An U.S. soldier in Zhari District, Afghanistan, July 2010
Whatever else U.S. President Donald Trump has done in the field of international relations, he can claim one signal accomplishment: making grand strategy interesting again. For decades, American foreign policy elites in both parties embraced liberal internationalism, the idea that Washington should sustain and expand a global order that promoted open markets, open polities, and multilateral institutions. But Trump has repeatedly attacked the key pillars of liberal internationalism, from questioning the value of NATO to blowing up trade agreements to insulting allies. When, in July 2017, hisnational security team metwith him in a windowless Pentagon meeting room known as “the Tank” to educate him about the virtues of the liberal international order, Trump blasted them as “a bunch of dopes and babies,” according toThe Washington Post.
Trump’s disruptions have forced foreign policy analysts to question first principles for the first time in decades. With bedrock assumptions about liberal internationalism dislodged, the debate over U.S. grand strategy has experienced a renaissance. New voices have entered the fray, ranging from far-left progressives to populist nationalists on the right. Advocates of retrenchment and restraint have received a fuller hearing, and unusual alliances have formed to advance common agendas.
Yet even as these debates have flowered, the very concept of grand strategy has become a chimera. A grand strategy is a road map for how to match means with ends. It works best on predictable terrain—in a world where policymakers enjoy a clear understanding of the distribution of power, a solid domestic consensus about national goals and identity, and stable political and national security institutions. In 2020, none of that exists anymore.
The changing nature of power, along with its diffusion in the international system, has made it much more difficult for the United States to shape its destiny. The rise of multiculturalism and the populist backlash against it have eroded shared narratives and a common identity. Political polarization has hollowed out the country’s domestic political institutions, meaning that each new administration takes office bent on reversing whatever its predecessor did. Anti-establishment fever has debased policy debate and loosened the checks on executive power that generate consistency.
We write as three scholars who do not agreeon much when it comes to politics, policy, or ideology. We do agree, however, that these new factors have rendered any exercise in crafting or pursuing a grand strategy costly and potentially counterproductive. None will be effective, and none will be long standing. Rather than quarrel over contending strategic doctrines, academics, pundits, think tankers, and policymakers should focus on more pragmatic forms of problem solving. From military intervention to foreign aid, policy made on a case-by-case basis will be at least as good, and likely better, than policy derived from grand strategic commitments. To debate grand strategy is to indulge in navel-gazing while the world burns. So it is time to operate without one.
POWER PROBLEMS
A successful grand strategy must be grounded in an accurate perception of the global distribution of power. One that grossly exaggerates a foe or underestimates a threat is not long for this world, because it will trigger policy choices that backfire. Indeed, one reason so many have attacked the United States’ strategy of liberal internationalism over the past decade is that they believe the strategy failed to appreciate the rise of China.
Power in global politics is no longer what it once was. The ability of states to exercise power, the way they exercise power, the purposes to which they put power, and who holds power—all have fundamentally changed. The result is an emerging world of nonpolarity and disorder. And that is not a world where grand strategy works well.
Many things remain the same, of course. People still define their identities largely in terms of nationality. Countries still seek control over crucial resources and access to vital sea-lanes and clash over territory and regional influence. They still want to maximize their wealth, influence, security, prestige, and autonomy. But amassing territory is no longer the prize it used to be. Today’s great powers seem determined to do two things more than anything else: (a) get rich and (b) avoid catastrophic military contests. They understand that states move up the ladder of international power and prestige by building knowledge-based economies and by promoting technological innovation and connectedness within global networks.
Meanwhile, power is becoming more about the ability to disrupt, block, disable, veto, and destroy than it is about the ability to construct, enable, repair, and build. Consider the “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities thatChina is pursuing—mainly cyberwarfare techniques and antisatellite weapons—with the goal of raising the risks to U.S. forces operating in the western Pacific. Iran is believed to be doing the same thing in the Persian Gulf, using submarines, antiship missiles, and sophisticated mines in an effort to make the area a no-go zone for the U.S. Navy.
When power is used for constructive purposes, it is becoming increasingly issue specific, unable to translate from one domain into another. Military power rarely achieves national goals or fixes problems anymore; interventions usually only make bad situations worse. The yawning outcome gap between the first and the second Gulf wars makes this plain. Power simply isn’t as fungible as it used to be. No wonder, for example, that the Trump administration’s efforts to hinge security and intelligence cooperation on renegotiated trade deals have fallen flat.
With traditional power no longer buying the influence it once did, global order and cooperation will be in short supply.
Finally, the diffusion of power throughout the international system is creating a nonpolar world. Many point to therise of Chinaand other competitors to say that the world is returning to multipolarity (or to bipolarity within a more multipolar setting), but that view understates the tectonic shift currently underway. International relations will no longer be dominated by one, two, or even several great powers. Because economic and military power no longer yield influence as reliably as they once did, the top dogs have lost their bite. The weak and the mighty suffer the same paralysis and enjoy the same freedom of action. Moreover, new actors, from local militias to nongovernmental organizations to large corporations, each possessing and exerting various kinds of power, increasingly compete with states. Relatively few states represented in the UN can claim a monopoly on force within their territorial borders. Violent nonstate actors are no longer minor players. Ethnic groups, warlords, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations—all are redefining power across the globe.
These changes in power are producing a world marked by entropy. A world populated by dozens of power centers will prove extremely difficult to navigate and control. In the new global disorder, even countries with massive economies and militaries may not be able to get others to do what they want. It is essentially impossible for modern states, no matter how militarily and politically powerful, to influence violent groups that prosper in ungoverned spaces or online. Not only do such actors offer no clear target to threaten or destroy, but many are also motivated by nonnegotiable concerns, such as the establishment of a caliphate or their own separate state. Worse still, violence is for many a source of social cohesion.
With traditional power no longer buying the influence it once did, global order and cooperation will be in short supply. International relations will increasingly consist of messy ad hoc arrangements. The danger comes not from fire—shooting wars among the great powers or heated confrontations over human rights, intellectual property, or currency manipulation. The danger comes instead from ice—frozen conflicts over geopolitical, monetary, trade, or environmental issues. Given the immense costs of warfare, great powers that cannot resolve their disputes at the negotiating table no longer have the option—at least if they are rational—of settling them on the battlefield. When political arrangements do materialize, they will be short lived. Like flocking birds or schooling fish, they promise to lose their shape, only to form again after a delay.
Grand strategy is not well suited to an entropic world. Grand strategic thinking is linear. The world today is one of interaction and complexity, wherein the most direct path between two points is not a straight line. A disordered, cluttered, and fluid realm is precisely one that does not recognize grand strategy’s supposed virtue: a practical, durable, and consistent plan for the long term. To operate successfully in such an environment, actors must constantly change their strategies.
A NATION DIVIDED
A sustainable grand strategy must also rest on a shared worldview among key political constituencies. If each new government enters office with a radically different understanding of global challenges and opportunities, no strategy will last long. Each new government will tear up its predecessor’s policies, shredding the very idea of a grand strategy. Containment endured because every U.S. president from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan largely adhered to its underlying vision of global affairs. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama all embraced variations on liberal internationalism.
Such a consensus no longer exists. Over the last half century, across the West, there has been rising skepticism of the virtues, and even the reality, of nations—of “imagined communities,” in the words of the political scientist Benedict Anderson, each unified by a shared narrative. That skepticism arose from a good place: a growing awareness that dominant narratives can be repressive, that they often reflect the interests and experiences of the powerful and silence the voices of communities on the margins. Beginning in the early 1970s, in the Vietnam War’s dying days, multiculturalism began to hold sway, at least in the United States. More than just a strategy to manage diversity in a fair and inclusive way, the concept was grounded in mounting doubt that societies should be rooted in some common identity.
Some effects of this cultural revolution, such as the explosion of weeks and months designated to celebrate specific ethnic and racial heritages, strike most Americans as innocuous and even good. But one consequence is particularly problematic: Americans today lack a common national narrative. For good reason, few speak any longer of the assimilative “melting pot.” As the historian Jill Lepore lamented in these pages in 2019, historians stopped writing about the nation decades ago. Listen to any Democratic debate this presidential campaign season, and you will see how uncomfortable American politicians on the liberal left have become with the rhetoric of American nationalism.
Yet nationalism has proved an enduring force, as has people’s desire for a shared narrative to make sense of their world. Cultural conservatives in the United States have long mined this vein. They have sought to define a cultural core, manifest in such books as The Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, in which the academic E. D. Hirsch, Jr., attempted to list the figures, events, and works that “every American needs to know.” They have waged war against bilingual education, and they have led a decades-long campaign—successful to date in over half of American states—to declare English the official language. They have charged that the United States is coming apart at the seams, blaming new immigrants for refusing to buy into the national creed. Liberals have vacillated on American exceptionalism, as in 2009, when Obama declared, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” Conservatives, by contrast, have leaned into it. Unlike the Democrats, Trump is very comfortable with nationalist language—although he deploys it in a manner that excludes half the country.
Among the victims of a fractured national narrative has been grand strategy.
Among the victims of a fractured national narrative has been grand strategy. Grand strategy rests on a security narrative that sets out the main protagonists of global politics, tells a story about what those actors have done and will do, and depicts the global backdrop against which events will take place. Debates over contending grand strategies are typically debates over one or more of these narrative elements. Those advocating deep engagement, for instance, believe that American and global security are indivisible, whereas those calling for restraint believe the opposite. In the absence of the rhetorical tropes that a shared national narrative supplies, crafting a grand strategy that can resonate with diverse constituencies becomes impossible. It becomes harder to implement a particular strategy across various policy areas and to sustain that strategy over time.
One manifestation of the narrative divide in the United States is the stark polarization that has come to define American politics, and not just on hot-button domestic issues. Across a wide array of foreign policy questions—climate change, counterterrorism, immigration, the Middle East, the use of force—Americans are divided along party lines. That is no environment for a useful debate about grand strategy. For one thing, it eviscerates the utility of expert feedback. Political scientists have found that an expert consensus can alter public attitudes about issues on which the public was not already polarized, such as how to respond to China’s currency manipulation. When the public is already split along party lines, however, as it is on climate change, polarization renders an elite consensus worse than useless. Expert opinions from nonpartisan sources simply make partisans double down on their preexisting beliefs.
Political polarization also makes learning difficult. For grand strategy to improve, there has to be agreement on what failed and why. In a polarized political environment, the side that fears being held responsible will not accept the premise that its policy failed until long after the fact. Republicans, for example, insisted that the Iraq war was a triumph for years after it was obvious that the United States had lost the peace. To support their leader, partisans have a persistent incentive to bend the truth to fit their arguments, robbing the foreign policy discussion of the agreed-on facts that ordinarily frame debate.
Most important, polarization means that any party’s grand strategy will last only as long as that party controls the executive branch. Because Congress and the courts have granted the president a near monopoly on the articulation of the national security narrative, a single president can radically shift the country’s grand strategy. And so can the next president from the other party.
THE PEOPLE VS. THE EXPERTS
Grand strategy requires a robust marketplace of ideas, backed by sturdy institutions, to help policymakers correct course over time. Even an enduring grand strategy must cope with changes in the strategic environment, and even well-considered strategies will result in policy missteps that need to be reversed. The United States made its share of foreign policy errors during the Cold War, but the push and pull between the establishment and its critics and between the executive branch and Congress eventually reined in the worst excesses of American activism and prevented the overembrace of restraint.
Over the last half century, once-stable structures of authority have eroded, and the American public has grown increasingly skeptical of the federal government, the press, and every other major public institution. Americans’ distrust extends to the foreign policy establishment, and on this, it is hard to blame them. U.S. foreign policy elites largely endorsed the use of force in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, and none of those interventions could be called a success. As revealed in “The Afghanistan Papers,” a collection of government documents published by The Washington Postlate last year, for over a decade, civilian and military leaders lied to the public about how the war in Afghanistan was going. The 2008 financial crisis and the Arab Spring caught foreign policy elites unprepared. Clearly, some healthy skepticism of experts is warranted.
Too much skepticism, however, can be corrosive. Calling into doubt the value of foreign policy expertise undermines a healthy marketplace of ideas on grand strategy. As the journalist Chris Hayes warned in Twilight of the Elites, “If the experts as a whole are discredited, we are faced with an inexhaustible supply of quackery.” Furthermore, new entrants are advancing their arguments in part by bashing the preexisting consensus on grand strategy. They are exploiting narratives about failed foreign policies of the past to argue that they could hardly do worse. As Trump told voters at a campaign rally in 2016, “The experts are terrible. They say, ‘Donald Trump needs a foreign policy adviser.’ . . . Would it be worse than what we’re doing now?”
Wreckage from the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, September 2013 Esam Omran Al-Fetori / Reuters
The death of respect for expertise is just one element of the biggest political story of the twenty-first century: the proliferation of right-wing populist nationalism as part of mainstream politics across the West. It is no flash in the pan, because its rise is rooted partly in economic dislocation but equally, if not more, in the politics of cultural reaction. And populism renders grand strategy moot.
At the heart of all forms of populism lies a simple image of politics. The populist leader asserts the existence of a morally pure people, set in contrast to corrupt elites, and he claims that he alone knows the people’s will. Populist politics therefore tilts authoritarian. In sweeping away supposedly corrupt elites and institutions, the populist leader weakens all forces standing in his way. Asserting his unmediated line to the people, the populist leader claims to represent them better than any political process can. Critics becomes enemies, constitutional constraints become obstacles to democracy, and the tyranny of the majority becomes a virtue, not a vice.
Populism is not hospitable to grand strategy. First, populism accentuates internal divisions. Polarizing by design, it narrows the sphere of the supposedly authentic people so that, within the nation as a territorial and legal entity, there can be no unity. Second, populist politicians regularly mobilize the people in righteous anger against enemies. When heated rhetoric is in the air, emotional responses to the crisis of the day threaten to overtake rational strategy. Strategy becomes less supple, as leaders have trouble pursuing conciliatory tactics in a climate of affront and retribution. Finally, populism concentrates authority in the charismatic leader. It disempowers bureaucrats and institutions that can check fickle rulers and block extreme decisions. Policy in a populist regime is thus a reflection of the leader—whether of his ideological commitments or his whims. If the populist leader does pursue something akin to a grand strategy, it will not outlive his rule.
WE COME TO BURY GRAND STRATEGY
Grand strategy is dead. The radical uncertainty of nonpolar global politics makes it less useful, even dangerous. Even if it were helpful in organizing the United States’ response to global challenges today, an increasingly divided domestic polity has made it harder to implement a coherent and consistent grand strategy. Popular distrust of expertise has corroded sensible debate over historical lessons and prospective strategies. Populism has eviscerated the institutional checks and balances that keep strategy from swinging violently.
The nation’s strategic thinkers, however, remain in the early stages of grieving for grand strategy. The raging debate over contending strategic options suggests that many are still in denial. The ire directed at the Trump administration for its lack of strategic thinking implies that many are stuck on anger. We ourselves differ on whether to mourn or to celebrate the demise of grand strategy, but we agree that it is high time we moved on to the final stage of the grieving process: acceptance.
Moving forward without grand strategy requires embracing two principles: decentralization and incrementalism. Highly uncertain conditions call for decentralized but mutually coordinated decision-making networks. The corporate sector has learned that managers must avoid the temptation to control every decision and instead figure out how to steer innovation, by shaping the environment within which choices emerge. Smart corporations decentralize authority and responsibility, encourage employees to address problems through teamwork, and take an informal approach to assigning tasks and responsibilities. Governments should organize their foreign policy machinery in the same way. Appreciating regional knowledge and trusting expert feedback is a better way to handle trouble spots and emergent problems and to defuse crises before they metastasize.
Organizational change must go hand in hand with a cultural one: toward prizing the virtues of bottom-up experimentation. Grand strategy wagers that careful planning at the center produces the best results. It presumes that the costs of being too flexible outweigh those of being too rigid. But that is unwise when change can occur rapidly and unpredictably. Incrementalism is the safer bet. It does not require putting all your eggs in one basket. It cannot achieve victory in one fell swoop, but it does avoid disastrous losses. It allows for swift adaptation to changing circumstances. In practice, it would mean devolving responsibility from Washington to theater commanders, special envoys, and subject-matter experts. In other words, it means taking the exact opposite tack of so many past administrations, which concentrated ever more decision-making in the White House.
Aspiring national security advisers should give up competing for the title of the next George Kennan. Crafting a durable successor to containment is neither important nor possible for the near future. Improving U.S. foreign policy performance is. Given the recent record of U.S. foreign policy, that goal doesn’t seem half bad.
AUTHOR BIO
DANIEL W. DREZNERis Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
RONALD R. KREBS is Beverly and Richard Fink Professor in the Liberal Arts and Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.
RANDALL SCHWELLERis Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program for the Study of Realist Foreign Policy at Ohio State University.
They are contributors to the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, edited by Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs.
We, the Punjabis historically have not been documenting our own history. The Muslim Punjabis have almost forgotten their genetic ancestry and now try to connect their gene pool to the Arab aristocracy of Sayeds and Qureshis. The Pakistan government ignorantly names its missiles after the Islamic invaders who dispossessed their ancestors from their land. The Hindu Punjabis have written off their own ancestors, warriors kings, and Gurus and relate more to the Middle-India heroes such as Rama, Krishna, and Shivaji, The Sikhs have done a better job in staying connected to their roots but their historical reach is limited just to the Sikh period.
Punjab history has to be taken as a whole, and that includes, Adivasis, Indus valley, Aryan Khatris, Kushans, Rajputs, Gujjars, Jatts, Islamic invaders, Sikh period, British rule, and the post independence era.
Trinity of Punjabi Pride
What's the Problem? So what? The results of this ignorance is astounding. We never wrote our own history and our recent generations are oblivious of their roots. They grew up reading their history as written by others - Chinese, Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Mughals, British, and the Leftist or Hindutva leaning Indian scholars, or pro-Islamic Pakistanis.
Guru Nanakgave us the message of Ek Ongkar - One Creator for all Humankind. “Give me not a knife but a needle. I want to sew together, not stab,” sang Sheikh Farid. But we Punjabis didn't follow their wisdom and slit each others throat in some form of religious frenzy. In this process we lost our common heritage, culture, and history, We forgot the history of our own land in which our ancestors are buried or cremated.
Sons of Punjab Soil
Lost Cities of Punjab and Sindh
How many Punjabis and Sindhis know that they are the descendants of one of the most advanced civilization? The Indus Valley Civilization flourished in the basins of the Indus River, which flows through the length of Sindh and Punjab and then spreading along a system of five rivers that coursed one of the most fertile land in the world.
Sacred Hindu scriptures Vedas were composed here. Panini defined the grammar of Sanskrit on this land and Patanjali wrote Yoga Sutras in Punjab. The descendants of most of the Hindu Gods that all of India worships are the Khatris of Punjab, the only true Kshatriyas. Jainism and Nath traditions have roots in Punjab. Buddhism flourished here in Taxila, and a secular Sufism challenged the fascist Sharia in Punjab.
Lets now look at some historic cities of Punjab and how these cities are related to Punjabi communities, otherwise known as cases or Last names.
Harappa
Mohenjo-daro in Sindh and Harappa in Punjab, emerged in 2600 BC along the Sindh River valley. Harappa is an archaeological site in West Punjab, about 15 mi west of Sahiwal. Harappa was mainly an urban city sustained by surplus agricultural production and commerce, the latter including trade with Mesopotamia. main characteristics included"differentiated living quarters, flat-roofed brick houses, residential irrigation and drainage system, and fortified administrative or religious centers."
Harrapa site on the banks of Sindh river
The weights and measures of Harappa were highly standardized, and conform to a set scale of gradations. Distinctive seals were used, among other applications, perhaps for identification of property and shipment of goods. Sindhis and Punjabis Arorasare most likely the direct descendants of Indus Valley Civilization.
Aror
Aror is the ancestral town of the Arora Community. Aror is the medieval name of the city of Rohri, Sindh was once the capital of Sindh. It was captured and sacked by Arab invader Muhammad bin Qasim in 711 AD. Arab historians recorded the city's name as Al-rur, Al-ruhr and Al Ror.
Ruins of Aror in Sindh
The city was totally destroyed by a powerful earthquake in 962 AD triggering the migration of its residents, the Aroras from Sindh to West Punjab.
Chhab
Just as Aror is the ancestral home of Arora community, Chhab is the ancestral home of the Chhabra community. It is located in along the banks of Sindh river in the Jand Tehsil of Attock District in West Punjab.
Chhab Railway Station
This site was overrun by the Khattak tribe of Pashtun invaders triggering mass migration of Chhabras to Sindh and West Punjab.
Gandhara
Gandhāra was an ancient region in the NW Frontier basin The region was at the confluence of the Kabul and Swat rivers, bounded by the Sulaiman Mountains on the west and the Indus River on the east. Gandhara's existence is attested since the time of the Rigveda (c. 1500 – c. 1200 BC), as well as the Zoroastrian Avesta, which mentions it as Vaēkərəta, the sixth most beautiful place on earth created by Ahura Mazda.
Gandhara People
Gandhara was founded by the Druhyu prince Gandharawho was the son of King Angara of DruhyuDynasty. King Nagnajit of Gandhara was defeated and killed by Rama's brother Bharata. It gets mention in Mahabharata as Gandhari, the queen of K uru dynasty was the daughter of the king of Gandhara. Her brother Shakuni, the Gandhara prince was the political adviser of Kauravas against the Pandavas during the Kurukshetra War.
Gandhara King
Gandhara was one of 16 Mahajanapadas (large urban areas) of ancient India mentioned in Buddhist sources such as Anguttara Nikaya. It was conquered by the Achaemenid Empire in the 6th century BC.Conquered by Alexander the Great in 327 BC, it subsequently became part of the Maurya Empire. Gandharais ancestral home of Khatri last name Kandhari.
Kandahar province of Afghanistan is sometimes mistakenly associated with Gandhara. However, Kandahar is instead etymologically related to "Alexandria" a city created by Alexander.
Party Manages Cadre: limits of Local People's Congress supervision and reform in China
Along with shareholders and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Communist Party of China (CPC). The firm’s party committee, which is commonly staffed with hand-picked executives, channels state policy into corporate practice. The party committee has control over the board of directors (“the party supervises the cadre”), although the party committee does not have the power to decide on the appointment and dismissal of key personnel.
In 1995, the CCCPC institutionalized the leadership recruitment via the Interim Regulation on the Recruitment of Party Cadre and State Leadership (The Department of Organization of the CCCPC 1995). The worldview, “party manages cadre and government leaders” was listed as the top principle. This principle implies that leaders are responsible to the party only, not the public.
At the provincial level, Department of Supervision handles official businesses jointly with the provincial CPC Commission for Discipline Inspection to implement the system of one set of working mechanism and two organs, and performs two kinds of functions, i.e. the Party discipline inspection and governmental administrative supervision.
The main responsibilities are responsible for carrying out the decisions of the CPC Central Committee, CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Provincial Party Committee on enhancing the Party work style and clean government building, implementing the supervision within the prescribed limit of Party constitution, maintaining the Party constitution and internal laws and regulations of the Party, inspecting the execution of the Party's routes, guidelines, policies and decisions.
China's Company Law (Article 17) provides that “the activities of the local branch units of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shall be carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the CCP,”which grants the local party committee the rights“to supervise party cadres and any other personnel.” The principle that the Party manages cadres, mainly refers to how the party committees at various levels adhere to and implement the cadre line and policies, select and employ cadres strictly in accordance with the principles of the Party.
The Party Constitution says that one important obligation of Party members is to play a "vanguard role" in production, work, study and social life. The CPC has boosted training to Party cadres and members since the concept of "pro-learning Party" was conceived at the 16th Party Congress held in 2002. The concept requires the CPC to keep pace with time through constant learning.
In the past, CPC members in non-state-owned companies were not willing to identify themselves as Party members. Now, Party members tend to identify themselves as a CPC members. The reason for the change is the central leadership's emphasis on Party governance in companies and the Party members' exemplary and significant role in the work.
The education given to Communist cadres entails Party spirit, Marxism theory and Party-building practices. This particularly capitalizes on its rich "red resources" as being a red base of China's Communism. For Party spirit education, trainees are asked to ponder over questions such as: how to hold on to Communist ideals and beliefs in the new era; how to improve relations with the masses; and how to exercise self-discipline and avoid corrupt practices.
The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2007 put forward a plan to firmly encourage, support and guide the development of non-government-owned businesses. With the continuous deepening of reform and opening up and the gradual improvement of the socialist market economy, non-public companies are increasingly demonstrating their unique advantages and huge potential to develop.
The open recruitment of Party secretaries (also known as "red CEOs") for private enterprises normalized a system to hire leading posts for Party organizations in non-public companies. In reality, some heads for Party organizations in private firms struggle for power with enterprise managers, and cannot correctly understand and properly handle the relationship between themselves and business owners. In addition, some of them lack knowledge of the market economy as well as business management knowledge. Although they can do Party work, they are less flexible. Finally, some of them cannot correctly understand and properly handle the relationship between the Party building and helping businesses make profits. These are the constraints of Party building in the non-public enterprises.
On 05 June 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the strengthening of Communist Party leadership at state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In October 2016 Xi Jinping stressed the Communist Party of China's (CPC) unswerving leadership over state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during a national meeting on building the role of the Party within SOEs. “Party leadership and building the role of the party are the root and soul for state-owned enterprises,” said Xi, who is also the party's general secretary. While ordering strengthened grassroots Party organs in SOEs, the president warned that the leading role of Party organizations in SOE personnel selection must not change and efforts should be made to cultivate a number of quality corporate executives.
The distinction between China's state-owned and private firms is not always as clear-cut as it might seem. A company's formal status can be misleading. And the Communist Party is everywhere: article 19 of China's company law states that a party cell must be set up in every firm above a certain size. Larger firms must have a Party cell, whose leader reports directly to the Party at the municipal or provincial level. Party organs at non-state-run firms served as the party’s fortress and political core for employees.
China's Communist party is making clear that it expects to dictate business decisions — not only at state-owned enterprises, but also at private companies and joint ventures with foreign partners. Under President Xi Jinping, the party has become more assertive. China's Communist party is writing itself into the articles of association of many of the country's biggest companies in a blow to investor hopes.
A push to establish the Communist Party in Chinese state enterprises is rolling through Hong Kong, raising corporate-governance concerns. China will continue to “deepen” reform of state-owned enterprises and experiment with new ownership structures, but strengthening ruling Communist Party leadership remains the guiding principle. The state-owned enterprises in China contain 10,000,000 Communist Party members and 800,000 party committees.
Multinationals operating in China have party committees. Party consultants help private companies integrate party work. The old rule that any organisation with three or more party members should set up a party cell is being enforced. China's Communist party is making clear that it expects to dictate business decisions — not only at state-owned enterprises, but also at private companies and joint ventures with foreign partners.
The presence of party units has long been a fact of doing business in China, where the law requires companies, including foreign firms, to set up a party organization. Many executives had long seen the measure as symbolic. Party cells in foreign firms were well-received as a way of helping them understand Chinese policies and resolving disputes, CCP Organization Department deputy head Qi Yu told a news conference on the sidelines of the party’s 19th National Congress in Beijing. “Senior executives at some foreign invested companies say party organizations can help them to understand in a timely manner Chinese policies, to resolve salary disputes and to provide positive energy for the company’s development,” Qi said.
The education campaign which kicked off in February 2016 sought to encourage all Party members to study theoretical and practical issues related to Party-building. As the 19th Session of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) approaches, Party-building activities of all kinds were held at CPC branches nationwide. Previously 'Party activities' simply meant attending meetings and studying reading materials, and some members did not actively get involved. Now there are various forms of Party work and Party members call early to ask about the activity every month.
Classes focus on studying the speeches of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping and enhancing the members' Party spirit. They boost this spirit by singing red songs; visiting patriotic sites like Lugou Bridge, where Japan's full-scale invasion of China kicked off; visiting an exhibition named "The Road of Rejuvenation" about China's rise; and watching anti-corruption documentaries.
While members could easily skip Party branch activities before, they are now required to take part in each session. They do not only need to show up for classes and meetings, but also need to study for enough hours and take notes in a special notebook. The regular activities no doubt remind people that they are a Party member and enhance their sense of identity.
By 2017 West Nanjing Road subdistrict in central Shanghai, which is home to a large number of regional headquarters of leading multinationals, had witnessed the development of Party organizations. The Party working committee in the subdistrict was responsible for the operation of 93 Party organizations in multinational companies, including eight general branches, 51 independent branches and 34 united branches. In total, these Party organizations oversee 1,587 Party members in 289 multinational companies.
In July 2017, executives from more than a dozen top European companies in China met in Beijing to discuss their concerns about the growing role of the party in their local operations. One senior executive whose company was represented at the meeting said that some firms were under “political pressure” to revise terms of their joint ventures with state-owned partners to allow the party the final say over business operations and investment decisions. Party officials are tightening their control over state-owned enterprises and want a voice in how some foreign companies are run.
At least 32 Chinese companies with shares traded in Hong Kong have proposed changes to their legal structure to make the party an adviser to their board. Financial commentators complain this might hurt shareholders.
According to the Party constitution, as long as there are three Party members, a primary Party organization should be formed. But in foreign countries, this will depend on each country's laws and regulations. Party members at overseas branches are required to hand in a report about their thoughts every three months, participate in a group Party activity and hold a Party meeting once every half-year, then report their activities to the university's politics department.
Zheng Xuexuan, vice president of the China State Construction Engineering Corporation, the largest construction company in China by revenue with projects worldwide, wrote on Guangming Daily that the need for Party building in overseas branches is urgent. "When employees leave their hometown and motherland for a long time and live in a strange environment … it is easy for their thoughts to fluctuate, posing challenges to the ideological and political work," he wrote.
Many State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are dual-listed or listed in multiple markets must further strengthen their efforts on communication and explanatory work to gain more recognition and support over the matter of putting the Party construction clauses in writing in company articles, a senior official at the country's securities market watchdog said.
"Putting contents on the Communist Party of China's (Party) construction into company's articles of association is an important step for the fusion of the leadership of the Party into corporate governance and efforts in building a modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics," said Yan Qingmin, vice-chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, at a May 2018 industry meeting.
By June 2018 the government was pushing domestically listed companies to strengthen Party building, according to an amendment on governance regulations for domestically listed companies. Domestic listed companies should take on social responsibilities, even though the economic returns may not be evident in the short term. China's securities watchdog, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), was seeking public opinion about the amendment, according to a statement published on the official website of the CSRC on 15 June 2018.
According to the new amendment, State-owned listed companies should include Party-building work in their corporate statutes, and companies should integrate Party leadership and corporate governance.
Dong Shaopeng, an expert advisor for the CSRC, told the Global Times on 18 June 2018 that leading companies in any country should take on social responsibility, including political responsibilities. "Companies have social attributes. They should not ignore social interests in the course of their development," he said.
According to Dong Shaopeng, Party building is not just about developing Communist Party members within the companies or planning activities. "It's about letting outstanding people, those with good political awareness and good technical abilities, bring their talent into full play in the management structure and production chain of companies," he said.
Dong Dengxin, director of the Financial Securities Institute at the Wuhan University of Science and Technology, said that Party member workers can help set a good example for other workers and spark their enthusiasm for work.
According to a report from Shanghai-based thepaper.cn on 18 June 2018, a listed company Party-building alliance was launched on 15 June 2018 in Wenling of East China's Zhejiang Province to promote the upgrading of listed companies.
Party Manages Cadre
Along with shareholders and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Communist Party of China (CPC). The firm’s party committee, which is commonly staffed with hand-picked executives, channels state policy into corporate practice. The party committee has control over the board of directors (“the party supervises the cadre”), although the party committee does not have the power to decide on the appointment and dismissal of key personnel.
In 1995, the CCCPC institutionalized the leadership recruitment via the Interim Regulation on the Recruitment of Party Cadre and State Leadership (The Department of Organization of the CCCPC 1995). The worldview, “party manages cadre and government leaders” was listed as the top principle. This principle implies that leaders are responsible to the party only, not the public.
At the provincial level, Department of Supervision handles official businesses jointly with the provincial CPC Commission for Discipline Inspection to implement the system of one set of working mechanism and two organs, and performs two kinds of functions, i.e. the Party discipline inspection and governmental administrative supervision.
The main responsibilities are responsible for carrying out the decisions of the CPC Central Committee, CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Provincial Party Committee on enhancing the Party work style and clean government building, implementing the supervision within the prescribed limit of Party constitution, maintaining the Party constitution and internal laws and regulations of the Party, inspecting the execution of the Party's routes, guidelines, policies and decisions.
China's Company Law (Article 17) provides that “the activities of the local branch units of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shall be carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the CCP,” which grants the local party committee the rights “to supervise party cadres and any other personnel.” The principle that the Party manages cadres, mainly refers to how the party committees at various levels adhere to and implement the cadre line and policies, select and employ cadres strictly in accordance with the principles of the Party.
The Party Constitution says that one important obligation of Party members is to play a "vanguard role" in production, work, study and social life. The CPC has boosted training to Party cadres and members since the concept of "pro-learning Party" was conceived at the 16th Party Congress held in 2002. The concept requires the CPC to keep pace with time through constant learning.
In the past, CPC members in non-state-owned companies were not willing to identify themselves as Party members. Now, Party members tend to identify themselves as a CPC members. The reason for the change is the central leadership's emphasis on Party governance in companies and the Party members' exemplary and significant role in the work.
The education given to Communist cadres entails Party spirit, Marxism theory and Party-building practices. This particularly capitalizes on its rich "red resources" as being a red base of China's Communism. For Party spirit education, trainees are asked to ponder over questions such as: how to hold on to Communist ideals and beliefs in the new era; how to improve relations with the masses; and how to exercise self-discipline and avoid corrupt practices.
The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2007 put forward a plan to firmly encourage, support and guide the development of non-government-owned businesses. With the continuous deepening of reform and opening up and the gradual improvement of the socialist market economy, non-public companies are increasingly demonstrating their unique advantages and huge potential to develop.
The open recruitment of Party secretaries (also known as "red CEOs") for private enterprises normalized a system to hire leading posts for Party organizations in non-public companies. In reality, some heads for Party organizations in private firms struggle for power with enterprise managers, and cannot correctly understand and properly handle the relationship between themselves and business owners. In addition, some of them lack knowledge of the market economy as well as business management knowledge. Although they can do Party work, they are less flexible. Finally, some of them cannot correctly understand and properly handle the relationship between the Party building and helping businesses make profits. These are the constraints of Party building in the non-public enterprises.
On 05 June 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the strengthening of Communist Party leadership at state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In October 2016 Xi Jinping stressed the Communist Party of China's (CPC) unswerving leadership over state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during a national meeting on building the role of the Party within SOEs. “Party leadership and building the role of the party are the root and soul for state-owned enterprises,” said Xi, who is also the party's general secretary. While ordering strengthened grassroots Party organs in SOEs, the president warned that the leading role of Party organizations in SOE personnel selection must not change and efforts should be made to cultivate a number of quality corporate executives.
The distinction between China's state-owned and private firms is not always as clear-cut as it might seem. A company's formal status can be misleading. And the Communist Party is everywhere: article 19 of China's company law states that a party cell must be set up in every firm above a certain size. Larger firms must have a Party cell, whose leader reports directly to the Party at the municipal or provincial level. Party organs at non-state-run firms served as the party’s fortress and political core for employees.
China's Communist party is making clear that it expects to dictate business decisions — not only at state-owned enterprises, but also at private companies and joint ventures with foreign partners. Under President Xi Jinping, the party has become more assertive. China's Communist party is writing itself into the articles of association of many of the country's biggest companies in a blow to investor hopes.
A push to establish the Communist Party in Chinese state enterprises is rolling through Hong Kong, raising corporate-governance concerns. China will continue to “deepen” reform of state-owned enterprises and experiment with new ownership structures, but strengthening ruling Communist Party leadership remains the guiding principle. The state-owned enterprises in China contain 10,000,000 Communist Party members and 800,000 party committees.
Multinationals operating in China have party committees. Party consultants help private companies integrate party work. The old rule that any organisation with three or more party members should set up a party cell is being enforced. China's Communist party is making clear that it expects to dictate business decisions — not only at state-owned enterprises, but also at private companies and joint ventures with foreign partners.
The presence of party units has long been a fact of doing business in China, where the law requires companies, including foreign firms, to set up a party organization. Many executives had long seen the measure as symbolic. Party cells in foreign firms were well-received as a way of helping them understand Chinese policies and resolving disputes, CCP Organization Department deputy head Qi Yu told a news conference on the sidelines of the party’s 19th National Congress in Beijing. “Senior executives at some foreign invested companies say party organizations can help them to understand in a timely manner Chinese policies, to resolve salary disputes and to provide positive energy for the company’s development,” Qi said.
The education campaign which kicked off in February 2016 sought to encourage all Party members to study theoretical and practical issues related to Party-building. As the 19th Session of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) approaches, Party-building activities of all kinds were held at CPC branches nationwide. Previously 'Party activities' simply meant attending meetings and studying reading materials, and some members did not actively get involved. Now there are various forms of Party work and Party members call early to ask about the activity every month.
Classes focus on studying the speeches of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping and enhancing the members' Party spirit. They boost this spirit by singing red songs; visiting patriotic sites like Lugou Bridge, where Japan's full-scale invasion of China kicked off; visiting an exhibition named "The Road of Rejuvenation" about China's rise; and watching anti-corruption documentaries.
While members could easily skip Party branch activities before, they are now required to take part in each session. They do not only need to show up for classes and meetings, but also need to study for enough hours and take notes in a special notebook. The regular activities no doubt remind people that they are a Party member and enhance their sense of identity.
By 2017 West Nanjing Road subdistrict in central Shanghai, which is home to a large number of regional headquarters of leading multinationals, had witnessed the development of Party organizations. The Party working committee in the subdistrict was responsible for the operation of 93 Party organizations in multinational companies, including eight general branches, 51 independent branches and 34 united branches. In total, these Party organizations oversee 1,587 Party members in 289 multinational companies.
In July 2017, executives from more than a dozen top European companies in China met in Beijing to discuss their concerns about the growing role of the party in their local operations. One senior executive whose company was represented at the meeting said that some firms were under “political pressure” to revise terms of their joint ventures with state-owned partners to allow the party the final say over business operations and investment decisions. Party officials are tightening their control over state-owned enterprises and want a voice in how some foreign companies are run.
At least 32 Chinese companies with shares traded in Hong Kong have proposed changes to their legal structure to make the party an adviser to their board. Financial commentators complain this might hurt shareholders.
According to the Party constitution, as long as there are three Party members, a primary Party organization should be formed. But in foreign countries, this will depend on each country's laws and regulations. Party members at overseas branches are required to hand in a report about their thoughts every three months, participate in a group Party activity and hold a Party meeting once every half-year, then report their activities to the university's politics department.
Zheng Xuexuan, vice president of the China State Construction Engineering Corporation, the largest construction company in China by revenue with projects worldwide, wrote on Guangming Daily that the need for Party building in overseas branches is urgent. "When employees leave their hometown and motherland for a long time and live in a strange environment … it is easy for their thoughts to fluctuate, posing challenges to the ideological and political work," he wrote.
Many State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are dual-listed or listed in multiple markets must further strengthen their efforts on communication and explanatory work to gain more recognition and support over the matter of putting the Party construction clauses in writing in company articles, a senior official at the country's securities market watchdog said.
"Putting contents on the Communist Party of China's (Party) construction into company's articles of association is an important step for the fusion of the leadership of the Party into corporate governance and efforts in building a modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics," said Yan Qingmin, vice-chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, at a May 2018 industry meeting.
By June 2018 the government was pushing domestically listed companies to strengthen Party building, according to an amendment on governance regulations for domestically listed companies. Domestic listed companies should take on social responsibilities, even though the economic returns may not be evident in the short term. China's securities watchdog, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), was seeking public opinion about the amendment, according to a statement published on the official website of the CSRC on 15 June 2018.
According to the new amendment, State-owned listed companies should include Party-building work in their corporate statutes, and companies should integrate Party leadership and corporate governance.
Dong Shaopeng, an expert advisor for the CSRC, told the Global Times on 18 June 2018 that leading companies in any country should take on social responsibility, including political responsibilities. "Companies have social attributes. They should not ignore social interests in the course of their development," he said.
According to Dong Shaopeng, Party building is not just about developing Communist Party members within the companies or planning activities. "It's about letting outstanding people, those with good political awareness and good technical abilities, bring their talent into full play in the management structure and production chain of companies," he said.
Dong Dengxin, director of the Financial Securities Institute at the Wuhan University of Science and Technology, said that Party member workers can help set a good example for other workers and spark their enthusiasm for work.
According to a report from Shanghai-based thepaper.cn on 18 June 2018, a listed company Party-building alliance was launched on 15 June 2018 in Wenling of East China's Zhejiang Province to promote the upgrading of listed companies.
Researchers in Singapore have prepared a mathematical model to predict when Covid-19 pandemic will end in different countries. The model predicts India will see 97 per cent decline by May 22.
Nationwide coronavirus lockdown has left people struggling to maintain supplies of essentials in their homes. As India prepares for graded lifting of coronavirus lockdown, researchers in Singapore have predicted that Covid-19 will end by 97 per cent in the country by May 22. (Photo: PTI)
HIGHLIGHTS
Researchers in Singapore have predicted end of Covid-19 outbreak in India by May 22
End dates for India, 97 per cent by May 22, 99 per cent by June 1 and 100 per cent by July 26
SIR model developed by researchers predict Covid-19 to continue in world till early December
Sitting in homes due to lockdown forced by novel coronavirus pandemic, millions of people in India and across the world have this question on top of their mind:when will Covid-19 end?
Researchers in Singapore have risked answering this question.
On the basis of the pattern of spread of Covid-19 from China to the rest of the world and slowing down, the researchers in Singapore have a predicted date for 131 countries each when novel coronavirus outbreak will end there.
Covid-19 will end in India around May 21-22, the researchers said. This is the time when novel coronavirus infection will be 97 per cent down compared to April 20, which they found as the turning date.
This is close to what the Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) hinted last week. ICMR director Dr Balram Bhargava had said,"One can say we have been able to flatten the curve."
The ICMR said the positivity rate has been stable at around 4.5 per cent in India in recent weeks. This stable rate of spread of Covid-19 could be a signal of India having passed the turning date, estimated by the Singaporean researchers.
Their mathematical model predicts that by June 1, India will have cured 99 per cent of Covid-19 cases. And, the novel coronavirus will be eliminated by July 26 from India, the researchers estimated.
Covid-19 progress graph for India based on SIR
model, developed by researchers in Singapore
This will, however, sounds optimistic given the scale of the surge in big Indian states and cities - Mumbai and Pune in Maharashtra, Delhi, Jaipur in Rajasthan and Indore in Madhya Pradesh among others. On the other hand, four states though smaller in size of the population -- Goa, Tripura, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh -- have become free of Covid-19.
However, there is strong corroboration for the model, called the SIR (susceptible-infected-recovered) model. It estimated February 8 to be turning date for China, and February 27 as End-97 per cent date.
On the ground, China on February 19 reported the lowest number of fresh coronavirus infection in a month, indicated that the country was past the turning date.
The SIR model had March 4 as End-99 per cent date for China, which on March 7 reported 99 fresh Covid-19 cases, the first below 100 daily cases since the outbreak.
April 9 was End-100 per cent date for China. It has not happened in a strict sense of the term as China continues to report new cases. But, it was on April 8 that China allowed people to leave Wuhan, the Covid-19 ground zero, for the first time since it enforced lockdown in January.
Also, China has said that almost all the new Covid-19 cases in recent weeks are imported. On April 25, China said it recorded just one local novel coronavirus infection case in 10 days. Others were imported Covid-19 cases.
The SIR model is very close to the ground situation in China. This research prediction brings some hope for Indians.
However, the researchers have themselves warned that "the model behind our prediction is only theoretically suitable for one-stage epidemic. The prediction is also conditioned by the quality of the data."
According to this mathematical model, Covid-19 will end in early December this year.
But this does not come without a note of caution."The reality is the future is always uncertain. No one predicted the Covid-19 outbreak in October or November 2019, although Bill Gates famously warned about the potential damage of a global infectious disease to the world during a TED Talk in 2015,"Jianxi Luo, the writer of the research paper said.
