GRAPHICAL MAP REPRESENTATION : RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR 2022

 SOURCE:

(A) Jomini of the West @JominiW            :   https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188/photo/1

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1509745733418762241/photo/1

(B) Summary on the last three days (9, 10, and 11 April) of the Ukraine War: https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-9-10-11-april-2022-78fbb8e24a4e

(C)  DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN  FORMATIONS ON MAP: http://uawardata.com

(D)  Michael Kofman@KofmanMichael     

   ( i ) https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1496876298051989504/photo/1

   (ii) https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael

(E) Jomini of the West @JominiW    :  https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1513354960469213188

           ( TO BE CONTINUED AS WAR PROGRESSES )  

      

 GRAPHICAL MAP REPRESENTATION : RUSSO-UKRAINIAN  WAR  2022 

( FURTHER UP FROM HERE TO BE CONTINUED AS WAR PROGRESSES )

SER 24

Invade Russia. One force maintains the front. Second force push into Russia towards Belgorod then push south and west, meeting the first Force as it begins pushing south in a broad flanking maneuver. Catch the Russians in an L shaped attack. Threaten some home territory

24/ To the north, Ukraine could assume risk around Kyiv & in the NE to reinforce the Kharkiv area and conduct a major counterattack to push Russian forces to the international border and east of the Siverskyi Donets River.

5:53 AM · Apr 15, 2022

25/ This would set conditions for a major counteroffensive east of the Siverskyi Donets that would likely seek to recapture the decisive geographic points of Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupiansk. Recapturing these towns would sever Russian GLOCs to Belgorod from Izium.

26/ With GLOCs to Belgorod blocked, Russian forces in the Izium area would either counterattack north to reestablish access to Belgorod or move east across the Oskil River and establish a new eventual line of defense to protect their hold on northern Luhansk.

27/ Concurently the recapture of Kupiansk would offer the Ukrainian military a new pivot of operations to either eventually advance into northern Luhansk or turn south and attack Russian forces toward Izium.

28/ The Izium area could be turned into a cauldron in which Ukrainian air & artillery strike could devastated a tightly compact Russian defense as it attempts to maneuver out of the kill zone.

29/ As with my Russian OPLAN assessment my estimation of Ukrainian options will likely end up being wildly off the mark. The point of such an exercise is more to illustrate that Ukraine has a variety of operational pathways it will undoubtedly explore and exploit.

30/ Both Russia and Ukraine have several weeks of hard fighting ahead. Though the situation currently favours Ukraine circumstances are always changing. Russian forces may be able to rally, or they could completely break. One thing is certain, it will be a long and deadly summer.

What if Belarus attacks from the north?

BELARUS IS NOT RUSSIA That risk could be avoided if troops from other countries were sent to THREATEN AND KEEP FIXED THE BELARUS TROOPS Thinking USA, Poland or global Nato force. They should do it.

SER 20 (NEW 15Apr)

: KHERSON- ODESA OPERATION DIRECTION (OD) 10 APR 2022

SER 19

: RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR 2022

SURMISED RUSSIAN OPLAN

DONBAS- KHERSON THEATRE OF MILITARY ACTION (TVD)

APRIL 11

1/ Surmising a revised Russian OPLAN. Here are thoughts on what Russia’s revised operational plan may look like. It has constructed this off what is considered the most logical operational approach that can yield positive results.

2/ Given Russian operational performance to date we realize that this assessment may end up being wildly off. Producing a reliable open-source analysis is difficult, to say the least. Information is scarce & what is available is heavily weighted in favour of Ukraine.

3/ Still, to understand where this war is going, what conditions military operations will create in the coming weeks, and how they may set conditions for a negotiated settlement an attempt to surmise a logical course of action is necessary.

4/ I do not see the Kremlin altering its war aims in Ukraine. If anything, the defeat of Russian forces in Kyiv has caused Putin & his top advisors to see the fulfilment of their war aims as vital to the survival of their regime. Therefore, they will have to remain in place.

5/ I have added what I feel are the Ukrainian government’s war aims to this assessment. Essential they are the opposite of Russia’s aims but contain important nuances that offer a “golden bridge” (i.e., making the Russians feel they have achieved a goal).

6/ BLUF, Ukraine seeks a condition in which they are politically independent of Russia, Russia recognizes Ukraine’s international borders, does not oppose its membership into the EU, and its future security is guaranteed by a legally binding agreement with world powers.

7/ Russia has already stated that it has achieved the goal of “demilitarization” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (25 March General Staff press conference). This goal was described as the reduction of Ukraine’s ability to threaten the Donbas & Russia.

8/ Though the claims made as to the level of destruction suffered by the UAF & its defense industrial base were exaggerated, it can be inferred that significant damage has been inflicted on the Ukrainian military, to the point the General Staff can claim a goal has been met.

9/ The Ukrainian concession of seeking a legally binding international security guarantee backed by the U.S. & major European powers to prevent future Russian aggression in lieu of NATO membership is a golden bridge for Russia’s 2nd war aim.

10/ This leaves the question of Crimea and the Donbas the only stated grievance remaining to be resolved by both parties. Neither Russia nor Ukraine is prepared to negotiate this point without a clear battlefield victory. This will be the focus of future operations.

11/ Russia is still faced with three key questions that need to be answered to properly allocate forces & resources to achieve its goals of Ukrainian acquiescence to its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Separatist Republics.

12/ First, what military conditions much be produced to achieve the strategic goals? Second, what sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions? Finally, how should forces and resources be arrayed to accomplish that sequence of actions?

13/ The logical conditions Russia must achieve to meet its strategic goals is the ability of the Russian military to seize and hold the entirety of the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, and retain territory it occupies in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and hold Kherson and its environs.

14/ The logical sequence of actions to obtain these conditions is to conduct simultaneous operations in designated Battle and Disruption Zones in each of these Oblasts, including Kharkiv, and a series of sequential offensive actions in Donetsk.

16/ Terminology. Battle Zone – Operations in these areas are decisive, using all components of available combat power, an armed force closes & engages with the enemy to defeat him. Doing so increases the likelihood to compel him to negotiations.

17/ Given the operational realities Russia is faced with (i.e., limited manpower, poor morale, fragmented command & control, substandard maintenance, inexperienced leaders, etc.) its military can only reasonably focus offensive operations in one area.

18/ It is assessed the primary battle zone for Russian forces will be in north-central Donetsk. Located here is the Donets River Line, Severodonetsk Salient, and former Line of Contact running SE to SW from Popasna to Donetsk along with 7x Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades.

19/ This area also constitutes one of the most fortified areas of eastern Ukraine. Russian attempts to break through the Ukrainian LOC over nearly two months of combat have proven unsuccessful. It is likely that Russian forces now massing near Izium will attempt to outflank the line

20/ Russian forces will advance on Slovyansk, but this will more than likely be meant as a feint to fix Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades along the Severodonetsk Salient. It is more likely that Russian forces will seize the decisive geographic point of Barvinkove & then push SW.

21/ The objective of this drive will most likely be decisive geographic point of Pokrovsk which is 79 km NW of Donetsk. The goal is likely to control the main highway from Barvinkove to Pokrovsk & create a cauldron out of north central & NE Donetsk.

22/ The Russian concept of a cauldron is a very large strategic-level concentration of trapped enemy forces. In the cauldron, Ukrainian forces would be contained but not directly engaged. Russian VKS, artillery, and other stand-off weapons would reduce Ukrainian resistance.

23/ The Russians could close the cauldron or leave an opening to encourage Ukrainian troops to flee through, either way Russian forces would be able to clear the most fortified region of Donetsk without having to physically push Ukraine forces out of their positions (in theory).

24/ The Russians used this approach during the Battle of Debaltseve [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debaltseve ] (14 January – 20 February 2015), forcing Ukrainian units to retreat from a key portion of the LOC. Success of this smaller cauldron allowed Russia to gain a more favourable negotiating position for Minsk II.

25/ The second battle zone would be around Kherson. Here we would expect to see the priority of forces and resources behind those sent to the Donetsk battle zone to maintain control of this decisive strategic point. A point is necessary for a favourable negotiation position.

26/ Kharkiv remains the principal disruption zone. Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix a substantial portion of Ukrainian mechanized forces, denying their involvement in operations in Donetsk.

27/ A second disruption zone will centre near the northern border of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Like Kharkiv, Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix several manoeuvre brigades from counterattacks in Donetsk.

28/ A potential third disruption zone is Kyiv itself. Although it is unknown if Russia intends to continue any sort of offensive action against the Ukrainian capital, air & missile strikes have the potential to divert critical resources away from east Ukraine.

29/ Of course all of this is speculation. The Russian approach to operations in the Donbas may be drastically different. They may opt to go head on with prepared Ukrainian defences, hoping that artillery and airstrikes can overcome stiff resistance.

30/ Russia may finally use chemical weapons to force Ukrainian units from their prepared defences and into the open where they are vulnerable to air & artillery strikes. Such a move would bring a new level of barbarity to the fighting.

31/ Without reliable data this assessment is really a wild stab in the dark, but it might provide a glimpse of what is in the realm of the possible. One thing I have not discussed is Ukrainian options, this is because there is even less verified Ukrainian data than Russian.

SER 18

: SIEGE OF MARIUPOL 10 APR 2022

SER 17

: ZAPORIZHZHIA OPERATIONAL DIRECTION(OD)

10 APR 2022

SER 16

SEVERODONETSK - DONETSK OPERATIONAL DIRECTION(OD) 10 APR 2022

SER 15

KHARKIV OPERATIONAL DIRECTION(OD) 10 APR 2022

SER 14

: RUSSO-UKRAINIAN THEATER OF WAR O6 TO 10 APR APR 2022

DONBASS-KHERSON THEATRE OF MILITARY ACTION (TVD)

SER 13

: DONETS RIVER LINE FOR 05 APR 2022

SER 12

: DONETS RIVER LINE FOR 05 APR 2022

SER 11

: RUSSIAN FORCE BUILD-UP NORTH OF IZIUM

05 APR 2022

SER 10

: KHARKIV-DONBAS STRATEGIC FRONT FOR

05 APR 2022

SER 09

:UKRAINE THRATER OF WAR ( 05 APR 2022 GMT )

SER 08

:UKRAINE THRATER OF WAR ( 02--04 APR 2022 GMT )

SER 07

: KHERSON-ODESSA STRATEGIC FRONT AS OF

01 APR 2022

SER 06

: INFORMATION AS OF 01 2300 APR 2022(GMT)

SER 05

: KHARKIV-DONBAS STRATEGIC FRONT FOR

01 APR 2022

SER 04

: SUMY STRATEGIC FRONT FOR 01 APR 2022

SER 03

:KYIV - CHERNIHIV STRATEGIC FRONT FOR 01 APR 2022

SER 02

: UKRAINIAN THEATER OF WAR (O1 APR 2022) [GMT]

SER 01

:SIEGE OF MARIUPOL FOR 30-31 MAR 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 16

 

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , APRIL 16,2022

Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina Hird

April 16, 5:00 pm ET

Ukraine’s sinking of the Moskva was a significant event that has likely triggered intensified Russian air and missile attacks in retaliation, but the decisive operations of this phase of the war will still be conducted on the ground in eastern Ukraine. The commitment of the Black Sea Fleet’s naval infantry to the fight around Mariupol some weeks ago meant that Russian naval operations would play a supporting role in the conflict. Increased Russian air and missile attacks are also unlikely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war, since there is no reason to assess that Russia has been holding enough air and missile capability in reserve to tip the balance if it is now committed. This report, and likely future reports as well, will thus remain focused on the ground operations, especially those in eastern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued to amass troops around Izyum in preparation for continuing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. The Russians continued small-scale attacks in the vicinities of Izyum, Popasna, and the area around Rubizhne and Severodonetsk—sometimes with artillery, sometimes with mechanized forces. These attacks have not made significant gains so far. It is unclear if they are part of a rolling offensive operation into which Russian reinforcements will be fed as they become available or if they are setting conditions for a larger-scale, better-coordinated offensive that will start soon.

The specific terrain on which battles in eastern Ukraine will be fought may constrain the Russians’ ability to take advantage of the number of forces they are amassing for the attack. Eastern Ukraine is famous for being superb terrain for large-scale mechanized maneuver because of the World War II campaigns of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. It is far from clear, however, that Russian forces will find it much more conducive to rapid decisive mechanized operations than other parts of the theater. The Russians have struggled repeatedly to seize built-up areas rapidly or even to reduce them once encircled. They will have to seize several significant population centers to achieve their apparent objectives in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, however, including Severodonetsk, Rubizhne, Lysychansk, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, as well as several smaller towns. The difficulties they have encountered taking Rubizhne do not bode well for their rapid success against other built-up areas. The ground itself is also challenging as it is crisscrossed by many small water features and, at the moment, still very muddy. The reinforcements the Russians are bringing into this part of the theater will help, of course, but large numbers of much fresher Russian troops struggled to take relatively small population centers north, west, and northeast of Kyiv even before getting into the Kyiv suburbs proper. The Russians must take the major population centers in Donetsk and Luhansk, however, if they are to achieve the operation’s stated goals.

Russian forces will likely continue operating along three primary axes of advance in Donbas: from Izyum south via Slovyansk toward Russian-controlled Donetsk Oblast near Debaltseve; from Rubizhne and Severodonetsk southwest toward the Izyum-Debaltseve highway; and from Popasna west toward that highway. They may open an additional axis of advance from near Donetsk City to the north toward Kramatorsk as well, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[1] The Russian main effort currently appears to be from Izyum southeast along the highway to Slovyansk. The drive west from Popasna is presumably meant to reach the Izyum-Debaltseve highway, possibly setting conditions to encircle or drive off Ukrainian forces defending against a Russian advance from the Debaltseve area to the northwest. The purpose of the direct assaults on Severodonetsk and Rubizhne is less clear. The Russians may be trying to seize those cities as part of the objective to seize Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, rather than waiting until they have been encircled and trying to reduce them at that point. They may alternatively be seeking to fix Ukrainian forces in that northeastern sector of the salient the Russians intend to encircle. The general pattern of operations and apparent movements of Russian reinforcements suggest that the drive from Izyum to the southwest will be the main effort in this part of the theater but that the Russians will continue to attack on multiple axes that are not immediately mutually supporting.

Ukrainian officials report that Russia has concentrated as many as 22 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the vicinity of Izyum, but the Russians will struggle to take advantage of that force concentration if they cannot open up parallel axes of advance—something they have notably struggled to do in other parts of the theater. Russian forces are apparently attempting to drive southwest from Izyum toward Barvinkove, which could allow them to open up an axis of advance in addition to the main Izyum-Slovyansk highway. But Barvinkove is a large enough settlement to delay the Russian advance if Ukrainian forces hold it, and the route from Izyum to Barvinkove is not really parallel to the Izyum-Slovyansk highway—Barvinkove is roughly 50 kilometers west of Slovyansk. Taking Barvinkove does not cut the only Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Slovyansk, moreover, as another main GLOC to Slovyansk from the west runs through Kramatorsk, about 45 kilometers southeast of Barvinkove.

The individual Russian offensives in the east are thus unlikely to proceed dramatically more successfully than similar operations around Kyiv unless the Russians change their operational patterns significantly. The Russians could overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders by the sheer number of different axes of advance forcing the Ukrainians to spread themselves too thinly. But the Ukrainians’ demonstrated will and ability to hold much larger Russian forces at bay in built-up areas for a considerable time suggests that many if not most or even all of these Russian drives will stall. This discussion does not take account of the quality and physical and psychological state of the Russian forces, which we have considered in detail in previous reports, and which makes a sudden dramatic Russian offensive success even less likely.

Key Takeaways

• The Russians and their proxies appear to be preparing to declare victory in the Battle of Mariupol, as Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin opened a United Russia party office in the city.
• Russian reinforcements drawn from troops that had fought around Kyiv have appeared in eastern Ukraine. Those reinforcements have not received sufficient time to recover physically or mentally from their losses and defeat around Kyiv and are unlikely to generate combat power proportionate to their numbers.
• Ukrainian officials claim that the Russians canceled the deployment to Syria of one of the last combat units that had not previously seen combat in Ukraine and sent that unit toward Donbas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued their slow advance through Mariupol on April 16. Elements of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) forces arrived at the central Mariupol beach from the north.[2] Fighting continued in central Mariupol itself.[3] Russian forces entered the base of the Ukrainian National Guard’s 12th Operations Brigade and DNR forces seized a police station in central Mariupol relatively close to the beach.[4] Ukrainian forces continued to defend in pockets but especially in the Azovstal plant, which Russian and proxy forces continued attacking heavily.[5] The Russians' use of Tu-22M Backfire bombers to attack to Azovstal plant may suggest that they intend to end the battle soon by devastating the remaining defenders with firepower.[6]

Ukrainian advisor to the mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushenko claimed that DNR head Denis Pushilin opened an office of the United Russia party in Mariupol on April 15.[7] This action likely indicates that the DNR is preparing to begin governing Mariupol (or what remains of it) soon. Andryushenko further claimed that Russian “filtration” measures are reaching a crescendo in Mariupol and that the Russians have announced a complete lockdown of the city on Monday, April 18, to allow them to complete the “filtration” process.[8] The Battle of Mariupol and the fight in Donbas generally have cost the Russians and proxies dearly, however. Social media confirmed that the funeral of the deputy commander of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army, Major General Vladimir Petrovich Frolov, was held on April 16.[9]

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian troops continued shelling Severodonetsk, Rubizhne, and Popasna, and Russian troops made small tactical attacks around Popasna on April 15.[10] The shelling has destroyed much of the cities’ infrastructure.[11] Russian forces made no significant territorial gains in these areas in the past 24 hours, however.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported artillery strikes in and around Avdiivka on April 16, possibly in preparation for an offensive operation in that area.[12] Avdiivka is just north of Donetsk City on the N20 highway toward Kramatorsk, which lies about 70 kilometers to the northwest. A Russian advance along this axis could complement the drive from Izyum to the southeast via Slovyansk toward Debaltseve.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Russian forces continued their build-up in and around Izyum over the last 24 hours, including deploying elements of units that had fought around Kyiv into the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 6th and 20th Combined Arms Armies as well as of the 1st Guards Tank Army that had been operating in the Kharkiv and eastern Ukraine area for some time were being reinforced by elements of the 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies and the 106th Airborne Division, all of which fought and suffered heavy losses around Kyiv.[13] The General Staff claimed that elements of the 68th Army Corps of the Eastern Military District were also operating in eastern Ukraine. The forces of the 68th Corps likely came from the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle brigade, based on Sakhalin Island.[14] Those troops likely have not previously participated in the fighting in Ukraine, as the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that their scheduled rotation into Syria was canceled to facilitate their entry into the war.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff claims that Russian forces have amassed as many as 22 BTGs around Izyum for operations toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove.[16]

Actual combat activity on the Izyum axis was limited, however, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting one significant attempt to drive on the village of Dovgenske, roughly 20 kilometers south of Izyum on the Slovyansk highway, that the Ukrainians claim to have repulsed.[17]

Russian forces around Kharkiv City generally held their positions, although the commander of Ukraine’s Joint Operational Headquarters claimed on April 16 that Ukrainian forces regained some territory around the city.[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

There has been no significant change around Kherson in the past 24 hours.

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces concentrating around Izyum will continue small-scale offensive operations to the southeast and southwest and may begin larger-scale offensives.
• Russia and its proxies may declare victory in the Battle of Mariupol.
• Russian forces could launch a new offensive operation from Donetsk City to the north through Avdiivka toward Kramatorsk.
• Russian attacks on Severodonetsk, Popasna, and Rubizhne will continue.

---

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/296207789358973

[2] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515316200150114317; https://twitter.com/wargonzoo/status/1515269158560309250

[3] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1515019690871037960; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515314924007956491 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1515169159730106369; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515187540017483776; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1514848210845581313

[4] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1515308610133311489; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515316875680436231; https://twitter.com/AZmilitary1/status/1515290166818189322; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1515019690871037960

[5] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515193541194100737; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1515094094279815180; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515314587561828363; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515190592283852800; https://twitter.com/UkrWarReport/status/1514948432875728897

[6] Russian Bombers Just Carpet-Bombed Mariupol (forbes.com); https://t dot me/andriyshTime/292

[7] https://t.me/andriyshTime/290

[8] https://t.me/andriyshTime/292; https://t.me/andriyshTime/294

[9] https://twitter.com/just_whatever/status/1515338108639842312; https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1515343018471006212

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295827436063675; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295827436063675;

[11] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/52-j-den-povnomasshtabnoyi-vijni-rosiyi-proti-ukrayini-tekstovij-onlajn; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1515033019505164292; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515189729695830016;

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295827436063675

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295827436063675; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/296207789358973.

[14] 68th Army Corps - Coastal Missile-Artillery Forces (BRAV) (globalsecurity.org); [“The winners of tank biathlon in Sakhalin given rental house keys,”] Sakhalin.info, August 21, 2017, https://sakhalin.info/news/137455; [“39th motorized rifle brigade conducted large-scale military exercises in Sakhalin,”] ACTB, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhfk2n2zGI0; [“2017 Day of the Motor Troops,”] Ok Group, https://ok.ru/video/39848380978; [“39th separate motorized rifle brigade - Military Unit 35390,”] Russian Military Units, https://voinskayachast.net/suhoputnie-voyska/motostrelkovie/vch35390; [“39th separate motorized rifle brigade - Military Unit 35390,”] Russian Military Units, https://voinskayachast.net/suhoputnie-voyska/motostrelkovie/vch35390; [“39th Independent Motorized Rifle Red Banner Brigade (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk),”] Wikimapia, http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=46.888662&lon=142.757592&z=16&m=b&show...я-отдельная-мотострелковая-Краснознамённая-бригада&search=sakhalin

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/296207789358973

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/296207789358973; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/295827436063675

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/296207789358973

[18] https://inforesist.org/bojczy-vsu-osvobodili-o-okkupantov-dva-sela-na-ha...

 

 

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