Monday, May 9, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 9,2022

 

ASSESSMENT [ not edited]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, MAY 9,2022

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

May 9, 7:15pm ET

 

Russian forces continue to face widespread force generation challenges. A senior US defense official stated on May 9 that the US has not observed any indicators of a “new major Russian mobilization” and that members of the private military company Wagner Group “urgently” requested hundreds of thousands of additional troops to reinforce Russian efforts in Donbas.[1] The official noted that Russia currently has 97 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in Ukraine, but that BTGs have been moving in and out of Ukraine to refit and resupply, suggesting that Russian troops continue to sustain substantial damage in combat.[2] ISW has previously assessed that most Russian BTGs are heavily degraded and counting BTGs is not a useful metric of Russian combat power.[3] The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed that under-trained, ill-equipped Russian conscripts are still being sent into active combat despite the Kremlin denying this practice.[4] A prisoner of war from the BARS-7 detachment of the Wagner Group claimed that a ”covert mobilization” is underway in Russian to send conscripts to clean damage caused by combat in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.[5]

Russian troops in Ukraine continue to display low morale and poor discipline as fighting in many areas has stalled out against Ukrainian resistance. A senior US defense official claimed that Russian troops in Donbas are failing to obey orders from top generals.[6] Russian forces deployed to the Zaporizhzhia area reportedly are experiencing very low morale and psychological conditions, complain about the ineffectiveness of operations in the area, frequently abuse alcohol, and shoot at their own vehicles in order to avoid going to the frontline.[7] This is consistent with reports made by the Ukrainian General Staff that the extent of Russian losses is having widespread impacts on the willingness of Russian troops to engage in offensive operations.[8]

Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories directly into Russia, as opposed to creating proxy “People’s Republics.” The Kherson occupation Deputy Chairman of Military Civil Administration Kirill Stremousov stated on May 9 that the Kherson region intends to become part of Russia and that Kherson authorities do not intend to hold a referendum to create an independent republic.[9] Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported that Russian occupation authorities are intensifying reconnaissance measures and increasing checkpoints and patrols in occupied areas in order to prepare to integrate these regions directly into Russia.[10] Motuzyanyk noted that Russian and Crimean groups have been arriving to occupied regions to intensify propaganda measures to prepare for integration. ISW will publish our assessment of the Kremlin’s most likely course of actions towards their occupied territories in Ukraine in the coming days.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances to the southeast or southwest of Izyum on May 9 but are likely attempting to concentrate the forces necessary to resume offensive operations in the coming days.
  • Russian forces made marginal gains around Severodonetsk in the past 24 hours.
  • Russian forces are likely continuing to amass troops in Belgorod Oblast to stop Ukrainian counterattacks around Kharkiv City from reaching the Ukrainian-Russian border.
  • Russian units in Zaporizhia Oblast are regrouping and will likely receive reinforcements from forces previously deployed in Mariupol.
  • The Kremlin continues to face severe force mobilization challenges, and ongoing “covert mobilization” efforts are unlikely to generate substantial combat power.
  • Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories directly into Russia, as opposed to creating proxy “People’s Republics.”

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1 — Mariupol; 
  • Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort— Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances to the southeast or southwest of Izyum on May 9 but are likely attempting to concentrate the forces necessary to resume offensive operations in the coming days. Russian troops are likely reprioritizing a push southeast of Izyum towards Slovyansk after focusing on advancing southwest to Barvinkove in the past few weeks. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), 1st Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District, and 29th, 35th, 36th Combined Arms Armies and 68th Army Corps of the Eastern Military District are preparing for an offensive south of Sulyivka (about 25 kilometers south of Izyum) towards Nova Dmytrivka and Kurulka, both of which lie within 10 kilometers of the border between Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts.[11] A senior US defense official notably reported that Russian forces are conducting artillery strikes and ground attacks southeast of Izyum to drive towards Lyman and Slovyansk, but that Ukrainian resistance in this area has confined Russian advances to gains in the "single digits” of miles.[12]


Russian forces continued attacks westward in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and made marginal gains around Severodonetsk on May 9. Troops of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) reportedly captured Nyzhnje and are fighting for control of Toshkivka, about 25 kilometers southeast of Severodonetsk.[13] Ukrainian sources reported fierce fighting around Rubizhne and Vojevodivka, immediately to the north of Severodonetsk and in Bilohorivka, about 25 kilometers west of Severodonetsk.[14] NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) imagery showed fires in the area west of Severodonetsk around Bilohorivka, Pryvillya and Novodruzhesk, likely indicating that Russian forces are shelling Ukrainian positions in this area in order to encircle Severodonesk and Rubizhne from the west and continue to push towards the Donetsk Oblast border.[15]

 

 

[Source: NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to conduct artillery strikes and assaults against Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 9.[16]  A senior US defense official reported that 2 Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) remain in Mariupol and continue to storm Azovstal as over a dozen of the BTGs previously deployed to Mariupol are moving into other areas in Donbas, though ISW cannot independently confirm the actual strength of these reported BTGs.[17] Russian forces reportedly blew up a bridge in the northern part of the Azovstal complex previously used to evacuate civilians, indicating that Russian troops have advanced into the northern part of the plant.[18] Russian occupying forces conducted a “Victory Day” parade in Mariupol on May 9, consistent with ISW’s previous forecasts that the city is a focal point of the Kremlin’s occupation narrative.[19]


Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces are likely continuing to amass troops in Belgorod Oblast to stop Ukrainian counterattacks around Kharkiv City from reaching the Ukrainian-Russian border.[20] A senior US defense official said on May 9 that Russian forces have not abandoned efforts to encircle Kharkiv City from the north and east in “a horseshoe-like shape,” despite having only three battalion tactical groups (BTGs) operating in  northern Kharkiv Oblast.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces accumulated 19 BTGs in Belgorod Oblast, which could reinforce the Kharkiv City axis.[22]

ISW cannot confirm if Russian forces withdrew past Ruski Tyshky, a settlement approximately 18 northeast kilometers of Kharkiv City.[23] The senior US defense official said that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces nearly 48 kilometers east in the past week, likely referring to the Ukrainian liberation of Staryi Saltiv on May 2.[24] Pro-Russian Telegram channels posted images of Victory Day celebrations in occupied Kozacha Lopan, despite previous unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces were fighting near the settlement on May 7.[25]


Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed offensive operations in southern Ukraine on May 9 but continued to shell and launch missile strikes to pin Ukrainian troops and prevent them from transferring to other axes.[26] The Ukrainian Genral Staff reported that Russian units in Zaporizhia Oblast are regrouping and will likely receive reinforcements from forces previously deployed in Mariupol.[27] Russian forces will likely reinforce units pushing toward Zaporizhia City and Donetsk Oblast due to the reports of an ineffective offensive around Huliaipole.[28] Satellite imagery from May 6 also showed that Russian forces have significantly increased their concentrations of military equipment and anti-aircraft and missile systems in southwestern Kherson Oblast since April 27, likely due to newly resumed railway connection with Crimea.[29] Russian forces may have paused offensive operations in Southern Ukraine on May 9 due to Victory Day celebrations in occupied areas.[30]

Russian forces continued to target Odesa with missile strikes on May 8 and 9.[31] An unnamed US defense official said that Russia has no ability to threaten Odesa from the sea and the ground, despite consistent missile strikes and ongoing aerial reconnaissance.[32] Russian forces will likely continue to shell Odesa but are unlikely to inflict significant damage or resume advances towards the city. The official also noted that the US has no confirmation that Ukrainian forces recaptured Snake Island, off the coast of Odesa Oblast.[33] Russian and Transnistrian sources claimed Ukrainian forces closed the border with Moldova on May 9 amidst growing tensions in Transnistria, although ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[34]


Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.
  • Russia may change the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, possibly by merging them into a single “Donbas Republic” and/or by annexing them directly to Russia.
  • Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
  • Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian positions northeast of the city and will likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
  • Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

 


[1] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523686642053431296

[2] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523684661884747776

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[4] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/308323554812405

[5] https://armyinform dpt com.ua/2022/05/09/rosijski-okupanty-yakyh-mobilizuvaty-u-kvitni-vzhe-potrapyly-u-polon-i-dayut-svidchennya/

[6] ttps://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523685601933139969https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523687526677975040

[7] https://t dot me/zoda_gov_ua/7560

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588

[9] https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/62218; https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/62161

[10] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/05/09/na-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-vorog-obmezhyv-peremishhennya-misczevyh-znimayut-syuzhety-dlya-rosijskyh-zmi/

[11]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312758441037241

[12] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523681560175984640; https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523682635721359361https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523681749191979008; https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523686806599786498

[13] https://twitter.com/Suriyakmaps/status/1523414144946294784; https://t dot me/millnr/8433; https://t dot me/RKadyrov_95/2057

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588; https://twitter.com/Suriyakmaps/status/1523413210166046721; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2459; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2444; https://t.me/stranaua/41052?single; https://t.me/stranaua/41153;

[15] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/active_fire/

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1327920494370027; https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523691018754789379; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1327920494370027

[17] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523682005249978369

[18] https://twitter.com/Suriyakmaps/status/1523682704658923521; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/762; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/744

[19] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/759; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/747; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/742; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588

[21] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523690303408189440;https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523686033980018689

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312758441037241

[23] https://t dot me/synegubov/3154

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[25] https://t.me/journalist_lnr/1983https://twitter.com/Vasilisa_2_0/status/1523040586097328128

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=403721975095002; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312758441037241; https://t dot me/zoda_gov_ua/7560

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313164970996588

[28] https://t dot me/zoda_gov_ua/7560

[29] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1523687906358882309https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-tekhnika-krym/31839157.html#c...https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-campaign-assessment-may-5

[30] https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/62142; https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/62141; https://t.me/stranaua/41088;

[31] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=727068631820754; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=403721975095002; https://t dot me/Bratchuk_Sergey/11609; https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2051459095025333https://t.me/truexanewsua/45866https://t.me/epoddubny/10425

[32] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523684441108877312; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=403721975095002

[33] https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1523684115853111298

[34] https://t.me/krepostpmr/33979

 

Tags

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT MAY 8 ,2022

  SOURCES:


GOOGLE  TO  GLIMPSE THE WAR 

(P) TOM COOPER UKRAINE WAR: 

https://medium.com/.../ukraine-war-7-8-may-2022-fec911e68251

(Q) RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg

(R)    WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: 
          https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 

DATE
May 7th, 2022

ASSESSMENT


0600 UTC: Russia's Central Military District grouping made some progress towards clearing to the north bank of Siverskyi Donets and is possibly preparing to seize a bridgehead south of Kreminna to envelop Ukraine's defense in Sievierodonetsk. South of Izium, an approximately regimental-sized force, likely composed of elements of 4th Guards Tank Division and 106th Guards Airborne Division, sustained losses and withdrew back north according to the Ukrainian General Staff. At Popasna, Russian forces entered the central part of the city but have yet to clear most Ukrainian defenses in the area. Ukraine launched a counterattack northeast of Kharkiv, notably retaking Staryi Saltiv. Elsewhere the lines remained largely static. Ukrainian Luhansk governor publically stated that he expects a significant Russian offensive to begin in the three days at either Sievierodonets or Popasna.

SHOW BTGS
SHOW UKRAINIAN UNITS
  • Russian Units
  • Ukrainian Units (official Sources)
  • Tank BTG
  • Airborne (VDV) BTG
  • Motor Rifle BTG

Source Russian advances:
liveuamap.com, May 7th, 2022

About | Get the Data

ASSESSMENT

      RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN 

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros

May 8, 4:00 pm ET

Russian forces did not make any significant advances on any axis of advance on May 8. The Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City has likely forced Russian troops to redeploy to Kharkiv instead of reinforcing stalled Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces are continuing their attempt to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but have not made substantial territorial gains since securing Popasna on May 7.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces are likely amassing in Belgorod to reinforce Russian efforts in northern Kharkiv to prevent the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive from pushing closer to the Ukraine-Russia border.
  • Russian forces near Izyum focused on regrouping, replenishing, and reconnoitering Ukrainian positions in order to continue advances to the southwest and southeast of Izyum.
  • Russian forces continued their ground attacks to drive to the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but did not make any territorial gains
  • Russian troops continued to assault the Azovstal Steel Plant and advanced efforts to economically integrate occupied Mariupol into the wider Russian economy.
  • Russian troops may be preparing for a renewed offensive on the Southern Axis but are unlikely to be successful in this endeavor.  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Mariupol; 
  • Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
  • Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not conduct confirmed attacks in any direction from Izyum on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continued to regroup units, replenish reserves, and reconnoiter Ukrainian positions to continue offensives in the Izyum-Barvinkove and Izyum-Slovyansk directions.[1]

Russian forces intensified ground, air, and artillery attacks in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on May 8. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Popasna, confirming that Russian forces established full control of the city in the last few days.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are attempting to reach the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, which is confirmed by social media footage of ongoing fighting along existing Russian lines of advance.[3] Ukrainian sources reported active fighting in Bilohorivka, Vojevodivka, and Lysychansk, indicating that Russian forces may intend to encircle Severodonetsk from the south (in support of ongoing operations in Rubizhne, north of Severodonetsk) and push west toward the Luhansk Oblast border.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division are operating around Lyman in the vicinity of Shandryholove and Oleksandrivka, which both lie less than 20 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast border. [5]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 8. Commander of the Azov Regiment Denis Prokopenko stated that the Ukrainian defense remains in Azovstal after the evacuation of all civilians and that fighting is ongoing within parts of the plant itself.[6]

Russian authorities are advancing efforts to integrate Mariupol into Russian economic systems. Head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin visited Mariupol’s commercial port alongside Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin on May 8 and claimed that products will start moving through the port later this month.[7] Khusnullin’s visit to Mariupol is likely indicative of the Kremlin’s broader desire to capitalize on Mariupol’s port access and integrate the city’s transport capabilities into Russia’s regional economic agenda.

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces are likely amassing Belgorod to deploy to the Kharkiv City region to prevent the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area from reaching the international border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that units of the 1st Tank Army are concentrating in Belgorod, Russia, for deployment to areas near the Ukraine-Russia border.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the main Russian effort around Kharkiv City is oriented around preventing Ukrainian counteroffensives from pushing Russian forces to the international border.[9] ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive northeast of Kharkiv City has forced Russian forces to deploy reinforcements to the Kharkiv city area instead of deploying them to Russian axes of advance.[10] The Ukrainian counteroffensive did not make any confirmed advances on May 8.

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed ground attacks on the Southern Axis on May 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces may be preparing for a potential offensive in order to improve their tactical positions and fix Ukrainian forces in place.[11] Russian forces focused on reconnaissance and regrouping frontline units in likely preparation to renew offensive operations on the Southern Axis, although the likelihood of their ability to do so successfully is doubtful.[12] Satellite imagery notably showed Russian forces concentrating on anti-aircraft missile forces and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in Filatovka, northern Crimea, between April 27 and May 5.[13] Such reconnaissance and renewal measures indicate that Russian troops are preparing to restart offensive operations, likely in the direction of Zaporizhia and Kryvyi Rih, in the coming days.

Russian forces additionally continued to target Odesa with missile strikes on May 8.[14] The situation in Transnistria remains tense but unchanged. [15]

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.
  • Russia may change the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, possibly by merging them into a single “Donbas Republic” and/or by annexing them directly to Russia.
  • Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
  • Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian positions northeast of the city and will likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
  • Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

References

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/311957571117328

[2] https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2417; 

https://t dot me/RKadyrov_95/2055; https://t dot me/RKadyrov_95/2054; 

https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/61770

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665

[4] https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2417

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/311957571117328; 

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1523221514711093249

 https://t.me/RVvoenkor/11248;

 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1523217625106771968 https://t.me/RVvoenkor/11248      

[6] https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/05/8/7344860/

[7] https://t dot me/pushilindenis/2194;

 https://t dot me/stranaua/40916

[8]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/311957571117328;

[9]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/311957571117328;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665; 

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1113935402498056; 

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/311957571117328

[13] https://t dot me/stranaua/40896

[14] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1523048350073110528; 

https://t dot me/stranaua/40926;

 https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/61926

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/311957571117328;

 https://t dot me/stranaua/40908

 

Tags

 Ukraine Project

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