Tuesday, April 19, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 18, 2022 (r)


DONBAS

Russia-Ukraine War l Why Battle In Donbas Will Not Be A Cakewalk For Putin Forces

Ukraine President Zelensky has confirmed that Russia has started its offensive in Donbas. Reports suggest that Russia has already captured the eastern Ukraine town of Kreminna. Ukrainian units in Donbas have reported new intense and coordinated bombardments. However, experts warn that Russian troops’ operation in Donbas may not be a very smooth one either. Watch the video to know more. #RussiaUkraine #Donbas #Putin

                                                      [ https://youtu.be/dCVZbM1wY1M ]
 


Ukraine-Russia Battle For Donbas Begins

                                                     [   https://youtu.be/BJgP-eNQR6I ]



                                         

Russia prepares for renewed military offensive in Ukraine 

                                               [  https://youtu.be/uQ__9YkD6do  ]





RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 18

 SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 


INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

   (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE


       ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:              https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

    (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

 (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                                     (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf




ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

                                           APR 18,2022


                   MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS, 

                                              AND

                           KATERYNA STEPANENKO 


                                 APR 18, 6:30 pm ET


Russian forces began a new phase of large-scale offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on April 18 likely intended to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russian forces have been concentrating reinforcements—including both newly-deployed units and damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine—to the Donbas axis for several weeks. Russian forces conducted large-scale assaults focused on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka with heavy artillery support on April 18 after previously conducting only localized attacks and shelling along the line of contact. Russian forces have not secured any major territorial gains as of publication.

The Russian offensive in the east is unlikely to be dramatically more successful than previous Russian offensives, but Russian forces may be able to wear down Ukrainian defenders or achieve limited gains. Russian forces did not take the operational pause that was likely necessary to reconstitute and properly integrate damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine into operations in eastern Ukraine. As we have assessed previously, Russian forces withdrawn from around Kyiv and going back to fight in Donbas have, at best, been patched up and filled out with soldiers from other damaged units, and the Russian military has few if any, cohesive units not previously deployed to Ukraine to funnel into new operations.[1] Frequent reports of disastrously low Russian morale and continuing logistics challenges indicate the effective combat power of Russian units in eastern Ukraine is a fraction of their on-paper strength in numbers of battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Russian forces may certainly be able to wear down Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine through the heavy concentration of firepower and sheer weight of numbers, but likely at a high cost. A sudden and dramatic Russian offensive success remains highly unlikely, however, and Ukrainian tactical losses would not spell the end of the campaign in eastern Ukraine, much less the war as a whole. 

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces likely began large-scale offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts focused on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka.
  • Russian forces may be able to gain ground through the heavy concentration of artillery and numbers. However, Russian operations are unlikely to be dramatically more successful than previous major offensives around  Kyiv. The Russian military is unlikely to have addressed the root causes—poor coordination, the inability to conduct cross-country operations, and low morale—that impeded prior offensives.
  • Successful Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Kharkiv will likely force Russian forces to divert some units intended for the Izyum offensive, but Ukrainian forces are unlikely to completely sever Russian lines of communication north of Izyum in the coming days.
  • Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol continued to hold out against heavy Russian artillery and air bombardment. 


Russian authorities face mounting unwillingness to fight among both conscript and contract personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 18 that Russian forces began efforts to form additional units in Rostov and Crimea by April 24 to form a “second echelon” to occupy administrative buildings and important infrastructure in occupied Ukraine.[2] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 18 that the number of Russian personnel refusing to join the war effort is increasing, including 60-70% of contract soldiers in the 150th Motor Rifle Division of the 8th Combined Arms Army—the primary Russian combat force in eastern Ukraine.[3] The GUR stated that Russian authorities are threatening the families of servicemen who refuse to fight and making permanent marks in the criminal records of those servicemen.

Russian cruise missiles struck a Ukrainian vehicle repair shop in Lviv, western Ukraine, killing civilians in Lviv for the first time in the war. Social media users depicted several missiles striking a warehouse and railway junction in Lviv and killing several civilians on April 18.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed a logistics center in Lviv used to store weapons arriving in Ukraine from the United States and European Union on April 18.[5] Russian forces seek to disrupt western aid shipments to the Ukrainian military but likely lacks large numbers of the precision weapons needed to frequently strike these targets in western Ukraine. 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued assaults against Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal steel plant but did not make any verifiable gains in the last 24 hours. Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, unspecified other aircraft, and heavy artillery continued to pound Ukrainian defensive positions around the Azovstal plant.[6] The commander of the Ukrainian 36th Marine Brigade (one of the Ukrainian units remaining in Mariupol) appealed to the United States and EU to provide Ukrainian forces with additional heavy weaponry, stating “we are ready to fight to the last drop of blood, but we must know that the world has done everything possible for this.”[7] Mariupol mayor advisor Petro Andryushenko said that Russian forces did not mark the promised “safe exit corridors” through which they demanded Ukrainian forces leave Mariupol on April 17 and that the Russian ultimatum was likely a trap for Ukrainian defenders.[8] Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk stated on April 18 that Ukrainian forces in Mariupol are successfully tying down Russian forces and enabling Ukrainian offensives elsewhere.[9] Ukrainian military sources shared footage of Ukrainian forces conducting limited counterattacks near the Azovstal plant on April 18.[10] Russian forces will likely clear any isolated Ukrainian forces active in Mariupol outside the Azovstal plant in the coming days.[11]

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces likely began large-scale offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on April 18. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian General Staff, and the Ukrainian Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council all stated that Russian forces began a new phase of large-scale offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on April 18.[12] Russian forces concentrated on Popasna, Rubizhne, and Marinka.[13] Luhansk Governor Serhei Haidai stated that Russian forces captured Kreminna, directly northwest of Rubizhne, but did not make any major gains elsewhere along the line.[14] Social media footage depicted heavy fighting ongoing in Rubizhne and Popasna.[15] Russian forces conducted heavy air and artillery strikes along the line of contact.[16] Russian forces may be able to make advances in eastern Ukraine by dividing Ukrainian forces among many small axes of advance, but Russian offensive operations are unlikely to be dramatically more successful than failed operations around Kyiv, as ISW has previously discussed.[17]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Ukrainian forces continued a successful counterattack (begun on April 16) southeast of Kharkiv, taking several small towns on April 17-18. Ukrainian forces reportedly seized Bazaliivka, Lebyazhe, and Kutuzivka and claimed to capture several unspecified villages near Izyum.[18]

This Ukrainian offensive will likely force Russian forces to divert some of the combat power intended for the stalled Izyum axis to defend against Ukrainian advances but is unlikely to threaten the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Izyum in the coming days. Ukrainian forces already controlled elements of the M03 highway, preventing direct Russian movement from the outskirts of Kharkiv to Izyum. ISW has documented Russian forces, including a major Russian convoy observed by Maxar Technologies on April 8, deploying to Izyum using a GLOC extending from the main Russian logistics and communications centre in Belgorod, Russia, directly southeast into Ukraine through Velykyi Burluk and Kupyansk before reaching frontline positions in Izyum.[19] Ukrainian counterattacks would need to capture and hold Velykyi Burluk, approximately 45km from their current forward positions in Bazaliivka, to disrupt this GLOC. Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct such an advance over several days or weeks, but Russian forces east of Kharkiv are unlikely to collapse as quickly as Russian forces did during the final withdrawal from Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine.

Russian forces additionally have a secondary GLOC from Valuyki, Russia, directly south through Kupyansk to Izyum. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces began using the Valuyki-Kupyansk railway to reinforce Izyum, and several Russian units fighting in Izyum (including the 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 752nd Motor Rifle Regiment, and 237th Tank Regiment) are permanently based directly in or near Valuyki.[20] Russian forces will be able to use this GLOC to reinforce operations around Izyum even if Ukrainian forces prove capable of capturing Velykyi Burluk in the coming days. The Ukrainian counterattack may successfully force Russian forces to redeploy some units intended for the Izyum axis but is unlikely to completely disrupt Russian lines of communication and reinforcement in the coming week.


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Fighting continued in Oleksandrivka, just west of Kherson, without any major territorial changes.[21] Ukraine’s Airborne Forces command claimed the Ukrainian 80th Airborne Brigade captured several villages in the Mykolayiv direction, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[22]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces likely commenced large-scale offensive operations in Donbas but are unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough.
  • Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Kharkiv may divert some Russian units but are unlikely to sever Russian lines of communication in the coming days.
  • Russian forces concentrating around Izyum will continue small-scale offensive operations to the southeast and southwest and may begin larger-scale offensives.
  • Russia and its proxies may declare victory in the Battle of Mariupol.
  • Russian forces could launch a new offensive operation from Donetsk City to the north through Avdiivka toward Kramatorsk.

 References 

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign....

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/297662705880148.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/294203199557774.

[4] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1516005258333495297;

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1515952200392060940;

 https://t.me/vorposte/19325;

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1515976444605870083;

 https://t.me/vorposte/19338 ; 

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1516003970388578305?s=20&t=MUlxY... 

https://meduza dot io/news/2022/04/18/minoborony-rf-zayavilo-ob-unichtozhenii-krupnyh-partiy-zapadnogo-oruzhiya-vo-lvove-vysokotochnymi-raketami-v-rezultate-udara-pogibli-sem-chelovek.

[5] https://tass dot com/politics/1439371.

[6] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/18/harkiv-chastkovo-zablokovanyj-mariupol-pid-aviaudaramy-vorozhyh-bombarduvalnykiv-tu-22m3-oleksandr-motuzyanyk/; 

https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/18/operatyvna-sytuacziya-na-fronti-bryfing-rechnyka-mo-ukrayiny-4/; 

https://t dot me/andriyshTime/316;

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1516002436447625219;

 https://t.me/opersvodki/3493; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1516004513030754307; 

https://t.me/opersvodki/3492; https://t.me/wargonzo/6631; 

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1516005888125018113;

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1515961811882885124; 

https://t.me/milinfolive/81378.

[7] https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1516078063917879311?s=20&t=5-6N....

[8] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/316.

[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/18/operatyvna-sytuacziya-na-fronti-bryfing-rechnyka-mo-ukrayiny-4/.

[10] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1516029852016590851;

 https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/status/1516033202149855236; 

https://twitter.com/Polk_Azov/status/1516025387779825668.

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/297662705880148.

[12] https://twitter.com/OleksiyDanilov/status/1516135897347272709?s=20&t=5-6... 

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1516144875196014601?s=20&t=5-6NcN4....

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/297662705880148;

[14] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidai.loga/posts/145536104652448; 

http... https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1692; 

https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1715.

[15] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1515948773876318211;

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzIplg7-hHY ;

 https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515798052870791176?s=20&t=ovwCL...

 https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1515996535514927107; 

https://twi... https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1692?single.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/videos/1013986689232550/; https://....

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign....

[18] https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1515779693315870725;

 https://twitter.com/suspilne_news/status/1515745224710148098;

 https://t... https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1515866677405175817;

 https://t.me/s... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/18/operatyvna-sytuacziya-na-fronti-bryfing-rechnyka-mo-ukrayiny-4/.

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1515954950781685761;

 https://t.me/milinfolive/81409; https://twitter.com/Syria_Protector/status/1515798708318842881; 

https:/... https://twitter.com/JSO_Kula/status/1510732462170775568

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; 

https:/... https://t.me/dvish_alive/11478; 

https://mobile.twitter.com/Danspiun/sta...

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287740683539017

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/297678982545187;

 https:/... https://armyinform and com.ua/2022/04/18/operatyvna-sytuacziya-na-fronti-bryfing-rechnyka-mo-ukrayiny-4/.

[22] https://www.facebook.com/www.dshv.mil.gov.ua/posts/353322463508415.

Tags

  Ukraine Project 

 File Attachments:



Monday, April 18, 2022

PART 2 : Invasion of Ukraine, D+40 APRIL 05 : Crowd Sourcing Battle Damage Assessment(BDA

SOURCE : 

(A)Bn Tac Gp:     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battalion_tactical_group 

(B) Bn Tac Gp: https://www.thefivecoatconsultinggroup.com/the-coronavirus-crisis/perspective-ukraine  

(C) Bn Tac Gp:    https://www.thefivecoatconsultinggroup.com/the-coronavirus-crisis/ukraine-context-d40  

(D)  DEFEAT  BTG:   https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2017/spring/2Fiore17.pdf

 ( E) Russian BTG & hybrid warfare   2018-06-11 Russias View of Mission Command of Battalion Tactical Groups (Bartles an

 (F) Russian “Hybrid warfare”: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337844663_Hybrid_Warfare_and_Russia's_Ground_Forces

 (G)  211th Rifle Division : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/211th_Rifle_Division

(H) 40th Army :  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/40th_Army_(Soviet_Union)

INDEX

PART 1 :  Russian BTG-    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/battalion-tactical-group.html

PART 2 :  Battle Damage Assessment:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/a-b-invasion-of-ukraine-d40-sitrep-207.html

PART 3 :   BTG-   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/part-2-battalion-tactical-group-btgs.html

PART 4 :    DEFEAT  BTG:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/defeating-russian-battalion-tactical.html

PART 5 :  Russian BTG & “Hybrid War” :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/russias-view-of-mission-command-of.html




Part 2 : Invasion of Ukraine, D+40, SITREP (#207)

Today, April 5, 2022, is D+40 in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. In addition to updating the crowdsourced [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdsourcing] Battle Damage Assessment on both sides of the conflict using the data from the Oryx website and providing an assessment of the impact of the war on both the Russian and Ukrainian forces, this article looks at crowdsourced BDA, implications for the future, and provides an assessment overtime on the Russian losses.

Crowd Sourcing Battle Damage Assessment(BDA)

Each day the Russian Invasion of Ukraine continues, both Russian and Ukraine forces have vehicles destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured from combat. Battle Damage Assessment, or BDA, is “the estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force.” In the old days, the Battalion or Brigade Intelligence Officer had to collect reports from helicopter pilots, Air Force pilots, forward observers, and ground forces who engaged the enemy. Based on these reports, the Intelligence Officer would make an assessment of how badly the enemy had been damaged by the actions of friendly forces.

Stijn Mitzer, along with Joost Oliemans, Kemal Janovsky, Dan Janovsky, and Jakub Janovsky, have taken this idea into the 21st Century. The five people are attempting to crowdsource battle damage assessments in real-time from both the Russian and Ukraine armed forces during the invasion of Ukraine on The Oryx Website. The team finds photos of destroyed, abandoned, and captured vehicles and then tries to count them based on the vehicle type. They also categorise them based on the vehicle being destroyed, abandoned, or captured. The team does its best to make sure that they are not counting the same vehicle twice and are updating it daily. Check it out yourself — the link to their regularly updated article is here.

Russian Losses Over Time and Bigger Implications

Crowdsourced Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) continues to be intriguing to watch after almost 6 weeks of combat. Here are three thoughts on crowd-sourced BDA.

One shortcoming of the Oryx Website is that due to the Russian withdrawal from near Kyiv there is a large number of vehicles in a backlog waiting to be counted or recognized that they already have been counted. Oryx’s team of five people is diligently working through the backlog, but the data has a lag right now — even so, the Russians have lost 400+ tanks!

Second, I think that crowdsourced Battle Damage Assessments will be part of future battlefields. Cell phones with cameras and social media platforms are here to stay and will only get better. The Oryx Website is just a team of five civilians working through every social media post of destroyed or damaged vehicles from both sides in Ukraine. Hats off to them for their incredible work. But every Army in the future will have to deal with this phenomenon. There certainly are implications for the US military as well. Is crowd sourced-BDA going to be replicated at the US Army’s National Training Center? How about at a Warfighter Command Post Exercise? What if the crowd-sourced BDA is more accurate than the reports the unit has received from its own people? Which report will be believed? Which report will decisions be made from?

There are larger, more strategic issues as well. Has the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) started to put together teams that can crowdsourced review photos and crowd source the BDA of North Korean, South Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese, Pakistan, and Indian equipment? Is the DIA able to replicate what Oryx is doing with a team crowdsourcing the BDA from Ukraine and Russian losses? Thinking ahead of five years, the technology should be there to enable a computer to do the crowdsourced BDA faster and more accurately than people. Has the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency started to encourage tech start-ups to produce an Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning platform that can review social media photos and provide this crowdsourced BDA to the US Department of Defense in future conflicts? What about Army Futures Command or the United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence? There’s work to be done to add this capability to the US military and the US intelligence community.

Lastly, Oryx’s updates are dynamic and their web page is being updated by the minute. However, there is n historic data available. I have maintained my data from over the last month. Here is a graphic that shows Russian vehicle losses from Monday at 3:00 PM EDT for, each of the last 5 weeks. For example, February 24, 2022 is the beginning of the Russian invasion — the vehicle numbers are my estimate that Russia attacked with 94 Battalion Tactical Groups.

Unfortunately, my Excel skills are limited. If you want the complete spreadsheet and can put together a better graphic/chart (if anyone out there can do a Minard chart that would be awesome!) send me a note here and I’ll send you the spreadsheet.



Current Situation


Here is Jomini of the West’s (Twitter @JominiW) map of the current situation (April 4, 2022). As he states “The collapse of the Kyiv-Chernihiv & Sumy Strategic Fronts & a shift of combat focus to east Ukraine will change the character of the war, not its essence.”


Advanced BDA:

Just counting damaged, destroyed, and captured vehicles is Basic BDA. Taking the raw numbers and then assessing the impact on the invasion force is Advanced BDA. Advanced BDA helps military leaders understand the context and make better decisions.

The military uses three categories to measure the impact on enemy units: suppressed, neutralized, or destroyed. As you would expect, each of these terms has a military definition. These terms use the US Army’s Field Artillery percentages for suppressed, neutralized, or destroyed.

  • Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish its mission. It is the lowest level and typically equates to 3% of a friendly or enemy unit’s equipment being destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured.

  • Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. It is in the middle and usually equates to 10% of a friendly or enemy unit’s equipment being destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured.

  • Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. It is the highest level and usually equals 30% of a friendly or enemy unit’s equipment being destroyed, damaged, abandoned, or captured.


  • Russian BDA (As of April 4, 2022 at 15:00 EDT the Oryx Website)

Russian forces have lost:

  • 424 Losses (74 ⬆️) out of an estimated 940x T-72/80/90s Tanks — 45.1% Losses (Destroyed)

    • Average of 10.9x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict

  • 487 Losses (18 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 3,102x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) — 15.7% Losses (Neutralized)

    • Average of 12.5x BMPs/BTRs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict

  • 7 Losses (No Change) out of an estimated 376x Shturm-S ATGM Carriers — 1.8% Losses (No impact)

  • 81 Losses (16 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 282x BAT-2s and 188x IMR-2s (Engineer Vehicles) — 12.9% Losses (Neutralized)

  • 175 Losses (29 ⬆️ )out of an estimated 564x 152 mm 2S19 Msta and 564x BM-21 122mm MLRS (Field Artillery) — 15.5% Losses (Neutralized)

  • 57 Losses (4 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 564x Pantsir-S1 (SAMs) — 10.1% Losses (Neutralized)

  • 133 MT-LB Losses (11 ⬆️) out of an estimated 658x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) — 20.2% Losses (Neutralized)

    • Average of 3.4x MT-LBs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict


There have not been regular updates or reports on casualties. Until there are updated reports, I will continue to provide this for some perspective:

On March 21, 2022, Komsomolskaya Pravda, a pro-Kremlin tabloid, reported that according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 9,861 Russian soldiers were killed in Ukraine and 16,153 were injured during the invasion. There may be an additional 10,000+ Russian soldiers captured by Ukraine as well. On Wednesday, March 23, 2022, a NATO spokesperson announced that their estimate was between 7,000 and 15,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine and up to 40,000 Russian troops in total have been killed, wounded, taken prisoner or are missing.


                                      Ukrainian BDA
(As of April 4, 2022 at 1500 EDT the Oryx)Website)

I believe these numbers are low since the Russian forces are not using social media and it makes it difficult for the Oryx team to crowdsourcestarting the data. However, it is a good start point. So far, according to Oryx, Ukrainian forces have lost:

  • 93 Losses (14 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 630x T-64/80s Tanks — 14.6% Losses (Neutralized)

    • Average of 2.5x tanks damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict.

  • 150 Losses (22 ⬆️) out of an estimated 2,215x BMPs/BTRs/BMDs (Armored Personnel Carriers) — 6.8% Losses (Suppressed)

    • Average of 4x BMPs/BTRs damaged, destroyed, abandoned and captured per day of the conflict.

  • 57 Losses (10 ⬆️ ) out of an estimated 306x 152 mm 2S19 Msta and 306x BM-21 122mm MLRS (Field Artillery) — 9.3% Losses (Suppressed)

  • 13 MT-LB Losses (1 ⬆️) out of an estimated 476x MT-LB ACRV (Command and Control) — 2.7% Losses (No Impact)starting

Casualties

Once again, there have not been regular updates or reports on casualties. Until there are updated reports, I will continue to provide this for some perspective:

President Zelenskyy said on March 13, 2022 that over 1,300 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed (US estimates were 3,000). Remember casualties in war are killed, wounded, and captured. This would also imply that there are about 6,500 Ukrainian soldiers wounded or captured. This uses the same ratio (1 killed to 5 wounded/captured) from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. This number does not include civilian casualties. There have been no updates on Ukrainian casualties for the past 20 days.

Map Notes

To help you understand the maps better, here is a short guide to some of the symbology above the units. Russian units are in red. Ukrainian units are in green. The name of the unit is typical to the right of the symbol.

  • Combined Arms Army (CAA) — Symbolized by XXXX above a unit on the map, the Army Group system was developed by the Soviets during World War II, when the echelons of corps and armies were merged together. Army Groups typically have several motorized rifle and tank divisions and brigades; headquarters, artillery, air defence, reconnaissance, and MTO (logistics) brigades; and an engineering regiment and an NBC defence regiment. These formations have over 20,000 soldiers in them.

  • Divisions — symbolized by XX above a unit on the map, these formations have about 8,500 soldiers and resemble Soviet-era divisions, with three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment (for a motorized rifle division (MRD)) or three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment (for a tank division) plus supporting units.

  • Brigades — symbolized by X above a unit on the map, these formations typically have 3,000-4,500 soldiers

  • Battalion Tactical Groups — symbolized by II above a unit on the map, these formations typically have 600 soldiers. See Invasion of Ukraine, D+15, SITREP for more details on the BTG.

More Information on Both the Russian Invasion Force and Ukrainian Defense Forces Can Be Found at:

Invasion of Ukraine, D+36, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+33, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+29, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+26, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+22, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+19, SITREP

Invasion of Ukraine, D+15, SITREP

BTGs, OoB, and Crowd Sourced BDA in Ukraine, D+11

Conclusion

Want even more? Reach out to me me here for a virtual talk to your group or company on the Invasion of Ukraine and its tactical and strategic implications.

Use your deeper awareness of the invasion of Ukraine to go on the offensive and follow the conflict with better insight.