Wednesday, December 2, 2020

Winter at LAC – Indian Defence Research Wing (r)

 SOURCE:  https://indianexpress.com/article/india/lac-winter-china-ladakh-border-indian-army-7072185/



                          

Defence 

                       Winter at LAC

    : Indian Defence Research Wing


The deployment of more than 100,000 soldiers belonging to two big armies, strung out over 872 km, in some of the harshest climes in the world, is simply without parallel in military history. The Indian Express on how the Army is staying fighting fit on the Line of Actual Control









 “General Winter”. 

That is the name historians gave to the adversary who routed both Napoleon and Hitler in Russia, more than a century apart from each other.

As the Indian and Chinese armies deployed at the Line of Actual Control eyeball each other, sometimes separated by just hundreds of metres, they are up against the same formidable foe, in a way that ambitious military campaigners of previous centuries might not have imagined. Eastern Ladakh is no Russia. Here the peaks go up to 18,000 ft and more. The winter deployment of more than 100,000 soldiers belonging to two armies, strung out over 872 km, is simply without parallel in military history.

“The first problem faced by a soldier in Ladakh is survival, fighting the enemy comes next… The peculiar geography has a major impact on the fighting and its outcome” — these are the opening sentences of the Fighting in Ladakh chapter of India’s official History of The Conflict with China, 1962, that was published more than three decades later.

At this time of the year, the maximum temperature in the forward areas of the LAC is as low as 3 degrees Celsius; minimum can plunge to minus 10 to minus 15 degrees Celsius. December and January will see minus 30 to minus 40 degrees, and snow. Added to this is the wind chill, as the official 1962 history highlighted. “Wind generally starts around mid-day and continues throughout thereafter”, and the combined effect “can cause cold injuries similar to burn injuries”. “Touching metal with bare hands is hazardous.”


With no breakthrough yet on a disengagement proposal from China at the eighth round of Corps Commanders’ talks, and no word on the next round, around 50,000 or so Indian troops are set for the long haul, guarding peaks over 15,000 ft through the winter, mirroring the deployment of the People’s Liberation Army.

Acute Mountain Sickness, high altitude pulmonary oedema, deep vein thrombosis, cerebral venous thrombosis, psychological illnesses — these are just some of the risks they are up against. With falling temperatures will come frostbite, snow-blindness, chilblains, and peeling of skin due to the extremely dry conditions.

Even now, with the most difficult months still ahead, Army sources say, there is daily attrition due to “cold-related” conditions — with many sent back to duty as soon as they get better. While information on altitude-related ailments is confidential, an official source says the non-fatal casualties are “not alarming” and “within the expected ratio”. There have been reported evacuations from the Chinese side too, from the heights of Finger 4.

Major General A P Singh (retd), who headed the logistics for XIV Corps deployed on the LAC between 2011 and 2013, says that till about a decade ago, the attrition rate was around 20%, mostly due to medical-based non-fatal casualties. “Attrition is because of snow, health or failure of oxygen,” he says, adding that soldiers are much better equipped now.

Singh expects soldiers, most of whom were sent to Ladakh between May and September, to be adequately acclimatised. At these heights, that matters as much as who has the superior fire power. Effectively, the Army is in winter deployment at the LAC, though that term has not been officially used. This is the first time.

The 1962 war document states that “nearly equal number of casualties suffered by the Indians were weather casualties”, lauding that it is “a tribute to the Indian soldier that even under such circumstances he fought and fought well”.

While this is the first ever time that so many troops are present in Ladakh at this time of the year, Indian military veterans say things have changed exponentially — for the better. Indian troops, with four wars against Pakistan (including Kargil), one against China, plus a three-decade-long experience of guarding Siachen, the highest battlefield in the world, are used now to dealing with both the heights and the winter, perhaps more so than their Chinese counterparts. Several establishments such as the Kargil and Siachen Battle Schools and the High Altitude Warfare School in Gulmarg train soldiers specifically to fight at heights.

“Our soldiers are deployed at 21,000 ft in Siachen, at 14,000-15,000 ft in Kargil and 14,000-17,000 ft in Eastern Ladakh,” says Lt Gen P J S Pannu (retd), who commanded the XIV Corps from 2016 to 2017. “In both Siachen and Kargil, we have posts that have no access to the outside world once snowfall begins. In the Kargil region, snow accumulates to 15-20 ft… it is highly avalanche-prone. For five to six months, troops are in lockdown positions… This kind of training and resilience is already there in our troops.”

Still, nobody thinks it will be easy.

***

Counting the elements the soldiers are up against, Major General Singh says, “One is the weather, which includes extreme cold and very high-speed winds. The second is the rarefied atmosphere, which is lack of oxygen and a function of the altitude. The third is of course the enemy. All three are treacherous.”

For a soldier arriving especially from a garrison in the plains, the first challenge is the sheer drop of oxygen level. The reduction can range between 25 and 65% — from Leh at 12,000 ft, to Mukhpari heights near Spanggur Gap at over 17,000 ft. On arrival troops undergo a three-stage acclimatisation exercise over 14 days. The first stage involves six days at 9,000 to 12,000 ft, with two days of rest and four days of walks and minor climbs. Stage 2 is four days at 12,000 to 15,000 ft heights, walking and climbing, and carrying loads over short distances. The next stage is four days at 15,000 ft and above, with the same walk-climb routine with and without loads.

In an emergency, this process is cut from 14 to 10 days. But that situation does not exist yet, says an officer. At Siachen in comparison, troops are inducted after a 21-day acclimatisation.

This gap gives the body time to adjust to the low oxygen and not go into hypoxia, which can lead to disorientation, nausea, headache, and if not detected early, more serious complications.

A medical memorandum issued by the Directorate General of Armed Force Medical Services in 1997 said that apart from hypoxia and cold, other factors that can affect performance at high altitudes and cause illnesses are “low humidity, solar and ultraviolet radiation”.

Lt Gen Pannu points out that the low oxygen levels mean efficiency reduces by almost 30-50%. “The soldier’s weight-carrying capability also goes down when, on the contrary, the requirement to carry weight goes up due to the lack of infrastructure.”

The layers of clothing one wears also cut efficacy, Major General Singh says. Talking of the sheer physical exertion needed, including to construct defences and bunkers, he adds that what can be done in the plains in a single day, “takes five to seven days”.

At high-altitude posts, soldiers carry anything between 20 and 45 kg of equipment, says a serving officer who does not want to be identified, depending upon the role the soldier is playing, whether offensive, defensive or on patrol. First and foremost are the weapon and ammunition. The weapon can be a pistol or a carbine, a rifle. If the weapon is heavy like a machine gun, weighing over 20 kg, multiple soldiers help carry it. A company of 60 to 120 soldiers carries at least one Medium Machine Gun, a section (6 to 20 soldiers) a rocket launcher. The ammunition load is divided.

Apart from this, a soldier’s gear includes boots, clothing for extreme weather, a set of inners, a multi-layered jacket, face protection from the cold, goggles to prevent snow-blindness and a helmet. Then there is a ‘sustenance kit’, which includes a sleeping bag, mattress, two pairs of change, toiletries, extra socks, a water bottle, and at least 24 hours worth of emergency, high-calorie cooked rations.

At forward posts, soldiers usually carry tinned food. “You cannot carry logistics to the frontline. Certainly not fresh food and vegetables, and due to low atmospheric pressure, you cannot cook in a pressure cooker for example. But it is not possible to eat large quantities of this (tinned) food. The moment you eat, your stomach pushes the diaphragm up against the lungs and heart, making breathing difficult. Very high calorific value of fruits, dried fruits, chocolates etc are given to soldiers. He enjoys none, and eats only to survive…,” says Pannu.

At the same time, any small movement can mean up to six-10 hours. “If pinned down by enemy fire, a soldier should be able to sustain (on his own),” the officer quoted above says.

Soldiers on the front also need to carry communication sets, the size depending on whether needed for company-to-company calls, battalion communication, or for communication between battalion headquarters and brigade or division headquarters. The sets get bigger with the formation.

***

In the 1962 conflict, the Indian forces across all sectors faced a severe paucity of winter clothing. In his book India’s China War, British journalist Neville Maxwell calls this “inadequate and in short supply”, apart from referring to other problems faced by the men such as the rarefied air, and lack of animals to carry loads. “All supplies, often including water, had to be airdropped.”

Elaborating what this means, Pannu says, “Imagine the air-dropped supplies falling a kilometre or even a few hundred meters from the designated dropping zone. It becomes a nightmare for the soldier who might spend the rest of the day fetching a few kilogrammes of essential supplies.”

Nearly 60 years after the India-China war, India still does not manufacture the insulated clothing required for the heights at which soldiers are now deployed in Ladakh. The clothing is imported at steep rates. Last month, at a public event, Vice Army Chief Lt General S K Saini talked of “a lack of viable indigenous solutions”.

Clothing has to not just ensure that the soldier keeps warm but also not be too heavy. Pannu warns against “heat load”, where the wearer feels hot when he is physically active but not warm enough when he is static.

Referring to the difference between Ladakh, Siachen and Kargil, all of which come under XIV Corps, Singh says that the LAC does not see that much snow, but “is cold, rocky”. “Soldiers here will not carry much snow clothing, but will carry warm clothing.” In comparison, in Siachen soldiers need alpine clothing and mountaineering equipment.

The winds also mean mere tents cannot be much of a protection, Singh says.

Recently, the Army unveiled some newly constructed heated accommodation for troops deployed behind the LAC; sources say facilities to accommodate all the men are in place. These are “smart camps” with barrack-like structures, and including electricity, water, heating, and other facilities. At the frontline though, where soldiers sit on peaks facing the PLA, they live in “heated tents as per tactical considerations”, an officer says.

Pannu notes that in reality a soldier might not spend much time inside the shelters. “He has to patrol, as well as build bunkers and defence work against the enemy’s fire and shelling from ground and air… He has to ultimately dig into the earth and bear the consequences of extreme cold directly.”

***

As deployment of this kind has never been required before at the LAC, many of the forward posts in Eastern Ladakh are being newly established, with no military infrastructure in place. This means, says the officer requesting anonymity, carrying material to create “defensive structures”, “if occupying a new feature”, as the heights on the north bank of Pangong Tso and in the Chushul sub-sector on the southern bank. Digging tools and corrugated galvanised iron sheets are needed to build bunkers and observation posts.

With the road infrastructure patchy, tracks right up to the top exist in only a few places, and soldiers must carry most of the equipment. “We use some amount of animal transport but patrolling is usually carried out on foot, unlike PLA troops who try and reach locations as far as possible by vehicles,” says Pannu.

The Chinese have the advantage of a topography that is like a rooftop — flat, with fewer mountains that are far apart, making the valleys on their side much wider, the veteran officer adds. “They have built highways, much easier to build on that side as they don’t go through so many mountain passes or tunnels. We, however, need to drill tunnels and build roads over passes. We cannot build very wide roads as that would need cutting mountains. The precipitation level on our side is also much more, therefore snow levels are much higher. In the Tibet area, the snowfall is only a few inches because it is very dry there. So they don’t have the challenges of snow blocking passes or tunnels for long period of time,” Pannu says.

While the IAF and Army helicopters have been pressed into service as part of the supply chain, the areas are higher than these are designed for, reducing their carrying capacity and hence meaning more sorties.

***

The other effect on soldiers is harder to detect. Singh talks of “the psychological part of being isolated”, with soldiers cut off from any contact for weeks, even months, from each other. “There is the fear that if something happens, even a helicopter cannot come to evacuate you.”

In order to reduce the exposure of soldiers at these forward posts, troops are being rotated as quickly as every two weeks. Singh says this is possible given the numbers the Army has there now, with a substantial strength in reserve. “If you come back from the post in two-three weeks, you are recouping yourself.”

At Siachen, which has infrastructure in place now at the forward posts as well as the base, a soldier generally spends around 90 days on the front. However, often this rolls over, an officer says, and beyond an acceptable limit, the damage could be permanent. The officer adds that they expect harsher climates in Ladakh, and hence the short rotation times.

“It is not just about maintaining a presence, but also keeping the soldier combat-ready. If you have to fight, you have to keep the health at a certain level. So, an early turnover may be necessitated. He can do a second round after a break,” the officer says, stressing this balance between raising defence and sustenance.

It’s not just the men either. Tanks, artillery systems and other hardware also need to be protected from the cold. “The equipment needs to be hardened and winterised. Repair and recovery are extremely difficult at sub-zero temperatures. In-situ workshops are equipped with warm canopies with bazooka heaters. The oil and radiators are prepared for the winter. All equipment with water pipes faces the problem of freezing, but certain innovations were made (during my time) to ensure water does not remain static in pipes,” says Pannu.

“There are inbuilt SOPs depending on the nature of the equipment, depending on whether they have oil, gas or electronic systems,” says another officer.

Whatever the difficulties, as of now, the troops at the border have dug in for the long haul, quite prepared for the eventuality that there may be no breakthrough towards disengagement. At the moment here is no clarity even on when, or if, the next round of senior commanders meeting will take place. There is precedence that a resolution could take years. In Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh, a standoff that began in 1986 took seven years before status quo ante was restored.

While no one can predict if the winter deployment at the LAC is going to become an annual feature, there are murmurs that these are the first straws in the icy winds blowing over Ladakh of the “LoC-isation” of the LAC, meaning the border with China may turn into a front that has to defended in the same way as the one with Pakistan.

And even as nobody wants that, this year could just be the start of a long, cold winter.

About the clothing
This is special clothing for 14,000 feet and above. Most of the troops on the frontline in Pangong Tso and Chushul would be having a similar kit
The soldiers carry enough ammunition (to attack/defend, depending on tasks), water bottle and medicine. As part of the unit, they might also have to carry ammunition for larger weapons, medicines, equipment to build defensive structures
The weight a soldier carries can vary from 20 to 45 kg, depending on the role he is playing and location



Line of Defence
Numbers: 50,000-plus;
average deployment is 15,000 to 17,000 usually

Heights: average 15,000 ft,
going upwards of 18,000 ft

LAC length: Over 870 km
in Eastern Ladakh

Weather conditions:
Temperatures 3 degrees to -15 degrees Celsius currently, will fall to up to
-40 degrees; oxygen low by 25% to 65%



Accommodation: Corrugated galvanised iron sheets for bunkers; heated tents on the frontlines; and new ‘smart camps’ with integrated electricity, water, heating behind the LAC

Risks: Acute mountain sickness, high-altitude pulmonary oedema, deep vein thrombosis, cerebral venous thrombosis, psychological illnesses, frostbite, snow-blindness, chilblains

Rotation at forward posts: At some places, as short as every two weeks, to minimise exposure

LAC vs Siachen, Kargil: Desert, not so snowy, with chilly winds, more rugged peaks


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Saturday, November 28, 2020

Sharpen Tech Focus to Boost Defence Prowess

SOURCE:

 https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/sharpen-tech-focus-to-boost-defence-prowess-176926


                                        WORRISOME

: The military leadership is reluctant to lessen the reliance on the existing organisational structures and systems.


          AlphaDogfight Trials Final Event



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                             [ https://youtu.be/NzdhIA2S35w ]



Welcome to the AlphaDogfight Trials Competition Event #3 - Final simulated dogfight between the Champion AI and an Air Force F-16 pilot! The DARPA AlphaDogfight Trials aim to demonstrate the feasibility of developing effective, intelligent autonomous agents capable of defeating adversary aircraft in a dogfight. AlphaDogfight Trials Competition #3 is being broadcast live from the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL) via a ZoomGov Webinar on 18-20 August 2020. DARPA’s AlphaDogfight Trials seeks to advance the state of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies applied to air combat operations. The trials are a computer-based competition designed to demonstrate advanced AI algorithms that can perform simulated within-visual-range air combat maneuvering, otherwise known as a dogfight. The goal is to use the dogfight as the challenge problem to increase performance and trust in AI algorithms and bring together the AI research and operator communities. In August 2019, DARPA selected eight technically and organizationally diverse teams to compete in the AlphaDogfight Trials with the purpose to energize and expand a base of researchers and developers applying AI technologies to complex operational problems. The first of three AlphaDogfight Trials competition events was held at JHU/APL in November 2019. Trial #1 was an exhibition match with the opportunity for teams to compete against different APL developed adversary agents and test the simulation environment at scale. Trial #2 held in January 2020, was the first competition where teams were ranked against each other and tested their agents against more challenging adversary agents. Trial #3 is the final competition. Teams will compete against each other in a bracket style competition with the top team advancing to fight against a USAF fighter pilot in a simulated dogfight on Aug. 20. AlphaDogfight Trials is a precursor to the DARPA Air Combat Evolution (ACE) program, which involves AI development and demonstration in three program phases – modeling and simulation, sub-scale aircraft, and full-scale aircraft testing. Ultimately, ACE will be flying AI algorithms on live aircraft to demonstrate trusted, scalable, human-level autonomy for air combat.

           Two Robots Debate the Future of Humanity                                           

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                                      [ https://youtu.be/1y3XdwTa1cA ]





Sharpen Tech Focus to Boost Defence Prowess

                                   By 

                  Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd)


                                   ( Former Northern Army Commander )

The final round of the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Alfa dogfight trials took place on August 20. The trials aimed to “demonstrate advanced AI (artificial intelligence) algorithms capable of performing simulated within-visual-range air combat manoeuvring, colloquially known as a dogfight.” Eight teams participated in the event, and the winning team, Heron Systems, squared off against a top

F-16 pilot. The AI pilot won 5-0.

Although the simulation was a simple one-on-one scenario and did not imply that AI is ready to replace pilots, it demonstrated that an AI agent could effectively learn and successfully apply basic fighter  manoeuvres.  A DARPA official said, “This was a crucible that lets us now begin teaming humans with machines… where we hope to demonstrate a collaborative relationship with an AI agent handling tactical tasks like dogfighting while the onboard pilot focuses on higher-level strategy as a battle manager supervising multiple airborne platforms.”


Technology has always played a crucial role in warfighting and the character of war. However, some sceptics state that the impact of technology is overrated. They point out the failure of a network-centric US military to defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a similar discussion in India on how far technology can overcome the challenges posed by the terrain along the Himalayan watershed or in areas like Siachen.


There is no doubt that the quality of human resource, levels of training, motivation, and human ingenuity will be major war-winning factors. But we must also recognise that today, technology is having a more transformative impact on the world than ever before. Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum, in his book The Fourth Industrial Revolution, writes that the most critical challenge today is to understand the “speed and breadth” of the technology revolution. Many of the emerging technology breakthroughs are in their infancy but are “already reaching an inflection point in their development as they build on and amplify each other in a fusion of technologies across the physical, digital and biological worlds.”

We are yet to grasp all the implications of this new revolution fully, but it is clear that emerging technologies, while empowering individuals and societies, are also disrupting traditional models of business, governance, and even social interaction.

The ‘empowerment-disruption’ effect is equally real for warfare. There is a blurring of lines between war and peace as hybrid conflicts take centre-stage. The distinction between civil and military technologies is disappearing with the diffusion of technologies, resulting in non-state actors increasingly getting access to lethal weapon systems. Saudi Arabia is among the top five countries globally in military expenditure, yet it has been regularly attacked by drones and missiles fired by Yemen Houthi rebels.

The Indian military faces the twin challenges of an assertive China and stressed budgets. In view of this, there is little option but to look at capability enhancement through greater adoption of technology. However, there is still some hesitation in the military to move firmly in this direction. The military leadership has grown up with and is comfortable with the existing organisational structures and systems. There is an understandable reluctance to lessen the reliance on high-value monolithic platforms like tanks, battleships, and manned aircraft that have served us well in the past.

While it is clear that the fighter pilot and the tank may not disappear soon from the battlefield, it is equally clear that these are decades-old systems, and there is a limit to how much incremental technology can be applied to make them more potent. In future capability building, we should be aiming for transformational change, not incremental.

One more reason why emerging technology is attractive is that the development and operating cost of traditional military platforms are becoming prohibitive. The development cost of the F-35 aircraft is $400 billion and the cost to own and operate the entire F-35 fleet over its expected 60-year lifetime is a staggering $1.12 trillion. This is prompting countries to explore the option of low-cost but highly networked systems to defeat conventional weapon systems.

In looking at the future, we need to have clarity on areas of technology focus and the approach to be followed. The adoption of advanced technology is uniformly low in the three services, and while this is worrying, it also provides us a second-mover advantage. We could learn from the successes and failures of others and move straight into areas of technology that offer revolutionary progress.

Michael O’Hanlon, in his study Forecasting Change in Military Technology, 2020-40, looked at 39 categories of military-relevant technologies. Of these categories, he found that revolutionary advances are most likely in artificial intelligence, computer hardware and software, internet of things, offensive cyber operations, robotics and autonomous systems.

It is evident that the most revolutionary changes are likely to come in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector. To exploit this, we must leverage our considerable talent and skills that exist in the civil industry and academia. Relying on government R&D institutions that are neither agile nor innovative in ICT could be counterproductive.

The Indian industry can help build trusted networks based on indigenous hardware and software. Our military will inevitably become more networked in the future, and if these networks are built on foreign hardware and software (as is currently the case), there is a huge vulnerability that can easily be exploited by our adversaries.

Even in robotics and autonomous systems, there is considerable expertise and adoption in the civil industry. Research in autonomous vehicles is more advanced in the auto industry than in the military. Here again, industry knowledge needs to be utilised. Where the defence R&D can play its role is in funding the AI-based backbone that enables relatively inexpensive commercial systems to be employed as a networked attack swarm with a degree of autonomy.

The fourth industrial revolution is already here. It demands a faster embrace of future technologies and a change in our traditional reliance on government organisations to lead the military R&D effort.  


EXISTING   LIMITED USE OF AI  IN DRONES AT DISPLAY                                                     IN 

                AZERBAIJAN- ARMENIA WAR 2020

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#Karabakh #Drone_strike #Azerbaijan


Azerbaijan TB2 drone strike compilation #1 | Azerbaycan TB2 SİHA atışı derlemesi #1


            SADHGURU    ON  ARTIFICIAL   INTELLIGENCE


Technologies of the Future | Sadhguru and Michio kaku (2018) LIVE from Russia



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                                         [  https://youtu.be/4RQ44wQwpCc ]