, the Phalcon was able to map the large force engagement (LFE) from 10,000 to 40,000 feet, distinguishing and identifying the various PAF fighters taking part through their electromagnetic emissions (radars, navigational equipment and other active sensors) — duly picked up, processed and analysed by the powerful Electronic Intelligence (Elint) systems. It identified F-16, JF-17 and Mirage IIIs as part of the PAF package, spread out from north to south J&K on three main axes near the Line of Control in the POK.





Radar and Elint data fused together identified the PAF aircraft operating in POK near the line of control



The fused radar and Elint signatures accurately depicts the presence in time and space of the F-16’s APG-68 V9 radar signature over Lam valley, along with 4 different blips between 10–15,000 feet.
The data proves beyond doubt — that F-16s were operating against India that day — exposing the lies and contradictions of the DG ISPR, Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor exposed further by the remains of the AMRAAM missile found in Naoshera sector by the Indian military. AMRAAM missiles can only be fired by F-16s in the PAF inventory.


             
The IAF’s PRO and his team displaying part of an AMRAAM missile fired by the PAF F-16s against IAF Su-30MKIs



The IAF’s Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS) had initially missed tracking the ingress of these 4 F-16s towards the LOC since they maintained below the radar horizon of the IAF’s ground based radars, picking them only once they approached north of Poonch — where they lay in wait to ambush IAF Su-30MKIs who were being ‘pushed’ towards them by another formation of 4 F-16s north west of Poonch at 40,000 feet. This formation had fired 4–5 AMRAAM missiles at IAF Su-30 MKIs, as they approached south of Rajouri.
Having spotted the lower formation of F-16s and seeing that the Su-30MKIs were effectively being checked by the higher formation of F-16s — the IACCS vectored two MiG-21 Bisons to prevent these 4 F-16s from breaking through towards Srinagar — Awantipore. Abhinandan was the lead in this 2 aircraft MiG-21 pair. The approach of the 2 MiG-21s was missed by the F-16s who were busy scanning for the Su-30MKIs, but a Saab 2000 ERIEYE Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) operating in depth near Islamabad, spotted the MiG-21s over Naoshera, warning the F-16s. The IAF’s gound controller saw the defensive maneuvering of the F-16s, warning the MiGs in turn. While his No 2, who was lagging behind, turned ‘cold’ or away from the F-16s which were going ‘hot’ or facing the MiGs — -Abhinandan chose to ignore this threat and continued towards the F-16s.
Both the IACCS & The Phalcon AWACS registered the radar signature of one MiG-21 piloted by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman cross the Line of Control and engage a F-16 with a R-73 missile. His call on R/T of a missile launch was monitored by the AWACS. Abhinandan was 8–10 km away from the F-16, which was turning towards him — aiming for a frontal aspect launch with high closing speed between the missile and the incoming F-16. The R-73 is a heat seeking air to air missile with a sensitive, dual band cryogenic cooled seeker with a substantial off-boresight capability. The seeker can see targets up to 40° off the missile’s centreline. Minimum engagement range is about 300 meters, with maximum aerodynamic range of nearly 30 km at altitude.
Abhinandan fired his R-73 well within the range and tracking capabilities of the R-73 missile, with a high closing speed of more than 3500 kmph between the missile and the F-16, which was at 15,000 feet. At those ranges, the missile would have closed into the target in less than 20 seconds, its proximity fuse activating the 7.4 kg warhead to explode and engulf the F-16 in frontal quarters with flame and high velocity shrapnel — in all probability grievously injuring the pilot. The ‘splashed’ F-16 fell towards the earth post that, with the pilot ejecting out of the stricken aircraft as reported by eyewitnesses.













Radar Images of the aerial engagement as released by the IAF

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CgW6JLyF7PA ]




The F-16 ‘kill’ was noticed by the Phalcon’s radar — with the said blip vanishing from the radar scope in the radar picture processed 8 seconds after the previous one, which had shown the blip in place.
This is the first hard evidence on the F-16 kill based on a concrete electronic signature recordings.
The same is corroborated by a Thales GS-100 Low Level Targeting Radar (LLTR) deployed in that area and integrated into the IACCS. The GS-100 is an AESA radar with low-altitude search capability that can track targets up to 180 km range with high accuracy. The post event milking out of radar data from the GS-100 clearly has shown the MiG-21 closing into the F-16s, which were higher between 15–25,00 feet.
The overlapping time and place of the missile launch and the subsequent ‘splash’ with the blip vanishing is registered very accurately, matching with the Phalcon data. This is the second hard evidence on the F-16 kill.

The same LLTR had clearly registered a PAF F-16 maneuvering towards Abhinandan’s MiG-21, as he turned northwards post his missile launch. Guided by the Saab ERIEYE, it was a classic Type III converting into a Type IV interception by the F-16 — which fired an AMRAAM to shoot down the IAF MiG-21. The LLTR noticed the MiG-21 blip vanishing after nearly a minute post the F-16 kill, matching with the account from Abhinandan’s debrief post his repatriation back to India.

Visual Sighting and Plotting by Indian Army

The air battle was visible in great details, on both sides of the Line of control, thanks to the contrails formed at the altitudes where the jets were operating on most occassions.



The ensuing air combat as viewed from the Pakistani side of line of control

As the F-16 fell to the ground after being hit by the MiG-21, its downward trajectory with parachutes in proximity, was recorded by at least 2 different geographically apart Indian Army posts, which accurately estimated that the wreckage would have fallen 7–8 km in POK close to Sabzkot in Bhimber.

About 40–50 seconds later, the same army posts noticed and tracked Abhinandan’s MiG-21 going down and his ejection in general area Tandar 6–7 km in POK, which through OSINT is close to the village of Horan Kotla where the wreckage was seen vividly on social media.
The sightings and the time of the aircraft (and parachutes), match up with the electronic signatures from both the AWACS and the LLTR.

This is irrefutable proof of the F-16 being shot down by the MiG-21.
Post this, radio transmission picked up by the Indian military around 1145H shows Pakistan soldiers from Northern Light Infantry talking about two ‘parinda‘ (aircraft) and two ‘parinde wale‘ (pilots), having bagged one in their custody.











While the first parachute was seen in General Area Sabzkot, the second parachute was spotted in General Area Tandar. The distance between the two locations of the F-16 and MiG-21 wreckage is about 6–7 kms.


Indian Army sightings of two different aircraft crashing released by the IAF


In a damning intercept at 1242H, a soldier of 7 Northern Light Infantry battalion, Tandar area, blatantly talks about soldiers from 658 Mujahid battalion having picked up a second pilot — which was Abhinandan as seen with the Mujahid soldiers in the various social media grabsThe NLI soldiers already had one pilot in custody at the time. At 1520 hours, another intercept says that while one pilot is in custody, another has been sent to the military hospital.


This clearly shows that a second pilot was also in the Pak Army custody as also being mentioned in the parralel narrative by the ISPR chief.
So if one was Abhinandan with the Mujahids, who was the second pilot with the NLI battalion — obviously none other than the F-16 pilot!

Besides the initial video of locals who said two pilots were caught, the sighting by the Indian army and videos showing two parachutes coming down —all indicate that a Pakistan jet was shot down.


Overlaying of radar data on satellite maps gives the the last known position of the F-16 west of Sabzkot. https://twitter.com/bishwa55900127/status/1118714986187169792 (edit 20 Apr 19)












    1. End of conversation
    1. New conversation














A case of two wreckages and three parachutes: OSINT data analysis

After sifting through a large volume of social media videos, images and posts — some very interesting OSINT data emerges. With over 10 different videos of the aerial engagement and the subsequent aircraft crashing into the ground accessed, there are at least two videos which show two different aircraft falling towards the ground. These can be distinguished by their rapidly falling trajectories towards the ground and the vapour trails created in the skies.


Clearly two different aircraft have crashed in the Bhimber region, POK on the 27th of February.

There were at least 2 different aircraft spotted crashing to the ground in POK on 27 February

A detailed analysis of Abhinandan’s crash site by geospatial experts and eyewitness accounts places it near the village of Horan Kotla in Tandar area. Working backwards from the location of the MiG-21 wreckage, one can plot the approximate area where the F-16 wreckage might have fallen.
After the tirade of videos on the MiG-21 wreckage surfacing on the social media, there was an initial rush to brand the Mig-21's R-25 engine, as seen in the wreckage — as the F-16’s General Electric Engine. However, it petered down when experts stepped in to debunk these theories.
A part of the R-25 engine at the MiG-21 crash site. Note the Mujahid battalion troops at the location
What is however noteworthy — is the hurry that the Pak Army showed to transport and shift pieces of the MiG-21 wreckage from the crash site. This initiative, which took place around 1500H is shown well in a Twitter video and gives us a vital clue — one of the part being loaded onto a truck is certainly not from the MiG-21. In fact the smooth metal finish panel may be from the F-16’s underbelly, where there is supposed to be an arrestor hook assembly. It is further complemented by NLI soldiers in its vicinity, indicating that this is closer to the F-16 wreck in the Sabzkot area.


IAF confirms that the smooth metal finish panel is not from the MiG-21

A couple of photos tweeted by ANI the same 
day, evidently show pieces of PAF bombs which missed Indian Army targets that day. On a closer inspection — what this picture shows is clearly a part of a panel from a F-16 Falcon fighter jet and not a bomb as incorrectly assumed by ANI. This may have landed on the Indian side of the Line of Control after the F-16 shoot down.


The grey/ light gray camouflage panel can only be a part of a PAF F-16 aircraft

The photo evidence provides ample proof that the PAF F-16 had indeed disintegrated after the R-73 hit, with its wreckage strewn and scattered around the area in the same manner as that of the MiG-21.

Now lets examine the various versions of the videos floating around on the social media of eyewitnesses around the crash sites. Some of these witnesses interviewed — claim to have seen at least three different parachutes. This matches to the sightings by the Indian troops, who saw different parachutes from both the crashes, at different locations in the area. The following key aspects emerge from the comments of the various eyewitness. Lets analyse them for their worth-


1# There were more than one parachute in the sky — Cleary seen in the various video grabs, this adequately indicates that more than one pilot ejected.

  [    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZ0OMbhLlXM ]


2# Pak civilians had apprehended Abhinandan, who tried to escape, but was caught and handed over to the Pak Army — This is documented well with a flurry of ISPR and Pak media videos and images on the social media.
3# Ostensibly, one of the witness claimed that they had apprehended an IAF sikh pilot of the IAF — In all probability, the witness has confused Abhinandan, who was wearing a skull cap under his helmet, which resembles a sikh patka at times. His burly moustache with the patka would have given the impression of him being a Sikh to the eyewitnesses on ground.
4# Many witnesses claim to have seen a parachute with colours of the Indian flag — A very significant detail, which emerged in many videos on the social media. On closer analysis, a startling fact emerges — the colour of the C-9 parachute on the PAF F-16’s ACES ejection seat has four colours — white, orange, jungle green and sandy brown — eaily anyone taking a look at the same will assume it to be an Indian parachute due its uncanny resemblence to the Indian flag.






In all probability, just like they tried to lynch Abhinandan when he landed — the POK civilians have clearly mistaken the F-16 parachute to be an Indian and lynched the possibly injured PAF pilot. Due to extreme injuries, the PAF pillot would have been taken to the Pak Army CMH as briefed by the Maj Gen Ghafoor to all — where he would have passed away due to the wounds sustained. Eyewitness accounts from POK civilians also confirm that the second pilot was taken to a Pak army hospital.
A quick run of an image and size interpolation software comparing the reference C-9 image from above and the image taken from a Pakistani video grab of a parachute landing in the area throws up some interesting results — confirming the view that a F-16 parachute did land near the same time that Abhinandan ejected .

Image interpolation of the reference C-9 image with the screengrab image of a parachute landing suspected to be post the F-16 shoot down

So why didn’t the Pakistanis recognise their own pilot before lynching him?

For this we need to go back in air — at the exact moment when Abhinandan fired his R-73 against the PAF F-16 — As per Abhinandan’s debrief after his return, the R-73 missile was fired when the PAF aircraft was turning towards the IAF MiG-21, about to roll out towards him in its frontal quarter. This means when the R-73 missile, with a massive closing speed of over 3500 kmph, would have reached the calculated range for its proximity fuse to explode the warhead — the PAF jet would be still be travelling towards the explosion.
Let's try to understand how the R-73 warhead would have exploded— The R-73 has a continuous rod warhead weighing 7.4 kg — which is activated by a proximity fuse when it senses an aircraft in close quarters. When detonated, the high explosive imparts momentum to the rods, thrusting them outward in an expanding circle. The pressure wave from the explosive acts evenly on the rods over their length. The rods are sufficiently soft to allow the expansion without breaking the rods or the welded joints, and the detonation velocity is limited to approx. 1000 m/s, allowing the rods to bend at these locations instead. At some intermediate point the ring will have a zig-zag (alternating direction) appearance within a cylindrical envelope — Upon ultimate expansion the ring is circular and contained within a plane.
This rapidly expanding ring, when hitting the aircraft, is more effective than an equivalent fragmentation warhead — for the science inclined, the ring’s effectiveness decreasing as 1/R, rather than 1/R2 for fragments.
Portions of the aircraft intercepted by the expanding ring of the continuous rod warhead — will receive a continuous cut through the skin, light structure, underlying cables, hydraulic lines, and other plumbing if present — This may cause a structural failure, or, if not, can be sufficient for defeating the redundancy of aircraft systems. The effect is only pronounced as long as the ring is unbroken, so multiple layers of rods are employed in practical weapons to increase the effective radius.

Expansion of a continuous rod warhead explained

Now when the R-73’s warhead would have exploded and expanded ‘outwards’ ‘towards’ the front at over 1000 m/s, the closing speed of over 3500 kmph would have ensured that the F-16 itself would be coming towards the explosion at 972 m/s.

So if we assume that the proximity fuse would have initiated the explosion in frontal quarters at around 300m — there would hardly be any time between the effect of the explosion taking shape, expanding the flame and shrapnel at high velocity outwards; and the closing in F-16 to absorb the explosion effectively.What that means is that most of the frontal section of the F-16 would have flown in through the expanding shockwave, with damage mostly limited due to shrapnel, rather than the explosive effect.

How the R-73 warhead would have hit the incoming F-16
Hence it is clear that the pilot would have survived the heat and flame effects of the explosion, but would have in all probability been effected by the shrapnel effect of the explosion — grievously injuring his upper body — with the flying helmet preventing fatal injuries, but not able to prevent rampant injuries to the face, neck and chest level.
In contrast, the AMRAAM hit on Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was from right 7 ‘o’ clock position, mostly damaging the rear portion of the MiG-21, as is visible during the post crash analysis of the wreckage.
An example of the effect of a missile hitting from rear quarters, like in the case of the MiG-21


Abhinandan’s aircraft displays signs of a classic missile hit in the rear quarters

Hence when the PAF F-16 pilot would have ejected, he would in all probability have been injured in the upper torso and facial region. He may or may not have been concious due to his injuries. After his landing in Sabzkot — the POK civilians would not have found the classic traces of PAF flight overalls and livery/ patches, which would have in all probability been ripped off due the high velocity shrapnel — crucially may not have displayed any name indicating he was a Pakistani because of bloodied appearance. They would not have recognised him as a PAF pilot and assesing from the Indian coloured parachute — would have mobbed him like Abhinandan, before being handed over to the NLI Regiment soldiers — injured and battered.

Though circumstantial, this relevant evidence proves that a Pakistani pilot was apprehended and injured by a mob after landing and would later have been taken to a Military hospital; where he may have succombed to his injuries as claimed by the ISPR.

Who was the PAF pilot shot down by the IAF?

Interestingly, post the aerial melee over South Western J&K on 27 February, the Pakistani Foreign Minister on 6 March spoke in the parliament about — two PAF pilots who had shot down IAF aircraft. These pilots were Squadron Leader Hassan Siddiqui and Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan.
His statement needs to be analysed objectively for the message it conveys — The FM said when interacting with the other members, “One clarification Bilawal paid tribute to Hassan Siddiqui as he’s absolutely a national hero, But I would like to clarify that two Indian planes were shot down. The other one was shot down by Wg Cdr Nauman Ali Khan,” he added, asking that the second pilot also be given due credit.”

Why did Bilal Bhutto and other parliamentarians praise the younger Sqn Ldr Hassan Siddiqui? Why was his heroism more significant that Nauman Ali Khan?

Why in the first week of March 2019, did the PAF chief urgently visit all PAF bases, particularly those housing the F-16 squadrons?
While Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan was seen being congratulated by the PAF chief, Air Marshal Mujhaid Anwar Khan in a recent PAF propoganda video — why has there been no photo or video released of Sqn Ldr Hassan Siddiqui post the aerial engagement?
Why is a fake video being circulated by ISPR affiliates on social media as that of Sqn Ldr Hassan Siddiqui after his return post shooting an IAF aircraft — the person being shown is not Hassan Siddiqui.
There is an interesting story of Pak TV channels rushing to Hassan Siddiqui’s parental house in Karachi on 27 February. They spoke to his friends and neighbours. However, after that there is complete radio silence on his status.


PAF chief personally congratulating Wg Cdr Nauman Ali Khan for shooting down an IAF MiG-21

It is my belief that Squadron Leader Hassan Siddiqui may be the pilot who was shot down by Wing Commander Abhinandan on 27 February. The fact that his heroism is widely recognised by the Pak parliament and ISPR is covering his presence with fake information, strengthens my theory.
Even if I am wrong, the fact of the matter is that a nameless PAF F-16 fighter pilot has sacrificed his life for Pakistan.
Tragically for the Pakistani nation, with the Pak Army adept at hushing up the deaths of hundreds of its soldiers without as much as batting an eyelid —there is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact and somewhere in between this blatant game of lies and deception by the ISPR — is a F-16 tail number and a dedicated PAF pilot both of whom having served Pakistan to the best of their ability; now have had their records unceremoniously wiped out from the face of the earth to serve a wider subterfuge of upholding the morale and image of the Pāk Fizāʾiyah, the pantheon of past glory and Pakistan’s best shot at hitting back at India in these times of turmoil.
The show goes on….

Since the initial flip flops on the day of the F-16 shoot down, the ISPR and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have invested a good amount of effort on creating alternative evidence around the MiG-21 wreckage, as well as reaching out to its foreign affiliates and sleepers —to influence foreign publications in questioning the IAF claim of a F-16 shot down at an international level — much in line with its effort to embarrass the IAF’s Balakot strike by the recruiting geospatial domain specialists across the word in its deception effort.
While any independent viewpoint on the subject is a worth a discussion — The IAF will need to watch out for articles based on false claims and twisted data, such as the recent Foreign Policy media piece by Lara Seligman. Ms Seligman claimed in her post that two US government sources has confirmed to her that ‘no’ F-16s had been lost by the PAF. This was based on a head count of all Pakistani F-16s by the USG as part of the end user compliances post 27 February.
The FP piece created a furore in the Indian media circles due the damning information it contained. While the IAF countered this by showing crystal clear proof in the form of the electronic signatures and call intercepts in its possession on the subject — Indian agencies were clearly seeing the hand of ISPR in this unwarranted spin to the Mig-21 vs F-16 saga.

This was proven to be a lie — as the US Government categorically denied any such F-16 count having taken place at all.

However Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor went ballistic on the subject, claiming that the ISPR and PAF’s denials had been vindicated. It was clear that the narrative besides influencing certain quarters of global information cells, was clearly aimed at placating a domestic audience — which had discreetly started to question the reality on the aerial engagement.
And things are not going well for the ISPR at all — with the DG ISPR having been forced to accept that the PAF had used F-16s in the aerial engagement on 27 February — another of his lies busted in earnest!
Bellowing his last hurrah on the subject— Maj Gen Ghafoor unrolled another tweet insinuating that — no missile was fired by the MiG-21 — with all being recovered at the site of the wreckage.


A closer inspection of the photograph has revealed that the extreme right R-73 missile has been fired — it being the remains of the R-73 used to shoot down the PAF F-16.
Bravo! Another lie exposed!!!
A very thoughtful tweet on the above does full justice to the ISPR’s protracted effort to keep up the disinformation campaign against India -





***The author is an former fighter pilot with extensive experience on the Mirage 2000 and MiG 21 aircraft of the IAF. He has seen combat in the 1999 Indo Pak Kargil conflict. He writes on military subjects and his article on the Air War in Syria, won the best military aviation submission at the 2017 Paris Airshow.

















Sunday, April 7, 2019

Delimiting Geopolitics: A Formal Approach to Define the Geopolitical Subject

SOURCE:
https://www.academia.edu/38702026/Delimiting_Geopolitics_a_formal_approach_to_define_the_geopolitical_subject?email_work_card=view-paper





Delimiting Geopolitics: A Formal Approach to Define the Geopolitical Subject

DE LEON PETTA GOMES DA COSTA1 



INTRODUCTION





After several years of neglect, the term “Geopolitics” has been more explored in recent years by academics and the media. This can seem, in general, as a good development, as it relates public opinion to foreign policy and internal territorial management. However, in few instances has the term Geopolitics really been related to the concept and has basic geopolitical study been proper used and applied. Furthermore, the discussion is sometimes not even related to geography by itself, but the term is rather misused in discussions that only focus on international security, nationalism or even international relations without a geographical or spatial approach.


Besides its definitions being extensively explained and explored (sometimes even more) in the last century by old theorists like Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolph Kjellén, Karl Haushofer or Halford John Mackinder and more recently Yves Lacoste or Saul Bernard Cohen, the limits to consider in determining whether a subject, event, analysis, or article is related to Geopolitics still remain poor and vague, creating voids and gaps that can be filled with anything that an author desires to be a geopolitical issue. Like in the past, when Geopolitics was misused and reinterpreted as the German concept of Geopolitik, almost banishing the main term from academics, the same problem has returned through the overuse of the term in banal cases and situations not related to Geopolitics and, even more dramatically, in situations not even related to any idea of geography or spatial conception. In fact, this can trigger dangerous situations that can render  geopolitics a pseudoscientific field to justify a supposed strategic vision of a malicious author who wants to do something and support it with an eventual geopolitical concern. For this reason, it is important not to create another definition of Geopolitics but rather develop a precise delimitation of its boundaries to determine when such issue, event or article is or is not a geopolitical subject of analysis and, furthermore, when a movement of such a country is related to its geopolitical ambitions

It is the intention of this research to evaluate different samples in which the term Geopolitics was employed to analyse when the term was or was not correctly applied. Furthermore, by these samples, the subject of Geopolitics can be separated and identified to determine when such a report or study is or is not related to the main term and to suggest a methodological chart to delimit when the term Geopolitics may be properly used.




FROM “BAD SCIENCE” TO IGNORED SCIENCE

After World War II, several academics related the concept of “Geopolitics” to a militaristic view linked with the German Geopolitik and the concept of the politically and militarily dominated space of Lebensraum (living space). This eventually resulted in a distance between Geopolitical studies and other academic areas, especially Geography, in North America and Europe. In fact, there was not a single book title in English using the term geopolitics between the 1940s and 1977, with the exception of Sen’s Basic Principles of Geopolitics and History, published in India in 1975, and there were few such papers in geographical or political journals. During this period, even with some scholars advocating that geopolitics retained a fundamental value and that its neglect could be both politically and intellectually dangerous, some academics remained very critical, arguing that anything of value in geopolitics was contained within political geography and that geopolitics should be abandoned completely as a scientific term, except for historical connotations or in cases where its revival was considered very premature. The contours of some Geopolitical subjects were appropriated by the political science, strategic studies and international relations literature or limited to military academies and staff colleges, with only occasional aspects coming to the surface in publications, but even in these cases, very few contributed new literature or analysis to the public debate. In general, the conclusion must be that geopolitical writing declined in both language and substance (Hepple 1986). It is important to note that the term Geopolitics was academically neglected, but the foreign policy of many governments was still guided by Geopolitical objectives and goals, such as the United States policy of  containment in the late 1940s and its approach to China in the 1970s, the Cuban situation for the Soviet Union, and even the French and English adventures in the Suez Crisis. However, it is worth of note the fact that this rejection was stronger in Europe than a general feeling in the academics. Especially in United States (as already cited), Brazil or Chile for example, that kept a regular basis of geopolitical writings. In Brazilian and Chilean cases, probably because their military governments during that period. In other countries, in turn, Geopolitics was normally limited to branches of some departments and not open to the general public or academics, like the former Soviet Union and China (where still is a closed subject), due to its sensitive issues



In 1974, the Swiss P. Guichonnet and C. Raffestin published their work about frontiers, and the French Yves Lacoste (Costa 2008) initiated a quasi-revolution in discussions of political geography, first with the Hérodote Journal and later with the book “La Géographie, ça sert d’Abord à Faire la Guerre”, both in 1976. The Hérodote Journal would shake the discussions of strategy and ideology by recognizing the crisis that geography was suffering at that moment because of its excessive pragmatism and depoliticization. Later, an editorial of the founders in 1986 would say that Hérodote (at that moment) was responsible for articulating the Geographical method and Geopolitical analysis. Yves Lacoste stated that Geopolitics was not a monopoly of Ratzel (Ratzel 1983 apud Costa 2008) and his Nazi followers or a Hitlerist concept by arguing that Geopolitics was a concern even for Élisee Reclus (Maspero 1983 apud Costa 2008), a geographer and anarchist and clarifying that it was not a change in his orientation but rather an explanation of characteristics. In fact, Lacoste considered the use of the term Geopolitics by scholars (and the geographers who were the most capable of this) something natural, as they should be explicitly dedicated to this subject. Furthermore, he proposed a critical Geopolitics more related to peace, social justice and democracy (Costa 2008). The matter around the concept was even more sensitive to some countries like Brazil and Chile, where some scholars linked the Geopolitical writing and national security of Brazil and Chile with the geopolitics of fascist Germany, arguing that the historical context and connection reflect its logic and structural connections (Cavalla and Chateaux 1977). Furthermore, the troubled figures of these countries were directly involved in Geopolitical studies, like the former dictator president of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, and General Golbery do Couto e Silva in Brazil, chief of the SNI (the Brazilian intelligence agency during the military dictatorship) (Chapman 2011). To Peters (1999), the term geopolitics was a substantial element of Western foreign policy during the Cold War against the world under  influence of its rival, the Soviet Union. As a concept to explains the competition for spheres of influence, driven by the fear in the Western camp of a ‘strategic strangulation’ by the Soviets


However, Geopolitics barely had regained its centrality in academic discussions when a new “crisis” arrived to Geography by itself. The 1990s and the Post-Cold War Era give a boost to liberal idealism, bringing hard statements like the weakening or even the end of the borders, the inevitable spread of democracy and the loss of the importance of the Geography in a globalized world. Francis Fukuyama argued that the triumph of Western liberal democracy and the free market predicated some form of universal state in a new world, where Geography would have less importance, borders would be useless, and national issues would be more homogenous (+ 1992). In national security matters, even a new generation of threats, like organized crime, terrorism and other non-state agents, would be more important than the older security model based on States as a threat. This “new world” would have deprived the State of its sovereignty with many new globalized threats that do not respect the borders. Furthermore, new technologies would make geography less important than ever. Therefore, the mobility of people and products would drastically increase and lower transaction costs. In fact, geography would be irrelevant in this New Age because irregular (non-state) actors would use the Information Age and cyberspace in a global level of communications, with the resulting absolute loss for the nation-state of the ability to control the mass media and cybernetic space due to widespread access by the population to digital information. In other words, the State would not be able to shape public opinion or control the cyber-criminal enterprises that could hurt its sovereignty (Naim 2006). In this flat world, the concept of space would be useless, like the New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman (2007) has stated. In fact, the sentence “because the globalization…” turned into a general motto or excuse to explain almost any situation, some of them not even really new but only interrupted by the Cold War.



 This process of globalization, initially developed by National States, acquired its own life, developing to even threaten its creators (the StateNation) by its logic and consequences. The implications of the current form of globalization would establish a new pattern of development that could make it at odds with the notion of the old state system (Backer 2004). In this Post-Cold War New World, Geography would be irrelevant, and the Nation-State would die. A vision much shared by academics in the 1990s was that Geopolitics would be something useless and a Cold War relic of an outdated world that no longer existed. Some of these perspectives of a “global fluidic” world remained even after the terrorist attacks in  New York and Washington in 2001, based on the excuse that they were only possible because of their peculiar historical and technological moment (Bonanate 2001). Even today, it is not hard to find speeches trying to present the idea of a useless Geography or that Geopolitics lost its meaning in the globalized world. This idea was sometimes connected to the global War on Terror, a supposed new form of war without borders and without a territory.


THE RECOVERY OF GEOPOLITICS AS A VULGAR USAGE


In the 1990s, some authors noticed the reborn of the term “geopolitics”, even among regional groupings, which had abstained from any kind of power aspect in politics, as the European Union for example. As well the problematic precision of what constitutes the Geopolitical Power. With several military, humanitarian and economic crises in the decade of the 2000s, along with the creation of political/economic/military news blocs and several studies and publishes predicting a more complicated world, there was an attempt to take back the idea of Geopolitics, especially because it is a concept that suggests and connotes an idea of a strategic and scientific accurate situation. The Geopolitical perspective attracted greater attention in the academic and popular views. However, this led to a misconception of what Geopolitics really is and when an incident was a geopolitical scenario, confusing it with a regular political or diplomatic event, an economic investment, or a minor international security issue rather than the main concept. In fact, the term Geopolitics became overused, extensively employed in situations just because some map was involved, or even worse, in cases where there was no Geography at all.

It is possible to take as an example some journal articles of Brazilian newspaper columns “trying to analyse” football and the World Cup from a geopolitical perspective. An issue without any Geopolitical context. For example, “World Cup and the Geopolitics” (Copa do Mundo e a Geopolítica), which the author makes a deep economic and political (even sociological) analysis of the World Cup and the participating teams of the tournament, something regarding the nationalism and the feelings involved in the tournament. Or “Geopolitics and Football” (Geopolítica e futebol), an analysis only about the performance of the teams in the World Cup of France (2002). In both cases, there is not a single direct (or even indirect) relation to Geopolitics, and in fact, there is no Geography involved at all. There is some confusion in mixing nationalism, flags, and performance in the games with a Geopolitical situation, in which even a microlevel of Geopolitics is not involved. In “Sexual Salvation: Affirming Women’s Sexual  Rights and Pleasures”, there is a chapter devoted to the history and the geopolitics of prostitution, with an extensive use of Geography and geographical explanations of different situations of prostitution and sexual slavery around the world, but there is not even a single bridge to connect the subject to a geopolitical context (Mccormick 1994). In fact, even former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (partly responsible for the rebirth of the term in the 1970s and 1980s) overused the term. Besides the spatial element that was always present in his speeches, the geographical content was often unclear (Hepple 1986)


Another situation that can be a context of confusion is the Chinese involvement in Africa (Florcruz 2015). The obvious Chinese interest in Africa and its investments in African countries are typically seen as a Geopolitical movement and expansion. However, such a term is not so often used in situations involving European (Doya 2015) countries’ investments or those of Japan, even though Japanese investments are three times larger than those of China in African countries (Crowley 2015). Hence, despite Africa being a common interest for every large or relevant country in the world, investment in that region is only perceived as a Geopolitical movement when it is convenient to sketch a more militaristic or “sinister” scenario. Despite the article’s claim of a possible military interest in this case, there is no evidence to support it


Even the employment of military personal does not necessarily indicate the Geopolitical interest or ambition of the countries involved in the situation, especially peacekeeper missions. MINUSTAH, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti since 2004 (United Nations), for example, comprises military forces from many countries (twenty countries currently). Although it includes countries with an interest in the Caribbean region such as Brazil and USA, it also includes countries for which it would be harder to argue any type of geopolitical interest in the Caribbean region, like Philippines, Jordan and Nepal. The same applies in MINUSCA, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (United Nations), which would be difficult to call a geopolitical area of interest to Bhutan, Bolivia or Serbia, despite their participation in the mission. This type of situation represents more a diplomatic goal than a geopolitical one. In fact, even participation in a direct military engagement does not necessarily represent a Geopolitical interest, as seen in the Iraq War in 2003, where the Coalition Forces comprised countries such as Poland, Mongolia and Nicaragua, who had no direct Geopolitical goal in the region


The same logic can be applied to the “Lobster War”, when France and Brazil disputed the rights of lobster fishing in a Brazilian maritime region  in 1961. Despite the direct economic interest of the France in fishing lobsters, it hardly proves or indicates that Pernambuco in Brazil was inside the French Geopolitical interest. This discussion is important to show that even military conflicts or crises do not necessarily mean that there is a Geopolitical direct interest. In fact, the word “Geopolitics” is largely deployed in cases in which there is no direct involvement with a Geopolitical background, and this overuse is the result of confusion not only by the media but also by academics who mix this concept with generic geographical information without any basic Geopolitical connection, or in more problematic cases, without even the use of Geography or a map, just a political or a social situation. Although the discussions around Geopolitics, leading to its increased attention in recent years, can be viewed as being generally positive, several precautions must be taken to avoid the unnecessary and excessive use of the concept, causing deterioration to the main subject of Geopolitics


The formal definition of the term is a very old discussion, not only between geographers but also political scientists, with several approaches to this objective. Besides the delimitation of Rudolph Kjellén (Kjellén 1917 apud Cohen 2003), who defined Geopolitics as being “the theory of the state as a Geographical organism or phenomenon in space”, that of Edmund Walsh, who stated that it is “a combined study of human geography and applied political science… dating back to Aristotle, Montesquieu and Kant”, and that of Saul B. Cohen, who defined it as an interaction between geographical settings and political processes (Cohen 2003), the main problem is not to define what Geopolitics is but rather when a study of a case, subject of analysis or political movement is a Geopolitical matter (Geopolitical Subject). As I already demonstrated, several cases referred to as topics of “Geopolitics” are not even close to geopolitical cases. The frontiers to specifying Geopolitics still remain too far open and vulnerable to be interpreted as any writer wants.




Leslie W. Hepple stated the same problem in 1986:                    


Geopolitics serves as an umbrella term, encapsulating the interaction of global and regional issues with economic and local structures. But the term geopolitics often appears only in the title, introduction and conclusions, with no linkage to other geopolitical literature, and with the major analysis being conducted using other political and economic intellectual frameworks, usually with   little geography and few maps      




In his criticism of the overuse of the term “Geopolitics” in 1986, Hepple points to several studies containing geographical or spatial information  (some of them with no geography at all) but with lack of geopolitical data or relevance, like Geopolitics of Information (many studies with the same title have been published in the last years and with the same hardly problematic use of the term) and Géopolitiques de l’Apartheid (Geopolitics of Apartheid), which provide an analysis of the territorial and spatial logic, but with no Geopolitical subject or literature involved. The lack of history or critical philosophy may not only “reinvent the wheel” but misrepresent the concept by creating a blank check to consider any subject a strategic issue without providing any discussion of social and political aspects or/ and models, which must be always involved in social constructions such as geopolitics.

According to Hepple (1986)


            The more general, popularized use of geopolitics is very vague in approach, far away from any   geopolitical or geographical tradition, and whilst  the contributions are often original and valuable,  they seem  to be searching for an appropriate  framework under the general heading of “geopolitics "                                            



WHEN IS AN EVENT A GEOPOLITICAL MATTER?

After exposing the two extremes of the treatment of Geopolitics, from its exclusion from academia to the extensive and unnecessary use of the term, I want to raise a discussion to refocus on the core of geopolitics to define when an event is really a geopolitical matter and subject case of study or analysis. For this reason, I want to introduce some patterns, dimensions and theories to summarize when a subject can be considered a Geopolitical matter

After exposing the two extremes of the treatment of Geopolitics, from its exclusion from academia to the extensive and unnecessary use of the term, I want to raise a discussion to refocus on the core of geopolitics to define when an event is really a geopolitical matter and subject case of study or analysis. For this reason, I want to introduce some patterns, dimensions and theories to summarize when a subject can be considered a Geopolitical matter and/or Effective Regional Territories, the moderately pro-state population areas; Empty Areas, essential areas devoid of population; Boundaries, the mark and limit of the national states; and Nonconforming Sectors, areas with separatism sentiment (Cohen 2003)

Meta-Geopolitics, the geopolitics related to the outer space, suggested by Nayef Al-Rodhan, is constructed according to the seven dimensions that countries involved in large space programs possess: Social and health issues; Domestic politics; Economics; Environment; Science and human potential; Military and security issues; and International diplomacy (Al-Rodhan 2012). Five of his dimensions can be directly connected to the Geopolitical context of the national States, like Social (demographics), Domestic politics, Economics, Scientific potential and Military issues. These five characteristics, grouped into a set, can shape not only the internal geopolitical reality of such country but also its foreign policy interests and capacity to protect or extend its sphere of influence. In other words, this model of dimensions proposed by Al-Rodhan can help in part to define and delimit if such a subject of analysis can or cannot be considered a geopolitical issue by comprising these five points from a geographical perspective and also the geopolitical potential of each state (or non-state) actor.


Peters (1999) modified the Lacoste’s definition by extending the term territory to include maritime and airspace elements, especially because rivalry between two antagonists, especially national States (but not only), are rarely limited to the territorial sense of on-shore territory. Especially because natural resources are also located in the sea, and the control of maritime zones or airspace are indispensable for sustain such power over a delimited piece of territory. Like Al-Rodhan (2012) would do it later by expanding such projection of spatial power to the outer space in modern space program races. Peters also extend this definition with the inclusion of rivalries between groups of States, for example Western OECD against non-Western states, in general she defines the geopolitics term as an analysis of power between different types authorities for political (ideology) and economic dominance over a delimited territory


Among State strategists, not only Kissinger but also Brzezinski (1997) extensively used this approach by explaining the geopolitical base was no longer the geographic part of Eurasia as a point of departure for continental domination, but a fundamental that moved from the regional space to a global dimension, while the Eurasian continent would be the central core of a global primacy. In fact, the term of “Geostrategy” for him would be a long-term management of America’s Eurasian geopolitical interests. Finally, to Brzezinski the geopolitical approach to the “Eurasian Geostrategy” was a:


       management of geostrategically dynamic states and    the careful handling of geopolitically catalytic states,   in keeping with the twin interests of America in the  short-term preservation of its unique global power  and in the long-run transformation of it into increasingly institutionalized global cooperation. To             put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more              brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent  collusion and maintain security dependence among   the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected,  and to keep the barbarians from coming together.                                              
                                                   
                   
Considering the geopolitical literature, I propose a definition to address when a particular subject analysis may or may not be considered a geopolitical subject by the simultaneous convergence of three fundamental aspects (Politics, Economy and Military) inside the specific geospatial sphere of a particular country or political actor (non-state actors may also be interested in geopolitical strategy). The economic aspect must be regarded, for areas that provide a fundamental or vital resource are fundamental to the production of an essential good or are fundamental places on trade routes that provide necessary logistics for these vital resources, so that their loss could or will damage the economic functioning of such a country; in other words, these areas should be controlled directly or indirectly for the State to survive. Although the logistical importance of this aspect is largely based in a Mahanist vision of military naval power and controlled seaborne commerce interdependence (Mahan 1890), it must also be applied to land areas. Those economic considerations are important to separate investments that every state or non-state actor normally pursues from a geographic area of interest that is fundamental to the economic existence of such a political organization


As previously demonstrated, even the most classical and associated aspect of geopolitics, the military, is not always necessarily guided by geopolitical ambitions, so it is important to delimit when a military involvement is or is not inside of the geographic sphere and when a region is considered a geopolitical area of interest of a country. For this reason, the security aspect can be split in two different segments, the external projection capability, which includes conventional military forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), and the capability to maintain control of the central authority within its own territory, normally executed by public security agencies (police departments, for example), especially in nonconforming sectors. Such military involvement can be considered as geopolitical factor if linked to a delimited geographical space that is important to the economic survival of the state (as previously explained) and/or politically important; in the vast majority of cases, the Geopolitical area of interest is around the borders of the national states that ensure the projection of its sphere of political influence. In the case of the internal security agencies, their task is to establish and maintain social and political order in the state’s territory, avoiding problems such as separatist organizations, organized crime and/or terrorist groups that can eventually lead to some type of territorial loss of state power

The third and most subjective aspect is regarded to politics. Again, it is important to split this aspect into two different segments, Demography and Diplomacy, which are the internal management of the population inside the national territory, especially in nonconforming territories, to ensure the presence of the central authorities inside its own borders, and the capacity of the external influence of such country on other countries through diplomatic means, where the ability to maintain control or influence over the political actors (does not need be the government by itself) of a region or a country within its sphere of influence or area of interest is crucial for its strategic interests in that country or region. There are many possible ways that governments can apply this procedure through soft power diplomatic acts, some of them by controversial actions that can involve even bribery


A Geopolitical subject must involve more than a military operation, financial investment or diplomatic or territorial management; the three aspects must be combined simultaneously and based in a geographical plan to consider such an object of analysis as a Geopolitical issue of study. This delimitation is important to guide and separate the different layers of discussion in areas of the humanities, avoiding confusion with different segments of studies like International Security, Political Science and Economy. Furthermore, it makes it clear that Geopolitics is not the same as nationalism, diplomacy or geography, but it can sometimes be related. Above all, it is not necessarily a concept to justify some type of Imperialism, but a geopolitical strategy can also develop a defensive policy to deal with potential external threats in the military, economic and/or political spheres of a country or countries, leading a group of countries to develop countermeasures and partnerships like trade blocs or military alliances. Additionally, it is important to establish that Geopolitics is not exclusivity for foreign policies or international relations, as normally stated (Devetak et al 2011), but may drive territorial management in their homeland policy. I suggest the following schematic that tries to simplify and clarify the main idea:






This graphic illustrates when a subject is a Geopolitical matter by the confluence of the three spheres (aspects) inside a larger sphere based on a Geographic/Spatial plan. For example, besides the political and economic aspects of BRICS and several claims about its Geopolitical arrangement (Leahy 2014), there is not only no military ambition in the involved countries, but, more importantly, there is a complete lack of a geographic and spatial relationship between them, configuring it as a political-economic bloc, not even close to a geopolitical ambition. In this way, it is very different from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Meanwhile, even small-scale conflicts, due to their scale, would hardly relate to a geopolitical situation, including the war on drugs or/and war against terrorism. Military engagements against these assets are punctual and do not mobilize all aspects simultaneously, except if this non-state actor eventually evolves to operate in all three aspects in a particular delimited geographic region, such as the Islamic State briefly was able to achieve.1


There are some factual situations that can also demonstrate when the term can be properly applied, like in the classical Mahan theory regarding the Canal in the Isthmus of Panama (Mahan 1890), involving the geographical aspects that reduced the distance between the two North American coasts by 8,415 geographical miles (Mills 2010), directly affecting the economic and the military logistical structure of the United States and to guarantee the political interests in the region. The American government has always held some type of political influence over Panama, even that of the troubled and obscure involvement with General Manuel Noriega and his corrupt government related to drug trafficking (Marcy 2010). In this case, it is very easy to identify a subject of analysis in the Caribbean and Central America as related to Geopolitics due to the confluence of the geographical factor with the three aspects

This perception is not so far from Brzezinski (1997), in fact it based on. He explored what was called “Geopolitical pivots”. States with importance derived from its very sensitive location and from the consequences of its potentially vulnerable condition. Those geopolitical pivots are determined by their geography, in some cases having a special role either in giving access to important areas or in denying access to resources to another significant player (in general he refers to national States). While in other situations, those geopolitical pivots can play a defensive shield for a vital State or a region. Sometimes, according to him, the existence of a geopolitical pivot can have a significant political and/or cultural consequence for neighboring player. Many years later, Brzezinski (2012) would still sustain such methodology and views of what Geopolitics is by presenting Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel and the Great Middle East as the Geopolitically most endangered States while using the same methods that he defined as “Geopolitical pivots”

It is not ironically neither coincidence the fact that those Geopolitical pivots are regions/countries/areas of friction between bigger State powers. In fact, such geographical places turned in pivot areas because they are inside a bigger structure of geopolitical dispute among regional and/or global powers. To define when such matter is or not a Geopolitical Subject of study (and by consequence related with Geopolitics) the researcher must consider such context of frictional disputes because the subject of study in this theme are normally inside this context

An example where the term cannot be applied is the Chinese geopolitics in Africa. Despite many media articles arguing about the geopolitical interests of China in the African countries, there is no clear evidence that supports it. As previously stated, the Chinese investments in Africa are not the largest among other non-African countries. Furthermore, at this point, the Chinese government has not deployed any military asset or base in Africa, and even with several reports and media news describing the possibility (Benabdallah 2015), it is hard to sustain such a position. Even the Chinese naval presence against piracy in the Gulf of Aden (BBC 2008) cannot be considered geopolitical, as it seems to be more related to a multinational task force for peacekeeping than a military engagement. Furthermore, besides the financial investments, there are few signals or evidence of a Chinese direct influence over the local political elites. In fact, the Chinese geopolitical maritime areas of interest are more related to “vertical” expansion near its coasts, in the South China Sea and East China Sea, than a “horizontal” expansion that could eventually go towards Africa (Kaplan 2010). These examples demonstrate that in several cases, there is double standards in use of the term “geopolitics


Another common mistake, which unfortunately is growing, is the split between Geo-economics from Geopolitics, like if eventually one could surpass another. For example, Søilen (2010) who stated:


          Geoeconomics is gradually replacing the   importance of Geopolitics. The transition is marked by the start of the process we call Globalization about two decades old now, but still in  its infancy, when government and government   institutions discovered that they no longer were self-evident key actors and watchmen of world events.The process is an effect of the end of the Cold War and  marks a strategic shift from political ideologies to economic realities.                           
                                            

A statement absurdly wrong because it does not understand the fact that the economy is directly affected by security/military issues, as clearly observed by Mahan more than a century ago, the close relation and interdependence between these two is what defines the modern strategy and economic stability in the world. Especially in the Chinese situation regarding the China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative, considering the obvious fact that connectivity and infrastructure projects are integral element of global political and economic power. The China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), also known as “Belt and Road” or “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, are contemporary connectivity geopolitical projects due to the financial and geographic scale of these projects. Through several economic actions is possible to see its security background context. For example, the objective to promote the development of western Chinese provinces such as Gansu, Guangxi, Ningxia, Shanxi, Yunnan and Xinjiang. To produce a favorable regional/domestic security environment in China’s western areas decreasing challenges of religious extremism, separatism and terrorism. Moreover, reducing the Chinese dependence on sea-based energy transportation routes, especially the Strait of Malacca (Blanchard and Flint 2017). In other words, it is not possible to Geoeconomics replace the importance of Geopolitics, because it is already inside a bigger Geopolitical realm


It is also important to establish objectives and projection limitations that define if a subject is a geopolitical matter according to the potential of the state actor (or non-state actor) involved, which means that if new elements appear, it may change such projections and objectives, in the manner that the Canal of Panama changed the United States’ destiny, as predicted by Mahan, by expanding its interests and projection, or like the political transition of the Soviet Union to Russia, decreasing its projection and geopolitical interests. Furthermore, based on these three aspects, if we take the five main dimensions of Al-Rodhan as a sample of the projection capacity, the United States would be the only country with a global geopolitical interest and projection, at least at this point, with all other countries being more or less limited to specific areas around its own borders. In addition to not expanding their geopolitical projection by the five-dimensional limitations, some of their foreign policy interests are also more restricted, like those of China, Russia and India.2 However, other cases, like England and France, despite aspiring for greater projection, still suffer from serious limitations. This could lead to a reflection that the maintenance of the United States’ geopolitical objectives would necessarily sooner or later crush other states’ geopolitical spheres

These crushes could be represented by the shatterbelt regions, which are strategically oriented regions that are disputed by the competition of Great Powers in geostrategic realms and compression zones, while fragmented areas subject to the completion of neighbouring countries but not Great Powers could be identified as geographical spaces where the geopolitical interests and objectives of different countries overlap and collide with each other. Following the graphic presented before, if fewer than all three aspects collide in this particular place, some sort of competition will start (or in some cases, a deal may be drafted that can turn it into a cooperation or partnership due to its small scale) but would not trigger a geopolitical crisis. In this case, the three aspects should be involved, disrupting a more severe and dramatic situation. As stated by Saul B. Cohen, a good example of a shatterbelt is the Middle East, due to its fragmentation reinforced by a dozen regional states as well the influences and actions of major powers. However, not all areas in turmoil are shatterbelts. For example, the Caribbean did not become a shatterbelt because of the communist Cuba or Nicaraguan uprising in the region, because the United States’ sphere of influence was never seriously contested. Similarly, the conflicts in South Asia did not evolve to a shatterbelt because India’s sphere of influence in the region is not threatened by the United States or China (Cohen 2003). This could change, though, if the Chinese government eventually makes a major movement in the Strait of Malacca, triggering a regional dispute (Kaplan 2010). Those cases are good to validate the theory represented in the previous chart, on how the terminology of Geopolitics would fill in these scenarios and how the term must be employed only in the case of the  political, economic and military aspects being involved at the same time inside a spatial sphere

This elasticity must be also considered as a fundamental characteristic of the Geopolitical Subject. Because the needs and capacity of national States, as well any other political group, will eventually change in time. Boundaries are socio-spatial limits of difference and will define the territorial extent in its legal fact or legitimacy. While at the same time, spatial inscriptions are not static. The hierarchy of territories based on political boundaries are frequently in question, because it involves negotiations for cooperation and competition between interests and identities (Novak 2011). A good example of change of those geopolitical shapes may be found in the European Union expansion and its evolutional integration, a transnational organization not structured on fixed spatial model but based on heterogeneity of dynamics. Although new countries can go in or older members can out, according to its internal and external political context. Also, we must not fall in mistakes by considering that every Security aspect is also a geopolitical subject, because while in several issues both aspects may eventually cross paths, this is not a mandatory factor but just very likely.


                                              CONCLUSIONS


As demonstrated, several uses of the word Geopolitics are hardly connected to the concept itself. It is not surprising, as geopolitical study suffered significant damage in the last half century, coming from the association with the German Geopolitik for at least three decades to a brief recovery in the 1980s, just to suffer another hit with the overuse of the Globalization concept, sometimes more ideologically guided than scientifically. This crisis in Geopolitics is also because Political Geography, throughout the twentieth century, among the other sub-disciplines of geography, had great difficulty with an autonomous academic reflection not related to the immediate demands of national states, such as those by authors in the United States like Spykman and Mahan, Mackinder in England or Haushofer and Ratzel in Germany. Most of the theoretical constructions of classic geopolitical thinking still remain much more determined by the demands of the States than by proper intellectual needs, characteristics of a more academic “pure” reflection. In some Latin countries, geopolitical thought was produced by intellectuals related to the Military, directly linked to the military dictatorships in that time, as in the case of General Golbery in Brazil and General Pinochet in Chile. After the democratization of such countries, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc,  the “End of History” and the “End of Borders” speeches, Geopolitics and Geography lost much space in the Academy. The design of an academic geopolitical thinking produced by civilians or unrelated to national State demands is still in its infancy in several countries

Although the main “Geopolitical Subject” is the national State (at least in most cases), its analysis does not need to always be determined by National interests, but several forms of analysis and knowledge can be offered that may help analysts and researches understand the “bubbles of power” (political groups oriented in such spatial dimensions by one or more of the three aspects previously presented) that comprise the national and international scenarios of analysis. In fact, when such an issue is determined to be a Geopolitical subject, it will demonstrate how deep such a situation is and how much problematic it could become, due to the involvement of the Political, Economic and Military aspects at the same time. A popularization of the term relating the Geopolitics concept to non-sense matters such as football and prostitution, among others, is bad for the concept and bad for the readers who may not be able to understand the complexity and importance surrounding the geopolitical interests

The importance of delimiting a methodology for Geopolitics and the Geopolitical Subject beyond the basic literature of Mahan, Ratzel and Mackinder is because geopolitics presents an important key that drives and guide foreign policies and even national policies. Therefore, its popularization and use without the geopolitical literature or spatial or geographical elements is dangerous, not only for the term itself and the geopoliticians who spend much time studying, writing and analysing the area but also for State and non-state actors that require a geostrategic orientation. As a blank check, the concept can mislead and open doors to any type of political action like the Lebensraum concept in the name of national security or a strategic issue, causing severe damage not only to the science of geopolitics but also to the public who can be misguided. Hence, the Geopolitical Subject must be delimited by the Geographical aspect and composed of political, economic and military aspects, simultaneously, to determine when Geopolitics matters

This exact methodological delimitation, is far more important than only avoiding misinterpretations, it can also help to prevent another assault against Geopolitics and Political Geography, making it difficult to relate them to the Nazi concept of Geopolitik by avoiding an imminent connection with imperialistic acts (because it can be used to develop a defensive geostrategy) and by stating its permanent and strategic importance in the world, even on such a globalized planet. Because Geopolitics is a four-dimensional field of study (not only related to the spatial dimensions but  also the temporal), the proposed chart can also provide a guided orientation more accurate for studies, diplomatic actions and the public. Many political, economic or military reasons in time will change the shape the projection and gravity of the Nation-States. Something recently observed in the dissolution of Soviet Union (a retraction form) which lost its influence and capability over some territories, or in China rising (an expansion form) which is gradually absorbing more abroad areas as a form to sustain its “geopolitical energy”. To conclude, a one- or two-aspect conflict or crisis (Political, Economic and/or Military) is far easier to peacefully resolve than a Geopolitical crisis, due to the combination of the three aspects at the same time inside a geographical sphere that is normally fundamentally important for the states (or non-state actor) involved to survive. In other words, Geopolitics is also important as a delimited term, to show how deep such a situation could be.


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NOTAS

1. The Islamic State failed in achieve international legitimacy, support and political recognition. Otherwise, it would be able to turn itself in a National or governmental player.

 2. With an eventual change in its capacities, its interests may change.









DE LEON PETTA GOMES DA COSTA
Delimiting Geopolitics: a formal approachto define the geopolitical subject