Thursday, April 28, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 27

  GOOGLE  TO  GLIMPSE THE WAR 

(P) TOM COOPER UKRAINE WAR: 

 https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-25-26-april-2022-aa0c1122320e

(Q) RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg


(R)    WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: 

          https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

(S)  (UKRAINE CRISIS COVERAGE:
https://www.understandingwar.org/ukraine-crisis-coverage


SOURCE:

 (A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27

(C)   https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

 https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

  (E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 (F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP;     https://liveuamap.com/     

 (G)  ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 


INDEX  

( )  ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html 

 ( ) TIME LINE :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

 ( ) MAR 25:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 26:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 (  )   MAR 27:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 (  )  MAR 28:    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

 ( )  MAR 29:     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  MAR 30:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )   MAR 31:      https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 01 :     https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( ) APR 02 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )  APR 03 :  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html                                                           

 ( ) APR 04 :    https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 05 :   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

 ( )APR 06 :  ((i)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html 

 ( ) APR 06:  (ii)  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

 ( ) APR 07:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html            

 ( ) APR 08:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html  

  ( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html 

   ( ) APR 10:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

  ( )  APR 11:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

   ( )  APR 12:   https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

   (  )  APR 13:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html


RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

     ( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:                                        https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf                                                                                                

     ( B )  2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces    https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#  

     ( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense  :   

     https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503 

     (D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR 

 https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  

     ( E ) ORBITS  WORLD BATTLES : 

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

 (F)  (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District    https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf 

                                                     (G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf    https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

 (H)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  (J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf




ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

                                           APR 27,2022


                   MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS, 

                                              AND

                           KATERYNA STEPANENKO 


                                      April 27, 8:00   pm ET


Russian forces made minor but steady advances both from Izyum and in continued assaults along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine on April 27Russian forces took several small towns directly west of Izyum in the past 24 hours. While this line of advance takes Russian forces away from their main objective of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, they likely intend to outflank Ukrainian defensive positions on the highways to Barvinkove and Slovyansk. Russian forces made several small advances in eastern Ukraine; Russia’s increasing concentration of artillery assets is likely enabling these tactical advances. Russian forces are advancing methodically in several sectors but have achieved no notable breakthroughs. The capability of Russian forces to encircle large groups of Ukrainian forces remains in doubt.

The Kremlin continued to prepare for a likely false-flag missile attack against the Moldovan territory of Transnistria, which is illegally occupied by Russian forces. Russian proxies in Transnistria falsely claimed Ukrainian forces are preparing to attack Transnistria, and Ukrainian intelligence reported Russian forces are preparing to conduct a missile strike on Transnistria and blame Ukraine. Russian and Transnistrian forces also increased their readiness for possible operations in the last 24 hours. Russia may intend to involve Transnistria in the war in Ukraine to utilize Transnistria’s (limited) reserve forces or to launch attacks and shell Ukraine from the Transnistrian territory. The Kremlin may alternatively seek to destabilize Moldova itself to raise tensions in Moldova and neighbouring Romania and put additional pressure on NATO, possibly seeking to reduce Western military support to Ukraine either by diverting NATO forces to Romania or threatening a wider escalation.

Russian forces are stepping up “filtration measures” in occupied territories and abducting Ukrainian citizens, likely for use in future prisoner exchanges. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 27 that Russian forces are conducting large-scale “filtration measures” in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk Oblasts.[1] The “filtration” targets men of military age, former military and law enforcement personnel, and pro-Ukrainian activists for interrogation, torture, and possible execution. The GUR reported Russian forces are additionally shipping Ukrainian hostages to Crimea to “replenish the exchange fund,” seeking to exchange Ukrainian civilians for Russian military prisoners in future prisoner swaps. The GUR additionally speculated that Russian forces may be preparing to use Ukrainian civilians to portray Prisoners of War in May 9th Victory Day celebrations, noting that Russian forces conducted similar propaganda efforts in Donetsk in 2014.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted drone or possibly missile strikes on Russian logistics centers in Belgorod and Voronezh on April 27. Russian sources and social media reported multiple explosions early on April 27, which Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mikhail Podolyak later euphemistically confirmed were Ukrainian strikes, stating Russian cities cannot “sit out” the invasion of Ukraine and “the disarmament of the Belgorod-Voronezh warehouses is a natural process.[2] Ukrainian forces will likely conduct further cross-border strikes to disrupt Russian logistics, which the Kremlin will likely falsely frame as an escalation or somehow a war crime.

Key Takeaways

  • Concentrated artillery is likely enabling limited Russian advances in eastern Ukraine, though Russian forces continue to struggle to break through prepared Ukrainian defenses.

  • Russian forces funnelled additional reinforcements and tactical missile units into the Izyum front and made minor advances. Russian forces are likely attempting to bypass Ukrainian forces on the road to Barvinkove by advancing directly west before pivoting southwards in the coming days.

  • Heavy Russian bombardment and continued assaults failed to make headway against Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal plant, even as Russian forces reportedly prepared to stage a press tour in the occupied areas of the city in April 28.

  • Russian forces around Kherson are likely preparing for a renewed push to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days but Ukrainian counterattacks continue to disrupt Russian operations in the area.

  • Russian occupation forces continued preparations to announce the creation of a Russian proxy “Kherson People’s Republic” (KNR) amid widespread Ukrainian resistance.

  • The Kremlin may be preparing to either bring Transnistria into the war in Ukraine or destabilize Moldova itself to put additional pressure on NATO.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 


ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued ground and air assaults against Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant on April 27. The Ukrainian military reported Russian forces continued to conduct a high tempo of air strikes against Ukrainian defenders, including by Tu-22M3 strategic bombers.[3] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro  Andryushchenko and the commander of the Ukrainian 36th Marine Brigade separately reported that Russian forces continued ground assaults on the Azovstal facility and that Ukrainian forces are running low on food, water, and ammunition.[4]

Russian forces are also stepping up occupation and “filtration” measures in Mariupol to consolidate control of the city and turn it into a propaganda victory.[5] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin will hold a press tour in Mariupol on April 28 for Kremlin-loyal outlets – including foreign journalists – including faked witness testimonials about the course of the battle.[6]  Andryushchenko separately reported that Russian occupation forces are increasingly restricting civilian movement in Mariupol and “resorting to physical coercion and blackmail” to force Ukrainian citizens to work for the occupation regime.[7]

 

 

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces made marginal advances in frontal assaults around Severodonetsk, Rubizhne, and Popasna on April 27 and continued to shell the entire frontline.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Russian forces captured Novotoshkirske, a small town 25 km south of Severodonetsk, and attempted to advance further west.[9] Russian forces advancing south from the Svatove area (west of Rubizhne) additionally captured the town of Zarichne.[10] Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in Avdiika, near Donetsk city.[11] Russian forces are making slow progress on these multiple small axes of advance, likely due to their increasing use of concentrated artillery, but their ability to encircle Ukrainian forces and the extent to which they will be able to advance remain unclear.

 

 

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces in Izyum continued attacks on three lines of advance – southeast towards Slovyansk, southwest towards Barvinkove, and directly west away from Donetsk Oblast – on April 27.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Nova Dmytrivka, towards Barvinkove, and repelled unspecified attacks towards Slovyansk.[13] The Ukrainian general Staff reported that elements of Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA), 35th CAA, and 68th Army Corps are active on the Barvinkove front.[14] Two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) from the 76th Airborne Division – which was heavily damaged in fighting northwest of Kyiv – deployed from Belgorod, Russia, to the Izyum frontlines on April 27.[15] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense additionally reported that two Iskander-M ballistic missile batteries, likely in part from the 20th CAA’s 448th Missile Brigade, deployed to Belgorod Oblast from an unspecified location on April 27.[16]

Russian forces made territorial advances directly west of Izyum, capturing the town of Zavody and the outskirts of Velyka Komyshuvakha, 20km west of Izyum.[17] Russian forces west of Izyum most likely intended to pivot southwards and advance on Barvinvoke after completing the capture of Velyka Komyshuvakha, seeking to bypass Ukrainian defenses along the T2122 highway. These forces could alternatively attempt a deep encirclement of Ukrainian forces that is unlikely to succeed, as Russian forces pushing west of Izyum are moving away from the otherwise mutually-supporting Russian lines of advance roughly converging west of Severodonetsk.

Russian forces continued to partially encircle Kharkiv and shell civilian infrastructure across the oblast on April 27.[18]

 

 

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to shell along the entire line of contact along the southern axis and reinforce forward positions in preparation for the likely resumption of offensive operations towards Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on April 27.[19] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk stated that elements of Russia’s 8thCAA, 49th CAA, 22nd Army Corps, coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet, and airborne troops are reinforcing their forward positions and replenishing ammunition for further operations.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are actively conducting aerial reconnaissance in likely preparation for offensive operations.[21] Local fighting continued in the Mykolayiv direction, with Russian forces conducting failed attacks towards Tavriyske and Nova Zorya and Ukrainian forces reportedly recapturing Shyroke, Novopetrivka, and Lyubino, 50 km north of Kherson.[22] Russian forces are likely attempting to recohere forces to launch larger-scale offensive operations in the coming days to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast, but successful Ukrainian counterattacks are likely delaying and disrupting Russian operations.

Russian occupation forces continued preparations to announce the creation of a “Kherson People’s Republic” (KNR) amid widespread Ukrainian resistance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 27 that Russian forces are printing ballots and conducting a census for a “referendum” and preventing civilians from leaving the occupied territories.[23] Multiple Ukrainian government sources reported that Russian forces are taking several steps to crack down on possible resistance, including reports by the Pivden Operational Command on April 26 that Russian forces are appointing collaborators to local government positions; reports Rosgvardia forces stepped up filtration measures in Kiselivka and Stanislav; and reports that Russian forces are attempting to identify the places of residence of Ukrainian security personnel.[24]  Local social media users additionally shared footage of a large protest against the creation of the KNR in Kherson’s Freedom Square on April 27.[25] The Kremlin likely intends to create further proxy states modeled on the DNR and LNR in Kherson and elsewhere to consolidate its control over occupied Ukrainian territory – both by creating an occupation government and by falsely claiming in negotiations that the territory is occupied by “independent” states, not Russian military forces.

 

 

Russian forces also continued to prepare for a likely false-flag missile attack against the Moldovan territory of Transnistria, which is illegally occupied by Russian forces. The Kremlin mobilized Transnistrian proxy forces on April 27 as Russian state media began setting rhetorical conditions for the possible recognition of the self-styled Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) in Transnistria. Russian media is increasingly reporting that Transnistria may need to “protect the interests of the republic” by declaring its independence, echoing language used by the Kremlin prior to its recognition of the DNR and LNR in mid-February.[26] Ukraine’s Pivden Operational Command directly claimed on April 27 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct false-flag missile strikes into Transnistria to accuse Ukraine of attacking the unrecognized republic.[27] Local Transnistrian officials and media reported unconfirmed gunshots and several claimed incidents of Ukrainian drones crossing into Transnistria; ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Transnistria announced a “red level” of threat, increased the readiness of its forces, and strengthened checkpoint security on April 27.[29]

 

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City will likely make steady but tactical gains against Ukrainian defenders.
  • Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol and will not allow trapped civilians to evacuate but may conduct costly assaults on remaining Ukrainian defenders to claim a propaganda victory.
  • Russian forces are likely preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.
  • Russia may continue false-flag attacks in and around Transnistria or might move to generate a more serious crisis in Transnistria and Moldova more generally.

 


References

[1] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/300052648972829.

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/130257https://t.me/stranaua/38776; 

https://t.me/M_Podolyak/61?fbclid=IwAR2YisSID_hlZ1iIH8SGoOzZra_Uv4CwtP6J....

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868

https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/27/okupanty-ne-prypynyayut-zavdavaty-aviaudariv-po-mariupolyu-z-dalnih-bombarduvalnykiv-tu-22m3/;

[4] https://t.me/andriyshTime/511

https://t.me/stranaua/38821; https://t.me/mariupolnow/8176

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/300120265632734.

[7] https://t.me/andriyshTime/512https://t.me/andriyshTime/514.

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868;

 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2039; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2052;

 https://t.me/stranaua/38762;

 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2039.

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868

https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2039.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868.

[11] https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3161; 

https://t.me/stranaua/38790;

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1519297991886008320.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504;

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504;

 https://t.me/synegubov/3006.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868.

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868;

 https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/27/u-byelgorodskij-oblasti-v-30-km-vid-kordonu-z-ukrayinoyu-rozgornuto-batareyu-otrk-iskander-m/.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/27/u-byelgorodskij-oblasti-v-30-km-vid-kordonu-z-ukrayinoyu-rozgornuto-batareyu-otrk-iskander-m/.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868

https://t.me/synegubov/3006;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868.

[20] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/27/na-kryvorizkomu-ta-mykolayivskomu-napryamkah-ochikuyetsya-aktyvizacziya-bojovyh-dij/.

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868.

[22] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1638107116541847

https://www.unian.net/war/armiya-ukrainy-v-nikolaevskoy-oblasti-vernula-....

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504.

[24] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1638107116541847

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/303742171938868https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504.

[25] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1175;

 https://t.me/stranaua/38770;

 https://t.me/stranaua/38783https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2042505722587337.

[26] https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1518885976721997825; 

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1518885978328506368.

[27] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1185223818907103https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1638107116541847.

[28] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1638107116541847

https://t.me/stranaua/38758; https://t.me/stranaua/38766;

 https://t.me/stranaua/38772; https://t.me/tsvtiraspol/25000;

 https://t.me/tsvtiraspol/25011.

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/304045811908504;

 https://t.me/krepostpmr/33521https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=163810711654184

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN 2022 : Can Western Tanks, Artillery, And Missiles Save Ukraine? Don’t Count On It.

SOURCE :

 (A) 1945 mag :  https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/04/can-western-tanks-artillery-and-missiles-save-ukraine-dont-count-on-it/


Can Western Tanks, Artillery, And Missiles 

Save Ukraine? Don’t Count On It.

By

                                                    Daniel Davis







U.S. Marines with Ground Combat Element, Marine Rotational Force – Darwin, fire an M777 during fire missions training at Mount Bundey Training Area, NT, Australia, Aug. 6 2020. The training provided Marines with a unique opportunity to develop new techniques and procedures to integrate direct and indirect fire. The ability to rapidly deploy fire support and employ indirect fire weapons provides the Marine Corps an advantage as an expeditionary forward force deployed to austere environments. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Lydia Gordon)



On Monday, ( 25 Apr 2022 )    Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said one U.S. objective in its support of Ukraine was to “weaken” Russia. Former NATO commander Gen (ret). Wesley Clark recently told CNN that one way to accomplish that goal is to send Ukraine “500 tanks, a couple thousand tubes of artillery and rockets.” And, he added, “we’ve got to get (all those tanks and artillery tubes) moving if we’re going to break” Russia’s offensive in the Donbas

While It May Seem Self-Evident That Ukraine Could Defeat Russia’s Attack If The West Provided Large Numbers Of Tanks To The Front Quickly Enough, The Difficulties And Challenges Of Combat Realities Make Such An Outcome Highly Unlikely. In A Best-Case Scenario For Ukraine, It Would Take The Better Part Of A Year To Be Able To Produce An Armored Combat Capacity Strong Enough To Expel The Russian Army From Ukrainian Territory – And As Explained Below, Even With Such Weapons, Ukraine May Still Not Succeed.



             Current Tactical Situation in Russo-Ukraine War


                     RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S  CURRENT  PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  

GOOGLE  url  TO OPEN 

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg


First, let’s consider the existing military situation in the east of Ukraine today. 

The biggest fight raging at the moment is the Battle of Donbas, in which up to 50,000 Ukrainian troops are defending against reportedly a Russian attack of more than 70,000 troops. Putin’s army is trying to hold the center of a 300-mile front with one portion of its force, attempting penetration of the northern shoulder of Ukraine’s defenses with armored troops that repositioned from Kyiv, and pushing on the southern shoulder with troops recently redeployed from Mariupol.

Russia is waging two efforts to support this main fight, by conducting limited offensives against Kharkiv in the north and in the Kherson region in the south of Ukraine. The intent of these two actions appears to be designed to hold significant Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in place to prevent them from attacking the flanks of Russian troops attacking the Donbas front.  Meanwhile, other contingents of UAF troops are defending the coast near Odesa and near Kyiv to guard against any future incursions from Crimea or Belarus. 

Though the Ukrainian government has placed a strict embargo on its combat losses, in all probability they have suffered similar levels as that of the Russians, which are reported to be upwards of 40,000 dead and wounded. Other than the possibility of holding back some strategic reserve force, in all likelihood Ukraine has its entire armed force decisively engaged throughout the country. 

Second, in order to generate an armoured, mobile striking force of sufficient strength to dislodge Russian troops from their current positions, Kyiv would need to take a number of critical steps. At the top of the list, of course, is to procure sufficient numbers of armoured vehicles: tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, air defense systems, ammunition and fuel carriers, and other related kits. 

To be effective, these weapons must be something close to interoperable, have similar maintenance requirements, and be easy enough to operate that they require minimal training time. Ideally, that would mean getting all types of combat systems that Ukraine has already been using for decades. 

While it may sound good to add some modern U.S. howitzersGerman tanks, and British anti-air systems, for example, trying to graft those platforms into a system designed to supply and maintain a Soviet-era force would be building in challenges and roadblocks, if for no other reason than each would require its own separate trained mechanics to maintain and repair, and separate types of ammunition from all their other systems; no logistics system could adequately accommodate such disparity.

Third, and most significant: Once the challenges of getting equipment that can be operated and maintained by UAF troops, Ukraine would need to generate a new, trained crop of soldiers almost from scratch. As noted above, the entirety of the Ukrainian army is currently decisively engaged in fierce combat throughout the country. Kyiv doesn’t have the manpower to pull those trained troops off the line and send them somewhere to be trained. New forces would have to be generated, out of contact, while the existing troops try to hold the line against Russia’s attacks. That is a far more daunting task than it seems.  Here’s why.

Challenges of Training Ukraine Troops to Use New Heavy  Weapons from the West

As in any military task, it is necessary to start with the desired end-state in mind. To have a fighting chance of eventually expelling Russian troops from its territory, Ukraine will need meaningful numbers of effective mechanized brigades. Each mechanized brigade would consist of some mix of tank, infantry, artillery, and air defense companies (plus maintenance and logistic units, of course). To produce a system of such combat units that can fight effectively, however, the process starts at the individual trooper level.

First, let’s take the tank. Soviet-style T-64 and T-72 tanks, which the UAF has used for decades, are operated by a three-manned crew: the driver, the gunner, and the tank commander. Each of these individuals first hast to learn how to do their job and do it well. The Gunner has to know how to operate the various fire control systems, sights, and techniques for engaging targets. The driver must be proficient at handling the massive vehicle, understand where the tank can and can’t maneuver, how to control the vehicle, and be responsive to the orders of the tank commander.

For his part, the tank commander must know the capabilities and limitations of the tank as well as the driver, must know how to perform the duties of the gunner, and then understand how to “fight the tank” under every environmental circumstance in which the tank may be required to operate. 

Once those individual positions have been mastered, then the tank has to learn to fight as a team, which is crucial for the tank’s performance. The next step in forming an armored unit is to build the platoon, which is the tactical unit that faces the enemy.  It is typically composed of three to four tanks, led by a lieutenant serving as a platoon leader.

Next, the tank platoon has to learn how to fight as part of a tank company, which is composed of three to four tank platoons.  The tank company is usually commanded by a captain. The company commander, joined by his senior enlisted non-commissioned officer and other sergeants, has to fight the platoons as a coordinated team, ensuring that each platoon does its job, but also must know the different tasks he must assign to other platoons so that all work in unison to accomplish a single objective. 

T-80 Tank firing. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

After that, the tank company has to learn how to fight together within the battalion, usually commanded by a Lt. Col. The battalion commander and his staff must know how to fight each of the companies to achieve their mission, and also understand their role in the larger mission, which could be anything from the main effort, a supporting effort, flank support, or as a tactical reserve. The same is then true one level higher with battalions working within a brigade.

Each of these echelons, from platoon to brigade, must be mastered if the battle force is to be successful in combat. As I personally observed in the 1990s as a part of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) which was based in Germany, training a brigade-level unit in peacetime is very time-consuming. 

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered the 2nd ACR to deploy to the Middle East, along with hundreds of thousands of other U.S. units. We had to retrain ourselves from European terrain and scenarios to desert and Iraqi scenarios as rapidly as possible. 

We spent six full months firing weapons and training with the equipment and the crews who would fight the war before Operation Desert Storm began on the ground in late February 1991. We executed the final manoeuvre training in the Saudi deserts, at platoon, company, battalion, and finally regimental (brigade) level.

Since testing at U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, the Department of Defense’s lone extreme cold natural environment testing facility, began in January 2020, the M1A2 System Enhancement Package Version 3 main battle tank was driven more than 2,000 miles in rugged conditions across three seasons of sub-Arctic weather, fired hundreds of rounds for accuracy in extreme cold, and underwent testing of its auxiliary power unit.
Though the platform was extensively tested at U.S. Army Yuma Test Center prior to being put through its paces in Alaska, the sub-zero temperatures brought forth glitches that would have been unimaginable in the desert.

All of that was done out of enemy contact, using the equipment we had trained on for years, that was fully maintained, and led by officers and sergeants with decades of combined experience. Even then, I personally observed that not every American unit performed well. Some were nothing short of brilliant in combat, while others were tentative, and still others outright weak. For Ukraine to form an effective fighting force, they will have none of the advantages we had.


The Cold Calculations of Combat Realities

To build its army, Ukraine would have to train new troops not currently engaged in combat. It would be difficult, but definitely doable, to train new recruits at crew-level tasks of operating tanks, artillery, and other combat gear in an accelerated timeframe. Beyond that, however, there comes an increased cost in cutting corners and timelines. 

For example, in the American army, a company commander typically has five to six years’ worth of experience at the platoon level before taking the reins of a tank company. A battalion commander must have at least 16 years of experience, and a brigade commander, 22 years. The Ukrainian Army virtually didn’t exist eight years ago, so no officer will have much more experience than a company commander in the US, but even that understates the challenge.

For the majority of the eight years since 2014, the vast majority of UAF training and operations have been in static, World War I-style trench warfare; few officers or men have experience commanding tank or infantry units in mobile operations. Though officers can be taught many things, experience can’t be conveyed; it has to be earned over a period of years. Consider the ramifications of the monumental task facing Kyiv today.

Zelensky’s government must figure out how to train multiple mechanized brigades while virtually the whole of his army is actively defending his country. That means that Kyiv will either have to curtail every aspect of training and try to simply rush tanks, artillery tubes, and air defense systems into the front lines, while troops are actively fighting, in the hopes that the added equipment enables them to form offensive potential to launch counteroffensives necessary to drive Russian troops off the territory they currently possess.

An M60A1 tank from the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces fires a round at a range in Wadi Shadiyah during a massive military demonstration in front of dignitaries and media.

Or it will require Ukraine to hold the lines against Russia’s attacks throughout the country in order to form a new armoured organization, from scratch, in either a third country or in a relatively safe part of western Ukraine. In that safe location, troops would have to conduct many months of training, even in an expedited way, out of contact with the enemy, so that they could later be brought into the fight at full strength.

Obviously, either of those scenarios couldn’t be started until Ukraine had received a comprehensive set of combat equipment from western countries, had the gear brought up to operational standards, and supplied with large stocks of fuel and ammunition (necessary to sustain the training phase and then a sustained offensive campaign). Just the assembling of the equipment and sustainment would take three to four months, and that only after Western countries had made the decision to provide a specific kit. Only then could the months of individual, crew, platoon, company, and battalion training begin – also measured in months.

There will be the temptation to treat this like a fire brigade: if the house is on fire, you marshal everything you can, throw it all at the fire as it becomes available, and hope you can extinguish the blaze. Many will want to rush every tank, artillery tube, rocket launcher, or anti-air missile to the front as soon as it’s available, to bolster the fighting capacity of the troops right now. While that will be an understandable temptation, such a course would have little chance of success.


T-84 Ukrainian tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

War simply doesn’t work that way. It’s not merely about having a number of tanks or rocket launchers, but about having trained, disciplined troops that know what they’re doing, working as a team of teams, in various combat units working towards a single goal. It’s not unlike a sports team. It is possible to assemble a group of bone fide all-star athletes on a team, but if they don’t train together so that each works together as a team, even all-stars can get thrashed by an opponent that has less talent but works better together.

The Bottom Line

On one level, it is completely understandable that Zelensky would aggressively seek heavy weapons for his forces. But combat fundamentals aren’t impressed by emotions, the rightness of one’s cause, or how earnestly one side may desire a given outcome. If heavy weapons are inserted into the war zone piecemeal and sent to the front lines as they come in, they will add only marginal capacity to the units engaged at the front. 

More importantly, it will be many weeks or months before meaningful volumes of heavy weapons could be delivered to Ukrainian combat units.  Choosing to train new combat units from scratch, out of contact, would give Ukraine a better chance at producing a battle force of sufficient strength that it would have a chance to expel Russian forces, but doing so would take, in all likelihood, nine months to a year from now – and it is not clear Ukrainian troops currently under fire could hold the line that long.

The ugly bottom line is this:   the Battle of Donbas is almost certainly going to be won or lost with the forces engaging on the front lines today, using the equipment they have. It will take too long for Western governments to come up with a coherent equipping plan and then prepare, ship, and deliver the kit to its destination in a time frame that could provide Kyiv’s troops with the ability to tip the balance against Russia in the Donbas.

 

Ukraine may be forced to make a choice between horrible options. Zelensky could roll the dice and try to create a stalemate to hold Russia at bay for close to a year and then mount an offensive with a trained battle force or seek a negotiated settlement on the best terms available to stop the destruction of his army and people.

Trying to force and sustain a stalemate would guarantee Ukraine’s people continue to suffer and die and its economy to remain stagnant for the foreseeable future, and with no guarantee that creating an offensive force would later succeed (and employing it would necessarily spike the casualties again). Agreeing to a negotiated settlement in the near term would likely cement the loss of some eastern Ukrainian territory to Russia or the Russian-speaking population, yet end the destruction in the rest of the country.

War is a horrible crucible that rarely produces any winners, and this one is the ugliest, bloodiest, and cruelest in Europe in nearly a century. Everyone must understand at this point there are not “good” solutions. Ukraine’s leaders must choose among a raft of unpalatable options in search of the least detestable.

I do not envy their task.