RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT APR 22, 2022 r

(P)    WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: 

          https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

(Q)  (UKRAINE CRISIS COVERAGE:

 Click here to see a full list of ISW's Ukraine Conflict Updates. 

https://www.understandingwar.org/ukraine-crisis-coverage

SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

   (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

     ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:                                        https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

     (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

 (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                                     (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

                                           APR 22,2022

                   MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS, 

                                              AND

                           KATERYNA STEPANENKO 

                                       APR 22, 5:30 pm ET

A briefing by the Russian Deputy Commander of the Central Military District on April 22 reiterated standing Russian objectives in eastern and southern Ukraine and did not announce any new operations. Deputy Commander of the Central Military District Rustam Minnekaev gave a speech to the annual meeting of the Union of Defense Industries on April 22 that has been misinterpreted as the announcement of a new Russian campaign.[1]  Minnekaev said Russian forces began a new phase of the war two days ago, an unsurprising confirmation of the new phase of the Russian offensive announced by both Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian officials on April 19. [2] He stated the primary objective of Russian forces is to capture the entirety of the Donbas region and southern Ukraine to provide a land bridge to Crimea; as ISW has previously assessed, Russian forces seek to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and retain control of the Kherson region.

Minnekaev stated that Russian control of southern Ukraine provides Russia a future capability to conduct an offensive toward Transnistria, rather than announcing an imminent Russian offensive toward Moldova.   Minnekaev said Russian control of southern Ukraine will provide “another way out to Transnistria,” the illegally Russian-occupied strip of territory in Moldova, where he falsely claimed ”there are also facts of oppression of the Russian-speaking population.” We do not read this as a statement of intent to conduct a major offensive operation toward Moldova. An offensive toward Moldova would likely have been phrased around securing a “land corridor” [сухопутный коридор] to Moldova, much like the Russian land corridor to Crimea. Even if Russian forces did seek to resume major offensive operations toward Mykolaiv and on to Odesa, they are highly unlikely to have the capability to do so.

Key Takeaways

• A briefing by the Deputy Commander of the Central Military District restated the standing Russian objectives in the current phase of the war: capturing the entirety of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and defending Russian positions in southern Ukraine against Ukrainian counterattacks.

• Ongoing purges of Russian general officers for failures in Ukraine will likely further degrade Russian command and control.

• Russian forces seek to starve out the remaining defenders and civilians in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant and are unlikely to allow trapped civilians to leave.

• Russian forces conducted localized attacks and reconnoitered Ukrainian positions south of Izyum and did not make any advances.

• Russian forces secured minor gains in continuing daily attacks on the line of contact in eastern Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is setting conditions to create proxy republics in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to cement Russian control over these regions and conscript Ukrainian manpower.

Ukrainian Military Intelligence reported on April 22 that several Russian officers have been fired or imprisoned for failures in Ukraine.[3] The Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian authorities arrested the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Osipov and are investigating Black Sea Fleet Chief of Staff Vice Admiral S. Pinchuk, likely for the loss of the Moskva. The GUR additionally reported the commander of the 6th CAA, the commander and deputy commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, and the commander of the 22nd Army Corps have all been removed from their posts for unsatisfactory performance. Purges of Russian officers are unlikely to improve Russian capabilities, as replacement commanders will likely be less experienced and under intense pressure to achieve likely unreasonable objectives set by the Kremlin.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to bombard the Azovstal Steel Plant and besiege the remaining Ukrainian defenders.[4] Several Ukrainian government sources reported on April 22 that Russian forces have abandoned direct attacks on Azovstal but continue to shell the facility and have repeatedly refused Ukrainian requests to open humanitarian corridors to evacuate civilians.[5] Russian and DNR forces continued to consolidate their control of key buildings in Mariupol and are likely setting conditions to set up an occupation government.[6] Several videos circulated on social media of unspecified Russian forces departing Mariupol, but ISW cannot confirm at this time which Russian forces have departed the city or their likely destination.[7] Russian forces seek to starve out the remaining defenders and civilians in Azovstal and are unlikely to allow trapped civilians to leave. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on April 22 that it will only begin a humanitarian pause in Mariupol when Ukrainian forces “raise white flags” and surrender and claimed that they will run out of food and supplies within two weeks.[8]

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued local attacks along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine (continuing to focus on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka) on April 22 and made minor gains around Slovyansk, capturing the town of Lozova.[9] Russian forces additionally consolidated their recently captured positions to prepare for further assaults.[10] The military situation did not substantially change in the last 24 hours, and Russian forces are continuing to conduct localized attacks while feeding in additional reinforcements instead of pausing to prepare for a wider offensive. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that additional unspecified elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (previously withdrawn from the Chernihiv axis) deployed to eastern Ukraine on April 22.[11]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian units from the 6th CAA and Baltic and Northern Fleets (the Ukrainian General Staff reported up to seven battalion tactical groups (BTGs), though we cannot independently confirm this number, and these units are likely heavily degraded) continued to partially block Kharkiv and shell the city.[12] A pro-Russian telegram channel reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack on Kozacha Lopan, north of Kharkiv and just 5km from the Russian border.[13] ISW cannot independently confirm this report, but, if confirmed, it likely indicates Ukrainian efforts to conduct counterattacks north of Kharkiv to the Russian border, possibly threatening Belgorod.[14] 

Russian forces conducted localized attacks and reconnoitred Ukrainian positions south of Izyum on April 22 and did not make any advances.[15] Ukraine’s Special Operations Command claimed it destroyed a bridge being used by Russian forces at an unspecified location near Izyum on April 22.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported elements of the 1st Tank Army, the 20th and 35th CAAs, the 68th Army Corps, and unspecified airborne troops (many of whom remain highly damaged from fighting around Kyiv and in northeastern Ukraine) are concentrated on the Izyum axis.[17] Social media imagery depicted additional Russian forces concentrating in Belgorod Oblast in Russia on April 20.[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks on Ukrainian positions west of Kherson and towards Zaporizhia in the last 24 hours.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported elements of Russia’s 19th Motor Rifle Division (of the 58th CAA) deployed to the Zaporizhia front, likely to support offensive operations to the north intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine, though Russian forces remain highly unlikely to make significant headway in these offensive operations.[20]

The Kremlin is additionally setting conditions to create proxy republics in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to cement Russian control over these regions and conscript Ukrainian manpower. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported on April 22 that Russian forces are preventing Ukrainian citizens from leaving these regions and are preparing to conscript military-age men.[21]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka.

• Russian forces will attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate.

• Russian forces will likely increase the scale of ground offensive operations in the coming days, but it is too soon to tell how fast they will do so or how large those offensives will be. It is also too soon to assess how the Russians will weight their efforts in the arc from Izyum to Donetsk City.

 

 

---

References

[1] https://www.interfax dot ru/world/837353; 

https://www.rosbalt dot ru/world/2022/04/22/1954818.html

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass....

[3] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/296873329290761.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688; 

https://iz dot ru/1324677/2022-04-22/peskov-oproverg-zaiavleniia-gosdepa-ssha-o-tom-chto-vsu-prodolzhaiut-uderzhivat-mariupol.

[5] https://t dot me/tv_rada/6118; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/394; 

https://t dot me/andriyshTime/386;

[6] https://t.me/nm_dnr/7711; 

https://t.me/nm_dnr/7714; 

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1517444966108311552;

 https://t.me/ChDambiev/15759;

[7] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1517239456209768450;

 https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1517238842008481795

[8] https://iz dot ru/1324736/2022-04-22/minoborony-rf-soobshchilo-o-gotovnosti-vvesti-rezhim-tishiny-na-azovstali; 

https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/14448309; 

https://military.pravda dot ru/news/1701455-azovstal_mariupol/.

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300150852298000;

 https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1517240965521723392; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=698058888072526.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688.

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300150852298000; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688; 

https://t dot me/synegubov/2956; https://t dot me/synegubov/2952

[13] https://t.me/istorijaoruzija/57389.

[14] https://t.me/istorijaoruzija/57389.

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300150852298000; 

https://t.me/uniannet/48984; https://t.me/dvish_alive/12792

[16] https://www.facebook.com/usofcom/posts/394247465852861.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300150852298000.

[18] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1517241624702685185;

 https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1517060107850461185.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300150852298000;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300490638930688;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/300150852298000.

[21] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/22/na-hersonshhyni-ta-zaporizhzhi-okupanty-gotuyut-referendum-ta-planuyut-mobilizacziyu/.

 Tags  

Ukraine Project 

File Attachments: 

DraftUkraineCoTApril22,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft April 22,2022.png

Mariupol Battle Map Draft April 22,2022.png

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 22,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft April 22,2022.png

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 21 r

   WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: 

                                   https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

   (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

     ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:                                        https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

     (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

 (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                                     (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

                                           APR 21,2022

                   MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS, 

                                              AND

                           KATERYNA STEPANENKO 

                                 APR 21, 6:45 pm ET

April 21, 6:45pm ET

The Kremlin declared victory in the battle of Mariupol. Russian forces will attempt to starve out remaining Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant rather than clear it through likely costly assaults. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared victory in the battle of Mariupol on April 21 despite the continued presence of Ukrainian forces in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant. In a staged, televised meeting, Putin ordered Shoigu to halt assaults on the plant to limit Russian casualties, claiming Russian forces have already captured the entirety of the city. The Kremlin will spin the (still incomplete) capture of Mariupol into a major victory in Ukraine to compensate for stalled or failed Russian offensives elsewhere.

The Kremlin’s reduction of the pace of operations in Mariupol is unlikely to enable the deployment of significant combat power to support other offensive operations in the coming days and weeks. Statements from US officials that Russia has not yet removed a dozen battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from Mariupol despite Putin’s claimed victory do not capture either the status of these Russian forces or other constraints on their use.[1] ISW has consistently assessed that Russian BTGs have taken high casualties in the battle of Mariupol, are degraded, and are unlikely to possess their full complement of personnel (800-900 at full strength). As with Russian operations elsewhere in Ukraine, reporting on numbers of BTGs without additional context and analysis of the combat power of these units is not a useful evaluation of Russian forces. While it is unlikely that all 12 reported BTGs were involved in the final fighting around the Azovstal plant, it will still take some time for those units that were engaged in final assaults to disengage for redeployment elsewhere. Some portion of these Russian forces will be necessary for several other missions—including maintaining the siege of the Azovstal plant, securing the rest of Mariupol against any remaining pockets of Ukrainian forces and likely partisan actions, and possibly redeploying to support Russian forces maintaining control of southern Ukraine. Russian forces will certainly be able to redeploy some units from Mariupol to offensive operations elsewhere—but Ukrainian forces have succeeded in tying down and degrading a substantial Russian force, and the Kremlin's declaration of victory has not inherently freed up 12 BTGs worth of combat power for other operations.

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin’s declaration of victory in Mariupol is unlikely to enable the deployment of significant combat power to reinforce offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the coming days or weeks.

• Russian forces involved in the battle of Mariupol are likely heavily damaged and Ukrainian forces succeeded in tying down and degrading a substantial Russian force.

• Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine but made only marginal gains.

• Ukrainian forces continued to halt Russian attacks around Izyum.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

The Kremlin declared victory in the battle of Mariupol on April 21, though some Ukrainian forces remain in the Azovstal Steel Plant. Russian President Putin held a televised meeting with Defense Minister Shoigu (in his first confirmed public appearance since March 11) during which Shoigu claimed “the entirety of Mariupol is under the control of the Russian army” and stated Russian forces have “securely blocked” the "nationalists and foreign mercenaries” (Kremlin language for Ukrainian forces) remaining in the facility.[2] Shoigu claimed that Russian forces would require 3-4 days to finish clearing the Azovstal plant, after which Putin stated a final assault is unnecessary and ordered a full blockade of the facility to save Russian lives. The “meeting” was a managed Kremlin messaging effort claiming victory in the battle of Mariupol to be able to claim a major success without the likely costly operations required to clear out remaining Ukrainian defenders.[3] Local sources reporting fighting continued around the Azovstal plant in the last 24 hours despite Putin’s statement, but Russian forces did not conduct any major assaults against the facility.[4]

Ukrainian officials called for a local ceasefire to allow Ukrainian defenders and trapped civilians to leave Mariupol, though Russian forces will likely instead attempt to starve the remaining defenders into submission. Ukrainian Mayor of Mariupol Vadym Boychenko called for a ceasefire to allow civilians trapped in the plant to leave on April 21.[5]  Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk expanded on this call, stating around 1,000 civilians and 5,000 wounded soldiers (with an unspecified number of unwounded soldiers) remain in the Azovstal plant.[6]

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Ukraine but made only marginal gains on April 21. Russian forces continued to focus their assaults on Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, and Popasna and likely made local advances in Rubizhne, though Russian claims to have captured the entirety of Rubizhne are likely false.[7] The Ukrainian governor of Luhansk Oblast reported on April 21 that Russian forces control approximately half of Popasna, and street fighting is continuing across the city.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense additionally claimed to capture Kreminna, west of Rubizhne, but ISW cannot verify this claim.[9] Russian forces are continuing to deploy reinforcements to eastern Ukraine to support further offensive actions.[10]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces continued assaults on Ukrainian positions around Izyum but did not secure any territorial gains in the past 24 hours. Russian forces may be attempting to probe Ukrainian defensive positions around Izyum prior to larger offensive operations but remain largely road-bound and unlikely to secure any major breakthroughs.[11] Russian forces continued to shell areas of Kharkiv Oblast and partially block Kharkiv city on April 21.[12]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces likely conducted local attacks on Ukrainian positions west of Kherson on April 21 but did not secure any new territory.[13] Ukrainian military sources reported on April 21 Russian forces are preparing to conduct a “referendum” to create a “Kherson People’s Republic” on April 27.[14] The Kremlin likely intends to create one or more proxy states in occupied southern Ukraine to cement its military occupation and set conditions to demand permanent control over these regions.

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka.

• Russian forces will attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol.

• Russian forces will likely increase the scale of ground offensive operations in the coming days, but it is too soon to tell how fast they will do so or how large those offensives will be. It is also too soon to assess how the Russians will weight their efforts in the arc from Izyum to Donetsk City.

---

References

[1] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1517163219151900672?s=20&t=GdFmuTh....

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/68254.

[3] https://t dot me/mariupolnow/7305.

[4] https://t.me/andriyshTime/379; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/370; https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1517153355201585159;

 https://t dot co/cPwXih18QN; https://t.me/polkazov/4424; 

https://t.me/polkazov/4425; https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1517089022719496194.

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/21/russia-ukraine-war-news-... ;

https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-21-22/....

[6] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/21/vymagayemo-vid-rosiyan-terminovyj-gumanitarnyj-korydor-z-azovstali/;

 https://t dot me/mariupolrada/9304; 

https://www.facebook.com/vereschuk.iryna/posts/1887745004745347

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/299473092365776; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/299473092365776;

 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1822;

 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1829; 

https://iz dot ru/1323466/2022-04-20/podrazdeleniia-vsu-pokidaiut-raion-rubezhnogo-severodonetcka-i-lisichanska; 

https://iz dot ru/1323978/2022-04-21/v-lnr-rasskazali-o-zachistke-okrain-rubezhnogo-ot-natcionalistov; 

https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/21/7341118/.

[8] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1836; https://t.me/stranaua/37783.

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/14577.

[10] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/velikij-nastup-rosiyi-na-donbasi-she-ne-pochavsya-vorog-perevirye-sili-zsu-danilov.

[11] https://t dot me/synegubov/2952; https://t.me/stranaua/37779.

[12] https://t.me/synegubov/2952;

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/299473092365776;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/299820725664346;

[14] https://t.me/stranaua/37726; https://fb.watch/cx6FHu18yW/;

 https://t.me/stranaua/37794.

 Tags

Ukraine Project 

  File Attachments: 

Mariupol Battle Map Draft April 21,2022.png

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 21,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft April 21,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft April 21,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTApril21,2022.png