Sunday, September 11, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10 , 2022

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....sometimes, it's scary to be 'right'... even if it was just a logical conclusion: Ukrainians have reached Kremina today. That's 20km NW of Severodonetsk...
....and in the north, they've crossed the Siversky Donets, and then drove all the way to Vovchansk....
Mind: some of these distances would be hard to drive by a civilian in peace on a single day.
Of course, this is not coming 'out of nowhere': it slowly transpires that many of rapid advances were made possible by the local partisans (not only by fleeing Russians).
...sigh... need something funny to relieve my concerns... say, if this goes on like that, tomorrow at 22.00hrs there's a train from Belgorod to Moscow: they could catch Vlad on Monday morning...
....or: if they run into people speaking Chinese, think it might be the time to stop...
May be an image of text that says "севсродонецький район SIEVIERODONETSK DISTRICT"
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( ) IS PUTIN AT THE VERGE OF DISASTER?https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-11-september-2022-a-review-8f87459fb47e

( ) Ukraine War, 10 September 2022: https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-10-september-2022-4db2619d6fe1

( )    Ukraine War, 7 September 2022: 
https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-7-september-2022-8556d54a97fb



( )    https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=3233638870240003&set=a.1876977999239437

( ) Ukraine War, 5–6 September 2022: Ukrainian Attacks in Kherson Oblast :    https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-5-6-september-2022-ukrainian-attacks-in-kherson-oblast-1e86962b97a4

( )   The chips are down: Putin scrambles for high-tech parts as his arsenal goes up in smoke: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-chips-are-down-russia-hunts-western-parts-to-run-its-war-machines/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=f70eb5c4a2-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_09_06_03_56&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-f70eb5c4a2-189201625&fbclid=IwAR2UnerQTV1fY4yaegKVXJM04V10T95KlrUqR4CPrp4kcwvp2eWRvISrYBY


( ) Ukraine’s HARM Mystery – How "Top Gun" enabled Ukraine to use HARM Missiles in the War

: https://youtu.be/eKljpfkkrBk


( )Ukraine Invasion Day 193: intentionally methodical operation to degrade Russian logistics; 

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/9/3/2120598/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-193-intentionally-methodical-operation-to-degrade-Russian-logistics?utm_campaign=recent


( )  Ukraine War, 2–3 September 2022:   https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-2-3-september-2022-3adaa91fb95b

()   Ukraine War, 1 September 2022: Manoeuvre Warfare for Beginners:       https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-1-september-2022-manoeuvre-warfare-for-beginners-534edb28873d

() Ukraine War, 1 September 2022, Q&A Session, Part 2 :


https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-1-september-2022-q-a-session-part-2-e870cf153c25

 ()     Ukraine War, 29 August 2022, Q&A Session, Part 1:  https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-29-august-2022-q-a-session-part-1-e4aeb59bbbfe


SOURCE:

 ( A ) ARCHIVE BLOG OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT: HTTPS://WWW.ISWRESEARCH.ORG/

(B)  MILITARY LEARNING AND THE FUTURE OF WAR PROJECT:  HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/

 

(C)   BACKGROUNDER  TRACKER :  https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:   https://www.graphicnews.com/

  (E)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

  ( G )     Russian advances in UkraineTIME LINE   BACK IN TIME : https://www.uawardata.com/

 ( F  ) LIVE SITU MAP :    https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/16-august-at-pivdenny-buh-direction-russian-tanks-and-artillery

  (Q)   RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine 24 February 2022  To– Present  

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg


 (R)    ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 





Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign,September 10 ,2022

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, GeorgeBarros, 

                 Angela Howard and Mason Clark

                         September 10, 11:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast is routing Russian forces and collapsing Russia’s northern Donbas axis. Russian forces are not conducting a controlled withdrawal and are hurriedly fleeing southeastern Kharkiv Oblast to escape encirclement around Izyum. Russian forces have previously weakened the northern Donbas axis by redeploying units from this area to Southern Ukraine, complicating efforts to slow the Ukrainian advance or at minimum deploy a covering force for the retreat.  Ukrainian gains are not confined to the Izyum area; Ukrainian forces reportedly captured Velikiy Burluk on September 10, which would place Ukrainian forces within 15 kilometers of the international border.[1] Ukrainian forces have penetrated Russian lines to a depth of up to 70 kilometers in some places and captured over 3,000 square kilometers of territory in the past five days since September 6 – more territory than Russian forces have captured in all their operations since April.

Ukrainian forces will likely capture the city of Izyum itself in the next 48 hours if they have not already done so. The liberation of Izyum would be the most significant Ukrainian military achievement since winning the Battle of Kyiv in March. It would eliminate the Russian advance in northwest Donetsk Oblast along the E40 highway that the Russian military sought to use to outflank Ukrainian positions along the Slovyansk – Kramatorsk line. A successful encirclement of Russian forces fleeing Izyum would result in the destruction or capture of significant Russian forces and exacerbate Russian manpower and morale issues. Russian war correspondents and mil bloggers have also reported facing challenges when evacuating from Izyum, indicating Ukrainian forces are at least partially closing a cauldron in some areas.[2]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of troops from the Balakliya-Izyum line on September 10, falsely framing the retreat as a “regrouping” of forces to support Russian efforts in the Donetsk Oblast direction – mirroring the Kremlin’s false explanation for the Russian withdrawal after the Battle of Kyiv.[3] The Russian MoD did not acknowledge Ukrainian successes around Kharkiv Oblast as the primary factor for the Russian retreat and claimed that Russian military command has been carrying out a controlled withdrawal from the Balakliya-Izyum area for the past three days. The Russian MoD falsely claimed that Russian forces undertook a number of demonstrative actions and used artillery and aviation to ensure the safety of withdrawing Russian forces. These Russian statements have no relation to the situation on the ground.

The Russian MoD’s inability to admit Russian failures in Kharkiv Oblast and effectively set information conditions is collapsing the Russian information space. Kremlin-sponsored TV propagandists offered a wide range of confused explanations for Ukrainian successes ranging from justifications that Russian forces are fighting against the entire Western Bloc, to downplaying the importance of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCS) in Kupyansk.[4] The Kremlin’s propagandists appeared unusually disorganized in their narratives, with some confirming the liberation of certain towns and others refuting such reports. Guest experts also were unable to reaffirm the hosts’ narratives that Ukrainian successes are not significant for the Donbas axis. Such programming may reveal the true progress of the Russian “special military operation” to the general Russian public that relies on state media and the Russian MoD for updates.

The withdrawal announcement further alienated the Russian milblogger and Russian nationalist communities that support the Kremlin’s grandiose vision for capturing the entirety of Ukraine. Russian mil bloggers condemned the Russian MoD for remaining quiet, choosing self-isolation, and distorting situational awareness in Russia.[5] One mil blogger even stated that the Russian MoD’s silence is a betrayal of Russian servicemen that fought and still fight in Ukraine.[6] A Russian milblogger also noted that the Russian MoD has repeatedly ignored or demeaned the milblogger community that raised concerns with Russian military leadership and lack of transparency on the frontlines.[7] The milbloggers called on the Russian MoD to take the information space into its own hands and stop relying on silencing information.

Prior to the withdrawal announcement, the Russian MoD released footage of Russian military convoys reportedly moving to reinforce the Kharkiv direction on September 9.[8] Many Russian outlets and milbloggers expressed hope that these reinforcements would stabilize the frontline and repel Ukrainian advances on Izyum despite the Russian MoD failing to address the unfolding situation days prior. Russian milbloggers would have likely accepted MoD’s announcement of a withdrawal like they previously did with the Russian retreat from the Snake Island and other tactical Russian losses if the Russian information space was not oversaturated with footage of Ukrainian successes. Such inconsistencies in messaging further support ISW’s assessment that the Russian MoD faces challenges in responding to unexpected developments within the established informational framework, which portrays Russian invasion of Ukraine as an easy and faultless operation.[9] Most importantly, such unaware information practices erode the Russian public’s trust in Russian MoD messaging and disrupt the Kremlin’s propaganda facade.

Russian milbloggers also criticized the Russian occupation authorities for failing to organize evacuation measures in Kharkiv Oblast. Some milbloggers noted that occupation administrations are disoriented and lack initiative.[10] The Ukrainian counteroffensive is effectively paralyzing the Russian occupation leadership that is likely afraid for its fate.

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast are collapsing Russia’s northern Donbas axis, and Ukrainian forces will likely recapture Izyum itself in the next 48 hours.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of troops from the Balakliya-Izyum line on September 10, and the Russian MoD’s failure to set effective information conditions is collapsing the Russian information space.
  • The withdrawal announcement and occupation authorities’ failure to organize evacuation measures is further alienating the Russian mil blogger and Russian nationalist communities that support the Kremlin’s grandiose vision of capturing the entirety of Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces reached positions within 15-25km of the Russo-Ukrainian border in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast, Izyum’s northern outskirts, and Lyman’s south and southwestern outskirts, and captured the western half of Kupyansk.
  • Russian forces are reinforcing frontline positions in Kherson Oblast while Ukrainian forces conduct positional battles and continue their interdiction campaign against Russian logistics lines.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults north of Kharkiv City, south of Bakhmut, and west of Donetsk City.
  • Russian recruitment drives are generating some criticism among Russian milbloggers and regions.
  • Russian forces are reportedly intensifying filtration measures in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts in response to Ukrainian counteroffensives on the Southern Axis.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

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IS PUTIN AT THE VERGE OF DISASTER?

 

IS PUTIN AT THE VERGE OF DISASTER?

  

                                                               -----------------------------------

Ukraine War, 11 September 2022; a Review


BY   

Tom Cooper

Don’t want to spoil the party, but think it’s time for some serious review of the situation in Ukraine.

I also think that we need to try to understand the situation from Putin’s point of view. Indeed, exclusively from his point of view.

As for why: well, let me remind you it was Putin who launched this aggression on Ukraine, solely for his own, Putin’s purposes. The Primary between these is keeping himself unaccountable. Unaccountable to anybody, especially in Russia.

If we go back in time and limit his activities in this regard to this year alone, ‘Plan A’ was to topple the government in Kyiv and replace it with ‘somebody friendly. That failed. ‘Plan B’ was to conquer all of Ukraine east of Dnipro, plus Kherson. That failed. ‘Plan C’ was to complete the conquest of not only Luhansk and Donetsk, but Kherson and Zaporizhzhya, too. That’s when Putin run out of troops, thus managed ‘only’ Luhansk and Kherson. Plans D, E, and F were slightly downsized variants of Plan C, primarily related to Donetsk: i.e. Putin was all the time downsizing his war plans, in turn, re-focusing on Donetsk.

…..meanwhile, he’s down to ‘Plan G’: secure Kherson, Luhansk, and keep whatever of Zaporizhzhya — but get all of Donetsk, finally.

  1. For this, he simply had not enough troops. Yes, amid lots of fanfare, he brought in that 3 Army Corps. He’s going to bring another one, by the end of this month. But, neither of these had ‘30,000’ nor ‘90,000’ troops, as widely claimed.              The 3 ARMY CORP C  has about 10,000–12,000 at best. Thus, this was still not enough for realising the Plan G — and Putin is keen to realize that one, as can be seen from continuous (indeed: growingly stronger) assaults on Bakhmut and Pisky of the last few days.

Thus, he has to ‘find additional troops’.

AND Russians are not willing to FIGHT

AFAIK, this knocked-out BMP-2 is from the only unit of the 3 AC known as being involved in eastern Kharkiv so far.

On the other hand, contrary to all the promises from local sympathizer snothing, Kharkiv proved nothing else than welcoming Putin’s Direwlangers. Thus, why then squander the 3 AC in Kharkiv? For what purpose?

….and, ‘think Putin’: what a better idea but to ‘punish liars while saving troops’?

Don’t worry: I’m not buying the official line of the Keystone Cops in Moscow about another ‘reorganisation’ and whatsoever.

But, it cannot be denied that Putin did nothing to stop the liberation of eastern Kharkiv, the last few days, while all the time ordering additional assaults on Bakhmut and Pisky. And, his Dirlewangers in Kherson are still holding firmly, too.

So, now review what’s achieved:

- yes, eastern Kharkiv up to the Osikil River is in the process of being liberated by Ukraine;

- yes, the VSRF and auxiliaries lost up to 8,000–10,000 troops and large stocks of ammo and other supplies.

But, this is nothing Putin cares about. On the contrary: this is the same VSRF that (from Putin’s POV) failed, miserably, in three months of assaulting Slovyansk from the Izyum area (not to talk about all the earlier failures; see the 41st CAA at Chernihiv, see the 1st GTA at Kharkiv and Sumy, then again in Popasna etc., etc., etc., etc.).

Putin can’t care about losses, but he cares about failures. To him, the VSRF is the biggest failure of this war (just check Shoygu’s and Gerasimov’s faces in their latest joint appearances with Putin, and you’ll know what I mean).

On the contrary, the VDV seems to have escaped from this one in eastern Kharkiv at the cost of ‘just’ two weak BTGs. Putin’s ‘beloved’ PMCs came away with a similar loss. SOBR and OMON did suffer some. Altogether, ‘unfortunate, but bearable’ — from Putin’s point of view. Even the Separatists managed to run away….It’s the VSRF that suffered the most.

….and nobody in Russia cares about the VSRF  [ ie RUSSIAN REGULAR ARMY ] ☼: it’s expendable.

In turn, today the ZSU appears so busy just securing everything from Balakleya up to Vovchansk, Bilyi Kolodyaz, Velykyi Burluk and Dvorichna (and that is a HUGE area), that it has no time and no forces to continue exploiting over the Oskil on Svatove. The town is reportedly abandoned by the Russian troops for two days now, but there seem to be no Ukrainian troops there, either: at most, partisans and SOF only.

One can only hope the ZSU does have enough troops to continue exploiting towards Pisky-Radkivsky, Borova, Svatove, and Severodonetsk. I do know it’s monitoring the Russian withdrawal from Sudenok, in direction of the Pisky area, just for example, but I do not know about it ‘exploiting the opportunity’ there: perhaps the troops simply can’t follow at the Russian pace….?

A map of Ukraine as released by the Keystone Cops in
 Moscow. When studying it, keep in mind the ‘big picture’
 — and try to ‘think Putin’. ‘WTF cares about Kharkiv?
 Secure Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson etc….’

Above all, through all of this time:
- Russians are (still) bitterly contesting any Ukrainian advance into Kherson, and

- Russians are bitterly assaulting Bakhmut and north-west of Pisky, for days and nights, meanwhile.

So, my impression is, meanwhile, that of a ‘botched up, no doubt, but still’: a big ‘swap of territory-for-troops’. Kind of, ‘get rid of useless failures, incompetents, and liars in eastern Kharkiv, on behalf of realizing the Plan G’.

Putin didn’t care to inform VSRF’s local commanders, and he didn’t ‘invite’ Ukrainians to attack. But, once they did, ‘fine with him’.

The way things are today, his troops are going to establish a new frontline along the Oskil River; they’re continuing to resist in Kherson, and thus promising him at least some sort of outlooks for completing the conquest of the Donetsk. Its advances is going to cost the ZSU time, take away troops necessary to reinforce Bakhmut and Pisky, and it’s going to end with a situation forcing Ukrainians to deploy additional units along the border to Russia — instead of deploying them on the frontline.

i.e. the realization of the ‘Plan G’ is still looking at least possible. Putin still has outlook to declare a victory, sooner or later.

….and that’s all that matters to Putin.


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