Thursday, October 1, 2020

Keep your mask on: Why a coronavirus vaccine won’t be the panacea many hope for

SOURCE:
https://thebulletin.org/2020/09/keep-your-mask-on-why-a-coronavirus-vaccine-wont-be-the-panacea-many-hope-for/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=Newsletter_10012020&utm_content=DisruptiveTechnology_KeepMaskOn_09302020


Keep your mask on: Why a coronavirus vaccine won’t be the panacea many hope for



                               By

                  Eileen Choffnes



September 30, 2020


Facing the threat of a swine flu pandemic, President Gerald Ford's administration vaccinated more than 40 million people in 1976. The pandemic never materialized, and the program was linked to unexpected rates of Guillain-Barré Syndrome, a neurological condition. Credit: David Hume Kennerly/Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library via Wikimedia Commons.


Last week, we learned the United States had finally passed a threshold that at one time might have seemed unimaginable, 200,000 deaths from COVID-19. We passed this grim milestone despite months of lockdowns, PSAs about social distancing, mask wearing, and other interventions to slow the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. If low-tech measures have not worked well in the United States to stop COVID-19, what will? Many hope the global race to develop a vaccine against the novel coronavirus will bear fruit. The theory goes something like this: We will have a vaccine against the coronavirus; nearly everyone will want to be vaccinated; and, afterward, we can return to the way things were before COVID-19 became part of our lives. We can stop holding our breath, exhale, throw away our masks, and go back to living our lives.


But that’s not likely to happen anytime soon.


Since the 18th century vaccines have been enormously influential in saving millions from the death and illness associated with infectious diseases. In some cases, vaccines have totally eradicated these illnesses, including smallpox in humans and rinderpest in cattle. In other cases, childhood immunizations, such as those for mumps, measles, diphtheria, and rubella, have made getting sick or dying from once common diseases largely a thing of the past. That’s why we are eagerly awaiting a vaccine against COVID-19.


Vaccine development normally costs hundreds of millions of dollars and can extend over a decade while a vaccine candidate goes through a series of four stages of testing: from pre-clinical to clinical trials. Under normal circumstances, after up to five years of basic research into the immune response and an additional two years of animal testing, vaccine candidates begin moving through phase 1, 2, and 3 human clinical trials. Trials can involve tens of thousands of people and are used to establish the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine candidate.


Even after a vaccine candidate receives regulatory approval, it still must be manufactured at scale and delivered to the target population without losing potency (some vaccines require cold storage at minus 70 degrees Celsius). Health practitioners need to be trained to properly administer the vaccine. While President Donald Trump and government health experts have given conflicting timelines, the consensus view is that a vaccine won’t be widely available until sometime in 2021.


While many of us want a COVID-19 vaccine developed and distributed as quickly as possible, at least as important as a quick process is strong regulatory oversight that ensures vaccine development follows sound science and is not influenced by political considerations.


The annals of vaccine history are full of cautionary tales.


In 1955, at a time when summer polio outbreaks led to thousands of infections, the government announced the first vaccine against polio, a disease which—in the worst cases—can cause paralysis or even death. It affects mainly children, and by 1955 was a cause of profound fear in the United States. But a company that made the vaccine, Cutter Laboratories, failed to properly inactivate the virus before it was administered to 200,000 children; 40,000 kids contracted abortive polio, 200 were paralyzed, and 10 died. In the fallout from the Cutter Incident, as it’s known, the government strengthened regulatory oversight of vaccines.


In a case of hasty decision-making during an election year, epidemiologists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention predicted early in 1976 that an H1N1 swine flu influenza virus would cause a pandemic. They convinced the Ford Administration to prepare a vaccine against it. In late March, President Gerald Ford announced his goal of immunizing the entire population. Seven months later, the government began vaccinating more than 40 million people.

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Several hundred people contracted a rare neurological condition—Guillain-BarrĂ© Syndrome—after being vaccinated. While the syndrome is naturally occurring, a debate raged at the time about whether the cases could be directly linked to the vaccination program. According to a history of the vaccination campaign published in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s journal Emerging Infectious Diseases, the consensus view of epidemiologists was that cases were in excess of what would normally be expected. The program was suspended in mid-December. On top of that, the feared swine flu epidemic never materialized, and the Ford administration’s immunization campaign may have contributed to Jimmy Carter being elected president in 1976.


Problems can crop up even after clinical testing of a vaccine. In 1998, RotaShield, a rotavirus vaccine manufactured by Wyeth, was licensed for use in the United States. Clinical trials in the United States, Finland, and Venezuela had found it to be 80-to-100 percent effective at preventing severe diarrhea caused by a strain of rotavirus, and researchers had detected no statistically significant serious adverse effects. One year later, Wyeth withdrew it from the market after it was discovered that the vaccine may have contributed to an increased risk for bowel obstruction in 1 out of every 10,000 vaccinated infants. There was a seven-year hiatus until rival manufacturers were able to introduce new vaccines against rotavirus that were safer and more effective.


Some researchers worry that COVID-19 vaccine trials are not designed to run long enough to determine whether vaccine candidates will be effective at achieving their most important goal: preventing serious illness.


In a recent opinion piece in The New York Times, Eric Topol, a professor of molecular medicine, and Peter Doshi, a professor and medical journal editor, analyzed the recently published trial protocols for three leading candidate vaccines produced by Moderna, Pfizer, and AstraZeneca. They argue that the trials may prove only that the vaccines ward off mild COVID-19. For a trial participant to be counted as sick, a cough and a positive test will suffice under Moderna and Pfizer’s protocol, and mild symptoms plus a fever under AstraZeneca’s. The trials won’t establish that the vaccines protect against moderate or severe disease, or that they lower the risk of hospitalization, admission to the intensive care unit, and death. “To say a vaccine works should mean that most people no longer run the risk of getting seriously sick,” the authors wrote. “That’s not what these trials will determine.”



According to a report in The Washington Post, the Food and Drug Administration may require vaccine makers to find at least a handful of severe COVID-19 cases among the clinical trial participants who receive the placebo treatment as well as to follow participants for two months after they receive their second vaccine injection.


As Topol and Doshi argue, giving a vaccine to hundreds of millions of people that has only been tested on tens of thousands for a short period of time, “requires a real leap of faith.” Children, adolescents, and pregnant women have been excluded from these trials; while those with pre-existing conditions, the elderly, Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans may be underrepresented in some late-stage clinical trials.

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From the armed protestors who stood on state house steps demanding an end to pandemic lockdowns to altercations over mask wearing, the United States’s pandemic response has been highly politicized. Trump’s insistence that a vaccine will be available before the November 3 election has, for obvious reasons, only exacerbated those concerns. So has his perceived meddling in the Food and Drug Administration’s regulatory process for coronavirus therapeutics such as hydroxychloroquine and convalescent plasma that lacked strong scientific evidence to support their use.


Politicization of a COVID-19 vaccine could lead to even greater vaccine skepticism in the United States—to say nothing about what could happen if a flawed vaccine were approved for political expediency.


Even if a vaccine is found to be safe and effective, even if the government is able to get it distributed efficiently, it still won’t necessarily be the panacea many people hope for. Enough people need to get vaccinated to either prevent an epidemic or stop an ongoing one. Many in the United States are already wary of vaccines, and the so-called anti-vax movement has been growing for years. In 2018, only one in three people received the seasonal influenza vaccine. If there’s such low demand for a COVID-19 vaccine, the prospects for quashing the pandemic through inoculation could be dim.


A team of investigators lead by Bruce Y. Lee demonstrated in a computer modelling study that if 75 percent of the population gets vaccinated, the vaccine needs to be 70 percent effective in order to prevent an epidemic and at least 80 percent effective to extinguish an ongoing one. The thresholds are even higher if just 60 percent of the population gets vaccinated: the vaccine must be 80 percent effective to prevent an epidemic and 100 percent effective to extinguish one.


The Food and Drug Administration’s current threshold for COVID-19 vaccine approval is an efficacy of 50 percent, which is a pretty low bar. Even if 100 percent of the population of the United States received a vaccine that was 50 percent effective, we might not achieve vaccine-induced herd immunity.


Despite the growing enthusiasm from some about the COVID-19 vaccine trials, and the pre-ordering of hundreds of millions of units of vaccines from manufacturers whose products have yet to establish their safety and efficacy, a COVID-19 vaccine is unlikely to be the magic bullet that ends the pandemic.


A vaccine against COVID-19, once one becomes available, is only one tool in a tool box of collective and individual actions that will need to be taken to bring the spread of the virus under control. According to Anthony Fauci, the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the United States should not expect a return to normal until “well into 2021, maybe even towards the end of 2021.”


Robert Redfield, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, appeared to try and lower expectations in a vaccine and to boost low-tech interventions during a recent congressional hearing. “If I don’t get an immune response, the vaccine is not going to protect me,” 

he said. “This face mask will.”


So how do we control this pandemic while we are waiting to exhale? Through the rigorous application of low-tech practices like mask wearing; COVID-19 testing of symptomatic and asymptomatic people (with results available within hours instead of days); contact tracing for positives cases; physical distancing; and hand hygiene. While not “sexy” these measures worked a century ago during the Spanish Flu pandemic to control the spread of disease in the United States and elsewhere, and they can work again during this pandemic.


As the coronavirus crisis shows, we need science now more than ever.









Wednesday, September 30, 2020

The Evolved Destabilizing Factors Of South Asian Strategic Stability

 SOURCE:

  ( A ) https://www.eurasiareview.com/30092020-the-evolved-destabilizing-factors-of-south-asian-strategic-stability-oped/


( B ) JOINT DOCTRINE 2017 https://ids.nic.in/IDSAdmin/upload_images/doctrine/JointDoctrineIndianArmedForces2017.pdf

 ( C )    LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE 2018                                                                         http://www.ssrij.com/MediaReport/Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf

( D ) INDIAN ARMY DOCTRINE 2004

 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157030/India%202004.pdf

(  E)  Review of the Indian Army Doctrine: Dealing with Two Fronts

 https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1397629936Vinod%20Anand%20%20CJ%20Summer%202010.pdf

 ( F )  Insights from the Experiences of China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel 

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG836.pdf

( G )   The Mammoth Book of SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING     

 http://index-of.es/Varios-2/The%20Mammoth%20Book%20of%20Special%20Forces%20Training.pdf

 ( H ) INDIAN MILITARRY DOCTRINES PICTORIAL 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=Indian+military+doctrine&safe=active&sa=X&sxsrf=ALeKk03LwXkcRDnSYrDse64fphnnOYPBtg:1601479080608&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=s691WdjJadx24M%252C8d-0H3idB0Y7GM%252C_&vet=1&usg=AI4_-kQRR-C5e2B6c4WicfiE63Q0mjaY8w&ved=2ahUKEwiYx9u9lpHsAhVL8HMBHU9HBF4Q9QF6BAgQEAM#imgrc=s691WdjJadx24M

( J )The Indian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: A Critical Analysis Dr Masood Ur Rehman Khattak*

https://ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Article-5-IPRI-Journal-XX-I-Ind-Arm-New-Lan-ED-SSA-FINAL.pdf



OPINION FROM ACROSS THE FENCE


The Evolved Destabilizing Factors Of South Asian Strategic Stability 


                                           By

                             


The strategic stability of the South Asian region has been in a continuous state of vulnerability in recent years. Various factors have contributed towards destabilizing this region. At the military and strategic level, these include; the conventional disparity between India and Pakistan, India’s offensive military modernization drive, India’s evolved nuclear posture, and its aspiration to politically dominate the region. In addition to these, the Kashmir issue has been the most crucial factor in this regard which is widely believed to be a ‘nuclear flash-point’ between India and Pakistan. At the political front, India has held a dream of getting a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Though very unlikely to succeed, such aspiration would also destabilize the region as a whole. Apart from these factors, the US-Russia growing strategic competition in South Asia, as evident by the enhanced defence collaborations of both countries with India has also destabilized the region. Moreover, India’s desire to dominate the escalation ladder has become more frequent in recent years, especially since the year 2019. All these factors combined have made the South Asian security dynamics more complex. Such a volatile situation would have long-lasting implications for regional security and strategic stability.   

The military equation of South Asia, which India has been trying for long to dominate and readjust in its favor, remains one of the driving factors of the instability in the region. There are key determinants of this, like for instance, the conventional advantage of India vis-Ă -vis Pakistan, and India’s offensive nuclear posture. Moreover, the acquisition of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and the Anti-Missile systems like the Russian S-400 along with the development of supersonic and hypersonic technologies have further added to the volatility of the region. Indian attempts to change the South Asian military equation in its favor have created a dangerous atmosphere of destabilization in the region. These Indian notions are considerably dominating the regional security environment especially in the absence of a crisis stability mechanism. The resultant action-reaction spiral between India and Pakistan over the last few years has been adversely affecting the already fragile South Asian region.

Over the last few years, India has been continuously working to enhance its counter-force offensive military capabilities against Pakistan. This is further evident from the recent technological developments which Indian has been carrying out. Like for instance, the space capabilities for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) purposes, a technologically advanced fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and achieving anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capability are quite significant. These technological developments indicate that India wants to deliberately destabilize the strategic stability of the South Asian region. Furthermore, at the doctrinal level, there are various offensive war-fighting doctrines that India wants to pursue against Pakistan. These include the much-hyped Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) of 2004, and the recent Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) of 2017,  and the Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018. These offensive doctrines provide documented evidence of India’s desire to dominate the escalation ladder in the region which would ultimately destabilize the region.            

In the same vein, the Indian self-proclaimed notions of ‘surgical strikes’ and ‘new normal’ under a nuclear scenario are notably significant when the destabilizing factors of the South Asian strategic stability are to be analyzed. This has been evident from the threatening assertions of Indian political and military top brass on various occasions with such preemptions. The aggressive and provocative policies of India demonstrate that it has an ambition of achieving escalation dominance in South Asia at the cost of destabilizing the region. Based on India’s provocative and threatening strategies, there has been a continuous fear of war and conflict in South Asia. In the worst-case scenario, such a provocative conflict, contrary to Indian estimates, might not remain limited to sub-conventional or low-intensity level. It would likely challenge Pakistan’s nuclear threshold which already covers a broad spectrum of threats coming from India.    

The evolved security dynamics of the disputed Kashmir region since the year 2019 have once again become a global concern. There has been an increase in Indian brutalities in the Kashmir region which considerably holds a prospective fear of a nuclear confrontation between the two countries especially against the backdrop of the Pulwama-Balakot crisis of February 2019. Similarly, the subsequent revocation of the special constitutional status of Kashmir by India in August 2019 has further added to the volatility and destabilization of the region. Regardless of the criticism worldwide, India had imposed a lockdown in the region which remains imposed to date. This demonstrates that India wants to dominate the region with its provocative strategies. The significance of the Kashmir issue for the South Asian strategic stability is quite evident from the very fact that it has remained a crucial agenda item during the UNGA 74th session last year and also during the ongoing UNGA 75th session this year. During these sessions, Prime Minister Imran Khan has successfully drawn the attention of the international community towards this long-standing issue. Also, during these sessions of two consecutive years, other prominent leaders of the world have condemned the Indian brutalities in the occupied Kashmir and emphasized its peaceful resolution under the UN mandate.    

Hence at the present, the South Asian strategic stability has been considerably undermined by India’s provocative war strategies and its offensive politico-strategic ambitions against Pakistan. In these circumstances, Pakistan’s threat perception would likely remain more inclined towards India. Furthermore, the prevailing conventional asymmetry in South Asia has motivated India to embark upon its limited war agenda against Pakistan. India believes this would not challenge Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. It seems that while having a conventional advantage, India has been deliberately trying to change the nuclear deterrence equation in its favor as well. However, India’s hegemonic aspirations would likely provoke Pakistan to further intensify its nuclear threshold. Pakistan needs to further maintain a stable and credible nuclear deterrence approach. In this regard, an assertive manifestation of the nuclear doctrinal posture along with the technological sophistication seems to be a plausible way-out.        

 SOURCE:

https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-pinpoints-fundamental-issues-of-our-times-331165



Chinas Belt and Road pinpoints 
fundamental issues of our times


                           By 

            James M. Dorsey





Based on remarks at the RSIS book launch of Alan Chong and Quang Minh Pham (eds), Critical Reflections on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Palgrave MacMillan, 2020

Political scientists Alan Chong and Quang Min Pham bring with their edited volume originality as well as dimensions and perspectives to the discussion about the Belt and Road that are highly relevant but often either unrecognized or underemphasized.

The book is about much more than the material aspects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In fact, various chapter authors use the Belt and Road to look at perhaps the most fundamental issue of our times: how does one build a global world order and societies that are inclusive, cohesive and capable of managing interests of all stakeholders as well as political, cultural, ethnic and religious differences in ways that all are recognized without prejudice and/or discrimination?

In doing so, the book introduces a moral category into policy and policy analysis. That is an important and commendable effort even if it may be a hard sell in an increasingly polarized world in which prejudice and bias and policies that flow from it have gained new legitimacy and become mainstream in various parts of the world.

It allows for the introduction of considerations that are fundamental to managing multiple current crises that have been accentuated by the pandemic and its economic fallout. 

One of those is put forward in the chapter of the late international affairs scholar Lily Ling in which she writes about the need for a global agenda to take the requirements of ordinary people into account to ensure a more inclusive world. The question is how does one achieve that.

It is a question that permeates multiple aspects of our individual and collective lives. 

If the last decade was one of defiance and dissent, of a breakdown in confidence in political leadership and systems and of greater authoritarianism and autocracy to retain power, this new decade, given the pandemic and economic crisis, is likely to be a continuation of the last one on steroids. 

One only has to look at continued Arab popular revolts, Black Lives Matter, the anti-lockdown protests, and the popularity of conspiracy theories like QAnon. All of this is compounded by decreasing trust in US leadership and the efficacy of Western concepts of governance, democratic backsliding, and the handling of the pandemic in America and Europe.

Mr. Chong conceptualizes in his chapter perceived tolerance along ancient silk roads as stemming from what he terms ‘mercantile harmony’ among peoples and elites rather than states. It was rooted, in Mr. Chong’s mind, in empathy, a sense of spirituality and a mercantile approach towards the exchange of ideas and goods. 

It was also informed by the solidarity of travellers shaped by the fact that they encountered similar obstacles and threats on their journeys. And it stems from the connectivity needs of empires that built cities and roads to retain their control that Mr. Chong projects as civilization builders.

There may be an element of idealization of the degree of tolerance along the ancient Silk Road and the assertion that the new silk road is everything that the old silk road was not. But the notion of the role of non-state, civil society actors is key to the overall quest for inclusiveness. 

So is the fact that historic travellers like Fa-Hsien, Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta grappled with the very same issues that today’s world is attempting to tackle: the parameters of human interaction, virtue, diversity, governance, materialism, and the role of religion.

The emphasis on a moral category and the comparison of the ancient and the new Silk Road frames a key theme in the book: the issue of the China-centric, top down nature of the Belt and Road. Vietnamese China scholar Trinh Van Dinh positions the Belt and Road as the latest iteration of China’s history of the pioneering of connectivity as the reflection of a regime that is at the peak of its power. 

Mr. Van Dinh sees the Belt and Road as the vehicle that will potentially revitalize Chinese economic development. It is a proposition on which the jury is still out in a world that could split into two distinct camps. 

It is a world in which China brings much to the table but that is also populated by black and grey swans, some of which are of China’s own making. These include the favouring of Chinese companies and labour in Belt and Road projects, although to be fair Western development aid often operated on the same principle. But it also includes China’s brutal response to perceived threats posed by ethnic and religious minorities.

That may be one arena where the failure to fully consider the global breakdown in confidence in leadership and systems comes to haunt China. That is potentially no more the case than in the greater Middle East that stretches from the Atlantic coast of Africa into the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

Its not an aspect that figures explicitly in political scientist Manouchehr Dorraj’s contribution to the book on China’s relationship with Iran as well as Saudi Arabia but lingers in the background of his perceptive analysis of anticipated changes in the region’s lay of the land. 

Mr. Dooraj focusses on three aspects that are important as one watches developments unfold: The impact of shifts in the energy mix away from oil coupled with the emergence of significant reserves beyond the Middle East, Iran’s geopolitical advantages compared to Saudi Arabia when it comes to the architecture of the Belt and Road, and the fact that China is recognizing that refraining from political engagement is no longer viable. 

However, China’s emphasis on state-to-state relationships could prove to be a risky strategy assuming that the Middle East will retain its prominence in protests that seek to ensure better governance and more inclusive social and economic policies. 

That takes on added significance given that potential energy shifts could reduce Chinese dependence on Middle Eastern energy as well as repeated assertions by Chinese intellectuals that call into question the relative importance of China’s economic engagement in the region as well as its ranking in Chinese strategic thinking.

The implications of the book’s partial emphasis on what Mr. Chong terms philosophical and cultural dialogue reach far beyond the book’s confines. They go to issues that many of us are grappling with but have no good answers. 

In his conclusion, Mr. Chong suggests that in order to manage different value systems and interests one has to water down the Westphalian dogma of treating national interests as zero-sum conceptions. 

One just has to look at the pandemic the world is trying to come to grips with, the need for a global health care governance that can confront future pandemics, and the world’s environmental crisis to realize the relevance of former Singaporean diplomat and public intellectual Kishore Mahbubani’s description of the nation state system as a boat with 193 cabins and cabin administrators but no captain at the helm. 

Mr. Chong looks for answers in the experience of ancient Silk Road travellers. That may be a standard that a Belt and Road managed by an autocratic Chinese leadership that is anything but inclusive would at best struggle to meet.

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. He is also a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture in Germany.

Monday, September 28, 2020

 As leaders, the Politicians surely understand, that to emerge as a ‘super power’ will never be easy. Hon’ble Ministers Shri Rajnath Singh’s and Mr Jaishankar’s visits abroad give us some security---how much---we don’t know. The newspapers give us assurance that no more build up will be there from either side. But is our adversary trustworthy?

Recently the Defence Minister acceded that it is not possible to resolve border issues with talks. We need ‘credible deterrence’ to in order to resolve the border issue, even if it be with talks. The soldiers' “Fire and Fury” is intact, but of not much value. The Eastern Theatre also is threatened by unforeseen action. Chinese are slowly inching their way into eastern Bhutan and the day is not far off when our entire defence preparedness will be challenged. Our troops could be spread very thin over the 3500 kms borders.

China is suffering its own internal problems of Covid, another tick borne virus that carries with it the risk of becoming another pandemic. It faces unemployment and falling employment rates, Hongkong unrest and is being boxed in by the US and Russia. We too must be adequately prepared. China is being very devious, in keeping India occupied with border skirmishes on all fronts, so as to thwart our multi directional thrust in achieving global positioning. We must not be outwitted.

“1962, A War That Wasn’t” by Shiv Kunal Verma, prepares us for such scenarios that we, as a nation, do not envision because we trust our Netas, our hierarchy of bureaucracy and the forces, to lead kindly light and to lead us to pasture. It provides insight to lay people, looking for answers to the fiasco that was 1962. But what it truly clarified was that we lost not to the Chinese, we LOST TO OURSELVES.; Our faulty planning and lack of foresight. It must not happen again.

2020 has been an ugly year. Let us not add another chapter of pain and loss to it, by being ostriches with our head in the proverbial sand of “China will not attempt to transgress”. It ALREADY has.

We, as a country, are only as strong as the hands that hold the reins. The stronger those hands are, the stronger we shall be. China has declared its intent. We are a nation threatened by aggression. Defeat and accepting subservience to treachery, in this time, when India is aiming for super power status and world leadership, is not an option, dear countrymen. Let us not nurture feet of clay. Instead, be sure footed and strong. It is the need of the time to be resolute in achieving our destiny, in the comity of nations, as is ordained.

( Views expressed in the letter are personal) 

India’s Defense Modernization: Implications For Pakistan – OpEd (R)

 SOURCE:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26092020-indias-defense-modernization-implications-for-pakistan-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29





VIEW  FROM ACROSS THE FENCE-OpEd 



India’s Defense Modernization: Implications For Pakistan 


Under a nationalistic and aggressive regime in New Delhi, India is aggressively pursuing the development and acquisition of refined and high-end defense technologies that can alter the nuclear balance in the subcontinent region. The Indian efforts to modernize its military pose a credible threat to the strategic stability of South Asia. This drive also takes its motivation as India considers itself on the march to becoming a great power in the evolving global order. Having two rival nuclear states i.e. Pakistan and China on its border. New Delhi is facing a security tri-lemma that could undermine its geopolitical ambitions. From India’s entry into export control cartels, New Delhi is seeking to acquire encrypted defense technologies from its major defense partners. Great powers are favoring India to achieve modernized capabilities contrary to the norms of nuclear non-proliferation given the emerging geopolitical environment.

 In South Asian region, the development of nukes and the arms race between India and Pakistan together with the continuing issue of Kashmir has brought them to a nuclear flashpoint, which has augmented the possibility of stimulating stability-instability paradox. Indian military is constantly revolutionizing through doctrinal transformation and massively purchasing military hardware. India is supporting its quest with massive military development in terms of purchasing new arsenal, revolutionizing Indian military through technological development and also binding itself within strategic and military agreements like Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). India is ambitious to develop and enhance its warfare capabilities in the domain of hybrid, conventional/sub-conventional, and surgical strike capabilities. The aggressive strategic posturing by India has led Pakistan to reciprocate with the operationalization of full-spectrum deterrence while relying on its tactical nuclear weapons. India’s strategic outlook has taken a drastic transformation that has altered the power equation in South Asia, which has created security predicaments for Pakistan.

Since the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947, the security environment of South Asia is in a state of flux where both states are still rivals and have disputes over several pressing issues. The porous border between India and Pakistan is one of the most volatile and dangerous borders across the globe. The historical rivalry together with unresolved issues of the partition has the potential to trigger an armed conflict or may lead to a total war between India and Pakistan where one cannot rule out the possibility of nuclear exchange. 

Even though both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, conventional deterrence is a prerequisite for strategic stability in South Asia. However, it is widely speculated that India’s defense modernization will trouble the delicate balance of conventional military power between India and Pakistan and will have worrisome implications for the strategic stability of South Asia. To keep up with the pace of modernization and to operationalize its military might be including the development of Network Centric Warfare and Electronic Warfare capabilities. India has recently increased its defense budget manifold. During the fiscal year 2016 – 2017, the defense budget of India have reached up to US$52.2 billion and it is anticipated that the number will increase further. India is the fastest-growing economy and its intention to become a regional hegemon as well as a global superpower is evident from its military modernization. Based on Indian strategic thinking, it is generally believed that the military modernization of India is specifically against Pakistan. India’s military modernization is a defining feature of Indian quest for regional hegemony and India is able to maximize and enhance its military capability through economic development that the country has achieved so far. 

Furthermore, India has also developed strategic partnership with different countries including Russia, America, Israel, and France. The prime purpose of Indian military modernization is to develop combat capabilities to achieve strategic benefits and to secure its territorial integrity. India is seeking to become powerful enough to alleviate any element of surprise attack and to maintain credible deterrence against its adversaries. Military modernizations help India to enhance its defensive as well as offensive capabilities. It also grabs India to implement its hybrid warfare strategies and enlarge its political and strategic power regionally as well as globally. India is seeking strategic inconsistency as compare to its neighboring rivals most specifically for Pakistan both at conventional and non-conventional level. Although India justifies its military modernization as a response to an imminent threat from China and Pakistan.

However, its offensive posture and deployments of troops suggests that the arms buildup is purely Pakistan centric, which will significantly change the dimensions of Indo-Pak security environment. India is heavily investing in purchasing, Airborne Early warning system (AWACS) and Rafael jetsfrom Israel and France respectively. Furthermore, India is also spending on its nuclear submarines, satellites, artillery guns, and intelligence equipment’s.Indian military modernization is accredited to several factors. The primary motivation behind India’s military modernization is its power tussle with China. Territorial disputes such as Kashmir dispute and Dokhlam issue and a race for regional dominance has always triggered India to adopt a China-centric approach. With its rising economic and military might, China is a significant threat for Indian hegemonic designs.

On other hand, China’s support to Pakistan to strengthen its economic and defense machinery is another added factor instigating India to view China as their biggest rival. Indo-US strategic alliance that has emerged as a containment of China policy by India and the US is another important factor to be looked into while discussing this matter. The alleged String of Pearl’s policy of China to counter its Malacca Strait dilemma is viewed as a major threat to Indian maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean region. The aggressive mindset of policymakers in India has intensified this power struggle between India and China which has a crippling impact on the strategic stability of South Asia. Here appears a triangular domino effect, where the strategic competition between India and China has compelled India to modernize its military and attain lethal weapons.

Thus, the current India’s military posture put Pakistan’s defence credibility in danger as well as creating a challenging situation for the regional peace of South-Asia.



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*Saad Naveed, Department of Defense and Strategic studies Quaid e Azam University