Wednesday, May 11, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT MAY 11,2022

SOURCES:

GOOGLE TO GLIMPSE THE WAR

(P) TOM COOPER UKRAINE WAR:

ukraine-war-7-8-may-2022-fec911e68251

(Q) RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg

(R) WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:
https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl

ASSESSMENT
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN
MAY 11,2022

MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS,

AND

KATERYNA STEPANENKO

May 11, 5:30pm ET

Russian forces did not make any significant advances anywhere in Ukraine on May 11, and Ukrainian forces took further ground northeast of Kharkiv. The Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City has forced Russian troops onto the defensive and necessitated reinforcement and replenishment efforts intended to prevent further Ukrainian advances towards the Russian border. Russian efforts along the Southern Axis and in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts remain similarly stalled, and Russian forces have not made any significant gains in the face of continued successful Ukrainian defenses.

Key Takeaways

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City has forced Russian troops onto the defensive and has successfully alleviated artillery pressure on Kharkiv City.
Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Ukrainian positions in the Severodonetsk-Rubizhne-Lysychansk area but did not make any confirmed advances.
Russian forces may be initiating a new advance towards Bakhmut after capturing Popasna in order to secure highway access north to Slovyansk.
Russian forces are attempting to consolidate their positions in western Kherson Oblast to push into Mykolaiv Oblast.
Pro-Russian Telegram sources reported Ukrainian forces may be conducting a counterattack 40km north of Izyum to cut off Russian units in this key town, though ISW cannot confirm these reports at this time.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting effort 1 — Mariupol;
Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort— Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces fired at Ukrainian positions around Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances on May 11. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), 1st Guards Tank Army, 20th, 29th, 35th, and 36th Combined Arms Armies, and 68th Army Corps focused on inflicting fire damage on Ukrainian troops around Izyum.[1] The Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff’s Main Operations Department, Brigadier General Oleksiy Gromov, additionally stated that Russian forces have moved to defense and deterrence actions around Izyum due to the successful Ukrainian defense.[2] Pro-Russian media outlet Readkova noted that Ukrainian forces are attempting to cross the Severskyi Donets River by Chepil (about 40 kilometers northwest of Izyum) to cut off Russian ground supply lines to Izyum, although ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[3]

Russian forces continued ground offensives westward in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts on May 11. Russian troops continued attempts to encircle the Rubizhne-Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area and Ukrainian sources reported intense fighting in Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Rubizhne, Bilohorivka, Vojevodivka, Nyzhnie, Toshkivka, and Orikhove.[4] Russian forces are also likely preparing for a new line of advance towards Bakhmut, about 50 kilometers southeast of Slovyansk, along the M03 highway.[5] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are firing on the road that runs between Lysychansk and Bakhmut to interdict Ukrainian troops, which is consistent with claims made by a Russian war reporter that Russian forces are developing an offensive towards Bakhmut.[6] Bakhmut lies just west of Popasna and the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border, which Russian forces reportedly crossed on May 10.[7] The move towards Bakhmut is likely intended to gain access to the M03 highway and continue the northwestward push towards Slovyansk. Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground assaults around Donetsk City, as they have for the last several days.[8]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks against Ukrainian positions in the Azovstal Steel Plant with the support of air and artillery strikes on May 11.[9] The Azov Regiment stated that Russian forces launched 38 airstrikes and 4 strategic bombing flights on Azovstal in the last 24 hours.[10]

Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko claimed that Russian authorities are deporting those who are deemed to be “suspicious” during filtration measures in Mariupol to a detention camp in Olenivka, Donetsk Oblast.[11] Andryushchenko compared the facility to a concentration camp and stated that detainees are subject to overcrowding, atrocious conditions, mass interrogations, and forced disappearances.[12] ISW cannot independently confirm these claims, but they are fully in line with previously reported Russian ”filtration” measures in occupied Ukraine.

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces moved to the defensive in order to prevent further advances north to the Russian border by the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive around Kharkiv City on May 11.[13] Pro-Russian media outlet Readkova reported that Ukrainian forces are preparing for an offensive in Kozacha Lopan and Tsupivka, both within 10 kilometers of the international border, confirming reports from May 10 that Ukrainian forces had advanced to within 10 kilometers of the Russian border.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Russian 6th and 41st Combined Arms Armies and coastal units of the Baltic and Northern Fleets are conducting reconnaissance against Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv to stymie further advances.[15] The General Staff statement notably does not mention the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army, which was active in the area as of May 8.[16] If confirmed, this may indicate that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army withdrew to Belgorod to reconstitute and refit following losses sustained around Kharkiv City. Head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov noted that artillery pressure against the northeastern suburbs of Kharkiv City has been alleviated, indicating Ukrainian forces have successfully driven Russian forces largely out of artillery range of Kharkiv City.[17]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions along the Southern Axis but did not make any confirmed advances on May 11.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are attempting to take control of Bruskynske and Velyka Oleksandrivka to improve their tactical position in the South.[19] These settlements lie within 15 kilometers of the Kherson-Mykolaiv border and would likely allow Russian troops to conduct offensive actions towards Mykolaiv. The UK Ministry of Defense stated that Russian troops are likely trying to reinforce their garrison on Snake Island off the coast of Odesa for increased access to the northwestern Black Sea.[20] The situation in Transnistria remains tense but unchanged.[21]

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced the second stage of rapid response force exercises, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine.
Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and Western Donetsk.
Russia is likely setting conditions to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories directly into Russia, as opposed to creating proxy “People’s Republics.”
Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian positions northeast of the city towards the international border and will likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952

[2] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/05/11/na-izyumskomu-napryamku-vorog-perejshov-do-oborony-i-vede-strymuyuchi-diyi/

[3] https://t dot me/readovkanews/33494

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2484; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1524220659617910786; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1524049097619030017; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314771530835932; https://www.facebook.com/JFTaskForce/posts/368023488686301

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314771530835932

[6] https://t dot me/epoddubny/10551; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/2484

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[8] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1524050778448711683; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1524049637723848705

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314771530835932; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/807; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/800; https://t.me/istorijaoruzija/62747; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14595337

[10] https://t dot me/polkazov/4482

[11] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/818; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/819

[12] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/818; https://t dot me/andriyshTime/819

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314771530835932; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/05/11/vtraty-voroga-z-pochatku-tak-zvanoyi-speczialnoyi-operacziyi-stanovlyat-blyzko-20-osobovogo-skladu/; https://t dot me/readovkanews/33494; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/05/11/na-izyumskomu-napryamku-vorog-perejshov-do-oborony-i-vede-strymuyuchi-diyi/

[14] https://t dot me/readovkanews/33494; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/312377534408665

[17] https://t dot me/synegubov/3162

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952; https://t dot me/zoda_gov_ua/7642; https://t dot me/zoda_gov_ua/7629; https://t.me/istorijaoruzija/62695; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7617; https://t dot me/dnipropetrovskaODA/885; https://t dot me/mykola_lukashuk/448; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314771530835932

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952; https://www.facebook.com/khoda.gov.ua/posts/365523812276121

[20] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1524247559103033344

[21] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=996903861216686; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/314387997540952; https://t.me/tsvtiraspol/25330

Tuesday, May 10, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 10,2022

ASSESSMENT [ un edited]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, MAY 10,2022

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros

May 10, 7:15pm ET

The Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City continued to successfully push Russian forces toward the Russia-Ukraine border on May 10. Ukrainian forces liberated several towns north of Kharkiv City and continued pushing north of the recently liberated Staryi Saltiv to capture several towns northeast of Kharkiv: a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops advanced to within 10km of the Russian border, though ISW cannot independently confirm these specific claims.[1] Russian forces from the Izyum area are reportedly redeploying northwards to attempt to alleviate the pressure of this counteroffensive and stymie further northward advances toward the Russian border.[2] The Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely continue to divert Russian troops and resources from deployment to other axes of advance where fighting has been similarly stalled out by the successful Ukrainian defense. The counteroffensive will impede the ability of Russian artillery to target the northeastern suburbs of Kharkiv City, will potentially enable Ukrainian forces to threaten Russian rear areas with their own shelling and further attacks, and—if Ukrainian forces are able to further advance the counteroffensive or Russian forces collapse along the Kharkiv axis and withdraw further—unhinge Russian offensive operations around Izyum.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense escalated its false claims of US and NATO preparations to attack Belarus while announcing the start of a second stage of ongoing military exercises on May 10. However, Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced the second stage of ongoing rapid response forces exercises on May 10 in response to what he falsely claimed were NATO escalations.[3] Belarusian First Deputy Minister of Defense Victor Gulevich accused the US and its allies of building up a military presence around Belarusian borders and claimed that Poland and the Baltic states are threatening Belarusian territory through reconnaissance, sabotage, and special operations.[4] Gulevich announced that Belarusian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) will subsequently advance to the Western and Northwestern operational zones as part of a ”whole range of measures aimed at countering possible threats” in these areas.[5] Gulevich additionally stated that the presence of 20,000 Ukrainian troops in Belarus’ Southern Operational District have necessitated a deployment of unspecified Belarusian troops to three tactical directions near the Ukrainian border, which is consistent with Ukrainian General Staff reporting that certain Belarusian units have deployed to the Ukraine-Belarus border area for a combat readiness check.[6]

The rhetoric of threats to Belarus’ borders is not new and was frequently employed by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in the early stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[7] The Belarusian exercises, which are concentrated on Belarus’ borders with Poland and the Baltic States rather than Ukraine, are likely primarily demonstrative and signal Belarus’ continued political support for Russia‘s war in Ukraine. The exercises are likely additionally intended to draw NATO attention and possibly disrupt NATO aid to Ukraine, rather than threatening an actual military operation—similar to Russian efforts to destabilize Moldova that are likely intended to distract Romania and NATO rather than directly threaten Odesa. Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine. Lukashenko successfully repressed domestic opposition in 2020 and 2021 but remains vulnerable to further domestic unrest if his security apparatus weakens; he is likely unwilling to risk losing his military in a stalled and deteriorating Russian war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in northern Kharkiv took further ground and have possibly closed to within 10km of the Russian border.
Belarusian authorities are escalating rhetoric accusing NATO and the US of threatening Belarusian borders, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war.
Russian operations around Izyum remain stalled.
DNR and Russian forces are advancing efforts to consolidate their control of the ruins of Mariupol, including reportedly attempting to reopen steel plants to produce military equipment.
Russian forces in eastern Ukraine continued attempts to encircle the Severodonetsk area and reportedly reached the Donetsk-Luhansk administrative border from Popasna.
Russian and Ukrainian forces did not conduct any significant attacks on the southern axis.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the five primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and four supporting efforts);
Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting effort 1 — Mariupol;
Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
Supporting effort 3—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 4—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in any direction from Izyum on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces around Izyum are focusing on regrouping, replenishing equipment, and conducting reconnaissance to create conditions for renewed offensives east towards Lyman and Slovyansk.[8]

Russian forces continued ground attacks and shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and made marginal westward advances on May 10. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces moved west from Popasna and reached the administrative border of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[9] Ukrainian sources reported intense fighting to the north, west, and south of Severodonetsk in Vojevodivka, Toshkivke, Rubizhne, Lysychansk, Orikhove, Hirske, and Bilohorivka as Russian forces attempt to encircle the town.[10] Ukrainian forces notably destroyed a Russian pontoon bridge across the Siverskyi Donets River in the vicinity of Bilohorivka, which may allow Ukrainian forces to develop a line west of Severodonetsk and disrupt the intended Russian encirclement of the Rubizhne-Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[11]

Russian troops continued attacks in Donetsk Oblast around Oleksandrivka and Shandryholove in order to move west to the Donetsk-Kharkiv administrative border.[12] Russian forces additionally continued unsuccessful frontal assaults around Donetsk City but did not make any confirmed advances on May 10.[13] Pro-Russian reporter Aleksandr Sladkov, who is operating around Donetsk City, complained that Russian forces are fighting Ukrainians at a 1:1 assault force ratio and have not been able to push Ukrainian forces from their positions in Donetsk.[14]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to conduct air and artillery strikes and ground assaults against Ukrainian positions in the Azovstal Steel Plant on May 10.[15] Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Vershchuk reported that there are 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the plant and that hundreds are wounded.[16] A senior US defense official noted that Russian forces are increasingly relying on “dumb bombs” to assault Mariupol because they have expended precision-guided munition supplies.[17] Russian authorities are continuing to prepare Mariupol for economic integration. Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko claimed that occupation authorities of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) are trying to call workers back to the captured Ilyich Iron and Steel Work Plant to launch production of military equipment to supply Russian and proxy forces.[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Retain positions on the outskirts of Kharkiv within artillery range of the city and prevent further Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces reportedly pushed Russian troops further north from Kharkiv City toward the international border on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on May 10 that Ukrainian forces recaptured Cherkasy Tyshky and Ruski Tyshky, both within 10 kilometers of the northeast boundary of Kharkiv City, after unverified reports on May 7 and 9 that Russian forces withdrew from the two towns.[19] Ukrainian units reportedly also took control of Pytomnyk, 10 kilometers directly north of Kharkiv City.[20] The Ukrainian 227th Kharkiv Territorial Defense Battalion claimed that they successfully advanced north of Staryi Saltiv (about 40 kilometers east of Kharkiv City) and liberated Bairak, Zamulivka, Verkhnii Saltiv, and Rubizhne (a different Rubizhne than the town of the same name in Kharkiv Oblast) on May 10.[21] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian troops are as far north as Vovchansk, which is less than 10 kilometers south of the Russian border.[22] ISW cannot independently confirm this claim, but it is consistent with the overall Ukrainian push toward the Russian border over the last few days.

The Borivka Village Council reported that Russian forces are withdrawing en masse from Borova and Bohuslavka, southeast Kharkiv Oblast, and moving north in the direction of Kupyansk.[23] Russian forces are likely prioritizing reinforcing their grouping northeast of Kharkiv to prevent further Ukrainian counteroffensives in the direction of the international border at the expense of offensive operations to the southeast.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 138th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Combined Arms Army withdrew to Belgorod due to losses sustained in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian and Ukrainian troops clashed on the line of contact between Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts but neither side made any confirmed advances on May 10.[26] Russian forces continued to shell Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[27] Russian forces additionally intensified airstrikes against Odesa.[28] Transnistrian authorities announced that they will extend the “red level” terrorist threat until May 25.[29]

Supporting Effort #4—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There were no significant events on this axis in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced the second stage of rapid response force exercises, but Belarus remains unlikely to join the war in Ukraine.
Russian forces will likely continue to merge offensive efforts southward of Izyum with westward advances from Donetsk in order to encircle Ukrainian troops in southern Kharkiv Oblast and western Donetsk.
Russia is likely setting conditions to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories directly into Russia, as opposed to creating proxy “People’s Republics.” Russian forces have apparently decided to seize the Azovstal plant through ground assault and will likely continue operations accordingly.
Ukrainian counteroffensives around Kharkiv City are pushing back Russian positions northeast of the city towards the international border and will likely continue to force the Russians to reinforce those positions at the cost of reinforcing Russian offensive operations elsewhere.
Russian forces may be preparing to conduct renewed offensive operations to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in the coming days.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://t.me/natsionalKharkiv/5737; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1523918568995401729; https://twitter.com/donikroman/status/1523880239448866816; https://www.facebook.com/227TrO/posts/126772019973301

[2] https://t dot me/stranaua/41184; https://t dot me/borova_gromada/962

[3] https://t dot me/stranaua/41338; https://t dotme/modmilby/14146; https://tdotme/modmilby/14147; https://t dot me/modmilby/14148

[4] https://t dot me/modmilby/14150

[5] https://t dot me/modmilby/14150

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://t dot me/modmilby/14150

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-1 -7; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-3

[8]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603

[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/15591; https://t dot me/epoddubny/10493

[10]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2470; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/313588154287603; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1523975349670924289; https://twitter.com/abdujalil/status/1523933520585969670; https://twitter.com/SESU_UA/status/1523951975141937153; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2462; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2466

[11] https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1523752742820343808; https://twitter.com/InformNapalm/status/1523736045732319232; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2470

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0iAPLjshcPf5ci5XyCRR...; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1523991358356307971; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1524052036286824448