CONFLICTS Battle of Shusha Part of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war

SOURCE:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Shusha_(2020)

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               The Battle of Shusha 

:Part of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war

The Battle of Shusha (Azerbaijani: Şuşa döyüşü; Şuşa uğrunda döyüş, Armenian: Շուշիի ճակատամարտ, romanized: Shushii chakatamart), referred to by Azerbaijanis as the Liberation of Shusha (Azerbaijani: Şuşanın azad edilməsi; Şuşanın qurtuluşu), was a battle fought between the armed forces of Azerbaijan and the self proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, militarily supported by Armenia, over the control of the city of Shusha, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Battle of Shusha
Part of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war
Map of the battle as of 8 November 2020:   Controlled by Artsakh   Controlled by Azerbaijan   Disputed (For a more detailed map, see military situation in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war)
Date 4 November 2020 – 7 November 2020 (3 days) Location Shusha, Azerbaijan Result Azerbaijani victory Azerbaijan captures Shusha Stepanakert–Goris highway cut off Eventual ceasefire agreement
Belligerents
Azerbaijan	Artsakh  Armenia
Commanders and leaders
Hikmat Mirzayev[1]  Samir Safarov[2]	Seyran Ohanyan[3]
Strength
Per Azerbaijan: c. 300 soldiers of the Special Forces[4] Per Armenia: 6,000 soldiers[5]	Unknown regular military
Casualties and losses
Per Azerbaijan: Undisclosed[6] Per Armenia:[7] 200+ servicemen killed Dozens injured	Per Armenia: Unspecified Per Azerbaijan: 800+ servicemen killed[8][a]

hide v t e 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war
Offensives Hadrut Aras Valley Lachin Shusha Bombings and shelling attacks Ganja Barda Stepanakert Ghazanchetsots Russian Mil Mi-24 shootdown

Shusha, and the surrounding mountainous terrain, is one of the most strategically important locations in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.^[9] Until the middle of the 19th century, the city was considered the cultural and political center of the regional Azerbaijani population,^[10] while for Armenians, it served as a defensive backbone within Artsakh, connecting the capital, Stepanakert, to the town of Goris in Armenia via the Lachin corridor.^[11] The city was captured by Armenia in 1992, during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, and its predominantly Azerbaijani population was expelled.^[12]

Advancing from the city of Jabrayil, the Azerbaijani military captured the town of Hadrut in mid-October. Azerbaijani forces then advanced further north, entering Shusha District. Although Shusha had been under bombardment since the beginning of the conflict, local warfare erupted near the city on 29 October. Azerbaijan seized control of the village of Çanaqçı, followed by part of the strategic Shusha–Lachin road on 4 November, with Armenian forces subsequently closing the road to civilians. Le Monde reported that the battle had turned in favour of Azerbaijan on 6 November, despite Artsakh's denial.^[13] On 8 November, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, stated that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of the city; Armenia issued a denial.^[14] The next day, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence released a video from the city, confirming full Azerbaijani control.^[15] On the same day, the Artsakh president's spokesperson, Vahram Poghosyan, confirmed that it had lost control of Shusha,^[16][17] although this was later contradicted by statements from the Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan,^[18] and the Armenian Ministry of Defence.^[19] On 10 November, following the signing of the ceasefire agreement, in a live Facebook broadcast session by Arayik Harutyunyan, it emerged that Artsakh had lost control of the city on 7 November.^[20]

 http://

[ Refer :  https://english.iswnews.com/16110/shusha-lachin-road-is-closed/ ]

SWNews Analysis Group:

Shushan Stepanyan, Armenia DM spokesperson, reported that Azerbaijan attack to control Shusha-Lachin road was repelled but some of the road is closed to public.

Contents

• 1Background
• 2Prelude
• 3Battle
• 4Casualties
  • 4.1Armenian
• 5Aftermath
• 6International reactions
• 7Notes
• 8References

Background

Further information: First Nagorno-Karabakh War and Battle of Shusha (1992)

Shusha city square in 2014.

Shusha, referred to by Armenians as Shushi, is the second-largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Caucasus. It is de jure part of the Shusha District of Azerbaijan, although it had been controlled by the un-recognised  Republic of Artsakh since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994, as part of its Shushi Province. The city is located at an altitude of 1,300–1,600 meters above sea level,^[21] about 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) from the regional capital Stepanakert (Azerbaijani: Xankəndi).^[22] The two settlements are separated by a valley,^[23] and Shusha, situated in mountainous terrain overlooking the region, has been described as a "strategic height from where one could keep all Nagorno-Karabakh under control".^[24][25][26] The strategic town is popularly referred to as an "unassailable" mountain fortress by both Armenians and Azerbaijanis.^[27] A key road connecting Goris in Syunik Province, southern Armenia, to Stepanakert passes through the Lachin corridor via Shusha;^[28] the only other major road connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh passes through the Murovdağ mountains in the northern Kalbajar District.^[29]

In 1923, during Soviet rule, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) was created, with Shusha, a predominantly Azerbaijani-populated city,^[30] chosen as its administrative centre.^[31] In February 1988, the government of the Armenian-majority NKAO voted in favour of seceding from Azerbaijan and unifying with Armenia,^[32] leading to a wider ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Armenians and Azerbaijanis vied to take control of Karabakh and the fighting had escalated into full-scale warfare by early 1992. By then, the enclave had declared its independence and set up an unrecognised government.^[33] On 8 May 1992, Armenian forces captured Shusha, and its Azerbaijani population, which made up 85.5% of the city's population in 1979,^[34][35] was forced to flee.^[12]

The city has political and cultural importance for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis.^[36][37] Shusha holds particular cultural significance to Azerbaijanis, who consider the city to be their historical capital in the region.^[38] The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, had frequently described retaking the city as one of the war's key objectives. In an October 16 interview with Turkish television, Aliyev said that "without Shusha our cause will be unfinished",^[39] while the Armenian President of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, called Shusha "one of our greatest legacies we have inherited from our ancestors".^[40] 

Despite the symbolic importance of the town, the International Crisis Group's Azerbaijani analyst Zaur Shiriyev stated that it remained unclear whether the capture of Shusha was a military or political target.^[39]

Prelude

Main articles: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Aras Valley campaign, and Battle of Hadrut

On 27 September 2020, clashes broke out in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is de facto controlled by the self-proclaimed and unrecognized Republic of Artsakh, but de jure part of Azerbaijan.^[41] Azerbaijani forces first advanced in Fuzuli and Jabrayil districts, taking their respective administrative centres.^[42] From there, they proceeded towards Hadrut.^[43] After capturing Hadrut around 15 October, Azerbaijani forces pushed into Shusha District.

Shusha had been under sporadic artillery fire from the beginning of the war. On 8 October, Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha reportedly came under bombardment and was seriously damaged.^[44] On 17 October, it was reported that Shusha had been rocketed and shelled at dawn.^[45] On 25 October, Artsakh authorities stated that Azerbaijani forces were shelling several villages in Askeran Province, close to Shusha.^[46] On 28 October, Artsakh stated that Azerbaijani forces were shelling Shusha and the situation in Çanaqçı was "tense";^[47] Azerbaijan denied shelling Shusha.^[48] On 29 October, the Armenian Ministry of Defence stated that clashes were taking place in Çanaqçı, several kilometres south-east of Shusha,^[49] and the self proclaimed President of Nogorno-Karabagh, Arayik Harutyunyan, stated that Azerbaijani forces were already 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) from Shusha.^[50] On 30 October, clashes were reported to have erupted near Shusha.^[51] On 30 October, an Abkhazian Network News Agency correspondent reported that large explosions were heard near Shusha and Stepanakert.^[52] On 31 October, Artsakh authorities stated that Shusha had again come under bombardment.^[53] On 2 November, the Armenian MoD reported that fierce clashes were taking place near Shusha.^[54]

Battle

On 4 November, Armenian authorities reported that clashes continued near Shusha.^[55] Subsequently, Armenian forces closed the Shusha–Lachin road to civilians,^[56] trapping 80 journalists within the enclave, according to Reporters Without Borders.^[57] Armenian authorities stated that Shusha was heavily shelled on the morning of 5 November,^[58] and that clashes continued the following day.^[59] On 6 November, Le Monde reported that the battle had turned in favour of Azerbaijan, despite a denial by Artsakh.^[13] The next day, thousands of Armenians fled Shusha and neighbouring Xankendi.^[9][11] Armenian authorities stated that fierce combat took place overnight near Shusha, and also claimed that several Azerbaijani attacks had been thwarted; Azerbaijan denied this.^[60] On 8 November, Ilham Aliyev announced that the Azerbaijani forces had taken control of the city.^[14][61] Armenian authorities denied this on November 8 and 9, stating that the fighting continued in and out of the city.^[62][63] On 9 November, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence released a video from the city, confirming full Azerbaijani control.^[15] Subsequently, Artsakh authorities acknowledged that they had lost control of Shusha.^[16][17] However, the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan appeared to contradict this, stating that the battle was continuing;^[18] this claim was later reiterated by the Armenian Ministry of Defence.^[19] However, on 10 November, following the signing of the peace treaty, it emerged that Artsakh had lost control of the city on 7 November.^[20]

According to Arayik Harutyunyan only a group of 30-40 odd Azerbaijan SOF soldiers armed with knives and light guns managed to take Shusha from a battle hardened, terrain knowledgeable and heavilyily armed Armenian force equipped with armour and tanks.

Casualties

Armenian[edit]

Armenia has not commented on its military casualties from the battle before the tri-lateral agreement. Post the tri-latera agreements videos and reports have shown a huge number of dead Armenian soldiers in the vicinity of Shusha and according to one report the hospitals in Stepanakert did not have space to accommodate any more injured during the battle for Shusha. The Azeri Daily, a Baku-based and Azerbaijani government-affiliated website, citing military sources, claimed that more than 800 corpses of Armenian soldiers have not been released into the Armenian possessions. Armenian Ministry of Defence has asked Azeris to transfer these corpses to the Armenian side.^[8]

However on 16th November Arayik Harutyunyan admitted that 150 bodies have been recovered from Shusha and hundreds are still missing.^[64]

Azerbaijani

Azerbaijan has not disclosed its military casualties since the beginning of the war.^[6] However, Armenian authorities claimed that at least 200 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed during the battle.^[7]

Aftermath

Further information: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement

Celebrations in Baku, Azerbaijan on 8 November.

The battle was a key point in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, and was seen as a significant blow by both the Armenian military and wider Armenian society.^[65] Two days after the battle, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, announced the signing of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.^[66] According to Armenian political scientist Suren Sargsyan, the ramifications of Shusha's loss was difficult for Armenians to grasp. Sargsyan added that it would lead to demands from the Armenian opposition for a change of government.^[67] Arayik Harutyunyan, president of Artsakh, pushed back against allegations of treason, stating that the ethnic Armenian forces lacked the manpower to defends Shusha.^[68] In contrast, the announcement of the city's capture by the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev led to celebration among Azerbaijanis, with flag waving, singing and the sounding of car horns in Baku, the country's capital.^[69][70][71] A wreath laying ceremony took place at the Alley of Honor in Baku with the participation of Aliyev and Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva.^[72] Ships moored in the Bay of Baku honked their horns,^[73] and Azerbaijanis in Moscow celebrated with a firework display.^[74][75] In Azerbaijan, some political figures labelled the battle the Divorce in the Mountains (Azerbaijani: Dağlarda boşanma), in reference to the Armenian name Operation Wedding in the Mountains (Armenian: «Հարսանիք լեռներում» ռազմագործողություն) for the 1992 capture of the city.^[76]

International  Reactions

On 8 November, following Aliyev's announcement, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, congratulated Azerbaijan while addressing to the crowd in Kocaeli, stating that he believed it to be a "sign that the rest of the occupied lands will be liberated soon too."^[77] Selçuk Bayraktar, a Turkish engineer and creator of the Bayraktar TB2 drone, which was widely deployed by Azerbaijan during the conflict, also sent a message of congratulations.^[78] On 9 November, Iranian MP Ahmad Alirezabeigi stated that the "liberation of Shusha city from the occupation proved that justice has been restored", adding that he was "proud and happy" for the occasion.^[79] The Pakistani ambassador to Azerbaijan also congratulated Azerbaijanis.^[80] Former Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga^[81] and former Kyrgyz Prime Minister Djoomart Otorbaev both congratulated Aliyev in their positions as members of the Baku-based Nizami Ganjavi International Center.^[82]

On 9 November, France expressed its "very strong concern over the military advance toward the town of Shushi".^[83 

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60. ^ "Обстрелы Лачина и Шуши". BBC Russian Service (in Russian). 5 November 2020. Retrieved 6 November 2020.
61. ^ "Главное к утру четверга, 40-го дня войны". BBC Russian Service (in Russian). 5 November 2020. Retrieved 6 November2020.
62. ^ "Nagorno-Karabakh Briefing". The Moscow Times. 7 November 2020. Retrieved 8 November 2020.
63. ^ "Azerbaijan liberates Karabakh's second-largest city occupied by Armenia". Middle East Monitor. 8 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
64. ^ "Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan 'takes key town' in Armenia conflict". BBC News. 8 November 2020. Retrieved 8 November2020.
65. ^ Hovhannisyan, Nvard; Bagirova, Nailia (9 November 2020). "Armenia reports battles around strategic city in Nagorno-Karabakh". Reuters. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
66. ^ "150 bodies retrieved from outskirts of Shushi, hundreds still missing – Artsakh president says". armenpress.am. Retrieved 19 November 2020.
67. ^ "Журналист Марк Григорян: потеря Шуши - это, видимо, потеря Карабаха". BBC Russian Service (in Russian). 8 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
68. ^ "Пашинян заявляет о подписании мирного соглашения". BBC Russian Service (in Russian). 10 November 2020. Retrieved 10 November 2020.
69. ^ "Потерю Шуши армянам будет "очень сложно воспринять" - политолог Сурен Саргсян". BBC Russian Service (in Russian). 8 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
70. ^ ""I warned about lack of manpower on October 3", Karabakh President". www.civilnet.am. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
71. ^ McKernan, Bethan (8 November 2020). "Azerbaijan claims to have captured key city in Nagorno-Karabakh". The Guardian. Retrieved 8 November 2020.
72. ^ "Azerbaijani leader: Forces seize key Nagorno-Karabakh city". Associated Press. 8 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
73. ^ "Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan announces capture of major city". Deutsche Welle. 8 November 2020. Retrieved 8 November2020.
74. ^ "Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic - NEWS » Events". en.president.az. Retrieved 11 November 2020.
75. ^ "Azerbaijan celebrating 'liberation of city of Shusha in Karabakh', Turkish ministers in Baku". JAMNews. 8 November 2020. Retrieved 8 November 2020.
76. ^ "Celebration without the borders: Azerbaijanis celebrated the capture of Shusha in Moscow". Novye Izvestia. 9 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
77. ^ https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/euphoric-azerbaijanis-celebrate-victorious-nagorno-karabakh-peace-deal/news
78. ^ "Вугар Сеидов: "Освободить то, что спрятано в центре - Шушу - это просто фантастика!"". 1news.az. 9 November 2020. Retrieved 10 November 2020.
79. ^ "Azerbaijan announces capture of Karabakh's second-largest city, Armenia denies it". Reuters. 8 November 2020. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 8 November 2020.
80. ^ "Şuşa zaferinin kutlandığı Azerbaycan'da gündem Selçuk Bayraktar! 'Milli Kahraman adı verilsin'". Takvim (in Turkish). 9 November 2020. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
81. ^ "Liberation of Shusha prove that justice has been restored - Iranian MP". Mena Report. 9 November 2020. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
82. ^ "Pakistan's ambassador to Azerbaijani expresses congratulations on liberation of Shusha". Trend News Agency. 9 November 2020. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
83. ^ MENAFN. "Former President of Latvia congratulates President Aliyev on regaining Shusha". menafn.com. Retrieved 11 November 2020.
84. ^ "Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic - DOCUMENTS » Letters". en.president.az. Retrieved 11 November2020.
85. ^ "Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (7 November 2020)". Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. 9 November 2020. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 9 November 2020.

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Karabakh Armistice: Azerbaijani National Triumph, Russian Geopolitical Victory (Part Two) (r)

SOURCE:

https://jamestown.org/program/karabakh-armistice-azerbaijani-national-triumph-russian-geopolitical-victory-part-two/

Checkpoint outside Shusha, in Karabakh (Source: Reuters)

Karabakh Armistice: Azerbaijani National Triumph, Russian Geopolitical Victory  (Part Two)

 

To Read Part ONE :  Google / Click the URL 

: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2020/11/karabakh-armistice-azerbaijani-national.html

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 161

                                        By

                            Vladimir Socor

November 13, 2020 

Azerbaijan’s army has won the second Karabakh war, regaining about one half of the territory seized from it by Armenian forces in the early 1990s. However, Russia has won the “peacekeeping” after this war—a goal that had eluded Russia after the first war and one it had pursued ever since (see Part One in EDM, November 12).

The armistice agreement, signed on November 9, brings Russian “peacekeeping” troops into Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh and the Lachin corridor. The agreement also assigns Russian border troops to control transportation routes due to reopen between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan, across Armenian territory. The deployment of Russian “peacekeepers” to Azerbaijan began within hours of the armistice agreement’s signing (TASS, November 10–12).

This move in Azerbaijan holds not only local but also international significance. It confirms and reinforces Russia’s self-arrogated monopoly on “peacekeeping” in former Soviet-ruled territories. Russia’s method is to impose a unilateral peacekeeping operation without an international mandate in a given conflict theater and then reject any proposals to internationalize the operation. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria became case studies in this regard (as did the now-forgotten operation in Tajikistan in the 1990s). By the same token, Moscow rules out an internationally mandated peacekeeping mission in Ukraine’s Donbas.

The Kremlin has, from time to time, sought Western recognition or express acceptance of a special prerogative for “peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space.” Although such recognition never materialized, Western tacit acceptance became a reality over time. Russia’s “peacekeeping” monopoly is an element of sphere-of-influence rebuilding or maintenance.

Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation in Upper Karabakh is the latest case study. Its initial stage conforms to the pattern of the earlier operations (see above) in several respects. It lacks the mandate of an international organization. It is purely Russian in the composition of its personnel. It contravenes the norm that bars a country from peacekeeping in a neighboring country. It is being undertaken in a territory not controlled by the government (Azerbaijan’s in this case) that holds the internationally recognized title to sovereignty in that territory (the Armenian-controlled rump of Upper Karabakh). It has obtained Azerbaijan’s indispensable but reluctant consent in a swift, opaque negotiation. And by stipulating prolongation at regular five-year intervals, it sets the stage for a long-term, potentially open-ended Russian military presence in this territory and thus another “frozen” conflict.

A number of differences from the familiar pattern also stand out. When Georgia and Moldova accepted Russia as “peacekeeper,” they were incompletely formed, dysfunctional states, devoid of allies, and had suffered defeats at the hands of Russian-backed secessionist forces. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is a successful nation-state that has just demonstrated a newly acquired skillset in conducting a modern military campaign thanks to its partnership with the regional power Turkey. Wisely, Azerbaijan has settled for a limited victory over Armenian forces. A further advance into Upper Karabakh—even by 10 kilometers, to the administrative center Stepanakert/Khankendi—would have risked the intervention of Russian forces based in Armenia and international complications for Azerbaijan. Instead, Baku has chosen a more manageable risk—that of a bargain with Russia.

This apparent bargain allows Azerbaijan to regain and securely keep a portion of Upper Karabakh, additional to the seven adjacent districts. In return, Baku has given its consent to Russia’s long-term military presence in the remainder of Upper Karabakh. The local Armenian population certainly welcomes this protection: it looks genuinely peacekeeping from its perspective (Arminfo, November 10–12). Russia, however, will be able to use this enclave as it has used Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria over the years to manipulate the security situation. Russia’s “peacekeeping” presence there was subject to prolongation at regular intervals by agreement with the titular sovereign state—Georgia and Moldova, respectively—just as in the case of Upper Karabakh under Azerbaijan’s legal sovereignty. Yet Russian troops never left those enclaves. After some years, Western powers discouraged Georgia and Moldova from demanding the removal of Russian “peacekeepers”; such demands came to be viewed as destabilizing. Similarly, Russian “peacekeepers” might remain in Upper Karabakh for many years to come.

Russian troops will also be stationed in the Lachin corridor to guarantee the unimpeded overland traffic between Armenia and the rump Upper Karabakh. The Lachin corridor is due to be placed under Azerbaijan’s civilian administration, while the reduced Upper Karabakh remains Azerbaijani de jure but out of bounds to it de facto. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has raised its flag and is installing its administration in the regained portion of Upper Karabakh around Shusha (Azertag, November 12).

With Russian troops controlling Lachin and Russian border guards controlling Azerbaijan’s overland connections with the Nakhchivan exclave, Russia will hold pressure levers that can be activated or held in reserve as the situation might warrant.

 SOURCE:

https://jamestown.org/program/karabakh-armistice-azerbaijani-national-triumph-russian-geopolitical-victory-part-one/

Azerbaijanis celebrate victory (Source: Daily Sabah)

Karabakh Armistice: Azerbaijani National Triumph, Russian Geopolitical Victory  (Part One)

To Read Part  TWO :  Google / Click the URL 

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2020/11/karabakh-armistice-azerbaijani-national_27.html

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 160

                              By

               Vladimir Socor

November 12, 2020

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian signed, over a video conference, on November 9, an armistice agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mediated by Russia between the two belligerents, this armistice dramatically changes the situation on the ground, establishing “new realities” for many years to come.

Azerbaijan’s recovery of Armenian-occupied territories crowns a 44-day military operation featuring sophisticated equipment and tactics, amid a groundswell of domestic popular support. The campaign’s success transcends the battlefield. It signifies another stage in Azerbaijan’s maturation from a nation- and state-building project (as it was barely 30 years ago) to a fully consolidated nation-state.

Released in the form of a tripartite declaration (Kremlin.ru, November 10), the armistice agreement: a) restores Azerbaijan’s sovereign control over seven districts that Armenian forces had occupied since the early 1990s and emptied of their Azerbaijani population; b) it divides the Armenian-populated Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh into two parts, under Armenian and under Azerbaijani control, respectively; and c) it authorizes the long-term stationing of Russian “peacekeeping” troops, a goal that had eluded Russia from the 1990s to date.

Karabakh peace deal map (Source: BBC)

TRANSLATED ON GOOGLE EARTH (APPROXIMATE)

 

AZERBAIJAN  APPROACH  LINES. 

TRANSLATED ON GOOGLE EARTH (APPROXIMATE)

A full ceasefire went into effect at 00:00 hours, Moscow time, on November 10, along the then-existing contact lines between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces. The armistice agreement brings the following changes and new realities on the ground:

In terms of territory, the November 10 contact line allows Azerbaijan to retain the districts of Fizuli, Gubatly, Zangilan, and Jabrail, all which Azerbaijan’s forces regained in the campaign just concluded. In addition, the Kelbajar and Aghdam districts shall be returned (by Armenia) to Azerbaijan until November 15 and November 20, respectively; and the Lachin district will be returned by December 1. This will complete Azerbaijan’s recovery of the seven districts adjacent to Upper Karabakh.

Furthermore, the November 10 contact line allows Azerbaijan to retain the southern part of Upper Karabakh itself. This amounts to partitioning Upper Karabakh, militarily and administratively. The city of Shusha comes under Azerbaijan’s control while Upper Karabakh’s administrative center of Stepanakert/Khankendi remains under Armenian control.

Within the next three years, Azerbaijan and Armenia shall jointly develop a plan to build a new road connecting Armenia with Upper Karabakh via Azerbaijan’s Lachin district (Lachin corridor). Azerbaijan pledges not to interfere with traffic through the Lachin corridor. The corridor’s width is set at five kilometers. The document’s wording does not clarify whether the proposed new road would replace the existing road or run parallel to it, in parts or in toto. Stepanakert/Khankendi is the terminus of the existing Lachin road, and it will undoubtedly remain the terminus of a new road. The proposed new road seems intended to bypass the Azerbaijani-controlled Shusha (see above and below).

A Russian “peacekeeping” contingent shall be stationed within the Armenian-controlled rump of Upper Karabakh along the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact lines. Its deployment to the area began on November 10 and shall be synchronized with the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Upper Karabakh. The Russian contingent’s size is set at 1,960 infantry (motor-rifle) troops with light weapons, 90 armored personnel carriers, and 380 motor vehicles (no mention of helicopters). The command headquarters will be located “in the Stepanakert area” (TASS, November 10). The mission’s duration is set at five years initially, to be prolonged automatically at five-year intervals, unless one of the “sides” (Armenia or Azerbaijan) declares its refusal with six months advance notice.

Russian “peacekeepers” shall guard the Lachin corridor’s existing and future road. This will be the sole Russian military presence in Azerbaijan’s sovereign and effectively controlled territory. The Armenian de facto controlled rump of Upper Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and shall henceforth host Russian “peacekeepers” with Azerbaijan’s consent under this agreement. Although Shusha’s location could be construed as a part of the Lachin corridor, the armistice agreement excludes Shusha both from the notion of the Lachin corridor and from the Russian “peacekeepers’ ” area of responsibility (which partly explains the intention to build a new Lachin road).

The armistice agreement creates a “peacekeeping center for ceasefire monitoring” on the ground, without elaborating any further. This is meant to accommodate a minimal Turkish presence in the armistice-implementation system. Moscow and Ankara were still negotiating about this center after the November 10 armistice declaration had been made public. It will be a bilateral Russian-Turkish military observer mission, with its own technical equipment, to be located in Azerbaijani territory, thus to monitor the ceasefire at a certain distance from the Upper Karabakh contact lines. This Russo-Turkish center does not bring Turkey into Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation and does not change the latter’s mono-national character (TASS, Interfax, November 10–12).

The armistice agreement stipulates the “reopening of all economic and transportation links in the region.” As part of the general reopening, Armenia pledges not to interfere with traffic via the Armenian territory that separates the western part of Azerbaijan from Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan, which has been isolated since the early 1990s. Russian border troops shall control the traffic of goods and passengers via that corridor. Additional transportation links (meaning motorways) could be built, subject to mutual consent of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The agreement fails to specify the number of Russian border troops that will be part of that mission; what forms that control would take; and whether it would apply to the highway, the railroad or both. The railroad in this corridor belongs (as do all Armenian railroads) to Russia’s state railways corporation. Russian border troops have long been stationed in that part of Armenia guarding the border with Iran. Presumably, additional Russian border troops would be deployed for the transportation-control mission.

Displaced persons and refugees may return to their places of origin in Upper Karabakh and the seven adjacent districts, with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Azerbaijani population of expellees—technically, displaced persons and refugees—from these areas in the early 1990s numbered some 800,000 by generally accepted estimates, almost all of whom fled to Azerbaijan’s interior. The seven adjacent districts had no Armenian population. They have remained uninhabited and been systematically made uninhabitable since then.

The armistice agreement stops short of addressing the ultimate core issue of this conflict—that of the legal-political status of Upper Karabakh. That status was to have applied to the territory of the former “Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region” (abbreviated NKAO in the negotiators’ parlance over the last three decades)—i.e. Upper Karabakh—the Armenian-majority enclave within Azerbaijan. The armistice agreement, however, not only omits this issue but divides that territory between an Azerbaijani-controlled part and a locally Armenian-administrated part (see above), the former being free from Russian troops, the latter guarded by Russian troops with Azerbaijan’s consent, even as both parts are Azerbaijani territory under international law.

Nor does the armistice agreement reference the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, whose three co-chairing countries (Russia, the United States, France) had, during almost three decades, developed a framework for the settlement of this conflict. Often cited as the Madrid Principles, this framework inspires the November 10 armistice agreement in many ways, with one major exception: Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation. The Minsk Group never agreed on it. This operation gives Russia significant leverage to manipulate and pressure the other parties for a long time to come, pending a definitive solution. Azerbaijan has won the campaign, Russia has won the “peacekeeping.”

 

Conflict Nagorno Karabakh : Ceasefire in the Caucasus Opens Door to Rebalancing of Regional Power (R)

 SOURCE:

https://medium.com/the-turbulent-world-of-middle-east-soccer/ceasefire-in-the-caucasus-opens-door-to-rebalancing-of-regional-power-a899682b3e6a

      Armenia begins handover of disputed territory to Azerbaijan

                            VIDEO URL :    Google/Click to open

                           [ https://youtu.be/XiLSujCpgaY ]

     Districts handed over/ to be handed over by 01 Dec 2020 to 

                                    AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan's army said Friday it had entered the district of Agdham, an area of Azeri territory ceded by Armenia as part of a Russian-brokered peace deal to end the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. "Units of the Azerbaijan Army entered the Aghdam region on November 20," the Defense Ministry in Baku said, referring to one of three districts that will change hands over the next two weeks. The handover of Agdham, which was captured by Armenian forces in July 1993 during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, will be followed by the Kalbajar district, wedged between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, on November 25, and the Lachin district by December 1. Armenian forces and ethnic Armenian residents packed up and left the district over the past few days ahead of Friday's deadline, which was delayed from Sunday for humanitarian reasons. Most of the town of Agdham, however, was destroyed to discourage Azerbaijani residents from returning; it remains uninhabited. The latest conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in late September. The disputed region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan in law, but has been controlled by ethnic Armenians for the past 30 years. Thousands of people have been killed in 6-weeks of fighting and more than half of the region's 150,000 population was displaced. The warring parties, at odds over the territory since before the end of the Soviet Union, finally agreed to end hostilities last week under a Russian-brokered accord, made as Azerbaijan progressed rapidly in the combat. As part of last week's agreement, Armenia agreed to return some 15 to 20% of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory captured by Azerbaijan in recent fighting, including the historical town of Shusha.

  Ceasefire in the Caucasus Opens Door to                  Rebalancing of Regional Power

                                 By 

                    James M. Dorse

A Russian mediated-ceasefire in the Caucasus cements a Turkish-backed Azerbaijani military defeat of Armenia but raises tantalizing questions. 

Spontaneous mass protests against the terms of the ceasefire and the government’s conduct of the war potentially throw into doubt the future of Armenian President Nikol  Pashinyan and Armenia’s ability to implement the ceasefire.

The protests also suggest that any negotiated solution to the long-standing dispute over Nagorno - Karabakh, an Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan and a touchstone of Armenian identity, will have to address deep-seated existential fears on both sides of the ethnic and national divide.

The ceasefire cements Azeri battlefield successes in a six-week war. Azerbaijani forces retook Azeri territory occupied by Armenia since the early 1990s in violation of international law as well as the strategic mountain top city of Shusha in Nagorno Karabakh. 

The capture of Shusha made an Azeri assault on the region’s capital, Stepanakert, all but inevitable, prompting Armenia to accept the humiliating ceasefire.

Under the ceasefire that will be policed by some 2,000 Russian peacekeeping forces, Armenia has been forced to agree to withdraw from further occupied Azeri territory on the edges of Nagorno - Karabakh.

The Azeri and Turkish  sense of moral and military victory coupled with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s assertive regional policies bodes ill for the need for Azerbaijan to balance its defeat of Armenia with gestures and magnanimity that will rebuild confidence in Azeri assurances that the safety, security and rights of the Armenian majority in Nagorno Karabakh will be safeguarded amid fears of renewed ethnic cleansing.

 President Ilham Aliyev was interviewed by BBC News

VIDEO URL : Google/Click to open

          [ https://youtu.be/eP98bXyWBdc ]

The ceasefire agreement calls for the return to Nagorno Karabakh of those displaced since the conflict erupted in the early 1990s. It also allows for an exchange of prisoners of war and the bodies of those killed in the fighting.

Mr. Erdogan’s support of Azerbaijan is part of his effort to carve out a regional sphere of influence that stretches from the Caucasus, Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya into the Horn of Africa.

As Russian peacekeepers moved into position, the ceasefire leaves open the question of the balance of power between Russia and Turkey in a region that was once part of the Soviet Union and that Moscow sees as its backyard. 

It also throws into doubt longer term relations between Russia and Armenia where many feel betrayed by Moscow’s refusal to come to Armenia’s aid under a defense pact between the two countries. Russia maintains a military base in Armenia under the pact. 

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-dominated military alliance of former Soviet republics.

In his announcement of the ceasefire, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev suggested that Turkey would participate in the peacekeeping process even though Turkey is not an official party to the agreement nor was it mentioned in the ceasefire statement signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as Messrs. Pashinyan and Aliyev.

Turkey’s inevitable role in any negotiations to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict adds to the balancing act that Russia and Turkey are performing to ensure that their alliance is not undermined by various regional conflicts like Syria and Libya in which the two countries back opposing sides.

Russia is likely to worry about pan-Turkish and nationalist voices demanding that Turkey capitalize on Azerbaijan’s success to increase its influence in Central Asia, a region of former Soviet republics with ethnic, cultural, and linguistic links to Turkey.

Pan-Turkic daily Turkiye, a newspaper with the fourth largest circulation in Turkey, urged the government to leverage the Azerbaijani victory to create a military alliance of Turkic states.                                      

                    Turanian Army - Turkish Military Power

                     VIDEO URL : Google/Click to open

                              [ https://youtu.be/BRh-ekLA4Jo ]

"The success in Karabakh has brought once again to the agenda one of the West's greatest fears: the Turan Army. Azerbaijan, which has become stronger with the military training, joint drills, and support with armed drones that Turkey has provided, has broken Armenia's back. This picture of success that has appeared has once again brought to life the hopes concerning a Turan Army, that would be the joint military power of the Turkic states,” Turkiye said.

Turan is the term used by Pan-Turkists to describe Turkic Central Asia.

Nationalist and Pan-Turkic fervour is likely to reverberate far beyond the Azerbaijani-Armenian battlefield.

France last week banned the Grey Wolves, a militant youth group associated with Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), an ally of Mr. Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The ban was imposed as part of French President Emmanuel Macron’s stepped-up crackdown on Islamists in the wake of a series of gruesome attacks, including the beheading of a schoolteacher.

At odds with Mr. Erdogan over Turkey’s flexing of its muscles in the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya, Mr. Macron, backed by the United Arab Emirates, has accused Mr. Erdogan of fuelling violence and hatred with his criticism of the French crackdown.

For now, Mr. Erdogan has strengthened his position in what inevitably will lead to a rejiggering of the balance of power in the Caucasus between not only Russia and Turkey but also Iran, a Russian and Turkish partner on Armenia and Azerbaijan’s southern borders, that has so far sought to strike a balance in the conflict between its neighbours.

                         ------------------------------------------------------------------------

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute.