Friday, April 15, 2022

ASSESSMENT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN APR 14, 2022

DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN FORMATIONS ON MAP

http://uawardata.com

Russia's flagship warship the Moskva has sunk

15 Apr 2022

[ https://youtu.be/VCJZVtKIwrU ]

Russia's flagship Black Sea missile cruiser has sunk after being "seriously damaged", Russian state media says.

The defence ministry said ammunition on the Moskva exploded in an unexplained fire and that the ship tipped over while being towed back to port. Ukraine claims it struck the vessel with its Neptune missiles. The 510-crew warship had led Russia's naval assault on Ukraine, which made it an important

________________________

SOURCE:

(A) https://www.understandingwar.org/

(B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13

(C) https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

(E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide: https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

(F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP; https://liveuamap.com/
(G) ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl

INDEX

( ) ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html

( ) TIME LINE : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

( ) MAR 25: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 26: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 27: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 28: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

( ) MAR 29: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 30: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 31: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 01 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 02 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 03 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html

( ) APR 04 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 05 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( )APR 06 : ((i) https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 06: (ii) https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

( ) APR 07: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 08: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html

( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html

( ) APR 10: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

( ) APR 11: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

( ) APR 12: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

( ) APR 13: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

( B ) 2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#

( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense :

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503

(D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR

https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

( E ) ORBITS WORLD BATTLES :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

(F) (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf

(G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

(H) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide: https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

(J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

APR 14,2022

MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS,

AND

KATERYNA STEPANENKO

APR 14, 7:15 pm ET

The Russian missile cruiser Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, sunk on April 14 after a likely Ukrainian anti-ship missile strike on April 13. Ukrainian forces claimed to strike the Moskva with two Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles on April 13.[1] The Kremlin denied this claim and stated the Moskva suffered damage from an accidental fire and ammunition explosion.[2] Initial Ukrainian claims to have sunk the warship on April 13 were likely false, but the Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed the Moskva sank in a storm while being towed to Crimea after the crew evacuated.[3] ISW cannot independently confirm that a Ukrainian strike sunk the Moskva, though Ukrainian forces likely have the capability to have done so.

The loss of the Moskva—regardless if from a Ukrainian strike or an accident—is a major propaganda victory for Ukraine. The sinking of the Moskva, which was involved in the infamous “Snake Island” incident in the early days of the Russian invasion, is a boon to Ukrainian morale as a symbol of Ukrainian capabilities to strike back at the Russian navy. The Kremlin will conversely struggle to explain away the loss of one of the most important vessels in the Russian fleet. The Kremlin’s current story of losing the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet due to an accidental fire and ammunition explosion will, at minimum, likely hurt Russian morale and cannot be hidden from the Russian domestic audience. Both explanations for the sinking of the Moskva indicate possible Russian deficiencies—either poor air defences or incredibly lax safety procedures and damage control on the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship.

The loss of the Moskva will reduce Russia’s ability to conduct cruise missile strikes but is unlikely to deal a decisive blow to Russian operations on the whole. The Moskva’s main role was likely conducting precision strikes with Kalibr cruise missiles on targets in Ukrainian rear areas, including logistics centers and airfields. These Russian strikes have been effective but limited in number compared to airstrikes and ground-launched cruise missiles throughout the invasion, and the loss of the Moskva is unlikely to be a decisive blow. Ukraine's possibly demonstrated ability to target Russian warships in the Black Sea may change Russian operating patterns, however, forcing them to either deploy additional air and point-defense assets to the Black Sea battle group or withdraw vessels from positions near the Ukrainian coast.

Key Takeaways

The flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet sunk on April 14 following a likely Ukrainian cruise missile strike on April 13. The loss of the Moskva is a significant propaganda victory for Ukraine but will likely have only limited effects on Russian operations.

Ukrainian officials admitted Russian forces captured “some” personnel from Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade in Mariupol despite initial denials, though Ukrainian defenders predominantly continued to hold out against Russian assaults.

Russian forces may have committed damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to combat operations in eastern Ukraine for the first time on April 14. Continued daily Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine are failing to take any territory.

Ukrainian partisans have likely been active in the Melitopol region since at least mid-March.

Russian forces continued to redeploy from Belarus to Russia for further deployment to eastern Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian conscription measures in Donbas have been largely unsuccessful, reporting Russia sought to mobilize 60-70,000 personnel by an unspecified date and has only recruited 20% of its goal.[4] ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, though they are consistent with the demoralization observed among Russian and proxy personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that unspecified elements of Russia’s Northern Fleet and 8th Combined Arms Army are preparing to deploy to Ukraine, though the Russian military likely has little effective combat power remaining to send to Ukraine.[5]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued assaults against Ukrainian defences in southwestern and eastern Mariupol on April 13, though ISW cannot confirm any territorial changes. Ukrainian officials admitted on April 14 that Russian forces captured “some” personnel from Ukraine's 36th Marine Brigade during their breakout from the Ilyich plant to link up with Ukrainian forces in the Azovstal plant in eastern Mariupol on April 13.[6] Petro Andryushenko, advisor to Mariupol’s mayor, provided a detailed report on April 14 on areas of active fighting in Mariupol, which we used to refine our control of terrain assessment in the accompanying maps.[7] Andryushenko said Russian forces are concentrated on capturing the Mariupol port in the southwest with heavy air and artillery support, contradicting Russian claims to have previously captured the port.[8] Andryushenko further stated that Russian forces are strictly controlling entry and exit in Mariupol and are “filtering” Ukrainian civilians—a term used by Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine to describe searches, interrogations, and possible targeted killings of Ukrainian civilians.[9]

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 14 that elements of Russia’s 2nd Combined Arms Army—which was previously withdrawn from the Chernihiv axis—are deploying around Severodonetsk. [10] If confirmed, this is the first Russian unit withdrawn from fighting in northeastern Ukraine to be recommitted to eastern Ukraine. These units likely remain degraded, and Russian forces will face challenges integrating units from several military districts into a cohesive fighting force.[11]

Russian forces continued unsuccessful daily attacks against Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka and did not make any territorial advances on April 14.[12] The DNR claimed its forces drove back Ukrainian forces around Marinka on April 14, but ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[13] The UK Ministry of Defense reported on April 14 that Russian forces in eastern Ukraine are employing “massive rocket and artillery strikes,” consistent with reports on the ground of continued Russian shelling along the line of contact.[14]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Local social media reports confirmed Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian Special Forces destroyed a bridge near Izyum while a Russian military convoy was crossing it on April 13.[15] Ukrainian Special Forces are likely successfully interdicting Russian operations to reinforce the Izyum axis. Russian forces launched limited attacks around Izyum in the last 24 hours but did not make any territorial advances.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces concentrated on reconnoitring Ukrainian positions and resupplying forward positions.[17] Russian forces reportedly deployed an information and psychological operations unit to Belgorod, Russia, to support unspecified efforts to demoralize Ukrainian forces and civilians in Kharkiv Oblast.[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Fighting continued west of Kherson city on April 14, though ISW cannot confirm any specific Ukrainian or Russian attacks. Russian forces conducted minor attacks against Ukrainian positions in Oleksandrivka, 30 km west of Kherson city, on April 14.[19] Ukraine’s Airborne Forces command claimed on April 14th that the 80th Airmobile Brigade (previously operating in Mykolayiv) liberated unspecified villages in southern Ukraine but declined to name them for operational security reasons.[20] ISW cannot independently confirm any Ukrainian counterattacks in the last 24 hours.

Ukrainian forces may have destroyed a Russian supply depot in Kherson on April 13. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych stated Ukrainian forces destroyed ammunition depots of Russia’s 22nd Army Corps at an unspecified location in Kherson on April 13, and social media users reported heavy Ukrainian shelling of the Choronbaivka airfield.[21]

Ukrainian partisans have likely been active in the Melitopol region since at least mid-March. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that “unknown patriots” killed 70 Russian personnel in Melitopol on April 12, while the Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian partisans killed 70 personnel in the area from March 20 to April 12—a more likely report.[22] ISW has previously assessed that growing Ukrainian partisan activities are likely tying down Russian forces in the region but we have not previously seen reports of specific Ukrainian partisan actions.

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

Russian forces continued to redeploy from Belarus to Russia for further deployment to eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported several Central Military District units are redeploying from Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts (near Chernihiv and Sumy) to Belgorod and Voronezh Oblasts (along the Kharkiv axis) but have not been recommitted to combat operations as of April 14.[23] Elements of the 36th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District are also likely redeploying from Gomel Oblast, Belarus, to western Russian Oblasts.[24] Commercial satellite imagery taken on April 12 confirmed that Russian aircraft have predominantly departed Belarusian airfields for likely redeployment to the Izyum axis or eastern Ukraine, though ISW cannot confirm their final destination.[25]

Immediate items to watch

Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas region, feeding reinforcements into the fight as they become available rather than gathering reinforcements and replacements for a more coordinated and coherent offensive.

Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol will not be able to hold out indefinitely, but it remains unclear how quickly Russia will be able to secure the city.

References

[1] https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1514476808200146944;

https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1514562883144855557;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1514401870185476097.

[2] https://twitter.com/KaptainLOMA/status/1514551733434916866;

https://t.me/tass_agency/127209;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1514379537903235074;

https://twitter.com/tass_agency/status/1514505021878112258;

https://twitter.com/tass_agency/status/1514378082660069379;

https://www dot rferl.org/a/moskva-missile-cruiser-damaged/31802678.html;

https://nv dot ua/world/countries/kreyser-moskva-gorit-kak-otreagiroval-putin-poslednie-novosti-50233786.html;

https://t.me/stranaua/36458 .

[3] https://twitter.com/KaptainLOMA/status/1514551733434916866;

https://t.me/tass_agency/127209;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1514379537903235074;

https://twitter.com/tass_agency/status/1514505021878112258;

https://twitter.com/tass_agency/status/1514378082660069379;

https://www dot rferl.org/a/moskva-missile-cruiser-damaged/31802678.html;

https://nv dot ua/world/countries/kreyser-moskva-gorit-kak-otreagiroval-putin-poslednie-novosti-50233786.html;

https://t.me/stranaua/36458 .

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294446282868457.

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345.

[6] https://t.me/stranaua/36475;

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1514309247466627072;

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1514404202776346629.

[7] https://t.me/andriyshTime/261.

[8] https://t.me/andriyshTime/261.

[9] https://t.me/andriyshTime/261.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294446282868457.

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass....

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345.

[13] https://t.me/nm_dnr/7576; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1514536349491212294.

[14] https://t.me/stranaua/36491; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/1585;

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294476516198767;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1514502155922808835;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1514501992843988994;

https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1514469114894598144;

https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1514583383367630849;

https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1514590063153319940; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1514590023483592709.

[16] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstrili-avdiyivki-ta-harkova-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-14-kvitnya;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1514506091614425101;

https://t.me/vysokygovorit/7354 ;

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294446282868457;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294446282868457;

[20] https://www.facebook.com/www.dshv.mil.gov.ua/posts/350773540429974;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294666696179749.

[21] https://twitter.com/GissiSim/status/1514359967083606027;

https://twitter.com/Guderian_Xaba/status/1514457630420389888.

[22] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/nevidomi-patrioty-vbyvaiut-okupantiv-v-melitopoli.html;

https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/04/13/ruh-oporu-likviduvav-70-okupantiv-u-melitopoli/.

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294446282868457

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294787402834345

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/294446282868457;

https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1514547313074659330

Tags

Ukraine Project

File Attachments:

Luhansk Battle Map Draft April 14,2022.png

Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 14,2022.png

Mariupol Battle Map Draft April 14,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTApril14,2022.png

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 15

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , APRIL 15,2022

Mason Clark and Kateryna Stepanenko

April 15, 4:30pm ET

Russian forces continued small-scale, tactical attacks on the Izyum and Severodonetsk axes; additional reinforcements to date have not enabled any breakthroughs of Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces continue to deploy reinforcements to eastern Ukraine but show no indication of taking an operational pause. The Russian military appears to be carrying out an approach in eastern Ukrainian similar to its failed efforts north of Kyiv in early March—continuing to funnel small groups of forces into unsuccessful attacks against Ukrainian defensive positions without taking the operational pause that is likely necessary to prepare for a more successful offensive campaign. Russian forces continue to grind down Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol, though ISW cannot currently assess how long these forces will hold out and their current supply status.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces continued to grind down Ukrainian defenses in southwestern and eastern Mariupol, though ISW cannot confirm any major new territorial changes in the past 24 hours. Ukrainian defenders reported that the situation is “deteriorating” and Russian forces are deploying additional artillery and heavy weapons.
Russian forces continued unsuccessful daily attacks against Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka and heavy shelling along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks from Izyum toward both Slovyansk and Barvinkove.

CORRECTION: ISW mistakenly reported on April 14 that the Russian guided-missile cruiser Moskva was equipped with Kalibr surface-to-surface missiles. The Moskva was in fact equipped to fire Bazalt anti-ship missiles. The Moskva was unlikely to have participated in strikes on Ukrainian land targets, as we incorrectly stated. We apologize for the error.

Ukrainian military intelligence reported on April 15 that sanctions are increasingly disrupting Russia’s ability to replace equipment losses.[1] The GUR stated that Uralvagonzavod, the largest tank manufacturer in the world and producer of Russia’s T-72 main battle tank, is facing rising interest rates on loans, rising prices on materials and components (including armored steel), and shortages of imported components. The GUR said that Russian import substitution efforts are failing to maintain existing contracts.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to grind down Ukrainian defenses in southwestern and eastern Mariupol on April 15, though ISW cannot confirm any major new territorial changes.[2] The commander of Ukraine’s 36th Marine Brigade stated on April 15 that the situation in Mariupol is “deteriorating” and that Russian forces are “aggressively attacking” Ukrainian positions but said Ukrainian forces would not surrender.[3] Petro Andryushenko, advisor to Mariupol’s mayor, said Russian forces are deploying unspecified heavy weapons and artillery to the Iliych area to support assaults on the Azovstal Steel Plant, though ISW cannot independently confirm this report.[4] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported that Russian long-range Tu-22M3 bombers struck Mariupol on April 15 for the first time in the war amid continued heavy Russian shelling and widespread reports of damage to the city.[5] Russian forces will likely increase their pace of air and artillery strikes due to the slow pace of ground assaults against entrenched Ukrainian defenders.

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued unsuccessful daily attacks against Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka and heavy shelling along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine but did not make any territorial advances on April 15.[6] Ukraine’s Defense Ministry stated on April 15 that Russia's 58th and 8th Combined Arms Armies are the primary Russian forces in Donbas, in addition to the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the DNR and LNR, respectively.[7] Russian forces likely require a true operational pause to cohere the forces that could enable them to advance through frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks from Izyum toward both Slovyansk and Barvinkove on April 15.[8] Several Ukrainian sources (including civilian administrators in Kharkiv and Izyum) stated Russian forces continued to deploy to the Izyum axis, but ISW cannot confirm any specific troops movements.[9] Russian forces—primarily elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) and 14th Army Corps (Northern Fleet) continued to shell Kharkiv and screen Russian efforts to reinforce the Izyum axis.[10]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

There has been no significant change around Kherson in the past 24 hours. Russian forces conducted limited attacks on Ukrainian positions west of Kherson and continued to shell Mykolayiv but did not make any advances.[11]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There has been no significant activity reported on this axis in the last 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas region, feeding reinforcements into the fight as they become available rather than gathering reinforcements and replacements for a more coordinated and coherent offensive.
Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol will not be able to hold out indefinitely, but it remains unclear how quickly Russia will be able to secure the city.

[1] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-rf-zupyniaietsia-vyrobnytstvo-novykh-tankiv-cherez-finansovi-problemy-ta-vidsutnist-importnykh-komplektuiuchykh.html.

[2] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1514739304706289676; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1514736696021168135; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1514755426398744589; https://t.me/romanov_92/9559;

[3] https://t.me/stranaua/36672.

[4] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/276; https://t dot me/mariupolnow/6508.

[5] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/15/upershe-vid-pochatku-vijny-okupanty-zavdaly-bombovyh-udariv-dalnimy-bombarduvalnykamy-tu-22m3/; https://t.me/mariupolnow/6531; https://t.me/mariupolnow/6532; https://t.me/mariupolnow/6533; https://t.me/mariupolnow/6544; https://t.me/mariupolnow/6545;

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295110612802024; https://t.me/stranaua/36679; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1606; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295482179431534.

[7] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/15/rosarmiya-nastupatyme-v-napryamku-syevyerodoneczka-slovyanska-ta-volnovahy-aby-stvoryty-umovy-dlya-otochennya/.

[8] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/15/rosarmiya-nastupatyme-v-napryamku-syevyerodoneczka-slovyanska-ta-volnovahy-aby-stvoryty-umovy-dlya-otochennya/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295110612802024.

[9] https://t.me/synegubov/2881; https://t.me/stranaua/36636.

[10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/15/rosarmiya-nastupatyme-v-napryamku-syevyerodoneczka-slovyanska-ta-volnovahy-aby-stvoryty-umovy-dlya-otochennya/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295110612802024.

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295110612802024; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/15/upershe-vid-pochatku-vijny-okupanty-zavdaly-bombovyh-udariv-dalnimy-bombarduvalnykamy-tu-22m3/; https://news dot liga.net/region_news/news/rossiyskie-okkupanty-udarili-iz-rszo-po-nikolaevu-est-postradavshie-foto.