Friday, May 6, 2022

RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 5, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5

Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and George Barros

May 5, 7:00 pm ET

The Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv city may disrupt Russian forces northeast of Kharkiv and will likely force Russian forces to decide whether to reinforce positions near Kharkiv or risk losing most or all of their positions within artillery range of the city. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zalyzhnyi stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces are transitioning to counteroffensive operations around Kharkiv and Izyum, the first direct Ukrainian military statement of a shift to offensive operations. Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the last 24 hours but repelled Russian attempts to regain lost positions. Russian forces made few advances in continued attacks in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to build their ongoing counterattacks and successful repulse of Russian attacks along the Izyum axis into a wider counteroffensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in Kharkiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces continued ineffectual offensive operations in southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts without securing any significant territorial gains in the past 24 hours.

Ukrainian officials and military officers confirmed that Russian forces have breached the Azovstal facility itself and confirmed that Ukrainian forces are losing ground. Russian forces will likely capture the facility in the coming days.

Ukrainian offensive operations around Kharkiv likely intend to push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv city, force Russian units to redeploy from the Izyum axis, and potentially threaten Russian lines of communication.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations toward Zaporizhia City but did not conduct any attacks in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian forces claimed to recapture additional territory west of Kherson, but ISW cannot independently confirm any advances.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated the structure of its discussion of the primary efforts Russian forces are currently engaging in. The main Russian effort is concentrated in eastern Ukraine and includes one subordinate main effort and four supporting efforts. The subordinate main effort is the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron formed between the Izyum-Slovyansk highway and the Kreminna-Rubizhne-Popasna frontline in Luhansk. The four supporting efforts are: completing the seizure of Mariupol, retaining pressure on Kharkiv City, holding occupied territory on the Southern Axis, and threatening northeastern Ukraine from Russian and Belarusian territory.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ineffectual offensive operations in southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts without securing any significant territorial gains in the past 24 hours. The Pentagon assessed that Russian forces have not been able to make further advances due to their inability to conduct offensive operations far from their ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along highways, as ISW previously assessed, and muddy terrain.[1] Russian GLOCs supporting the Izyum axis likely run from the Russian border to Kupyansk and Vovchansk, and local Kharkiv civilian authorities reported additional Russian reinforcements moving through these settlements towards the front line as of May 5.[2] Russian forces are reportedly suffering losses in stalled attacks along the Izyum axis, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting that elements of the 4th Tank Division and the 106th Airborne Division withdrew to Russia after sustaining heavy losses in the past several days.[3]

Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks in Lyman, Severodonetsk, and Popasna, and maintained shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.[4] Russian forces also used thermobaric munitions against Ukrainian positions in Lyman and are unsuccessfully attempting to leverage massed artillery fire to break through Ukrainian defenses.[5] Russian forces targeted grain facilities in Rubizhne and Soledar, a settlement located approximately 30 kilometers from Popasna, likely to deprive Ukrainian forces and civilians of supplies.[6] The Donetsk People’s Republic claimed to have seized Troitske (a village approximately 25 kilometers from occupied Horlivka) on May 5, but social media imagery confirmed that Ukrainian artillery inflicted heavy damage on Russian munitions depots, tanks, and armored personnel carriers in the area.[7]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued assaults on the Azovstal Steel Plant with supporting airstrikes and naval artillery on May 5.[8] Ukrainian officials and military officers confirmed that Russian forces have breached the Azovstal facility itself and that Ukrainian forces are losing ground.[9] Azov Regiment Deputy Commander Svyatoslav Palamar released a video on Telegram reporting the current Russian assault began on May 3 and confirmed that Russian forces are inside the facility.[10] Palamar said the remaining defenders and civilians were unable to evacuate on May 5, despite reports from the Ukrainian government that Russian and Ukrainian forces agreed to a ceasefire in Mariupol between May 5 and May 7.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that 344 Mariupol residents, including over 150 evacuees from Azovstal, evacuated on May 4.[12] Russian forces will likely completely capture the Azovstal facility in the coming days, but Ukrainian forces have successfully tied down and degraded large numbers of Russian forces in Mariupol for several months.

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Continue to pressure Kharkiv City to fix Ukrainian defenders there and prevent their movement to reinforce defenders on other axes.)

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zalyzhnyi stated on May 5 that Ukrainian forces are transitioning to counteroffensive operations around Kharkiv and Izyum, the first direct Ukrainian military statement of a shift to offensive operations.[13] Ukrainian forces likely intend to push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv city, force Russian units to redeploy from the Izyum axis, and potentially threaten Russian lines of communication. Ukrainian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the last 24 hours but repelled Russian attempts to regain lost positions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault on Stary Saltiv (approximately 40 kilometers east of Kharkiv City) on May 5, after Ukrainian forces liberated the settlement on May 2.[14] Russian forces also reconnoitered Ukrainian positions and continued to shell Ukrainian positions in the northeastern outskirts of Kharkiv City.[15] Pro-Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces blew up a bridge near the occupied settlement of Cherkaski Tishki, approximately 25 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City, which could indicate an ongoing Ukrainian counterattack in the area targeting the bridge to interdict Russian movements.[16]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Zaporizhia City but did not conduct any attacks in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on May 5.[17] Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces attacked Hulyaipole, near the Donetsk Oblast border, throughout the day.[18] The Administration additionally stated up to 13 battalion tactical groups are concentrated on this line of advance toward Zaporizhia City or the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders from the west, though these battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are almost certainly understrength.[19] Zaporizhia authorities noted that Russian forces operating in the region are more cautious than during the initial stage of the war and are increasing their use of reconnaissance assets.[20]

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in Kherson or Mykolaiv oblasts.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces liberated unspecified villages along the border between Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on May 5, but ISW cannot independently these claims.[22] Ukraine’s Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian forces successfully pushed Russian forces around 20 kilometers away from Mykolaiv City, possibly indicating that these liberated villages are in northwestern Kherson Oblast, though we have previously assessed that Ukrainian forces have taken most territory within this 20km arc and have not updated our maps with this Ukrainian claim.[23] Russian authorities in occupied Crimea claimed on May 5 that Russian forces restored railway connections between Crimea and Kherson Oblast for cargo and passenger trains, likely to improve logistics on the southern front.[24]

Transnistrian media reported unspecified indiscriminate shooting near the Kuchurhan-Pervomaisc border checkpoint with Ukraine on May 5, two days after Ukraine blocked the crossing.[25] Transnistrian media claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting military exercises in Pavlivka, a village on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. Transnistrian Foreign Minister Vitaliy Ignatiev also claimed that Transnistrian forces neutralized another Ukrainian drone on May 5.[26] ISW cannot independently verify any of these Transnistrian claims. Ukraine’s Operational Command South reported that the Transnistrian border is stable and that Ukrainian forces are taking counter-sabotage measures.[27] Russian forces and their Transnistrian proxy will likely continue to stage provocations to threaten Ukrainian forces with the possibility of a military operation out of Transnistria to fix Ukrainian forces in Odesa in place.

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that some unidentified Belarusian units increased their combat readiness amid ongoing snap exercises on May 5.[28] Belarusian social media users spotted Belarusian forces deploying military equipment in the direction of Pinsk, a settlement near western Ukraine, and on the way to Brest.[29] Belarusian forces remain highly unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine and likely aim to pin Ukrainian forces in place by threatening further action.

Immediate items to watch

Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.

Russia may change the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, possibly by merging them into a single “Donbas Republic” and/or by annexing them directly to Russia.

Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.

Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City may unhinge Russian positions northeast of the city, possibly forcing the Russians to choose between reinforcing those positions or abandoning them if the Ukrainians continue to press their counterattack.

Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

REFERENCES

[1] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3020478/pent...

[2] https://t dot me/synegubov/3098

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310027201310365

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/309656384680780;

https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2326;

https://www.facebook.com/JFTaskForce/posts/363927519095898

[5] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1522189581654888448?cxt=HHwWgMC49YHX8... https://t.me/sashakots/32252;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310027201310365;

[6] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1521887314120790023;

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1521886736066007041

[7] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1521960113820651523;

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1521958766576652288;

https://t.me/nm_dnr/7825; https://t.me/istorijaoruzija/60952

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/309656384680780;

https://t.me/mariupolnow/9205; https://t.me/stranaua/40253;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1522203615921852416

https://m.vk.com/wall-123538639_2532794

[9] ttps://hromadske dot ua/posts/rosiyani-prorvalis-na-teritoriyu-azovstali-u-mariupoli-tretij-den-trivaye-aktivnij-shturm-azov

[10] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/rosiyani-prorvalis-na-teritoriyu-azovstali-u-mariupoli-tretij-den-trivaye-aktivnij-shturm-azov;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[11] https://www dot rbc.ua/ukr/news/novaya-evakuatsiya-azovstali-ukraina-rf-dogovorilis-1651693316.html

[12] https://t dot me/V_Zelenskiy_official/1500

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/309839231329162.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310027201310365;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...; https://t.me/synegubov/3098

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/309656384680780;

https://t.me/synegubov/3098

[16] https://twitter.com/kargolow/status/1522256928436637696;

https://t.me/ukrainian_guide/1326

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1522181194342965248?cxt=HHwWgIC9ye...

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310027201310365

[18] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7382

[19] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7382;

https://hromadske.ua/posts/na-zaporizhzhi-rosijski-okupanti-zminyuyut-ta...

[20] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/na-zaporizhzhi-rosijski-okupanti-zminyuyut-taktiku-stali-oberezhnishimi-ova

[21] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2048688411969068;

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=539888341038398;

https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1521968047975710720?cxt=HHwWgICysYf...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/309656384680780

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/309656384680780

[23] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2048743755296867

[24] https://ria dot ru/20220505/blokada-1786905199.html;

https://t.me/stranaua/40270;

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...;

https://point dot md/ru/novosti/proisshestviya/v-pridnestrov-e-soobshchili-o-strel-be-v-raione-kpp-kuchurgan/?fbclid=IwAR2bGumjHTTNC-LQyok2qDiE3qPGVaDL41aNn01q1jVUf75wwH6dxrGq1wg;

https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14553077;

https://t.me/tsvtiraspol/25188

[26] https://t.me/readovkanews/32868

[27] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=539888341038398

[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310027201310365

[29] https://t.me/stranaua/40318

Tags

Ukraine Project

File Attachments:

Mariupol Battle Map Draft May 05,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft May 05,2022.png

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft May 05,2022.png

Moldova Battle Map Draft May 05,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft May 05 ,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTMay05,2022.png

_______________________________________________________________________________

ASSESSMENT OF

Jomini of the West

1/ Analyzing Breakthrough Operations in the Donbas. Today I take a little closer look at the state of operations along the line of operations ranging from Izium to Popasna in east Ukraine to gain a better understanding of what it will take to achieve a decisive breakthrough.

2/ This small study utilizes data, discussions, & insights from the following sources & is indebted to their amazing work:
@HN_Schlottman
,
@TheStudyofWar
,
@Militarylandnet
,
@AggregateOsint
,
@HelloMrBond
,
@War_Mapper
,
@KofmanMichael
,
@dupuyinstitute
, among many others.

3/ This is not a prediction, but a brief analysis of what seems to be the overall direction of operations by the Russian military in what is clearly the decisive terrain in east Ukraine – the convex line running from Izium through Siverskyi Donets to the Severondontsk Salient.

4/ I have been stressing since March 14 this portion of the Donbas front is the key to ultimate victory or defeat in the east. I still hold to this assessment. I think it is even more so now in the wake of Russia’s decisive defeat in the Battle for Kyiv.

Jomini of the West

@JominiW

 · Mar 15

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 19: Russian forces remain largely static in the Kyiv Sumy regions. Russian forces conducted limited attacks throughout the Donbas. Harassment of Russian supply routes remains effective. #UkraineRussiaWar #UkraineUnderAttack #RussianArmy

Show this thread

Jomini of the West

@JominiW

May 4

5/ There has been a lot of discussion lately, both online and in the media, of the trajectory of Russian operations and what they may accomplish. May 9 is seen as an important waypoint for Russia, whether this is an actual deadline is debatable.

youtube.com

Retired general makes prediction about Putin's plan in Ukraine

Retired Maj. General James "Spider" Marks outlines Russian President Vladimir Putin's plan to partition Ukraine and predicts that U

Jomini of the West

@JominiW

May 4

6/ Let us look at the balance of forces currently engaged in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD & their likely mission set. The most recent geolocation data places at least 60x BTGs in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. 51x BTGs are arrayed from Izium to Popsana.

7/ Of the known Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD, pre-war tables of organization allocate 61x Maneuver Battalions & 20x Territorial Defense Battalions in the Donbas. 37x Maneuver & all 20x Territorial Defense Battalions are currently arrayed from Izium to Popsana.

8/ The number of Ukrainian BNs have likely changed due to attrition. However, these numbers give us a picture of the balance of forces.
@HN_Schlottman
has gone a step further and done some great work on a general estimate of force composition for the OD.

Henry Schlottman

@HN_Schlottman

 · May 1

Managed to get close to 22 BTG figure around Izium stated by  gov officials. Less sure about the Severodonetsk grouping size (mostly Central Military District) but probably not too far off. Assuming BTGs are consolidated once losses reach a certain point.

Show this thread

9/ Russia has struggled, and continues to struggle, with properly resourcing & sustaining their war effort, but the Russian military clearly sees the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD, in particular the Siverskyi Donets line, as decisive terrain to control.

10/ To do this Russia has to accomplish the integration & synchronization of the preponderance of their forces in time & space through strategic movement, successively, upon decisive points & key points of communication without compromising their own.

11/ Here is a model of what this would look like. Key to successfully obtaining integration & synchronization of mass in time & space is the ability to arrange forces & combat multipliers (aviation, artillery, cyber, ADA, engineers, etc.) at the proper time with ample energy.

Jomini of the West

@JominiW

May 4

12/ This last part is the crucial element of combined arms maneuver. Here is the same graphic but arrayed with what I surmise is the Russian operational plan. April 24 is my mark on the wall for when general large-scale offensive operations began in earnest in the Donbas.

13/ Using May 9 as a key date for the Kremlin to declare some sort of “victory”, Russian forces only had 16 days to reach their operational objectives. As you can see, if May 9 is indeed a mark on the wall to measure Russian success, they are way behind the power curve.

14/ It is not likely at this point for Russia to achieve some sort of positive or negative breakthrough by May 9, if this is indeed a key date in Russian operational planning. Still, Russia is gaining ground through slow incremental advances.

15/ Russian forces have marginally improved at conducting large-scale operations with forces moving along mutually supporting routes of advance, employing for effective recon by force techniques to engage & maneuver against Ukrainian defenses supported by air & artillery.

16/ Though poor morale, logistical issues, manpower shortages, poor leadership still plague Russian operations, the immediate obstacle to their success is the Ukrainian military & resolve. This more than anything else, is what is slowing Russian progress. #SlavaUkraini

17/ Ukraine has reinforced and fortified prepared defensive positions. These points are capable of withstanding prolonged air & artillery strikes. With excellent morale and leadership, it will be difficult for Russian forces to breach their defenses.

Video showing Russian artillery strikes on a Ukrainian defensive position in Donetsk. The position looks well-fortified and the soldiers are likely underground. Not clear whether these strikes are particularly effective without a ground assault.
https://t.me/swodki/86506

Show this thread

https://twitter.com/i/status/1521429832999092225

18/ Here is a look at division opposed rates of advance against fortified, prepared, and hasty defenses based on historical combat data from the

@dupuyinstitute

. As you can see, historical daily advance rates for mechanized forces against intense resistance is slow.

19/ Let us now look at a variant of the space/time/mass maneuver model. This is aligned with a traditional Russian doctrinal template advancing along multiple axes to split defenders into separate or isolated groups to be destroyed in detail while striking deep into secure areas.

20/ Again, if May 9 is/was a target date for Russian forces in this OD, they should uniformly at or approaching the 20km line indicated in this graphic. Russian forces are not near this point. The grueling pace of Russian daily advances are consistent with HERO historical data.

Jomini of the West
@JominiW
May 4
Replying to
@JominiW
21/ Russia is underperforming when it comes to their ability to achieve a meaningful breakthrough, even along the Izium Axis where they should be making bigger gains. These trends support the assessment in-thread post 11, Russia may achieve a delayed breakthrough by late May.

22/ Here is one more data point to support this, using data from @HN_Schlottman

@HelloMrBond
inputted into a modified QJM model from Trevor Dupuy’s “Understanding War:

History & Theory of Combat” at the

@dupuyinstitute

23/ Even though the QJM shows Russia has an advantage in combat power and should be able to achieve a breakthrough there is a lot working against this effort. As noted at the top of this thread the Ukrainians have a greater number of maneuver BNs to blunt advances.

24/ Still we could see a situation that ends up like this by late May/early June if Russian forces are able to continue to make incremental progress. This would be the best situation the Russians could hope for now. Reaching this point will culminate what force they have left.

25/ The Summer may see a long-drawn-out siege of the urban cluster ranging from Kramatorsk to Lysychansk. Either way there is still a lot of bloody hard fighting to go before either side has a definitive battlefield advantage in the Donbas. It will be a long summer. END

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 6, 2022

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, MAY 6, 2022

Mason Clark and George Barros

May 6, 5:00 pm ET

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north and east of Kharkiv city secured further gains in the last 24 hours and may successfully push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv in the coming days. Ukrainian forces captured several settlements north and east of Kharkiv in the last 24 hours, reducing the ability of Russian forces to threaten Ukraine’s second-largest city. This Ukrainian operation is developing into a successful, broader counteroffensive—as opposed to the more localized counterattacks that Ukrainian forces have conducted throughout the war to secure key terrain and disrupt Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are notably retaking territory along a broad arc around Kharkiv rather than focusing on a narrow thrust, indicating an ability to launch larger-scale offensive operations than we have observed so far in the war (as Ukrainian forces predominantly retook the outskirts of Kyiv following Russian withdrawals rather than in a major counteroffensive). The willingness of Ukrainian forces to concentrate the forces necessary for this scale of offensive operations, rather than deploying these available forces to defenses in eastern Ukraine, additionally indicates the Ukrainian military’s confidence in repelling ongoing Russian operations to encircle Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk area. While Ukrainian forces are unlikely to directly threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum (as they run further to the east of recent Ukrainian advances), Ukrainian forces may be able to relieve Russian pressure on Kharkiv and possibly threaten to make further advances to the Russian border.

ISW cannot confirm initial reports of a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile strike on the Russian frigate Admiral Makarov on May 6.[1] Pentagon Spokesperson John Kirby said the United States cannot confirm the reported strike and added “we’ve been looking at this all day.”[2] ISW will update this assessment with further information as it becomes available.

Key Takeaways

The Ukrainian counteroffensive along a broad arc north and east of Kharkiv city took further terrain and will likely push Russian forces out of tube artillery range of the city in the coming days. The ability—and willingness—of the Ukrainian military to concentrate the forces in Kharkiv necessary to conduct this operation indicates Ukrainian confidence in repelling ongoing Russian attacks with their existing forces in the region.
Russian forces did not make any progress on the Izyum axis.
Russian forces likely secured small gains on the outskirts of Severodonetsk in the last 24 hours but are unlikely to successfully surround the town.
Russian forces continued assaults on the Azovstal plant, but ISW cannot confirm any specific advances. Likely widespread civilian resistance to the Russian occupation may additionally be disrupting previously announced Russian plans to conduct a Victory Day exhibition in Mariupol.
There were no significant changes on the southern axis in the last 24 hours and Russian forces continued to reinforce their forward positions.
ISW cannot confirm reports of a Ukrainian anti-ship missile strike on the Admiral Makarov at this time.

ISW has updated the structure of its discussion of the primary efforts Russian forces are currently engaging in. The main Russian effort is concentrated in Eastern Ukraine and includes one subordinate main effort and four supporting efforts. The subordinate main effort is the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron formed between the Izyum-Slovyansk highway and the Kreminna-Rubizhne-Popasna frontline in Luhansk. The four supporting efforts are: completing the seizure of Mariupol, retaining pressure on Kharkiv City, holding occupied territory on the Southern Axis, and threatening northeastern Ukraine from Russian and Belarusian territory.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
Subordinate main effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian attacks on the Izyum axis in the last 24 hours, with Kharkiv Oblast civilian leadership reporting that Ukrainian forces inflicted heavy casualties on Russian forces on the outskirts of Barinkove.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces prioritized aerial reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions and are deploying unspecified Eastern Military District units to the Izyum axis.[4] Russian forces around Izyum remain stalled and additional scattered reinforcements are unlikely to enable renewed advances.

Russian forces likely secured small gains on the outskirts of Severodonetsk on May 6. Russian forces continued attacks on Rubizhne and Voevodivka (just north of Severodonetsk) and likely captured Voronove (southeast of Severodonetsk).[5] Local Ukrainian and Russian sources both reported that Russian forces are attacking other unspecified villages on the outskirts of Severodonetsk in a likely attempt to surround the town.[6] Ukrainian forces repelled continuing Russian assaults around Popasna, and Russian forces did not launch any attacks against Avdiivka or Lyman.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 6 that Russian shelling along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine is intended to interdict Ukrainian movements.[8]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued assaults on the Azovstal plant on May 6, but ISW cannot confirm any specific advances.[9] Pro-Russian Telegram channels claimed Russian forces captured 100 Ukrainian servicemen attempting to escape Azovstal, though ISW cannot confirm this claim.[10] The Ukrainian Presidential Office announced a new humanitarian corridor opened on May 6, but Russian forces reportedly violated a local ceasefire and launched anti-tank missiles at civilian vehicles evacuating from Azovstal.[11]

Russian forces continued occupation measures but likely face widespread civilian resistance and may not be able to fully secure the city on their intended timetable. Russian forces were observed changing road signs in Mariupol from Ukrainian to Russian on May 5, and Ukrainian officials reported on May 6 that Russian forces are disseminating false information on Ukrainian losses to lower civilian morale.[12] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov declined to state if Russian forces would hold a parade in Mariupol on May 9, saying a wide celebration is currently impossible and claiming he could not say “on the behalf of the military if there are any plans” regarding a parade.[13] The continued resistance of Ukrainian forces in the Azovstal plant and likely widespread civilian resistance to the Russian occupation may be disrupting previously announced Russian plans to conduct a Victory Day exhibition in Mariupol.

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Continue to pressure Kharkiv City to fix Ukrainian defenders there and prevent their movement to reinforce defenders on other axes.)

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north and east of Kharkiv made substantial progress in the last 24 hours and Ukrainian forces may be able to drive Russian forces out of tube artillery range of Kharkiv city itself in the coming days. The Ukrainian General Staff and independent sources reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured Oleksandrivka, Fedorivka, Ukrainka, Shestakovo, Peremoha, Tsirkuny, and part of Cherkasy Tishki from May 5-6.[14] Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions, build up air defenses, and regroup damaged units on the Kharkiv axis.[15] Russian forces likely face the choice of sending additional reinforcements intended for eastern Ukraine to support defensive positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv or lose their ability to both shell the city and screen lines of communication through Kharkiv Oblast.

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces in the entire southern axis did not conduct any active operations (halting recent attacks toward Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhia) in the last 24 hours and continued to reinforce their frontline positions.[16] Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions along the entire southern axis. The Ukrainian General Staff specified that Russian forces are strengthening their air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities in the southern direction.[17] Russian forces may be concentrating on reconnoitering Ukrainian positions and preparing for further offensive operations, as local Ukrainian authorities reported on May 5.[18] Ukrainian forces did not conduct any reported counterattacks toward Kherson in the past 24 hours, and ISW did not collect any additional data to verify claimed Ukrainian advances since May 4.[19]

The Ukrainian General Staff and Operational Command South reported that Russian forces continue to provoke tensions in Transnistria and seek ways to provoke an escalation, including by spreading false allegations of Ukrainians shooting into Transnistria.[20]

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.
Russia may change the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, possibly by merging them into a single “Donbas Republic” and/or by annexing them directly to Russia.
Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City may unhinge Russian positions northeast of the city, possibly forcing the Russians to choose between reinforcing those positions or abandoning them if the Ukrainians continue to press their counter-attack.
Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

[1] https://dumskaya.net/news/u-zmeinogo-gorit-rossiyskiy-fregat-164010/?fbc... ;https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1522532475725099011; https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-europe-61343815?ns_mchannel=social&n... https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-gorit-fregat-admiral-makarov/31837252.html; https://t dot me/oleksiihoncharenko/20453; https://twitter.com/OAlexanderDK/status/1522549702692155393.

[2] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1522641408334704642?s=20&t=OkoYG4n....

[3] https://t.me/synegubov/3109; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310376874608731.

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138; https://twitter.com/BLANK8888800/status/1522519764039778306; https://twitter.com/L13CO/status/1522497077791449088; https://twitter.com/Guderian_Xaba/status/1522482492355325954; https://twitter.com/tw_khosiev/status/1522465921603969024;

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2372; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2375; https://t.me/millnr/8387.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1522483552499208192?cxt=HHwWg... ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1522325760807251969; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310376874608731.

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138.

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310792804567138; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/310376874608731; https://t.me/mariupolrada/9528; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1522263733908783106?cxt=HHwWhIC-oZ-...;

[10] https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/49752.

[11] https://t.me/mariupolnow/9382; https://t.me/mariupolnow/9381; https://t.me/mariupolrada/9532; https://t.me/mariupolrada/9529; https://t.me/polkazov/4465; https://t.me/polkazov/4464.

[12] https://t.me/mariupolrada/9527; https://t.me/mariupolnow/9366; https://t.me/andriyshTime/692.