Monday, May 2, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 2,2022

 

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, MAY 2,2022

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 2, 5:15 pm ET

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Ukraine on May 2. The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on the Russian command post in Izyum may be continuing to disrupt Russian efforts on the Izyum axis. Russian troops on the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and Southern Axis continued to regroup, likely in preparation for renewed offensives or to resist or reverse Ukrainian counter-offensives.

 

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along any axes of advance and instead shelled Ukrainian positions on the frontlines.
  • The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on Russian command headquarters near Izyum likely disrupted Russian operations on the Izyum axis and may hinder Russian offensives from Izyum for the next few days.
  • Russian forces on the Southern Axis continued to regroup and reconnoiter likely in preparation for ground assaults in the direction of Kryvyi Rih, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

 

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

 

Russian forces conducted naval artillery and air strikes on Mariupol while civilian evacuations from the Azovstal Steel Plant continued on May 1 and May 2.[1] Ukraine’s Military Law Enforcement Service reported that over 100 civilians evacuated to Zaporizhia city from Azovstal on May 2, but Ukrainian defenders remain at the plant.[2] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces saved 80 civilians (whom it falsely asserted had been held hostage at the plant) and that 11 evacuees ”volunteered“ to remain in the Donetsk People’s Republic.[3] Continued Russian bombardment of Mariupol belies Moscow’s claims that its forces have secured the city.

 

 

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces shelled along the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks on May 2.[4] Russian troops continued to focus on completing the seizure of Rubizhne and Popasna.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff forecasts that Russian troops will likely attempt to use these points to launch an offensive in the direction of Severodonetsk.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Russian forces moved one battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Popasna area to improve their tactical position and prepare to advance toward Severodonetsk.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff observed that Russian troops are setting conditions to advance on Slovyansk from the Lyman-Siversk frontline, which lies within 25 km to the east of Slovyansk.[8] This observation is consistent with ISW’s previous reporting of Russian troops making marginal southwestward advances around the Yampil area over the last few days.[9]

 

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces continued to regroup and conduct unspecified offensive operations in the Izyum area, but did not make any confirmed advances on May 2.[10] The April 30 Ukrainian rocket artillery strike on the Russian Airborne (VDV) and 2nd Combined Arms Army command post in the Izyum area may be continuing to disrupt Russian operations along the Izyum axis.

Russian troops, including elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army and Baltic and Pacific Fleet coastal troops, continued to shell Kharkiv City and surrounding settlements.[11] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar notably stated that Ukrainian forces suffered significant losses when they took control of Ruska Lozova (less than 10 kilometers north of Kharkiv City), suggesting that Russian troops saw sufficient value in this location to fight hard to hold it.[12]

 

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to regroup, reconnoiter, and concentrate logistics on May 2, likely in preparation for ground assaults on Ukrainian position in the directions of Mykolaiv, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporizhia.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed an unspecified artillery unit to Tokmak that will likely support Russian attempts to seize Orihiv, Zaporizhia Oblast.[14] Orihiv is on the intersection of several major highways, and its seizure could allow Russian forces to push toward Zaporizhia city as well as Donetsk. Russian forces also reportedly established an equipment repair shop in an occupied Zaporizhia Oblast settlement.[15]

Ukraine’s Operational Command “South” said that Russian forces did not attempt ground offensives in southern Ukraine on May 2 but conducted periodic artillery and mortar shelling and reportedly launched a third rocket strike on the bridge leading over the Dniester Estuary to Romania.[16] Ukrainian forces claimed to have struck Russian ammunition depots in Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast, on May 2; a video post on social media may corroborate that claim, but ISW cannot verify it with greater confidence.[17] Ukrainian forces also destroyed two Russian Raptor-class patrol boats that reconnoitered the Danube River delta on May 2.[18] There were no significant situational changes in Transnistria.[19]

 

 

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant activities on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian attacks from Izyum will likely be at least temporarily disrupted by the attack on Russian command post in the area.
  • Russian forces will likely attempt to starve out the remaining defenders of the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol.
  • Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.


[1] https://t dot me/mariupolnow/8805; https://t dot me/mariupolnow/8816

2https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/02/ponad-100-lyudej-evakujovanyh-z-azovstali-prybuly-do-zaporizhzhya/

[3] https://t dot me/mod_russia/15063

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307651304881288; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/02/zagarbnyky-obstrilyuyut-harkiv-nastupayut-u-napryamkah-barvinkovogo-ta-slovyanska/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307229161590169; https://t dot me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3231

[8] https://armyinform and com.ua/2022/05/02/zagarbnyky-obstrilyuyut-harkiv-nastupayut-u-napryamkah-barvinkovogo-ta-slovyanska/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307651304881288

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307651304881288; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/307229161590169; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/02/zagarbnyky-obstrilyuyut-harkiv-nastupayut-u-napryamkah-barvinkovogo-ta-slovyanska/; https://t dot me/synegubov/3056

[16] https://t dot me/stranaua/39672; https://t dot me/epoddubny/10280; https://t dot me/Bratchuk_Sergey/11089

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Image iconKharkiv Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png
Image iconLuhansk Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png
Image iconKherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png
Image iconMariupol Battle Map Draft May 2,2022.png
PDF iconRussian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2.pdf
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Sunday, May 1, 2022

 SOURCE: (a)  https://dmerharyana.org/ukraine-russia-war-casualties-so-far-who-is-winning/



1. It is 66 days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today we explore Ukraine’s options to respond to a faltering Russian offensive in the east.

2. Russia has made many errors in this war. It commenced with a bad strategy, underpinned by flawed assumptions about Ukrainian nationhood, Ukrainian military capacity, and the capacity of the West to intervene. From this has flowed multiple military shortfalls.

3. Over the past several weeks, the Russian high command reoriented its operational design to focus on eastern Ukraine as its main effort, with the south being a supporting effort. However, despite their concentration in the east, the Russians have yet to make major progress.

4. This week has also seen an evolution in the US approach to the war. President Biden requested Congress provide USD 33 billion in additional military, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

5. After a conference of aid donors in Germany, US Defence Secretary Austin noted that: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in Ukraine. They can win if they have the right equipment, the right support.”.

6. Since the start of the invasion Ukraine has played its inferior hand well. It is a country that is smaller in size, population, economy, and military force than Russia. As we have written previously, in this war Russia got the mass, but Ukraine got the brains and the heart.

7. Taking all this together allows us to pose an important question: Can Ukraine go on the offensive in the east and what might that look like? In answering this, We will explore five issues:

(a) Timing;

(b) Location;

(c) Design / Sequencing;

(d) Resources; &

(e) Limits of Ukrainian exploitation.

8. Timing. In war, the clock is always ticking. The ability to exploit time is one of the most important considerations in the planning and execution of military activities. Colin Gray writes that “every military plan at every level of war is ruled by the clock.”

9. For the Ukrainians, they will be wargaming the best time to shift from a defensive strategy to an offensive one. This is a significant activity. It will require excellent intelligence on Russian reserves, combat potential, logistic holdings, and operational priorities.

10. Timing will also be driven by the level of attrition of Russian forces, weather (especially cloud obscuration), phases of the moon (darkness still matters), and the progress of negotiations.

11. Timing for any Ukrainian offensive will also be influenced by how long it takes to concentrate the numbers of close combat, engineer support (the advance takes a lot of engineers), artillery support, air support, communications, logistics, psyops & EW, forces needed.

12. Location. The location of any offensive will be an important consideration. Which part of Ukraine offers the most potential for gains in territory for the Ukrainian forces that might be available? And where are significant concentrations of Russian forces located?

13.  In essence, there are two macro locations where the Ukrainians might focus any future offensive – the east and the south. They may choose one or the other, both concurrently, or both sequentially. It will be influenced by operational design, which is the 3rd consideration.

14. Operational Design. Operational design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good operational design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions to meet strategic and political objectives.

15. A vital aspect of campaign design is the prioritization of service-oriented allocation of forces, logistic support, intelligence, transport, and inter-service collaboration. At least, in theory, campaigns should be largely joint rather than service-oriented.

16. It is an art and a science that US schools such as the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) focus on.

                                                   [ https://youtu.be/N4VkDREyTY4]


17. For Ukraine, they will need a design that considers how many offensives at once, and how each consecutive advance is sequenced. This design considers main effort, supporting efforts, command and control, and opportunities to exploit breakthroughs.

18. Any Ukrainian operational design would seek to avoid what the Russians have tried during their invasion – advance on multiple fronts simultaneously without an obvious main effort and little unity of effort. The good operational design will also underpin tactical mission command

19. A 4th consideration is resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix & kill the enemy), artillery, armor, and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades & Divisions, will be needed.

20. Strategic support will also be necessary. Ukrainian industry, and western aid donors, will be required to provide weapons, ammunition,,builInoffensived and other support for the current defensive campaign, as wel lding up huge stocks for any offensive. Transport networks are critical.

21.  Exploitation Limits. Inoffensive operations ‘limit of exploitation’ is a line beyond which military commanders may not exploit the success of earlier stages of attacks. Such a line will be needed for a Ukrainian offensive. And this won’t just be a military consideration.

22. This is probably one of the most difficult issues for a Ukrainian offensive. Do they seek to recapture ground taken by Russia since 24 February, or something less? Alternatively, do they consider recapturing Crimea, or the Donbas or both?

23. The Ukrainian President will seek a balance of reclaiming Ukrainian territory while retaining Western support & not pushing the Russians to use chemical/nuclear weapons. The limits of a Ukrainian military offensive will be governed by political & not just military issues.

24. Ukraine will also need to have objectives for a future offensive & the means to measure progress. This will be important for the Ukrainian President to decide on when to halt offensive operations at the time that delivers the best war termination outcome for his country.

25. This exploration is not based on any ‘inside info’. But it does provide an analysis of considerations for the Ukrainians to eventually recapture the territory seized by Russia. Which also poses the question: what if Russia loses? That is another thread. (Image -

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