Monday, March 2, 2020

Ghazwa-e-Hind : MUSLIM CONQUESTS IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

SOURCE:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_conquests_in_the_Indian_subcontinent



                                       [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lr8Qx0SyrYI ]





From Ancient Times: https://youtu.be/dBZRTzXARWM 300 to 1000ce: https://youtu.be/j0kLX2aPgo8 1000 to 1850 ce: https://youtu.be/Lr8Qx0SyrYI 1850 to 1947: https://youtu.be/nx_vSuduwAk 1947 to Present: https://youtu.be/eVnqJHO3PcY Buy the History of Hindu India Textbook: http://www.amazon.com/History-Hindu-S... The History of Hindu India (Part Three) was developed by the editors of Hinduism Today magazine in collaboration with Dr. Shiva Bajpai, Professor Emeritus of History, California State University Northridge. It is intended to provide an authentic presentation of the history of India and Hinduism for use in American middle and high school classes, as well as Hindu temple study groups and general presentations on the Hindu religion and history. This documentary is based on the third chapter of the textbook, "The History of Hindu India," published in 2011. It covers Indian history from 1100 to 1850 ce, from the Arab Muslim invasions to British rule, a time of great difficulty for the Indian people. These extensive foreign invasions are recounted, including the plunder of the great Siva temple at Somnath, and the establishment of the Mughal Empire by the 16th century in most of India, its subsequent decline by the mid-18th century and the gradual control of India by the British. The documentary provides an account of the saints of the powerful Bhakti Movement, including Ramananda and Kabir. One section is devoted to an overview of the Sikh religion, from its founding in the 16th century by Guru Nanak to formation of the Khalsa by Guru Gobind Singh in the 18th century. This is followed by a brief introduction to Indian music and its basic concepts of tala (rhythm), raga (scale) and improvisation. For more information and for class lesson plans based on the book, visit www.hinduismtoday.com/education/. This documentary is directed and produced by Sushma Khadepaun; produced and narrated by Roger (Raj) Narayan. Funded by the Uberoi Foundation, Institute for Curriculum Advancement, this film may be freely distributed for educational purposes.







CLICK/GOOGLE URL TO OPEN VIDEO

https://youtu.be/WnzdmiZpEPw







ON ISLAMIC GENOCIDE OF KAFIRS 



    "The Islamic conquest of India is probably the bloodiest story in history. It is a discouraging tale, for its evident moral is that civilization is a precious good, whose delicate complex of order and freedom, culture and peace, can at any moment be overthrown by barbarians invading from without or multiplying within."

                            Will Durant, a Historian.



                                               Ghazwa-e-Hind 



          MUSLIM CONQUESTS IN THE                            INDIAN SUBCONTINENT


Ghazwa-e-Hind Islamic Doctrine.

CLICK URL TO OPEN VIDEO

         https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnzdmiZpEPw



                   
Renowned writer and thinker Tarek Fatah explaining the real reason behind terror attacks in India. He says that attacking India enshrines in Ghazwa-e-Hind Islamic doctrine. Ghazwa-e-Hind is an Islamic concept that is given in the Hadith. Ghazwa means barbaric war. Ghazwa-e-Hind means a barbaric war of conquering India. After this war, all Idol worshipers will be murdered by the winning Islamic army. According to Muslim beliefs, this war will occur before Kayamat and after this war every Hindu to be converted into Islam by force. Pakistan uses this concept to propagate violence against India. Terrorism has no other justification other than this. Tarek Fatah also talks about Gay Muslim heroes Mahmud of Ghazni and Ayaz. He also hits Bachchabaazi in Afghanistan.




FATE OF  THOSE WHO  OPPOSE ISLAM
                      [ AKBARNAMA ]



 War elephant executing the opponents    
 of the Emperor Akbar the Great.



Muslim conquests in the Indian subcontinent mainly took place from the 12th to the 16th centuries, though earlier Muslim conquests include the invasions into modern Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Umayyad campaigns in India, during the time of the Rajput kingdoms in the 8th century.

Mahmud of Ghazni
, the first ruler to hold the title Sultan, who preserved an ideological link to the suzerainty of the Abbasid Caliphate, invaded and plundered vast parts of PunjabGujarat, starting from the Indus River, during the 10th century.[1][full citation needed][2][full citation needed]

After the capture of Lahore and the end of the Ghaznavids, the Ghurid Empire ruled by Muhammad of Ghor and Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad laid the foundation of Muslim rule in India. In 1206, Bakhtiyar Khalji, whose invasion caused the disappearance of Buddhism from East India, led the Muslim conquest of Bengal, marking the eastern-most expansion of Islam at the time. The Ghurid Empire soon evolved into the Delhi Sultanate ruled by Qutb al-Din Aibak, the founder of the Mamluk dynasty. With the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, Islam was spread across most parts of the Indian subcontinent.

In the 14th century, the Khalji dynasty, under Alauddin Khalji, temporarily extended Muslim rule southwards to GujaratRajasthan and the Deccan, while the Tughlaq dynasty temporarily expanded its territorial reach till Tamil Nadu. The break up of the Delhi Sultanate resulted in several Muslim sultanates and dynasties to emerge across the Indian subcontinent, such as the Gujarat SultanateMalwa Sultanate, the Bahmani Sultanate and the wealthy Bengal Sultanate, a major trading nation in the world.[3][4] Some of these were however followed by Hindu re-conquests and resistance from the native powers, and states such as the Kamma NayakasVijayanagarasGajapatisCherosReddys and Rajput states.

Prior to the full rise of the Mughal Empire founded by Babur, one of the gunpowder empires, which annexed almost all of the ruling elites of the whole of South Asia, the Sur Empire ruled by Sher Shah Suri conquered large territories in the northern parts of India. Akbar The Great gradually enlarged the Mughal Empire to include nearly all of South Asia, but the zenith was reached in the end of the 17th century, when the reign under emperor Aurangzeb witnessed the full establishment of Islamic sharia through the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri.[5][6]

The Mughals suffered a massive decline in the early 18th century after Afsharid ruler Nader Shah's invasion, an unexpected attack that mortified even the British Empire.[7] This provided opportunities for the powerful Mysore KingdomNawabs of Bengal and MurshidabadMaratha EmpireSikh EmpireNizams of Hyderabad to exercise control over large regions of the Indian subcontinent.[8]



After the Battle of PlasseyBattle of Buxar and the long Anglo-Mysore Wars, the East India Company ended up seizing control of the entire Indian subcontinent. By the end of the 18th century, European powers, mainly the British Empire, commenced to extend political influence over the Muslim world, as well as extending into the Indian subcontinent, and by the end of the 19th century, much of the Muslim world as well as the Indian subcontinent, came under European colonial domination, most notably the British Raj.



Contents




1 Early Muslim Presence

Islam in South Asia existed in communities along the Arab coastal trade route in SindhBengalGujaratKerala, and Ceylon as soon as the religion originated and had gained early acceptance in the Arabian Peninsula, though the first incursion by the new Muslim successor states of the Arab World occurred around 636 CE or 643 AD, during the Rashidun Caliphate, long before any Arab army reached the frontier of India by land.


The connection between the Sind and Islam was established by the initial Muslim missions during the Rashidun Caliphate. Al-Hakim ibn Jabalah al-Abdi, who attacked Makran in the year 649 AD, was an early partisan of Ali ibn Abu Talib.[9] During the caliphate of Ali, many Hindus of Sindh had came under influence of Shi'ism[10] and some even participated in the Battle of Camel and died fighting for Ali.[9] Under the Umayyads (661 - 750 AD), many Shias sought asylum in the region oFf Sindh, to live in relative peace in the remote area. Ziyad Hindi is one of those refugees.[11]

1.1 Arab Naval Expeditions

Uthman b. Abul As Al Sakifi, governor of Bahrain and Oman, sent out ships to raid Thane, near modern-day Mumbai, while his brother Hakam sailed to Broach and a third fleet sailed to Debal under his younger brother Mughira either in 636 CE or 643 AD. According to one source all three expeditions were successful,[12] however, another source states Mughira was defeated and killed at Debal.[13] These expeditions were sent without the Caliph Umar's consent, and he rebuked Uthman, saying that had the Arabs lost any men the Caliph would have killed an equal number of men from Utham's tribe in retaliation.[12] The expeditions were sent to attack pirate nests, to safeguard Arabian trade in the Arabian Sea, and not to start the conquest of India.[14][15][16]


Rashidun Caliphate and the Indian Frontier



The kingdoms of Kapisa-Gandhara in modern-day Afghanistan, Zabulistan and Sindh (which then held Makran) in modern-day Pakistan, all of which were culturally and politically part of India since ancient times,[17] were known as "The Frontier of Al Hind". The first clash between a ruler of an Indian kingdom and the Arabs took place in 643 AD, when Arab forces defeated Rutbil, King of Zabulistan in Sistan.[18] Arabs led by Suhail b. Abdi and Hakam al Taghilbi defeated an Indian army in the Battle of Rasil in 644 AD at the Indian Ocean sea coast,[19] then reached the Indus River. Caliph Umar ibn Al-Khattab denied them permission to cross the river or operate on Indian soil and the Arabs returned home.[20]

Abdullah ibn Aamir led the invasion of Khurasan in 650 AD, and his general Rabi b. Ziyad Al Harithi attacked Sistan and took Zaranj and surrounding areas in 651 AD[21] while Ahnaf ibn Qais conquered the Hepthalites of Herat in 652 AD and advanced up to Balkh by 653 AD. Arab conquests now bordered the Kingdoms of Kapisa, Zabul and Sindh in modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Arabs levied annual tributes on the newly captured areas, and leaving 4,000 men garrisons at Merv and Zaranj retired to Iraq instead of pushing on against the frontier of India.[22] Caliph Uthman b. Affan sanctioned an attack against Makran in 652 AD, and sent a recon mission to Sindh in 653 AD. The mission described Makran as inhospitable, and Caliph Uthman, probably assuming the country beyond was much worse, forbade any further incursions into India.[23][24]

This was the beginning of a prolonged struggle between the rulers of Kabul and Zabul against successive Arab governors of Sistan, Khurasan and Makran in modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Kabul Shahi kings and their Zunbil kinsmen blocked access to the Khyber Pass and Gomal Pass routes into India from 653 to 870 AD,[25] while modern Balochistan, Pakistan, comprising the areas of Kikan or Qiqanan, Nukan, Turan, Buqan, Qufs, Mashkey and Makran, would face several Arab expeditions between 661 - 711 AD.[26] The Arabs launched several raids against these frontier lands, but repeated rebellions in Sistan and Khurasan between 653 - 691 AD diverted much of their military resources in order to subdue these provinces and away from expansion into Al Hind. Muslim control of these areas ebbed and flowed repeatedly as a result until 870 AD. Arabs troops disliked being stationed in Makran,[27] and were reluctant to campaign in the Kabul area and Zabulistan due to the difficult terrain and underestimation of Zunbil's power.[28] Arab strategy was tribute extraction instead of systematic conquest. The fierce resistance of Zunbil and Turki Shah stalled Arab progress repeatedly in the "Frontier Zone".[29][30]

3  Umayyad Expansion in Al Hind

Muawiyah established Umayyad rule over the Arabs after the first First Fitna in 661 AD, and resumed expansion of the Muslim Empire. After 663/665 AD, the Arabs launched an invasion against Kapisa, Zabul and what is now Pakistani Balochistan. Abdur Rahman b. Samurra besieged Kabul in 663 AD, while Haris b Marrah advanced against Kalat after marching through Fannazabur and Quandabil and moving through the Bolan Pass. King Chach of Sindh sent an army against the Arabs, the enemy blocked the mountain passes, Haris was killed and his army was annihilated. Al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra took a detachment through the Khyber pass towards Multan in Southern Punjab in modern-day Pakistan in 664 AD, then pushed south into Kikan, and may have also raided Quandabil. Turki Shah and Zunbil expelled Arabs from their respective kingdoms by 670 AD,  and Zunbil began assisting in organizing resistance in Makran.[19]

Sunday, March 1, 2020

PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA

SOURCE:
[ A ] http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00ambedkar/ambedkar_partition/

[ B ]  https://www.google.com/search?sa=X&sxsrf=ALeKk02f6Ut21mdpy2fntYjsV733VMsFuw:1583136151634&q=thoughts+on+pakistan+wiki&tbm=isch&source=univ&safe=active&ved=2ahUKEwjdycvfqfvnAhWBbysKHXjIA3gQsAR6BAgHEAE

[ C ]  https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/falsifying-the-truth/203929



      [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsMAYWzeZ70 ]


     







#Ambedkar #AmbedkarOnIslam #Islam

BR Ambedkar on Islam and Islamic Society-An Excerpt from his Book Pakistan or Partition of India



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBoVNta9oSo&vl=en ]









PAKISTAN
OR
THE PARTITION OF INDIA


BY
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar

"More brain, O Lord, more brain! or we shall mar,
Utterly this fair garden we might win."
(Quotation from the title page of Thoughts on Pakistan, 1st ed.)



~~~~~~~
INSCRIBED TO THE MEMORY
OF
RAMU
As a token of my appreciation of her goodness of heart, her nobility of mind and her purity of character
and also for the cool fortitude and readiness to suffer along with me which she showed
in those friendless days of want and worries which fell to our lot.
~~~~~~~

TO READ PLEASE CLICK / GOOGLE THE 

BLUE COLOURED 

LETTERING





TABLE OF CONTENTS



[Editor's Introduction]
Preface to the Second Edition
Prologue
Introduction



PART I -- MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN


CHAPTER I -- What does the League Demand?
Part I [The Muslim League's Resolution of March 1940]
Part II [Unifying the North-West provinces is an age-old project]
Part III [The Congress itself has proposed to create Linguistic Provinces]
CHAPTER II -- A Nation Calling for a Home
[What is the definition of a "nation," and what "nations" can be found in India?]
CHAPTER III -- Escape from Degradation
[What grievances do Muslims have against their treatment by the Congress?]



PART II -- HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN


CHAPTER IV -- Break-up of Unity

 [How substantial, in truth, is the unity between Hindus and Muslims?]


CHAPTER V -- Weakening of the Defences
Part I -- Question of Frontiers
Part II -- Question of Resources
Part III -- Question of Armed Forces


CHAPTER VI -- Pakistan and Communal Peace


Part I   [ The Communal Question in its "lesser intent"]

Part II   [ The Communal Question in its "greater intent"]

Part III   [ The real question is one of demarcation of boundaries]

Part IV   [ Will Punjabis and Bengalis agree to redraw their boundaries?]


PART III -- WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN?

CHAPTER VII -- Hindu Alternative to Pakistan


Part I  [Lala Hardayal's scheme for conversion in the North-West]

Part II   [ The stand of Mr. V. D. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha]

Part III   [ Mr. Gandhi's tenacious quest for Hindu-Muslim unity]

Part IV   [ The riot-torn history of Hindu-Muslim relations, 1920-1940]

Part V   [ Such barbaric mutual violence shows an utter lack of unity]

CHAPTER VIII -- Muslim Alternative to Pakistan


Part I  [ The proposed Hyderabad scheme of legislative reform is not promising]

Part II   [ The "Azad Muslim Conference" thinks along similar lines]


CHAPTER IX -- Lessons from Abroad


Part I [The case of Turkey shows a steady dismemberment and loss of territory]
Part II [The case of Czechoslovakia, a country which lasted only two decades]
Part III [Both were brought down by the growth of the spirit of nationalism]
Part IV [The force of nationalism, once unleashed, almost cannot be stopped]
Part V [Hindustan and Pakistan would be stronger, more homogeneous units]


PART IV -- PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

CHAPTER X -- Social Stagnation


Part I [Muslim Society is even more full of social evils than Hindu Society is]

Part II [Why there is no organized movement of social reform among the Muslims]

Part III [The Hindus emphasize nationalist politics and ignore the need for social reform]

Part IV [In a "communal malaise," both groups ignore the urgent claims of social justice]


CHAPTER XI -- Communal Aggression
[British sympathy encourages ever-increasing, politically calculated Muslim demands]

CHAPTER XII -- National Frustration


Part I [Can Hindus count on Muslims to show national rather than religious loyalty?]

Part II [Hindus really want Dominion status; Muslims really want independence]

Part III [The necessary national political loyalty is not present among Muslims]Part IV [Muslim leaders' views, once nationalistic, have grown much less so over time]

Part V [The vision of Pakistan is powerful, and has been implicitly present for decades]

Part VI [Mutual antipathies have created a virus of dualism in the body politic]


PART V



CHAPTER XIII -- Must There be Pakistan?


Part I [The burden of proof on the advocates of Pakistan is a heavy one]

Part II [Is it really necessary to divide what has long been a single whole?]

Part III [Other nations have survived for long periods despite communal antagonisms]

Part IV [Cannot legitimate past grievances be redressed in some less drastic way?]

Part V [Cannot the many things shared between the two groups be emphasized?]Part VI ['Hindu Raj' must be prevented at all costs, but is Pakistan the best means?]

Part VII [If Muslims truly and deeply desire Pakistan, their choice ought to be accepted]


CHAPTER XIV -- The Problems of Pakistan


Part I [Problems of border delineation and population transfer must be addressed]

Part II [What might we assume to be the borders of West and East Pakistan?]Part III [Both Muslims and Hindus ignore the need for genuine self-determination]

Part IV [Punjab and Bengal would thus necessarily be subject to division]Part V [A demand for regional self-determination must always be a two-edged sword]

Part VI [The problems of population transfer are solvable and need not detain us]


CHAPTER XV -- Who Can Decide?


Part I [Partition is a very possible contingency for which it's best to be prepared]

Part II [I offer this draft of a 'Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act']

Part III [My plan is community-based, and thus more realistic than the Cripps plan]

Part IV [My solution is borne out by the examination of similar cases elsewhere]

Epilogue -- [We need better statesmanship than Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have shown]


TABLES

-- 003a -- Revenues raised by Provincial and Central Governments
-- 101a -- The Congress's Proposed Linguistic Provinces
-- 205a -- Resources of Pakistan
-- 205b -- Resources of Hindustan
-- 205c -- Areas of Indian Army Recruitment
-- 205d -- Areas of Recruitment During World War I
-- 205e -- Changes in the Composition of the Indian Infantry
-- 205f -- Changes in the Communal Composition of the Indian Army
-- 205g -- Communal Composition of the Indian Army in 1930
-- 205h -- Communal Percentages in Infantry and Cavalry, 1930
-- 205i -- Provincial Composition of the Indian Army, 1943
-- 205j -- Communal Composition of the Indian Army, 1943
-- 205k -- Contributions to the Central Exchequer from the Pakistan Area
-- 205l -- Contributions to the Central Exchequer from the Hindustan Area
-- 206a -- Muslim Population in Pakistan and Hindustan
-- 206b -- Distribution of Seats in the Central Legislature (Numbers)
-- 206c -- Distribution of Seats in the Central Legislature (Percentages)
-- 307a -- Casualties of the Riots in Sukkur, Sind, November 1939
-- 308a -- Proposed Hyderabad Scheme of Communal Reforms
-- 410a -- Married Females Aged 0-15 per 1000 Females of That Age
-- 411a -- Legislative Councils (Act of 1909): Communal Proportion between Hindus and Muslims
-- 411b -- Communal Composition of the Legislatures, 1919
-- 411c -- Representation of Muslims According to the Lucknow Pact, 1916
-- 411d -- Actual Weightage of Muslims According to the Lucknow Pact


APPENDICES


-- 01 -- Appendix I : Population of India by Communities
-- 02 -- Appendix II : Communal distribution of population by Minorities in the Provinces of British India
-- 03 -- Appendix III : Communal distribution of population by Minorities in the States
-- 04 -- Appendix IV : Communal distribution of population in the Punjab by Districts
-- 05 -- Appendix V : Communal distribution of population in Bengal by Districts
-- 06 -- Appendix VI : Communal distribution of population in Assam by Districts
-- 07 -- Appendix VII : Proportion of Muslim population in N.-W. F. Province by Districts
-- 08 -- Appendix VIII : Proportion of Muslim population in N.-W. F. Province by Towns
-- 09 -- Appendix IX : Proportion of Muslim population in Sind by Districts
-- 10 -- Appendix X : Proportion of Muslim population in Sind by Towns
-- 11 -- Appendix XI : Languages spoken by the Muslims of India
-- 12-- Appendix XII : Address by Muslims to Lord Minto, 1906, and Reply thereto
-- 13 -- Appendix XIII : Allocation of Seats under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the Lower House in each Provincial Legislature
-- 14 -- Appendix XIV : Allocation of Seats under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the Upper House in each Provincial Legislature
-- 15 -- Appendix XV : Allocation of Seats under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the Lower House of the Federal Legislature for British India by Province and by Community
-- 16 -- Appendix XVI : Allocation of Seats under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the Upper Chamber of the Federal Legislature for British India by Province and by Community
-- 17 -- Appendix XVI : Allocation of Seats under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the Upper Chamber of the Federal Legislature for British India by Province and by Community
-- 18 -- Appendix XVIII : Communal Award
-- 19 -- Appendix XIX : Supplementary Communal Award
-- 20 -- Appendix XX : The Poona Pact
-- 21 -- Appendix XXI : Comparative Statement of Minority Representation under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the Provincial Legislature
-- 22 -- Appendix XXII : Comparative Statement of Minority Representation under the Government of India Act, 1935, in the Central Legislature
-- 23 -- Appendix XXIII : Government of India Resolution of 1934 on Communal Representation of Minorities in the Services
-- 24 -- Appendix XXIV : Government of India Resolution of 1943 on Representation of the Scheduled Castes in the Services
-- 25-- Appendix XXV : The Cripps Proposals
ERRATA -- [corrections have now been incorporated into the text]

MAPS

-- Punjab -- Bengal & Assam -- India --



-- more of Dr. Ambedkar's work -- Glossary -- Map index -- fwp's main page --











Afghanistan: what price tag do we put on strategic security?

SOURCE:
https://www.newslaundry.com/2019/02/04/afghanistan-what-price-tag-do-we-put-on-strategic-security

https://www.newslaundry.com/2020/02/29/despite-attending-the-us-taliban-peace-deal-india-has-every-reason-to-be-watchful-of-events-in-afghanistan









Afghanistan: what price tag do we put on strategic security?

India might end up paying a big price for its strategic myopia in Afghanistan.


One of the most galling whines that has characterised the take of Indian politicians, officials and analysts on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan is the threat this poses to Indian investments in that country. Apart from being insulting to our Afghan allies and friends, it is also reflective of the pettiness and penny-pinching attitude of India’s strategic community on an issue that they themselves label as being critical for India’s strategic security.
The constant refrain of the $2 billion (or is it $3 billion?) investment India has made in infrastructure projects and institution- and capacity-building in Afghanistan is flung in everyone’s face to justify Indian interest in Afghanistan. But India’s interests in Afghanistan transcend the bean-counter’s approach to any problem—India doesn’t need to wave the bill to justify its interests in Afghanistan. Even if we had spent nothing, or spent 10 times the amount we claim to have spent, India will always have a legitimate interest in Afghanistan’s stability and security.
If only we did the math before we wave the $2 billion figure in other people’s faces, we would realise that for a country with a $2.5 trillion economy to talk of $ 2 billion is only to demean itself. The $2 billion has not been spent every year in Afghanistan since 2001-02. It has been spent over the last 15-17 years. Average out this sum over this period and it means that India has spent around $150 million a year on Afghanistan. As a percentage of India’s GDP, this is 0.006 per cent. Even if India was to spend $2 billion every year in Afghanistan, it would constitute only 0.08 per cent of India’s GDP. In a country where scams like CWG had a price tag of around $10 billion, and other UPA-era scams like Jijaji, 2G, Coal and Jayanti Tax also ran into billions, to crib about the $2 billion we might lose if things go south in Afghanistan is really the worst sort of carping.
While it is fashionable to mock at and even bristle over the politically incorrect utterances of US President Donald Trump, he did have a point when he said that other countries—referring to regional players like India, Russia, Pakistan and China—were taking advantage of the US and doing their stuff in Afghanistan on the cheap by letting the US pick up the tab. Of course, Trump himself has a very cost-oriented approach to strategic issues. But given that his country foots most of the bill in and for Afghanistan, it can be justified to some extent.
Even more than Trump, it is Amrullah Saleh, the former Interior Minister and head of the Afghan intelligence and now running mate of President Ashraf Ghani, who gave a reality check to the international community when he said no one was doing Afghanistan a favour by assisting the Afghan state and society. He called it a partnership in which the Afghans sacrificed their blood in a war that also secured the Western countries spending money in Afghanistan. Although his comments were aimed more at the Western countries which spent more money on their consultants than on Afghans, they apply just as much to India, even though the Indian developmental record in Afghanistan has been better than anyone else’s.
What Amrullah is basically saying is that if the Afghan state collapses and the forces of medieval barbarism represented by the Islamist Taliban take over, then the war that is currently being fought in Afghanistan by Afghans will be fought by countries like India in India. Therefore, rather than worrying about the $2 billion, India should worry about the security fallout of a destabilised or Talibanised Afghanistan. This will cost us far more—in blood and money—than what we have spent so far in Afghanistan. If anything, India has so far profited handsomely from its investments in Afghanistan and has recovered in both tangible and intangible terms the investments we have made. The sort of influence India has wielded in Afghanistan since 2001 has actually come on the cheap.
It was India’s failing that we were diffident in cementing strategic gains by pushing the envelope further, not the fault of the Afghans who were always ready to partner with India in fixing our mutual enemy. If anyone lost the many opportunities that came India’s way in Afghanistan to actually steal a strategic march over its enemies, it was the pusillanimous policy of appeasing the enemy rather than fixing him. Part of the problem is cultural and civilisational—we like to appear to be the nice guys, people who are respected as friends not feared as foes. We were riding on US shoulders and therefore despite our tall talk of “strategic autonomy”, there was neither any strategy nor any autonomy that we chose to exercise in Afghanistan.
But part of the problem was also policy vacuity.
I remember a meeting with some of the top policymakers of the former regime in which one diplomat was jabbering about gender equality, women’s rights, etc. She was unable to understand that none of this would matter if the security dimension was ignored. But the focus in the meeting wasn’t so much on exercising hard power as it was to further push India’s soft power—capacity-building projects, Bollywood, cricket, medical tourism and trade promotion.
Soft power is very important but has no meaning without hard power to back it up. At a time when security was at a premium in Afghanistan, no one was going to be interested in India’s soft power. When things started going bad, and the Americans refused to build the sinews of the Afghan National Army by giving them force multipliers like airpower, tanks, artillery and choppers, the Afghans looked towards India. But we were scared that the Pakistanis wouldn’t like it. Plus we were afraid that some of this equipment could fall in the hands of the enemy. The wrong decisions of that time meant that we lost credibility with some of our friends and allies.
The result of this credibility loss is that even at this late stage when the US is all set to abandon Afghanistan, if India was to try and double down on support for its friends and allies and anti-Taliban forces, it is unlikely if it would find anyone who thinks India will use all its national power to back them against the Taliban. Indiscreet remarks by top officials have only further undermined India’s credibility among the Afghans. That barbarians like the Taliban can never be India’s friends or allies, nor can India’s interests ever be served by reaching out to this evil force which is also a puppet of Pakistan, somehow just doesn’t enter the mind-space of Indian officials who live in a world of their own make-believe.
India will probably end up paying a big price for its strategic myopia in Afghanistan. There is very little we can do at this stage to turn the tables in our favour. This doesn’t mean leaving the field open. If anything, India should continue to strive to build leverages because nothing ever remains the same in Afghanistan for very long and we will get our chance if we show strategic patience. But more importantly, we should learn the lessons from the blunders we have made and the opportunities we have missed.
First and foremost, India should ask itself what price tag it puts on strategic security. Do we want to continue seeking strategic stability and security on the cheap or by riding on other’s shoulders, or are we serious about building our own capacities and capabilities for exercising strategic autonomy? One thing is clear: India’s pretensions of being an emerging power just don’t sit well with a strategic mentality of a kirana shop owner who is more interested in counting pennies and nickels. Without an imperial mindset in which rather than playing for small change, India is ready to play the big game and take the risks and pay the costs—India will remain a bit of a pushover.
But how will we change our attitude to something like strategic security and stability that transcends our own borders? Remember, India is a country which ignores its own defence and puts national security at a deep discount by starving its defence forces of the capabilities they require and putting stupid bureaucratic obstacles in the path of developing a robust defence industry. We may continue to delude ourselves about our economic and military strength, but as long as we keep treating national security as something we can buy on tap—why else does every finance minister say in the budget speech that “more will be allocated for defence if required”?—we will continue to be treated as a weak power that can be trifled with.
The tragedy is that given the level of political debate in which the temptation to score political points and pulling down political rivals takes precedence over the damage caused to India’s interests, it is unlikely that India will wake up to the enemies and threats it faces, and the things it needs to do as a nation to secure itself.