RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 19, 2022 (r)

 

ASSESSMENT

                                  [ https://youtu.be/78KbH3Eb8lc ]

Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for India | The Grand Strategy With GD Bakshi

 RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , JUNE 19, 2022

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

June 19, 5:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The UK Ministry of Defense assesses that the Kremlin’s continued framing of its invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation” rather than a war is actively hindering Russian force generation capabilities. The UK Ministry of Defense reported on June 19 that Russian authorities are struggling to find legal means to punish military dissenters and those who refuse to mobilize because the classification of the conflict in Ukraine as a “special military operation” precludes legal punitive measures that could be employed during a formal war.[1]   ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin’s framing of the war as a “special operation” is compounding consistent issues with poor perceptions of Russian military leadership among Russian nationalists, problems with paying troops, lack of available forces, and unclear objectives among Russian forces. The Kremlin is continuing to attempt to fight a major and grinding war in Ukraine with forces assembled for what the Kremlin incorrectly assumed would be a short invasion against token Ukrainian resistance. The Kremlin continues to struggle to correct this fundamental flaw in its “special military operation.”

Russian authorities likely seek to use war crimes trials against captured Ukrainian servicemen, particularly troops that defended Mariupol, to advance its narratives around the war. Russian sources reported that the authorities of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) plan to hold war crimes tribunals until the end of August 2022 and that at least one of these tribunals will be held in Mariupol.[2] These tribunals will reportedly be judged in accordance with DNR legislation (which notably allows capital punishment, unlike Russian law) and be modeled on the Nuremberg format for war crimes trials. The trials are a sham attempt to try lawful prisoners of war as war criminals and support the Kremlin’s false framing of its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a ”de-Nazification” operation. Despite the fact that DNR authorities plan to try Ukrainian servicemen in the DNR, a source in Russian law enforcement told state-owned media outlet TASS that the deputy commander of the Azov Regiment and the commander of the Ukrainian 36th Marine Brigade will both be transferred to Russia for investigation and trial.[3] Russian authorities will likely use these trials to strengthen legal controls of occupied areas and further demoralize Ukrainian defenders by setting a harsh legal precedent during preliminary tribunals, as well as advancing the Kremlin’s false narrative of invading Ukraine to “de-Nazify” it.

Key Takeaways

• Concentrated Russian artillery power paired with likely understrength infantry units remains insufficient to enable Russian advances within Severodonetsk.

• Russian forces continued to prepare to advance on Slovyansk from southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.

• Russian forces are focusing on strengthening defensive positions along the Southern Axis due to recent successful Ukrainian counterattacks along the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border.

• Successful Ukrainian counterattacks in the Zaporizhia area are forcing Russian forces to rush reinforcements to this weakened sector of the front line.

• Russian forces are likely conducting false-flag artillery attacks against Russian-held territory to dissuade Ukrainian sentiment and encourage the mobilization of proxy forces.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Concentrated Russian artillery power paired with likely understrength infantry units remains insufficient to enable Russian advances within Severodonetsk, as Russian troops continued to fight for control of the city but made few gains on June 19. Russian forces continued efforts to encircle the remaining Ukrainian troops in the Azot industrial plant.[4] Russian Telegram channels additionally claimed that Russian forces are advancing on Lysychansk from the south and fighting in Berestove, Spirne, Vovchoyarivka, and the Lysychansk Oil Refinery.[5] Russian troops conducted airstrikes around Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and strengthened their grouping to the south of the area around Orikhove and Toshkivka.[6] Russian forces likely seek to levy their attempts to interdict the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway to support offensive operations in Lysychansk.

Russian forces continued to prepare for offensive operations toward Slovyansk from southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman but did not make any confirmed advances in either direction on June 19. Russian forces conducted reconnaissance and artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions southeast of Izyum around Dibrove, Virnopillya, Kurulka, Bohorodychne, and Dolyna, as well as to the west of Lyman.[7]

Russian forces continued offensive operations to the east of Bakhmut to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302  Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway on June 19. Russian forces reportedly fought around Nyrkove, Mykolaivka, and Berestove and conducted air, artillery, and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions east of Bakhmut and near the T1302.[8] Russian forces will likely continue efforts to gain access to the T1302 in order to support operations in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, especially as fighting in the area has largely stalled and Russian forces are increasingly unable to consolidate control of the city, even with artillery superiority.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces focused on maintaining their occupied frontiers north of Kharkiv City and fired at Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attempted reconnaissance-in-force operations in Rubizhne (in Kharkiv, not Luhansk Oblast), and Russian forces are likely fighting for more advantageous positions along the entire frontline north of Kharkiv City.[9] Russian forces additionally continued artillery strikes on Kharkiv City and surrounding settlements.[10]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Recent Ukrainian counterattacks have forced Russian troops to focus on maintaining their defensive positions along the Southern Axis on June 19.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast are strengthening their air-defense systems in the area, likely in response to continual, successful Ukrainian aviation attacks against Russian forces south of Davydiv Brid.[12] Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov claimed that Ukrainian troops are approaching the Kherson Oblast.[13] While ISW cannot independently confirm the current positions of Ukrainian troops, it is likely that localized Ukrainian counterattacks continue to push back Russian forces, especially along the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border, and Ukrainian forces may be able to further threaten Kherson City in the coming weeks.

Russian forces are continuing to accumulate equipment and manpower in central Zaporizhia Oblast, specifically along the Dniprorudne-Vasylivka-Orikhiv line, likely in response to Ukrainian counterattacks.[14] Fedorov stated that Ukrainian forces pushed the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline 10 km south. Ukrainian officials have previously reported that the Zaporizhia frontline shifted five to seven kilometers south and it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces have advanced 10 km in total or in addition to these earlier advances. Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Regional Military Administration stated that Russian troops are moving equipment and vehicles from Crimea through Melitopol toward the Vasylivka and Polohy areas and that Russian sabotage groups clashed with Ukrainian troops near the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border on June 19.[15] Russian forces are likely accumulating troops in Zaporizhia Oblast to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks towards Melitopol that could threaten Russian control of the city.

Russian forces continued missile and artillery strikes against various locations in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa Oblasts.[16] Although Ukrainian air defense intercepted missiles before they struck Odesa directly, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Russian forces likely targeted Odesa and other areas that are not experiencing direct hostilities to exert psychological pressure on the population and undermine local economies.[17] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally reported that Russian forces are restructuring their naval grouping to include more submarines, which is a likely response to successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian naval assets in the Black Sea.[18]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian forces are likely employing false-flag artillery strikes against infrastructure in Russian-held areas of Donetsk Oblast in order to dissuade pro-Ukrainian sentiment and encourage the mobilization of proxy forces. Open-source Twitter accounts confirmed ISW’s previous assessment that artillery attacks against

t Donetsk City were likely conducted from within Russian-held territory, refuting accusations made by Russian authorities that blamed Ukrainian troops for the attacks.[19] Such false-flag attacks are likely being propagated by Russian authorities to create hostility toward the Ukrainian military. 

References

[1] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1538401448404434944/photo/1

[2] https://t.me/rybar/34126

[3] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14965913?utm_source=meduza.io&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=meduza.io&utm_referrer=meduza.io

[4] https://t.me/rybar/34136

[5] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/7691; https://t.me/rybar/34136

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343208481325570;

 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3578; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3592

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343612411285177;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343208481325570;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343208481325570; 

https://t.me/nm_dnr/8302

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343612411285177;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343208481325570; 

https://t.me/miroshnik_r/7691

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343612411285177;

 https://t.me/synegubov/3464; 

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1538239490224947206

[10] https://t.me/synegubov/3464;

[11] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343612411285177;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343208481325570;

 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=432122485586534; 

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1148233979242074

[12] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1148233979242074;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343612411285177

[13] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/197

[14] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9328

[15] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9328;

 https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9328

[16] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=432122485586534; 

https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1148233979242074;

 https://t.me/stranaua/47833;

 https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1168 

https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1172;

 https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1173;

 https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/619; 

https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9336;

 https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9328;

 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343208481325570; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343612411285177

[17] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=432122485586534

[18] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1148233979242074

[19] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1538527271165771778;

 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

 

File Attachments: 

Luhansk Battle Map Draft June 19,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft June 19,2022.png

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft June 19, 2022.png

Severodonetsk Battle Map Draft June 19,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTJune19,2022.png

Understanding the Russian War Machine (r)

                                                         

SOURCE :   

(a) https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/understanding-the-russian-war-machine/ar-AAYEmcJ?ocid=winp1taskbar&cvid=df7ddd2d3da64e77aa988ae95bb72df9

    Lessons for India 

                                                     [  https://youtu.be/78KbH3Eb8lc ]

    

  Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons for India | The Grand Strategy With GD Bakshi

      Understanding the Russian War Machine

                                                                       Guest

It is not really possible for overstating the effect World War II had on Moscow’s military thinking that the surprise invasion during operation Barbarossa had led them to a state of being completely unprepared during the cold war.

The Russian officers most likely tend to stay in their initial field for their whole career which allows them to potentially achieve a particular level of expertise above that of the United States in any particular field for example. (Photo source: Reuters)

Huge commands were set by the Soviet Union just for being prepared in case of rapidly mobilizing thousands of divisions. However, Russia has been left with this command structure since the collapse of the Soviet Union while under the communist system, there was no way to pay for it.

A lot of these benefits are being tried to be maintained by Moscow but with further privatization such as capitalism and housing in general, it turns out to be highly expensive for the government although this has left them with a large ratio of enlisted personnel to officers. Several attempts were made by Russia for fixing this up and the new look reforms of 2008 were the most successful of all. This reform led to the shrinking of the size of formations from divisions to brigades thereby removing the requirement for a large number of officers down the ladder.

Most Moscow divisions turned into brigades that stand as the next step down while the regiments further step down to battalions and this took that officer ratio down to most of the western armies. However, Moscow seems to be reintroducing some divisions once again the 20th, 47th and 127th motor rifle divisions. For instance, one possible rationale could be their desire to have further combat power in various regions for deterring NATO in the west and threats in the Pacific to the east but unless they have the capability to completely man the units and make them up that is even a lower possibility with the Ukraine war, Moscow could be getting into this issue again.

Russia carries out things differently. They are completely aware and have extensively studied the way in which most of the Western armies emphasize NCOS and they reject it. Their system consists of smaller staff which provides their officers with more direct experience of leading and commanding their respective units while also a focus is created by the system on becoming an expert in their field, unlike the Western armies.

The Russian officers most likely tend to stay in their initial field for their whole career which allows them to potentially achieve a particular level of expertise above that of the United States in any particular field for example. However, this also offers certain downsides. The ever-increasing importance of joint warfare and combined arms which makes use of all the aspects of fighting background, sea, cyber and air together for maximizing the capability is and lethality deliberately needs knowledgeable officers in all aspects of warfare in order to completely take an advantage of this, so that said, pros and cons stand for each system.

Another big difference on the other hand in the choice is that Russia currently operates smaller deployable manoeuvre units at the battalion level which are often called Battalion Tactical Groups( BTG ). These are their basic units which have the capability of independent action along with a bit of everything necessary. Other air defence artillery support, tanks etc, the BTGs are formed in an ad-hoc manner from motor rifle brigades or tanks or regiments making use of the most combat-ready and capable equipment.

The above-cited can be compared to the United States which uses much larger brigade combat teams while once again each approach carries certain pros and cons with it. The Russian Federation had noticed that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the wars it was fighting has been smaller and thereby resulting in the overkill of large brigade-sized manoeuvre units and turning out ineffective.

On the other hand, there exist other pros but also there are several cons such as the lack of ability to act in a strategic role and such as complicating logistics. That role gets further accelerated to higher command and also to the general staff.

The BTGS stand with a more narrow focus as they are rigid and less flexible towards adapting to the changes in the battlefield conditions as compared to the larger brigade combat teams.

Coming to mapping the Russian armed forces the currently bifurcated into five districts Southern, central, eastern, western and northern, that is the recently added one. Each of these districts is made up of one Army Corps and a few combined arms Army with exception of the central district that stands effectively landlocked because of no other nation threat approaching from north and so, there’s no potential need for coastal defence.

Typically, each field Army consists of around three tank brigades or motor rifles or divisions. These are again the main formation from which the battalion tactical groups are crafted. They also are equipped with one command and control brigade, air defence brigade, an artillery brigade and other battalions such as chemical, nuclear, biological, engineers and logistics protection etc. some independent units are also there in the district which is not under any field Army.

Intriguingly, the northern district was just elevated to the status of a military district nearly 20 years back. Earlier, it was considered a part of the northern fleet of the Russian navy while before that was just a part of the western district due to the remote location and also the fact that Finland was a neutral country. The district has only one naval infantry, two motor rifles and three total combat brigades. However, as of now, Finland has applied for joining NATO in response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It would now be a point to see how Russia will be growing the district and possibly developing new combined arms armies as well.

The growing importance of the Arctic has been recognised by Moscow. Melting ice at the Arctic has enabled the extraction of the vast wealth of oil and gas along with other resources and also opened up new shipping routes. Several nations are now investing in the Arctic from the US increasing arctic exercises to Canada building new ships to operate in the region to Denmark creating their joint arctic command.

(Author is a Mumbai based journalist covering defence & aerospace. He can be reached on vaibhavmag1@gmail.com. He Tweets https://twitter.com/VaibhavMAG.)

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 20 , 2022 [ UNEDITED]

 ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , JUNE 20 , 2022 

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 20, 5:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian officials are emphasizing that the coming week will be decisive for Russian efforts to take control of Severodonetsk.[1] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian leadership has set June 26 as the deadline for Russian forces to reach the Luhansk Oblast administrative border, which will likely result in intensified efforts to take full control of Severodonetsk and move westward towards the Oblast border.[2] Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai reported that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk except for the industrial zone as of June 20, which is the first explicit Ukrainian confirmation that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk with the exception of the Azot plant.[3] Russian forces will likely continue efforts to clear the Azot plant and complete encirclement operations south of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk by driving up the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway.

Russian authorities likely seek to leverage the consequences of Russia’s blockade on Ukrainian grain exports in order to cajole the West into weakening its sanctions. Head of state-owned propaganda outlet RT Margarita Simonyan stated on June 20 that the famine caused by Russia’s blockade on grain exports will force the rest of the world to lift sanctions in order to curb further effects of global famine.[4] Simonyan’s statement is especially salient considering a report by the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office that Ukraine had generated 12% of global wheat and barley exports and that Russia’s blockade has trapped over 20 million tons of grain in storage.[5]

The UK Ministry of Defense claimed on June 20 that consistent failures of the Russian air force have significantly contributed to Russia’s limited success in Ukraine.[6] The UK MoD emphasized that the Russian air force has continually underperformed and been largely risk-averse, failing to establish air superiority or give Russian forces a decisive advantage in Ukraine. The report additionally claimed that training procedures for air force personnel are scripted and designed to impress senior officials but do not adequately prepare personnel for the challenges of active air combat.

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian sources stated that the coming week will be decisive for Russian forces to complete the capture of Severodonetsk and that Russian forces will focus troops and equipment on the area.
• Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk with the exception of the Azot industrial zone, where fights are ongoing.
• Russian sources are likely setting information conditions to justify slow and unsuccessful advances towards Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.
• Russian forces are likely intensifying operations to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway in order to support escalating operations in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk.
• Russian forces continued to focus on resisting further Ukrainian advances north of Kharkiv City towards the international border.
• Russian forces are continuing defensive operations along the Southern Axis.
• Ukrainian partisan activity is continuing to complicate efforts by Russian occupation authorities to consolidate control of occupied areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian sources confirmed that Russian forces control all of Severodonetsk except for the Azot chemical plant, where fights are ongoing on June 20. Head of the Luhansk Oblast Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian troops “only control the Azot plant” and that Russian troops are fighting within the industrial zone.[7] Haidai additionally confirmed that Russian forces took control of the southeastern suburb of Metolkine, but claimed that the remaining Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk are still not completely encircled.[8] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that the coming week will be decisive for Russian forces to complete the capture of Severodonetsk and that Russian leadership has set June 26 as the deadline for Russian forces to reach the Luhansk Oblast administrative borders.[9] Russian forces are accumulating equipment around Toshkivka, which is still highly-contested territory, and are drawing equipment into Starobilsk (approximately 40km northeast of Severodonetsk in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast) to support operations in Severodonetsk from the east.[10] Russian forces will likely continue to funnel troops and equipment into Severodonetsk to complete the capture of the industrial zone in the coming week.

Russian forces focused on maintaining positions to the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman but did not make any confirmed advances towards Slovyansk on June 20.[11] Russian forces reportedly conducted an unsuccessful assault on Bohorodychne, about 20 kilometers northwest of Slovyansk.[12] Russian Telegram channel “Military chronicle” notably claimed that Ukrainian positions around Slovyansk are highly fortified and on “dominant heights,” which likely is an attempt to set information conditions to justify slow, grinding, and largely unsuccessful Russian advances towards Slovyansk.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops around Lyman are conducting continual airstrikes and attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from regrouping in this area.[14] Russian forces remain unlikely to advance on Slovyansk as they concentrate resources on completing the capture of Severodonetsk and the rest of Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces continued efforts to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication east of Bakhmut along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway but did not make any confirmed advances on June 20.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian sabotage groups near Bakhmut conducted an unsuccessful assault on Mykolaivka, which is a settlement directly along the T1302 highway.[16] Chechen troops additionally continued efforts to take control of Zolote to further support efforts to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T1302.[17] Ukrainian officials have stated that the coming week will be decisive for the Russian offensive on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, and Russian troops will likely further intensify artillery attacks east of Bakhmut along the T1302 in order to set conditions for an offensive northward to support the encirclement of Ukrainian troops in Severodonetsk-Lysychansk from the south.[18]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces north of Kharkiv City continued to focus on preventing further Ukrainian advances towards the international border on June 20.[19] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar claimed that Ukrainian troops have nearly reached the Russian border in Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukrainian forces still have some territory to liberate north of Kharkiv City.[20] While ISW cannot independently confirm the positions of Ukrainian troops near the Russian border, Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in this area will likely continue to pressure Russian troops to fight for control of occupied frontiers and intensify artillery attacks against Ukrainian positions around Kharkiv City.[21] Russian forces additionally conducted artillery attacks and unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force southeast of Kharkiv City, likely in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive actions southeast of Kharkiv City heading towards the Izyum area.[22]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces focused on defensive operations and fired on Ukrainian positions along the Southern Axis on June 20.[23] Russian forces intensified artillery strikes on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border, likely in response to recent Ukrainian counterattacks along the border south of Davydiv Brid and just north of Kherson City.[24] Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration stated that Russian forces are continuing to move equipment northwards towards the Vasylivka district (approximately 40 kilometers south of Zaporizhia City) in order to fortify and defend occupied positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[25] Commander of the Azov Regiment Rodion Kudryshov notably claimed that Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia have moved from defensive to offensive positions, which is consistent with reporting that Russian troops are concentrating forces and equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast to prepare for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.[26]  Russian forces are reportedly engaging in continual counter-battery operations along the E105 (also known as the M18) highway that runs through Vasylivka south of Zaporizhia City.[27] Russian forces continued missile and artillery strikes against various areas of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa Oblasts.[28]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian authorities continued to struggle with consolidating control of occupied territories in the face of persistent Ukrainian partisan pressure. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 20 that mass partisan activity in occupied territories is preventing Russian authorities from being able to present public support for the accession of these areas to Russia.[29] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) similarly claimed that Russian authorities in Berdyansk are faking queues for Russian passports at local administrative centers in order to fabricate a false façade of public desire for Russian citizenship.[30] The GUR additionally reported that Russian occupation authorities in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, are coercing people into collective farming schemes and forcing those who work in these schemes into taking Russian citizenship.[31] Ukrainian partisan activity is likely having administrative consequences on Russian efforts to institute Russian citizenship processes en masse within occupied territories.

---

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/

[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/

[3] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3630

[4] https://twitter.com/ukraine_world/status/1538911097138331648

[5] https://twitter.com/FCDOGovUK/status/1538827534967910400

[6] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1538761939370795008; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1538762047856463872; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1538762219902717952; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1538762619674365952; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1538762728462065664

[7] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3630

[8] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3622; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3630

[9] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/

[10] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3622; https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1538639693688053763; https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1538928575579099138; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1538803220654567424

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776

[13] https://t.me/milchronicles/770

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776

[17] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2355

[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/vorog-namagatymetsya-vyjty-na-kordony-luganskoyi-oblasti-do-26-chervnya-ganna-malyar/

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776

[20] https://t.me/spravdi/11152; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/syly-oborony-majzhe-vyjshly-do-derzhkordonu-na-harkivshhyni-cherez-cze-rf-posylyly-obstrily/

[21] https://t.me/spravdi/11152; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/20/syly-oborony-majzhe-vyjshly-do-derzhkordonu-na-harkivshhyni-cherez-cze-rf-posylyly-obstrily/; https://t.me/synegubov/3466

[22] https://t.me/synegubov/3466; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=434410611569206; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=700733344551459; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9358

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197; https://t.me/milchronicles/770

[25] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9358

[26] https://t.me/milchronicles/770; https://t.me/mariupolnow/13953

[27] https://t.me/milchronicles/770

[28] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=434410611569206; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/14178; https://t.me/stranaua/47941; https://t.me/stranaua/47935; https://t.me/mod_russia/16936; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/50743; https://t.me/sashakots/33800; https://t.me/milchronicles/770; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1175; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/623; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9360; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9358; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/344356421210776; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/343975544582197

[29] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/06/20/cherez-sprotyv-rosiyany-ne-mozhut-zimituvaty-dobrovilne-vhodzhennya-okupovanyh-terytorij-v-sklad-rf/

[30] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/337599271884833

[31] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/337599271884833

Tags

Ukraine Project

File Attachments: 

ISW LOGO FINAL ACRONYM NAME_ISW LOGO FINAL ACRONYM NAME CMYK.png

DraftUkraineCoTJune20,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft June 20,2022.png

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft June 20,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft June 20,2022.png

Severodonetsk Battle Map Draft June 20,2022.png

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20.pdf