Sunday, June 19, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 18, 2022

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, JUNE 18, 2022

Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, George Barros, and Grace Mappes

June 18, 3:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces made marginal gains on the outskirts of Severodonetsk on June 18 but have largely stalled along other axes of advance. Russian troops are likely facing mounting losses and troop and equipment degradation that will complicate attempts to renew offensive operations on other critical locations as the slow battle for Severodonetsk continues. As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces will likely be able to seize Severodonetsk in the coming weeks, but at the cost of concentrating most of their available forces in this small area. Other Russian operations in eastern Ukraine—such as efforts to capture Slovyansk and advance east of Bakhmut—have made little progress in the past two weeks. Russian forces are continuing to fight to push Ukrainian troops away from occupied frontiers north of Kharkiv City and along the Southern Axis, but have not made significant gains in doing so, thus leaving them vulnerable to Ukrainian counteroffensive and partisan pressure.

The Russian military continues to face challenges with the morale and discipline of its troops in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate released what it reported were intercepted phone calls on June 17 and 18 in which Russian soldiers complained about frontline conditions, poor equipment, and overall lack of personnel.[1] One soldier claimed that units have been largely drained of personnel and that certain battalion tactical groups (BTGs) have only 10 to 15 troops remaining in service.[2]

Key Takeaways

Russian forces secured minor gains on the outskirts of Severodonetsk and likely advanced into Metolkine, but Russian operations remain slow.

Russian forces continued efforts to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway and conducted ground and artillery strikes along the highway.

Russian forces seek to push Ukrainian forces out of artillery range of railway lines around Kharkiv City used to supply Russian offensive operations toward Slovyansk.

Russian forces did not take any confirmed actions along the Southern Axis and continue to face partisan pressure in occupied areas of southern Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground assaults against Severodonetsk and its outskirts and secured minor gains in the southeastern suburbs of the city on June 18.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops had partial success while attacking Metolkine, (just south of Severodonetsk) where they have been fighting for the last few days, though ISW cannot independently confirm what areas of the town Russian forces seized.[4] Russian forces likely intend to capture the southern suburbs of Severodonetsk and advance to the bank of the Severskiy Donets river before assaulting the center of Ukrainian resistance in the Azot chemical plant. Russian forces are additionally fighting for control of Syrotnye, another nearby suburb of Severodonetsk.[5] Russian forces continued to fire on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[6]

Russian forces continued to launch attacks toward Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum on June 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.[7] Fighting continued around Krasnopillya, a village along the E40 highway less than 20 km northwest of Slovyansk.[8] Russian troops exerted continual artillery fire on settlements southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman in order to set conditions for further attempts to advance on Slovyansk.[9] Russian forces seek to capture Slovyansk to sever one of Ukraine’s lines of communications to Severodonetsk and Lysychansk but are making only incremental progress towards the city.

Russian forces continued ground and artillery attacks east of Bakhmut in order to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway on June 18.[10] Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack in Nyrkove, a settlement along the Luhansk-Donetsk Oblast border within 5 km of the T1302 highway.[11] Russian forces additionally conducted unsuccessful attacks against Hirske and Berestove, likely with the intent of interdicting Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302 highway and complicating Ukrainian operations to support the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[12]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces continued offensive operations to prevent Ukrainian troops from advancing further toward the international border on June 18.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces are taking measures to prevent Ukrainian troops from reaching Russian rear areas that are supporting operations toward Slovyansk and are laying additional railways to restore supply lines to Slovyansk.[14] Russian-controlled rail lines in northern Kharkiv Oblast are likely the primary means Russian forces are employing to supply ongoing operations to capture Slovyansk, and Russian forces have prioritized securing and repairing railways in this area throughout the war. While Ukrainian forces are unlikely to be able to quickly advance the dozens of kilometers into Russian-held territory in Kharkiv Oblast that would be required to directly sever these rail lines, Russian forces likely seek to push back Ukrainian forces to prevent their artillery from interdicting Russian supply routes. Russian forces additionally continued to fight for control of Dementiivka and Pitomnyk, both north of Kharkiv City, and conducted artillery strikes around northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[15]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces fired on Ukrainian positions along the Southern Axis but did not make any confirmed attacks on June 18, a pause from the steady localized attacks of the past several weeks.[16] Russian forces continued efforts to improve engineering equipment along the Inhulets River.[17] A Russian Telegram channel noted that Russian forces launched massive, unspecified strikes along the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border, likely in response to recent limited Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[18]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities continued to face partisan activity in occupied areas on June 18. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that unidentified Ukrainian partisans conducted an IED attack against Yevhen Sobolev, a Russian collaborator, in Kherson City on June 18.[19] Such partisan actions will likely continue to complicate the implementation of occupational agendas and pro-Russian sentiment in occupied areas.

References

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://gur.gov dot ua/content/abo-ide-i-ne-striliaie-abo-striliaie-i-ne-ide-rashysty-skarzhatsia-na-obstrily-z-boku-zsu-ta-nepratsiuiuchu-tekhniku.html;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYwoM2xrzik&feature=youtu.be&ab_channel=...

https://gur.gov.ua/content/v-rotakh-zalyshylos-po-10-15-liudei-bezvykhid...;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KBnITxmvpQ&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%B...

[2] https://gur.gov.ua/content/v-rotakh-zalyshylos-po-10-15-liudei-bezvykhid...;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KBnITxmvpQ&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%B...

[3] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3556; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3557;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...

[6] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3557

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779

[8] https://t.me/rybar/34061;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3556

[11] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3556; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1537832000446398464

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3557;

https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3546

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1537960887402631168;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1537961116432666631

https://t.me/milinfolive/85295; https://t.me/synegubov/3460;

https://t.me/rybar/34073; https://t.me/rybar/34064

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779;

https://www.facebook.com/khoda.gov.ua/posts/390583886436780;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pAgGDxGsMEbDdaeNfY...;

https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1166;

https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/617;

https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1166;

https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1167;

https://t.me/milinfolive/85332

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342446391401779

[18] https://t.me/rybar/34064

[19] https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/2022/06/18/u-hersoni-pidirvaly-kolaboranta/

File Attachments:

Severodonetsk Battle Map Draft June 18,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft June 18,2022.png

Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft June 18,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft June 18,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTJune18,2022.png

Saturday, June 18, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 17

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, JUNE 17,2022.

Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, George Barros, and Grace Mappes

June 17, 7:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces are continuing to deploy additional forces to support offensive operations in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area, and Ukrainian defenses remain strong. Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk reported that Russian forces are transferring tanks, armored personnel carriers, engineering equipment, and vehicles from Svatove, along the Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Luhansk Oblast, to Starobilsk, just 40 km east of Severodonetsk.[1] Social media users reported that Russian forces are likely redeploying equipment from northern Kharkiv Oblast to Donbas and published footage of Russian heavy artillery arriving by rail in Stary Osokol, Belgorod Oblast on June 17.[2] UK Chief of Defense Tony Radakin stated that Russian forces are “diminishing” in power by committing large quantities of personnel and equipment for incremental gains in one area.[3] The Russian military has concentrated the vast majority of its available combat power to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at the expense of other axes of advance and is suffering heavy casualties to do so.

Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that Russian forces will attack Ukrainian positions near Donetsk City but reiterated that the new tactic will require additional time during his address at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on June 17.[4] Putin stated that Russian forces will stop what he claimed is Ukrainian shelling of Donetsk City by attacking Ukrainian fortifications from the rear. Putin may have amplified reports of shelling of civilian areas of Donetsk City, which Ukrainian officials have denied, to discourage Western officials from supplying weapons to Ukraine.[5] Putin also declared that Russian forces will fully complete the “special military operation” in Ukraine, and noted that Russian and proxy forces will intensify counter-battery combat.[6] Putin urged Russian forces to refrain from entirely destroying cities that they aim to “liberate," ignoring the destruction Russian forces have inflicted on Ukrainian cities and the artillery-heavy tactics Russian forces are currently employing in Severodonetsk.”[7]

Unconfirmed Ukrainian sources report that the Kremlin fired the Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Andrey Serdyukov, due to mass casualties among Russian paratroopers. Odesa Oblast Military-Civil Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk reported that the Kremlin appointed the current chief of staff of the Central Military District, Colonel-General Mikhail Teplinsky, as Serdyukov’s replacement and named the Deputy Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Anatoly Kontsevoi, as the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Airborne Forces.[8][9] ISW cannot independently confirm these claims or Serdyukov’s exact role in the invasion of Ukraine, but they, if true, would indicate that Serdyukov is being held responsible for the poor performance of and high casualties among Russian VDV units, particularly in early operations around Kyiv. Continued dismissals and possible internal purges of senior Russian officers will likely further degrade poor Russian command and control capabilities and the confidence of Russian officers.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful ground assaults against Severodonetsk and its southeastern outskirts on June 17.

Russian forces continued efforts to sever Ukrainian lines of communication to Lysychansk, both from the north toward Slovyansk and in the south near Bakhmut.

Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a counteroffensive northwest of Izyum intended to draw Russian forces away from offensive operations toward Slovyansk and disrupt Russian supply lines and are making minor gains.

Ukrainian forces and aviation continued to strike Russian logistics and fortifications in occupied settlements along the Southern Axis, with localized fighting ongoing.

Russian forces continued to regroup and transfer personnel within Zaporizhia Oblast to maintain defensive positions along the frontline.

Russian President Putin reaffirmed his commitment to “completing” the Russian operation in Ukraine but acknowledged that unspecified new Russian tactics (which are likely simply explanations for poor Russian performance) will take time.

Unconfirmed Ukrainian sources reported that the Kremlin fired the commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Andrey Serdyukov, due to poor performance.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful ground assaults against Severodonetsk and its southeastern outskirts on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Syrotyne and Metolkine, just southeast of Severodonetsk.[10] Russian forces are reportedly deploying additional artillery systems and troops to support offensive operations in Severodonetsk.[11] Ukrainian parliamentary representative and military commentator Dmytro Snyegiryev stated on June 17 that Russian forces already have seven battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in Severodonetsk and recently introduced two reserve BTGs to the area, but ISW cannot independently verify Snyegiryev’s claims or the timeframe of his statement.[12] Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk added that Ukrainian forces continue to retain positions at the Azot Chemical Plant in the southeastern part of Severodonetsk.[13] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces are attacking Toshkivka, likely in an effort to secure positions on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets River.[14]

Russian forces continued to attack settlements along the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Lysychansk. Russian forces launched an unsuccessful assault on Zolote, near the T1303 Hirske-Lysychansk highway, and are likely attempting to encircle Ukrainian forces in the area.[15] Ukrainian forces also reportedly repelled Russian assaults on Berestove, Nyrokove, and Vasylivka along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway and Kodema, approximately 14km south of Bakhmut.[16] Russian forces committed additional two battalions of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the armed forces of the DNR and LNR) and are continuing to regroup troops to continue assaults along the T1303 highway.[17] Russian forces may also be attempting to resume river crossings southeast of Lyman to disrupt Ukrainian GLOCs around Siversk. Motuzyanuk stated that Russian forces are preparing to cross the Siverskiy Donets and are shelling settlements southeast of Lyman.[18] Geolocated footage showed that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces destroyed a Russian pontoon bridge near Bilohorivka (approximately 13km south of Kreminna) on June 16. Russian forces previously suffered significant losses during a failed river crossing attempt near Bilohorivka in early May.[19]

Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance north of Slovyansk and southeast of Izyum on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces failed to seize Bohorodychne (approximately 25 km southeast of Izyum) and retreated to previously occupied positions.[20] Russian forces also conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations near Krasnopillia, located along the E40 highway to Slovyansk.[21] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensives southwest of Izyum and pushed Russian forces out of Dmytrivka.[22]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces engaged in clashes north and northeast of Kharkiv City to push Ukrainian forces away from the international border on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations in Kochubiyika, just west of the Kharkiv City-Belgorod highway.[23] Ukrainian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Oleksandr Motuzyanyk stated that Russian forces are regrouping troops and conducting air reconnaissance in settlements within a 40 km range northeast of Kharkiv City in preparation to resume offensive operations in Ternova-Rubizhne area.[24] Social media footage also showed mobilized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) servicemen operating just east of Ternova and Rubizhne, who are likely defending Russian-occupied positions along the border.[25]

Ukrainian and Russian sources are increasingly reporting on the possibility of Ukrainian counteroffensives toward Izyum from Kharkiv City’s southeastern outskirts.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending rear positions to halt any Ukrainian advances toward Izyum from Kharkiv City.[27] Pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar noted that Ukrainian forces are actively attempting to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum.[28] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov reported that Russian artillery continues to fire at Chuhuiv, approximately 35 km southeast of Kharkiv City.[29] These Ukrainian operations are likely intended to draw Russian forces away from offensive operations toward Slovyansk and disrupt Russian supply lines.

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces and aviation continued to strike Russian logistics and fortifications in occupied settlements along the Southern Axis. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian aviation struck Russian positions in Kherson City, Kakhovka, and Bersylav districts situated at least 45 km southeast of the line of contact on the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border.[30] Geolocated footage also shows that Ukrainian forces previously destroyed a Russian ammunition depot and equipment repair center in Nova Kakhovka (just southwest of Kakhovka) on June 14.[31] Pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar reported that Ukrainian Su-25 jet aircraft struck Russian positions in occupied Snihurivka, approximately 65 km east of Mykolaiv City, but ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[32] Ukrainian forces destroyed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet “Vasily Bekh” tugboat as it delivered ammunition, weapons, and personnel to Snake Island off the Romanian coast despite the presence of Russian air-defense systems on the island.[33] Russian forces continued to fire at Ukrainian forces along the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border, likely to deter Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[34] The ability of Ukrainian ground-attack aircraft (as opposed to air-to-ground missiles fired from outside Russian-controlled airspace) to strike targets up to 45 km behind the Russian front lines indicates that previous Russian efforts to reinforce air defenses around Kherson have not been fully effective.

Russian forces continued to regroup and transfer personnel within Zaporizhia Oblast to maintain defensive positions along the frontline.[35] Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces are concentrating troops in the Vasylivka and Polohy areas, 45 km south and 90 km southeast of Zaporizhia Oblast, respectfully.[36] Russian forces reportedly relocated some elements from other settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast to Melitopol and are planning to move additional units to the city from the Enerhodar area.[37] The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration also noted that there are no indications that Russian forces intend to conduct offensive operations against Orihiv or Huliaipole (both settlements north of the frontline) in the near future. Russian forces likely lack the manpower to resume ground offensives in Zaporizhia Oblast and are likely reinforcing their frontline positions to defend against possible Ukrainian counterattacks.

Russian President Vladimir Putin implied that Russian-occupied settlements will hold referendums to join Russia during his address to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on June 17.[38] Putin said that Russian-occupied settlements will determine their own future and that the Kremlin will “respect any of their choices.” Putin also blamed Ukraine for threatening a food crisis in Africa and the Middle East, claiming that Ukrainian forces placed mines around ports and stopped grain exports.[39] However, the Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported spotting another ten Russian trucks filled with Ukrainian grain heading from Melitopol to Crimea on June 16.[40]

Rererences

[1] https://news dot liga.net/ua/politics/news/ustayut-no-ne-zakanchivayutsya-okkupanty-usilili-gruppirovku-svoih-voysk-u-severodonetska

[2] https://t.me/rybar/34027;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1537746167659909122;

https://t.me/milinfolive/85246;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1537750055884578816

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/17/russia-has-strategically-l...

[4] https://t.me/epoddubny/11268

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5705%E2%80%99; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5691;

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-dismisses-stupid-western-sanc...

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-gu...

[9] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/13996 https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/19143

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342084208104664

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631;

https://t.me/rybar/34027;

https://news dot liga.net/ua/politics/news/ustayut-no-ne-zakanchivayutsya-okkupanty-usilili-gruppirovku-svoih-voysk-u-severodonetska

[12] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/17/pid-syevyerodoneczkom-zsu-znyshhyly-do-60-syl-okupantiv/

[13] https://news dot liga.net/ua/politics/news/ustayut-no-ne-zakanchivayutsya-okkupanty-usilili-gruppirovku-svoih-voysk-u-severodonetska

[14] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3535

[15] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3535;

https://www dot unian.ua/war/u-rayoni-zolotogo-zsu-vidbili-shturm-vorog-namagayetsya-otochiti-syevyerodoneck-motuzyanik-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11869545.html;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342084208104664

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342084208104664

[17] https://news dot liga.net/ua/politics/news/ustayut-no-ne-zakanchivayutsya-okkupanty-usilili-gruppirovku-svoih-voysk-u-severodonetska;

https://www dot unian.ua/war/u-rayoni-zolotogo-zsu-vidbili-shturm-vorog-namagayetsya-otochiti-syevyerodoneck-motuzyanik-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11869545.html

[18] https://news dot liga.net/ua/politics/news/ustayut-no-ne-zakanchivayutsya-okkupanty-usilili-gruppirovku-svoih-voysk-u-severodonetska

[19] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1537525339487977476

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342084208104664;

https://t.me/synegubov/3449; https://t.me/rybar/34026

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342084208104664

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631;

https://t.me/synegubov/3449

[24] https://www dot unian.ua/war/u-rayoni-zolotogo-zsu-vidbili-shturm-vorog-namagayetsya-otochiti-syevyerodoneck-motuzyanik-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11869545.html;

[25] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1537508641393238018

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/342084208104664

[28] https://t.me/rybar/34026

[29] https://t.me/synegubov/3449

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/341691204810631

[31] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1537085652738707458;

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1536730993293512706;

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1536716468330631168;

https://t.me/hueviyherson/20431?single;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1536777212262744064;