The Philosophy of Mission Command in Indian context at Mid and NCO level

 SOURCE;

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/raising-the-indian-flag-in-pakistan-story-of-an-indian-battalion/articleshow/77559805.cms?from=mdr

     The Philosophy of Mission Command 

The Philosophy of Mission Command at MID LEVEL and at NCO aka JCO level is the need of the hour. An excellent true narrative of INDIAN ARMY of 1947/48

                                                    - Vasundhra

It was the highest flag that flew that day and fluttered freely under the icy cold and glare of the Pathans in Razmak

     Raising the Indian flag in Pakistan: Story of an Indian Battalion

                                By

                 Col DPK Pillay (Retd)

Synopsis

​Here is the story of an Indian Battalion trapped—at Razmak in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan -- a moment in Indian history that has largely been forgotten today. It happened as India and Pakistan awoke to a new dawn of freedom on the night of 14/ 15th August 1947.

15  Aug  2020

In the military there is a certain thrill in disobeying orders especially when the price to be paid is high. People are excused if they think all that soldiers are taught and expected to do is obey the orders of those placed in positions of command over them. Throughout regular military history, men and women have followed orders in combat, but sometimes, an order is given and disregarded when a Commander on the spot decides that their career is less important than the potential victory that will be cherished beyond their lifetime.

Here is the story of an Indian Battalion trapped—at Razmak in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan -- a moment in Indian history that has largely been forgotten today. It happened as India and Pakistan awoke to a new dawn of freedom on the night of 14/ 15th August 1947.

And it is a moment that belongs to the 1/7 Rajput - battalion that is today 4 GUARDS. A legendary Paltan whose rank and file have proved their mettle time and again challenging orders and human limits. Their exploits are legendary. It also has on its rolls the honour of providing India's finest Generals- our first commander in Chief as well as many of India’s legendary Generals.


Back to 1947 to the remote Badlands of Razmak. Just as the assets were being divided between the Indian and Pakistani forces, orders were issued that there shall be no flag hoisting of the Indian flag in Pakistan. And that no regimental silver shall leave with the Battalions going over to India. They were to be quietly handed over to the Pakistanis. It will be good to know such an order was never passed on the Indian side. Now given the context of the Partition of India, the 1/7 Rajput—once evenly split between Hindu and Muslim—suddenly found itself a largely a Hindu regiment, led by Lt Col Bakshi Kuldip Singh, son -in-law of a stalwart Lt Gen Thakur Nathu Singh. Lt Gen Thakur Nathu Singh is reported to have questioned Nehru’s desire to continue with British Generals, stating neither did Indians have any experience in running a country, so if British were required for heading the armed forces, we should request the British to head the Indian Govt, paving the way for Gen KM Cariappa to be C-in-C on 15 Jan 1949. It was however only after the Ceasefire was declared in Kashmir on 01 Jan 1949.

After the Muslim soldiers of 1/7 Rajputs were transferred to 5/8 Punjab, replaced by Hindus of that regiment the battalion picked up that local Pathans, were hell bent on ensuring that the Regimental Colours and silver will not be allowed to reach India.Unfortunately for the tribals, they hadn’t reckoned with the 1/7th, and their Col Kuldip Singh who made plans to head back to India with every single man and material and if possible additional resources and people wanting to head to India. Col Kuldip said “the hollow threats of whether we make it back or not will not be replied with words but answered by deeds hammered by iron and blood that later all of them will ask how did they do it”.

There are two parts in a battlefield – One is the actual combat where soldiers are expected to carry out that brutal bloody and ruthless actions to capture destroy kill or wound enemies and the other is the Strategy – that cold calculated mind that plans and executes the operation like a conductor runs a symphony in harmonising all elements in a battlefield. On one end is the primordial violence of physical war the other end is the lonely and intellectual strategy that runs in the mind of the commander. 1/7 Rajput now 4 GUARDS never lacked in any of them in all the bloody campaigns and situations it has been through. It never has lost a battle it has entered and whichever cause 1/7 Rajput fought for it has always been victorious.

Col Bakshi knew this was war and he had to plan every single step to evacuate himself and his men and material.He requested and ensured that he received permission from the Division Commander to make 1/7 Rajput the reserve battalion for the road opening force in the region that October; that road led to Bannu, 122 kms away. He then started sending their baggage and equipment—unnoticed in small batches—through to Bannu during the following weeks, the battalion quietly prepared to move out of Razmak. They operated as normal during the first two weeks of October before Brig. Singh decided to make the final  move. Distrusting Pakistani officers in the area who were likely to betray his movements to the tribals, he ordered all communication links — wireless and landline—be severed. Col Bakshi later talking of his plan said “none of my officers or men knew of my plans to evacuate from Razmak piecemeal, the only exception being my Subedar Major Devi Singh, an exceptional man and a pillar of strength” Sub Maj Devi Singh was the uncle of Gen V. K. Singh, the former Army Chief and now a second time MP from Ghaziabad and a Minister of State.

“How the hell did you reach Bannu?” was the reaction from their brigade commander Brig Khan when they arrived at that city. In fact enroute Bannu Col Bakshi even called on Brig. (later President and Field Marshal) Ayub Khan who wished him well saying “ We will meet at soon at Panipat,” he said, to which Col Singh replied “I will be there to receive you with open arms''

Everyone had wrongly assumed that local tribesmen would not have allowed the 1/7 Rajput to move. But move they did, and now, were ready to head to India. Maj Gen. Lee Fleming, the GOC of the Razmak Division observed of the 1/7th that “nobody on earth can stop them from doing what they want to do and they will be able to do what they want to and get out of Pakistan when and where they choose to.” He was referring to the indomitable spirit of the battalion that among other actions, decided to mark the night of Indian Independence on August 14 through the dawn of August 15—at their base on Pakistani soil against orders to that effect. Determined to mark the occasion, the 1/7 Rajputs sent an officer on casual leave from Razmak to Delhi to procure the Indian flags; he returned with the flags during the first week of August. The 17 officers on rolls of the Battalion in Razmak the Indian companies of the unit proudly swore allegiance to defend and protect India - two Indian tricolours were were raised that day on day despite the orders on Pakistani soil, one in the unit lines and the other in the Officers Mess.

It was the highest flag that flew that day and fluttered freely under the icy cold and glare of the Pathans in Razmak.

But that would prove a little harder to accomplish is the evacuation from Pakistan to India . “No Muslim train engine driver is willing to take your train given the risk ”Col Kuldip Singh was informed. As fortune favours the brave the same did for the 1/7th, in the ranks of the unit was one who had earlier been in the railways and he trained another officer and few others to assist him. This unlikely team of train drivers took the entire battalion from Bannu to Mari- Indus on two narrow gauge trains—stopping there for two days whole a broad gauge train was organized for the trip to Attari. Their journey was set against a backdrop of post-partition anger and bloodshed—a time that would displace over 11 million people on either side of the border, with one million losing their lives.

In the other trains from Pakistan many refugees would die on trains that crossed the border between both newly formed countries—and that made the 1/7th’s manifest on the all the more precious. On board were three hundred young girls and old women whose menfolk had pleaded for safe passage to Amritsar; bending all rules, the battalion had agreed. It was to be a long journey. Aware of the potential for a general massacre enroute, the train from Mari-Indus wouldn’t stop at any main station or town— reaching India, and Amritsar on November 3rd.

Their final destination was Ranchi but was abruptly changed at Amritsar station. Acting on top secret orders, Brig. M. S. Chopra and his Brigade Major would meet the 1/7th to assess their fitness for war. They would then report to Army Headquarters that not only was 1/7 Rajput fit for any task that may be allotted to them, they were also carrying thirty days of contact rate ammunition and their battalion’s heavy weapons.This was contrary to orders, which stipulated that only twenty rounds per man was to be brought out from Pakistan—and reminiscent of Maj Gen. Fleming’s words just two months earlier: “Nobody on earth can stop the 1/7 from doing what they want to do.”

It was a resourcefulness acknowledged by Lt Gen. K. M. Cariappa, the GOC in C Western Army Command. When he inspected the unit on their return to India, he was surprised to see the battalion not only fighting fit but also overflowing with supplies—over and above what they were authorized to bring back. Wryly observing that he did not even have a pair of woollen socks, he would ask 1/7 Rajput to share their excess stocks—including machine guns and 3 and 2 inch mortars—with other units that were that were short on supplies.

1/7 Rajput was ordered to relieve 77 Para Brigade at Gurdaspur, commanded by legendary Brig Usman who refused the lure by Jinnah to switch loyalty and move to Pakistan . He refused and he said he identifies with what India stands for and his religion doesn’t permit him to switch loyalty to his country. The Paltan took over responsibility for the border from Madhopur to Dera Baba Nanak. Soon they would move Naushera in Kashmir and face the Pakistani Army in a brutal war inflicted to wrest Kashmir . The war would see a section of ten men commanded by Nk Jadunath Singh face an onslaught of over thousand raiders led by Pakistani officers. He was ordered to withdraw as chances to stall them were none. Nk Jadunath said he heard the orders now hear my section commanders orders sir – I shall not withdraw and neither will my section .He earned the second PVC of independent India and the Paltan would go on to earn two MVCs and ten VrCs for their actions during the Kashmir War. The story of valour and courage in this and later wars needs another edition.

I had the honour of being commissioned in this battalion and being groomed in its traditions. This is indeed a fighting unit where lessons for valour and leadership never end . We owe much to the officers and men who make up such fighting units and leave a standard of duty gallantry and courage for others to follow.

Col DPK Pillay (Retd) is a decorated war veteran with MP- IDSA . He was commissioned in 4 GUARDS and earned his Shaurya Chakra and is honoured more for his act of self-sacrifice in saving the lives of two young children while he himself was nearly fatally wounded.

 SOURCE:
https://www.businessinsider.in/international/news/china-and-japan-are-building-forces-to-fight-it-out-on-pacific-islands-heres-how-they-stack-up/articleshow/77490856.cms


REF TO :    https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/236

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

China and Japan are building forces to fight it out on Pacific islands — here's how they stack up 

                                  BY 

                                     BENJAMIN BRIMELOW

11 AUG 2020

China has increasingly contentious relations with its neighbors, particularly Japan, with which Beijing has disputes over several islands in the East China Sea.

While the risk of conflict is low, any clash between them would require forces that can approach, capture, and defend islands, and both are building military units to do just that.

Military success in the Pacific has always relied on two things: naval strength and amphibious capabilities. Bitter fighting between the Allies and Japan across the region’s seas and islands during World War II made this abundantly clear.

China has carefully studied history, and its rapid increase in military might is now changing the balance of power in the world’s largest ocean. That makes many of China’s neighbors nervous — and one is responding in kind: Japan.

A well-equipped marine corps

Chinese marines at a military training  base in Bayingol, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,January 21, 2016.

Even amid China’s overall military growth, the expansion of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and its Marine Corps (PLANMC) has been striking.

In the last three years, the PLANMC has grown from 10,000 marines to between 28,000 and 35,000 and has plans to eventually reach a total of 100,000.

After briefly forming and disbanding in the 1950s, the PLANMC was reestablished in 1979 and, like the PLAN, soon began receiving significant investment.

Today, the PLANMC has seven brigades and is present wherever the PLAN operates. Each brigade is heavily armed, including a minimum of two infantry battalions, an armored regiment, a howitzer battalion, a missile battalion, and a special forces amphibious reconnaissance battalion.

Chinese marines at attention during a visit by a US official in Zhanjiang, November 16, 2006.

Particularly impressive are the PLANMC’s armored amphibious vehicles. These include the ZBD-05 — which is actually faster on water and better armed than its Western counterpart, which Japan uses — and even a self-propelled howitzer, the PLZ-07.

The US Defense Intelligence Agency in 2019 called the PLANMC “a fully amphibious force capable of conducting amphibious assault operations using combined-arms tactics and multiple avenues of approach.”

The PLANMC is “the most capable amphibious force of any South China Sea claimant,” the agency said. This is due in large part to the strength of the PLAN, which is the world’s largest navy with well over 300 vessels.

China is building ships faster than almost all of its competitors. According to a US Office of Naval Intelligence report, their “design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [US Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”

This is certainly true of vessels used for amphibious operations.

Chinese navy Type 071 amphibious transport dock ship Changba 

The PLAN has long maintained a fleet of landing ships to carry tanks, troops, and equipment. That fleet has been bolstered by new, modern amphibious ships similar to those used by the British, French, and US navies.

Since 2006, the PLAN has acquired six Type-071 amphibious transport docks with at least one more on the way. These ships differ from previous landing ships in that they  can carry hundreds of troops multiple armored amphibious vehicles, and up to four or more transport helicopters, such as the Z-18, for air-assault missions.

In just over a year China has built two 

The Philosophy of Mission Command and the NCO Corps

SOURCE:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2018/February/Philosophy-of-Mission-Command/

The Philosophy of Mission Command                               and

                the NCO Corps

                           By 

  Command Sgt. Maj. Paul G. Hutchings

     2nd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)

Feb. 21, 2018

UPDATED 12 AUG 2020

Yes, another article on mission command. Before you click the "back button," let me explain why embracing the philosophy of mission command is critical to the development of the noncommissioned officer Corps.

"Mission command" has been the buzz phrase of choice since its adoption as official Army doctrine in 2012. It was born from the need to evolve out of command and control doctrine to meet the demands of a complex and demanding battlefield. However, mission command is not a new concept, and examples of its application can be found as far back as when humans first took up arms against one another.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6.0, Mission Command, defines this philosophy as: "The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."1

We know what mission command is, and knowing is half the battle, but do we practice mission command at the NCO level? Is mission command, especially the philosophy, even in the realm of the NCO? Lastly, how do we create agile and adaptive leaders?

Holistically, the answer to the first two questions is "No." Even with mission command crammed down our throats, we still have NCOs, even senior NCOs, paralyzed with fear when asked to take initiative within the commander's intent. The answer to the second question should be a resounding "Yes" if we want to develop an NCO Corps that is prepared to meet all challenges. Therefore, how do we teach mission command and develop agile and adaptive leaders who feel empowered to take disciplined initiative? What is the secret? There is no secret. It takes time, patience, and understanding. With all the requirements Soldiers are tasked to accomplish each day, we can be lacking in all three of these elements.

When teaching mission command, we use examples like Joshua Chamberlain's stand on Little Round Top on the second day of Gettysburg. Do we have to wait for opportunities like this to teach the essence of mission command? Of course not! We do it through everyday tasks like cleaning your work areas or sweeping a hangar's floor.

The six guiding principles of mission command are:

1. Build a cohesive team through mutual trust.
2. Create a shared understanding.
3. Provide a clear commander's intent.
4. Exercise disciplined initiative.
5. Use mission orders.
6. Accept prudent risk.2

By employing these principles, everyday tasks can be used to teach and develop the philosophy of mission command and build leaders willing and able to take disciplined initiative within their commander's intent.

Build a Cohesive Team through Mutual Trust

Commanders must have the confidence that all required tasks for a properly functioning organization are being carried out. The act of completing even routine tasks also builds mutual trust. ADRP 6.0 puts it best: "Trust is gained or lost through everyday actions more than grand or occasional gestures."3 This is also true in building a cohesive team. The best teams are formed by doing routine, mundane, daily tasks together.

Create a Shared Understanding

A shared understanding starts with everyone knowing the part they play in accomplishing a goal. What is the operational environment? The hangar where we perform aircraft maintenance. What is the purpose of the operation? A clean and safe working environment. All the specified and implied tasks to accomplish the goal need to be conveyed and understood by everyone. 

Provide a Clear Commander's Intent

By doctrine, the commander's intent should be concise and to the point. The "conciseness" depends upon your target audience. For example, "go sweep the hangar floor" is enough for a sergeant who has swept many a hangar floor. However, if you are telling the specialist who has never done it before, more details may be needed.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

If we lay the proper foundation, this is where the magic happens. If you have built a team through mutual trust, created a shared understanding, and conveyed a clear intent, subordinates will have the confidence to exercise disciplined initiative.

Vice Adm. Horatio Nelson, a famous commander of the British Royal Navy known for his victories against the French during the Napoleonic Wars, once said, "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In other words, if the desired end state has been met, it is the right way! Is there a better way to sweep a hangar's floor? Tell a group of Soldiers if they complete this task they can go home, and watch the innovation flow!

Can there be mistakes? Sure, but the most valuable lessons often begin with a mistake. Leaders must possess the courage to allow their subordinates to make mistakes. No one put it better than retired Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, 38th chief of staff of the Army, when he said, "Encourage initiative and underwrite failure."4 Giving a subordinate the opportunity to "own" a task by allowing disciplined initiative, though checked by failure, is the philosophy of mission command.

Use Mission Orders

In the warfighting function, mission orders come in the form of Warning Orders, Operation Orders, and Fragmentary Orders. In our scenario, this can be as simple as "go sweep the hangar floor." Again, the level of detail required depends upon the experience level of the subordinate in charge.

Accept Prudent Risk

Are there risks in sweeping a hangar or the hundreds of other menial tasks you could use to develop agile and adaptive leaders? It is safe to say that as subordinates use creative ways to accomplish a task, they will also find innovative ways to hurt themselves or break something. The key to preventing injuries or damage is to analyze what could go wrong. It can be as simple as asking, "How have I screwed up doing this same task in the past?"

Conclusion

There you have it. There is no secret formula. It all starts with engaged leadership.

To put it another way, how do you get good at running two miles? By being good at running one mile. Two miles leads into three, four, and eventually a marathon. The same holds true with the NCO you are tasking with sweeping a hangar, supervising a motor pool, or running a small arms range. This same NCO, who now possesses the confidence to exercise disciplined initiative to seize, retain, exploit, or maintain a position of relative advantage, is the agile and adaptive leader you helped develop.

Again, this is a process that takes time, patience, and understanding. With everything we have to juggle as leaders, it is easier for leaders to give detailed instructions on how to accomplish a task, especially if they know the best way. Trusting subordinates to "figure it out" could mean a late night or two, but the pros far outweigh the cons. The result will be an NCO corps with the confidence won from opportunities given to find a better way. This is the philosophy of mission command we must embrace in the development of our future leaders.

Notes

1. U.S. Army, Mission Command, ADRP 6.0 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 17, 2012), para 1-5.
2. U.S. Army, ADRP 6-0, para 2-3.
3. U.S. Army, ADRP 6-0, para 2-5.
4. Jonathan Koester, "NCOs Have Important Roles in Mission Command," NCO Journal legacy website, September 17, 2013, accessed January 25, 2018, http://ncojournal.dodlive.mil/2013/09/17/1932/.

SOURCE:

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/target-g219-deploy-weapons-peace

Target G 219, Deploy Weapons of Peace

                  By

           Shiv Kumar Verma

• August 2, 2020,
 

  A view of the Chinese national highway, G219.

Whenever China decides to poke at India anywhere on the 4,056 kilometre boundary, we as a nation are subconsciously teleported to the events that led up to one of the greatest military debacles of all times—the war that wasn’t in October-November 1962. Mao Tse Tung and Peking, now better known as Mao Zedong and Beijing, have since been sitting on both our shoulders, seriously impacting our ability to think objectively. The military aim of the PLA in 1962 was to take Aksai Chin—and they took it, conveniently distorting history to fabricate their claim. The PRC’s strategic aim was to dominate India for the next 50 years—and they successfully did that as well! The price India as a country paid for that defeat, continues to haunt us.

The similarities between “then” and “now” are much too startling to ignore, for they continue to expose our underbelly to a ruthless and far-thinking enemy, who is constantly watching and looking to exploit fault lines. Unable to match China’s single-minded fixation towards its stated objectives of Asian and world domination, India finds itself constantly running extremely hard from pillar to post in a desperate attempt just to stay in the same place. In almost all modern day writing, China is depicted as the dragon draped across Tibet and Sinkiang, breathing fire in our direction. India, by the same token, is the elephant, good, solid and mostly benign. Trouble is, more often than not, it feels as if the elephant is being guided by the “blind men of Hindoostan”, who seem incapable of avoiding the same carefully laid out trap!

When the burden of history makes it difficult to breathe, like an exoskeleton it must be shed. For starters, we need to forget 1962 and nudge our historical clock to the events that led up to the 1965 war that was ostensibly fought with Pakistan. And with that we also need to forget Jawaharlal Nehru and perhaps turn our unfettered attention towards a diminutive little man called Lal Bahadur Shastri. For maybe, just maybe, the answers we seek might lie there.

Shortly after a brief skirmish had occurred in the Rann of Kutch and India and Pakistan disengaged in May 1965, a meeting took place in Peking, miles away from the swamp-like erstwhile delta of the Indus River. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, was listening in rapt attention to Chairman Mao, who carefully spelt out what the former needed to do. In great detail, Mao laid out the blueprint for what was later given the codename “Op Gibraltar”. China had brought India to its knees… Pakistan must now ruthlessly chop off the head and take Kashmir. It was big brother China’s gift to little brother Pakistan.

On Bhutto’s return to Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan had reservations about Mao’s masterplan, so the maverick minister decided to go over his President’s head. Since Pakistan was bristling with new US military hardware, there were enough weapons available from the discarded stocks to arm an entire new army. Though the projected strength of 30,000 Mujahids is probably an inflated number, a sizeable force was quickly trained and equipped for guerrilla warfare and infiltrated into Jammu & Kashmir by end-July 1965. As all hell broke loose, especially in the Valley and in the Naushera-Rajauri-Poonch region, the Indian Army suddenly found itself with its back to the wall. Taken initially by surprise, individual units started fighting back, but as the scale of the ingress became apparent, it soon became obvious something different had to be done.

Under the circumstances, the plan to take the fight into POK by capturing the Haji Pir salient, was an extremely bold decision. Most importantly, Pakistan suddenly found itself in an unfamiliar situation where it was not calling all the shots. Almost immediately, it reacted and launched “Op Grand Slam”, which aimed at cutting off the Akhnur-Chhamb axis and once again, given the boldness of the strike, it initially looked like the Pakistanis would have India on its knees. Lal Bahadur Shastri, without a moment’s hesitation, then green flagged “Op Riddle” that allowed India to attack across the IB in the Rajasthan and the Lahore sectors while “Op Nepal” then further took the battle into the Sialkot sector as well.

For all its bluster about “buzdil” Indians and a flurry of initial punches against India especially in the air, the tables were turned on Pakistan dramatically despite some inept and timid handling of both the Army and the Air Force by their respective commanders. By 14 September, a week after the Indians crossed the IB, Pakistan was a spent force and it was only their massive superiority in artillery and General Chaudhuri’s miscommunicating on the ammunition state that saved it the complete blushes.

1965 set the stage for 1971, where once again the political and military leadership came together to fight a war almost entirely on our own terms. The United States, the Chinese, the Soviets all had a role to play, but clear, firm leadership left no room for any ambiguity for anyone to exploit. It’s a different matter the same ruthlessness was not brought to the table in Shimla after the war.

34 years after Shastri’s masterclass on taking the fight to the enemy, we fell flat on our faces in Kargil, by letting Pervez Musharraf dictate terms to us again. With every passing year, we hail it as a great military achievement, but in reality, even though it was a tactical victory, it was a huge strategic defeat! After the dust had settled, the last remnants of the Northern Light Infantry returned to Pakistan either dead or alive despite their endless denials of involvement, India increased the deployment in the Baltistan region substantially. The area that had hitherto been looked after by 121 Independent Brigade was now the “area of responsibility” of a mountain division, which also then necessitated the raising of a new corps headquarters. For Musharraf, despite the “defeat” it was a big consolation prize—India for years would, in a classic case of bolting the door after the horse had bolted, be committed to guarding and maintaining a large tract of inhospitable land at considerable cost. To cover up our own lapses, it never seemed to occur to anyone that all we should have done was restore the status quo ante, albeit with better detection systems in place at best. Instead, we opted for a “boots on the ground” approach which committed a large number of men who now stay there even through winter. Just for the record, Drass used to be known as the second coldest inhabited place on the planet.

CALL OFF MILITARY TO MILITARY TALKS

Today, the lessons of 1965 and Kargil are unfortunately forgotten, and we are making the same mistakes again, caught up as it were in creating little illusions of victory where actually in a deadly game of geopolitical chess, we are looking down the barrel of a gun. Before we get further mired and trapped in quicksand, India needs to do some deft footwork in order to point the gun in the opposite direction. It’s always a lot better to look down a gunsight. It certainly gives you a lot more options.

By having put its offensive plans in place, China has done two things which place it in a position of advantage at the tactical level. First, it decides the place, the terrain and the timing of each confrontation. Second, confident that India will go into a tizzy over “loss of territory”, it can localize each area of conflict and therefore contain the situation. Since it sees itself as being vulnerable in the Chumar region, it has picked the Pangong Tso as the key area and will probably up the ante in October/November in the Depsang Plains in a bid to make DBO look vulnerable.

India has reacted firmly and has demonstrated its resolve to fight should matters escalate further. The formidable airlift capability of the IAF in my opinion is the key factor. However, now having put our existing troops on high alert, we now need to hold our hand and adopt not only a wait and watch policy, but also do some plain speak with China.

If indeed the threat to G219 (Chinese national highway, connecting Xinjiang and Tibet) by the construction of a road by the Indians to DBO has been the catalyst for Chinese actions (as suggested by most analysts) then it underlines the massive insecurity that is at the base of China’s thinking. Just for a while let us pull back from Eastern Ladakh and look at the entire alignment of this “highway in the sky”. Running more or less parallel to the Great Himalayan Range, following the flow of the Tsang Po, it’s a nice, fat juicy 2,500 km-long target for India to look at. This Chinese lifeline which is the equivalent of the “6 Degree Channel” on land, has plenty of “choke points” a la the Strait of Malacca.

We need to spell it out. Even if the LAC is not defined, any tampering with the status quo will amount to a declaration of war and India reserves the right to then pick and choose targets to hit this “artery” wherever it chooses. Since His Excellency the Chinese Ambassador is being most vocal about various issues these days including the South China Sea, some counter-advice to him may not be out of place.

First, India needs to call off the ridiculous military to military talks and if you must, then engage the Chinaman through the existing diplomatic channels—after all, Sun Weidong is there for a purpose other than writing op-edit pieces in leading Indian newspapers, a sign that he perhaps has little else to do. Generals are not meant for talking and by exposing a corps commander to the enemy, we are doing ourselves a huge disservice. Everyone knows with the Chinese it is two steps forward, three steps back.

Second, contrary to popular belief we don’t have to start saturating the border with troops. Every time the PM or some hot shot drives from Palam into town, the ridiculous spectacle of a cop every 20 metres “sanitizing” the route underlines the “police” mindset of our leadership. In the case of the Chinese border, the ITBP has had the sole charge of it and if there have been lapses, the issues need to be addressed but they must continue to police their designated areas and man their BOPs. Border management is not the job of the Army, but now that the Chinese have activated the border, the Army must be in the loop, if not in overall command. If 35,000 additional troops are being further inducted as reported by various newspapers, then we are once again, as in the post-Kargil scenario, thinking “police” and not “Army”.

NOT HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO GUARD A 4,000 KM BORDER

We are just two months away from winter in the Himalayas. The powers that be must also remember that mountains swallow men, and it isn’t humanly possible to guard a 4,000 km border (which incidentally is roughly the distance between New Delhi and Taipei—just to underline the distance). Today, there are plenty of existing protocols available to communicate with China. The message must be clear—any transgression will be treated as a declaration of war. Having demonstrated our capability to mobilize, we need to maintain the barest force levels and be prepared to induct the required manpower if and when required.

In Eastern Ladakh especially, building the infrastructure to house additional troops must continue, but troops must be thinned out and rotated as is done in Siachen so that they are mentally and physically acclimatized to operate in the region if the necessity arises. The welfare and health of our men must remain our biggest priority. Anyone who has operated in these regions in the harsh winter will know just how important it is to do this.

The IAF has always been the key. In 1962 we shot ourselves in the foot by taking that option off the table. India over the last few decades has also had a robust missile development programme and year after year we have watched with pride long cylindrical tubes being paraded on Rajpath with exotic names like Prithvi, Nag and BrahMos among others. If the entire G219 has not been bracketed, do it now. Like those policemen guarding VIP routes, these would be a lot more assuring to have if Xi Jinping further decides to rock the boat.

Until then, keep looking at ways to make China hurt if they so much as sneeze again in Ladakh, or refuse to pull back to Chip Chap in Pangong Tso. We must remember, when it comes to playing the game, big boys play with hard balls.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of “1962: The War That Wasn’t” and “The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why”.