Friday, September 16, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 15 , 2022

 ( )    Spoils Of War Captured Russian Hardware :     https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-war-abandoned-russian-equipment/32029623.html

( ) Who Is Yevgeny Prigozhin, 'Putin's Chef'? - Eater :  https://www.eater.com/23309160/who-is-putins-chef-yevgeny-prigozhin-sanctions-concord-catering-wagner-group

(  )  Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yevgeny_Prigozhin

(  ) 10 Best War Blogs and News Websites: https://blog.feedspot.com/war_blogs/


SOURCE:

 ARCHIVE BLOG OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENTHTTPS://WWW.ISWRESEARCH.ORG/

(B)  MILITARY LEARNING AND THE FUTURE OF WAR PROJECT:  HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/

 

(C)   BACKGROUNDER  TRACKER :  https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:   https://www.graphicnews.com/

  (E)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 ( F  ) LIVE SITU MAP :    https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/16-august-at-pivdenny-buh-direction-russian-tanks-and-artillery

 ( G )     Russian advances in UkraineTIME LINE   BACK IN TIME https://www.uawardata.com/

   (Q)   RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine 24 February

 2022  To– Present   https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg

(R)    ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 





ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , SEPTEMBER 15 , 2022


Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 15, 9:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine, increasingly pressuring Russian positions and logistics lines in eastern Kharkiv, northern Luhansk, and eastern Donetsk oblasts. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing ground operations southwest of Izyum, near Lyman, and on the east bank of the Oskil River, reportedly compelling Russian forces to withdraw from some areas in eastern Ukraine and reinforce others.[1] Russian forces in eastern Ukraine will likely struggle to hold their defensive lines if Ukrainian forces continue to push farther east.

The Kremlin is responding to the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast by doubling down on crypto-mobilization rather than setting conditions for general mobilization. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called on all federal subjects to initiate “self-mobilization” and not wait on the Kremlin to declare martial law.[2] Kadyrov claimed that each federal subject must prove its readiness to help Russia by recruiting at least 1,000 servicemen instead of delivering speeches and conducting fruitless public events. Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan echoed the need for Russians to volunteer to join the war effort, and several loyalist Russian governors publicly supported Kadyrov’s speech.[3] The Russian-appointed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, announced the formation of two volunteer battalions on the peninsula in support of Kadyrov’s calls.[4]

The defeat around Kharkiv Oblast prompted the Kremlin to announce a Russia-wide recruitment campaign. Kremlin officials and state media had not previously made country-wide recruitment calls but had instead tasked local officials and outlets to generate forces ostensibly on their own initiative. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov vaguely welcomed the creation of the battalions on July 12, while 47 loyalist federal subjects advertised and funded the regional volunteer battalion recruitment campaign.[5] A prominent Russian mil blogger and a supporter of general mobilization praised officials such as Kadyrov for taking the recruitment campaign from the ineffective Russian Ministry of Defense; this recruitment revamp is likely to secure more support for the Kremlin among nationalist figures who are increasingly critical of the Russian MoD, even if the drive does not generate large numbers of combat-effective troops.[6]

The Kremlin has likely abandoned its efforts to shield select federal subjects from recruitment drives, which may increase social tensions. ISW has previously reported that the Kremlin attempted to shield Moscow City residents from reports of the formation of the Moscow-based “Sobyaninsky Polk” volunteer regiment.[7]  Russian opposition outlet The Insider noted that several groups in the republics of Buryatia, Kalmykia, Tyva, and Yakytia (Republic of Sakha) are publicly opposed to the Kremlin's emphasis on recruitment on an ethnic basis.[8] Simonyan’s statement about “self-mobilization” prompted numerous negative comments among Russians calling on Russian oligarchs to pay for and fight in the war.[9]

The Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally stationed in Russian bases in former Soviet states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February, likely weakening Russian influence in those states. A Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigation reported on September 14 that the Russian military has already deployed approximately 1500 Russian personnel from Russia’s 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion began and plans to deploy 600 more personnel from facilities in Dushanbe and Bokhatar, a southern Tajik city, in the future.[10] RFE/RL additionally reported on September 13 that Russia has likely redeployed approximately 300 Tuvan troops from the Russian Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan to fight in Ukraine at varying points since late 2021.[11]

The withdrawals from the Central Asian states are noteworthy in the context of border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards exchanged fire in three separate incidents on September 14, killing at least two people.[12] The uptick in violence between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both of which are members of the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), comes alongside renewed aggression by Azerbaijan against CSTO member state Armenia. Russian forces also withdrew 800 personnel from Armenia early in the war to replenish losses in Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[13]

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine.

  • The Kremlin is responding to the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast by doubling down on crypto-mobilization, rather than setting conditions for general mobilization.


  • The Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally at Russian bases in former Soviet states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February, likely weakening Russian influence in those states.

  • Russian and Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks northwest of Kharkiv City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.

  • Russian-appointed occupation officials and mil bloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a landing at the Kinsburn Spit (a narrow peninsula of the Crimean Peninsula).

  • Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults and are reinforcing positions on the Eastern Axis.

  • The Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is likely attempting to stop its administrators from fleeing ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, demonstrating the bureaucratic fragility of the DNR.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine, setting conditions to drive deeper into the Russian rear in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces expelled Russian forces from Sosnove on the north bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and are fortifying positions at the settlement.[14] The source also reported that Russian forces may have pulled out from Studenok immediately west of Sosnove to avoid encirclement.[15] Official Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces reinforced Russian positions in Lyman.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the heavily reduced remnants of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps 202nd and 204th Motorized Rifle Regiments were disbanded into reserves, possibly meaning that the remnants of these reduced elements reinforced the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements fighting in Lyman.[17]

Ukrainian forces are reportedly advancing across the Oskil River in northern Kharkiv Oblast. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are establishing bases and artillery positions throughout Kharkiv Oblast, including emplacing artillery in Hryanykivka on the east bank of the Oskil River near the R79 highway.[18] A confirmed Ukrainian position in Hryanykivka would indicate that the Russian frontline east of the Oskil River is weak and/or that Russian forces’ lines in this area are farther east of the Oskil River than previously assessed.  ISW will continue collecting and reconciling data to refine our control of terrain assessment. A Russian source reported that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups occasionally cross the Oskil River in unspecified areas.[19]

Ukrainian forces continued operations to disrupt Russian logistics in eastern Ukraine and pin Russian forces away from the frontlines. Ukrainian forces reportedly struck rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast, including Lysychansk, Svitlodarsk, Perevalsk, and Kadiivka, all situated along major Russian GLOCs.[20] Imagery shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a Russian base in Lysychansk.[21] Russian and Ukrainian sources engaged in artillery duels across the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border.[22]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials are continuing their operational silence regarding the progress of the southern counteroffensive, noting that Ukrainian forces are continuing to improve their tactical positions and are engaged in positional battles.[23] Ukrainian local sources stated that there is no official confirmation that Ukrainian forces have liberated Kyselivka northwest of Kherson City but noted receiving local reports that Russian forces are mining all of the roads in the settlement.[24] Ukrainian officials did not report changes in Russian troop composition, but social media footage showed a Tuva Oblast flag in Beryslav, which likely indicates that Russian forces are continuing to reinforce northern Kherson Oblast with regionally formed volunteer units.[25] Conventional Russian military units typically do not fly republic or federal subject flags.

Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing their interdiction campaign, targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the Inhulets and Dnipro Rivers.[26] Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces are continuing to transfer equipment across the Dnipro River, however.[27] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck areas of Russian manpower and equipment concentrations in the Kherson City suburbs and in Krynychanka (about 21km southeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River).[28] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces damaged Russian ammunition depots in Sadove (about 15km southwest of Snihurivka) and Mykolaiv and Kherson raions, and struck the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control center in Komyshany, northwest of Kherson City.[29] Ukraine’s Department of Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian military base in Nova Kakhovka, and local footage and reports corroborated StratCom’s information.[30] Other social media reports noted Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions in Oleshky, on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[31]

Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated three areas of kinetic activity on September 15: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border west of Vysokopillya. A Russian milblogger claimed that one Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage group drove down 25km southeast of the bridgehead to Charivne in a car without encountering any obstacles.[32] The milblogger added that Russian shelling decreased in Sukhyi Stavok (about 12km southeast of the bridgehead) and that Ukrainians are operating helicopters in the area, which may indicate that Russian forces have pulled back further from the bridgehead area. The mil blogger noted that Russian forces continue to repel Ukrainian counterattacks on Davydiv Brid on the T2207 highway. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults from Arhanhelske on Ivanivka (west of Vysokopillya), while Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian airborne troops repelled Ukrainian counterattacks on Kostyrka and Novopetrivka.[33] Kherson Oblast Head Yaroslav Yanushevych stated that Ukrainian forces conducted evacuations from Myrolyubivka (southeast of Vysokopillya), which could indicate that Ukrainian forces have advanced to the settlement.[34] Both the Russian Defense Ministry and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched missile strikes at Ukrainian positions on the Kherson Oblast border.[35]

Russian-appointed occupation officials and milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a landing at the Kinsburn Spit (a narrow peninsula of the Crimean Peninsula southwest of Kherson City) on September 14, but offered differing accounts. Several milbloggers amplified the claims of a single source that suggested Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful amphibious landing at the Kinsburn Spit with five boats. The source also claimed that there was an unconfirmed report of a heliborne landing at the Iron Port in Lazurne, about 60km southwest of Kherson City.[36] Deputy Head of the Russian occupation administration in Kherson Oblast Kirill Stremousov claimed that Russian forces repelled the attempted landing and killed over 120 Ukrainian airborne troops at the Kinsburn Spit.[37] Another milblogger criticized Stremousov and pointed out that his sources within Russian units in the area did not witness or repel any Ukrainian landing attempts and that Stremousov did not present any visual evidence supporting his claim.[38]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults across the Eastern Axis and continued routine fire along the line of contact on September 15.[39] Both Ukrainian and Russian official sources confirmed fighting in Spirne (east of Siversk) and Mayorsk (south of Bakhmut).[40] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured Mayorsk, though ISW cannot verify this claim.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults against Mayorsk, southeast of Bakhmut, and southwest of Donetsk City.[42]

Russian forces are reinforcing positions along the Eastern Axis, likely due to extensive combat losses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are moving reserves from 3rd Army Corps volunteer battalions and remnants of units previously operating in Kharkiv Oblast to reinforce the Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast frontlines.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that the Russian 137th Airborne Regiment (subordinate to the 106th Airborne Division) sustained significant combat losses in the Bakhmut area and cannot continue combat operations without additional unspecified measures (likely meaning reconstitution).[44]

Supporting EffortSouthern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian hydraulic structures in Kryvyi Rih and other infrastructure in Ukraine on September 15. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials reported that Russian forces again targeted unspecified hydraulic structures in Kryvyi Rih, and Russian sources published footage of smoke claiming that Russian strikes damaged an unspecified dam on the Inhulets River on September 15.[45] Russian forces are likely continuing to strike Ukrainian dams on the Inhulets River to raise flood levels in an effort to disrupt the Ukrainian bridgehead over the river in northern Kherson Oblast and threaten Ukrainian logistics lines in the same way that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian crossings of the Dnipro River.[46] Russian milbloggers amplified footage of large-scale explosions in the cities of Uman, Zaporizhia, and Vinnytsia, as well as in Odesa Oblast.[47] Russian forces also launched an Onyx cruise missile from a Bastion coastal missile complex and a Kh-59 missile fired from an Su-35 aircraft at an open area in Mykolaiv Oblast.[48] Social media users reported witnessing the activation of Russian air defense systems in Yevpatoria, Crimea.[49]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian military leadership continues to pull newly-mobilized forces from every possible source but is unlikely to be able to meaningfully increase Russian combat power with those forces. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 15 that the Russian government lifted restrictions on conscription for large families, suggesting that multiple sons from the same family could be forced to fight in Ukraine.[50] The Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported on September 14 that Russian forces are promoting Russian military service in occupied territories such as Melitopol.[51] Forcibly or even willingly-mobilized Ukrainian civilians without military experience who are ordered to fight their better-trained countrymen are unlikely to significantly enhance Russian combat power in Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on September 15 that the Russian Military Construction Complex is building a new, modern “military town” in Sernovodskoye in the Chechen Republic.[52] The town will reportedly contain over 50 facilities to accommodate Chechnya-based units.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

The Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is likely attempting to stop its administrators from fleeing ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, demonstrating the bureaucratic fragility of the DNR. The DNR’s State Defense Committee extended one-time injury payments of 3 million rubles and one-time death payments of 5 million rubles to the families of officers, civil servants, and employees of the DNR’s Ministry of Emergency Situations killed in the line of work, the first time ISW has observed DNR civil servants being promised payment in the event of their injury or death in the war.[53] The DNR is likely attempting to incentivize its employees to remain in place to prevent a collapse in local governance as Ukrainian forces advance. Russian occupation forces have struggled to staff local administrations in occupied Ukrainian territory since the invasion began due to a lack of willing Ukrainian collaborators and competent bureaucrats.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 


References

[1] https://t.me/rybar/38811; https://t.me/rybar/38790; https://t.me/rybar... https://t.me/nm_dnr/9013; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17672; https://t.me/epoddubny/12301; https://t.me/sashakots/35673; https://t.me/sashakots/35659; https://t.me/sashakots/35666

[2] https://t.me/kommunist/9450; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2822

[3] https://t.me/margaritasimonyan/12050; https://ura dot news/news/1052587297

[4] https://t.me/Aksenov82/1469; https://t.me/kommunist/9459; https://t.me... com/ru/news/2022/09/15/v-krymu-tozhe-nachali-formirovat-dobrovolcheskie-batalony

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://tass dot com/politics/1478839

[6] https://t.me/strelkovii/3249

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[8] https://theins dot ru/politika/254329

[9] https://24tv dot ua/ru/simonjan-sdelala-novoe-zajavlenie-zovet-rossijan-sobirat-dengi_n2157987

[10] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-troops-tajik-base-redeployed-ukraine/3203...

[11] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-kyrgyzstan-base-troops-redeployed/3203164...

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/world/fresh-clash-erupts-betw...

[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[14] https://t.me/rybar/38811

[15] https://t.me/rybar/38811

[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HbJHe0hDck; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenk... https://t.me/nm_dnr/9013; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17672; https://t.me/epoddubny/12301; https://t.me/sashakots/35673

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf...https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/09/12/krasnyy_liman/

[18] https://t.me/rybar/38840

[19] https://t.me/rybar/38790

[20] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5759; https://t.me/millnr/9441; https://t.me/kommunist/9443; https://t.me/kommunist/9440; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/8708; https://t.me/kommunist/9438; https://t.... https://t.me/millnr/9443; https://t.me/millnr/9441

[21] https://twitter.com/typicaldonetsk/status/1570345103025405952; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1570371173313310720

[22] https://t.me/kommunist/9458; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/64024; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40407; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40404; https://t.me/kommunist/9456;  https://t.me/rusich_army/5169; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17693; https://t.me/rusich_army/5172; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1570444332947341313; https://tw... https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1570442667095375872; https://tw... https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1570465387677884420?s=20&t=agnWKM...

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf.... RUAF attacked the front and rear areas with aviation. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=582024966937795

[24] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid02VNV12o6Qi1m64GzXRm3GJ...\; https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1570397840551350275; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25949

[25] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1570306379335827457

[26] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=380532447618182; https://www.facebook...

[27] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=380532447618182

[28] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=582024966937795; https://www.facebook...

[29] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=582024966937795

[30] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25953; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25945; http...

[31] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25912

[32] https://t.me/rybar/38817

[33] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=582024966937795; https://t.me/rybar/3...

[34] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/991

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/19863; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua...

[36] https://t.me/rsotmdivision/992; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9411; https...  

[37] https://t.me/rian_ru/177844; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/8710; https://ta... ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15755683; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/320

[38] https://t.me/grey_zone/15032

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hvNPTZfMszbNwzXyddG... https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5758

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hvNPTZfMszbNwzXyddG... https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7549; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7548; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40384

[41] https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7549; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7548; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40384

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hvNPTZfMszbNwzXyddG... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf...

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hvNPTZfMszbNwzXyddG...

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hvNPTZfMszbNwzXyddG... https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5758

[45] https://t.me/rybar/38823; https://t.me/rybar/38832; https://t.me/rybar... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf...

[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[47] https://t.me/rybar/38803; https://t.me/rybar/38791; https://t.me/rybar...

[48] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=380532447618182; https://t.me/senkevi...

[49] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25953; https://t.me/milinfolive/90549; https...

[50]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf...

[51] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/562

[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/19867

[53] https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7553; https://t.me/dnronline/78609

 

 Attachments: 


Thursday, September 15, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 14 ,2022

( ) Who Is Yevgeny Prigozhin, 'Putin's Chef'? - Eater :  https://www.eater.com/23309160/who-is-putins-chef-yevgeny-prigozhin-sanctions-concord-catering-wagner-group

(  )  Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yevgeny_Prigozhin

(  ) 10 Best War Blogs and News Websites: https://blog.feedspot.com/war_blogs/


SOURCE:

 ARCHIVE BLOG OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENTHTTPS://WWW.ISWRESEARCH.ORG/

(B)  MILITARY LEARNING AND THE FUTURE OF WAR PROJECT:  HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/

 

(C)   BACKGROUNDER  TRACKER :  https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:   https://www.graphicnews.com/

  (E)   Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide:   https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

 ( F  ) LIVE SITU MAP :    https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/16-august-at-pivdenny-buh-direction-russian-tanks-and-artillery

 ( G )     Russian advances in UkraineTIME LINE   BACK IN TIME https://www.uawardata.com/

   (Q)   RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine 24 February

 2022  To– Present   https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg

(R)    ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:    https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl 




 ASSESSMENT

 RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, SEPTEMBER 14 ,2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 14

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 14, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine. Prigozhin gave a recruitment speech on September 14 announcing that Russian prisoners have been participating in the war since July 1 when they were instrumental in seizing the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant.[1] A Russian mil blogger noted that Prigozhin is introducing a “Stalinist” method that allows the Kremlin to avoid ordering a general mobilization that could ignite social tensions in Russian society.[2] Milbloggers have been consistently praising Prigozhin’s success in Ukraine and some even said that he should replace the Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, whom mil bloggers and Kremlin pundits blame for the Russian defeat around Kharkiv Oblast.[3] Russian military correspondent and mil blogger Maksim Fomin (alias Vladlen Tatarsky) claimed to have spoken to Prigozhin about the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian border after the withdrawal of Russian forces in the area.[4] The Prigozhin-Fomin meeting, if it occurred, could indicate that the Kremlin is attempting to address mil bloggers’ months-long complaints that the Russian Defense Ministry did not hear their criticism highlighting the ineffectiveness of Russian higher command. Prigozhin is Putin’s close confidant, and his developing relationship with mil bloggers may help retain mil blogger support for the Kremlin’s war effort while scapegoating Shoigu and the Russian Defense Ministry for the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has changed its information approach to address the demands of the Russian mil bloggers and nationalists’, suggesting that Putin seeks to win back the critical mil blogger community alienated by Russian failures.[5]

Russian forces likely targeted Ukrainian hydro technical infrastructure in western Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on September 14 to interfere with Ukrainian operations across the Inhulets River. Ukrainian sources reported that eight Russian cruise missiles struck unspecified targets in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and caused extensive flooding in areas of Kryvyi Rih.[6] Russian sources identified the target location as the Karachun Dam, which sits along the Inhulets River on the western outskirts of Kryvyi Rih.[7] Footage of the aftermath of the strike shows a 2.5m increase in the water level of the Inhulets River, which runs south of Kryvyi Rih and is an important geographical feature for the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border.[8] Russian forces likely targeted the Karachun Dam to damage Ukrainian pontoon bridges further downstream, especially in light of recent reports that Ukrainian troops are attempting to expand their bridgehead over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid as part of the ongoing Kherson counteroffensive.[9]

Key Takeaways

  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine.
  • Russian forces likely targeted Ukrainian hydro technical infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in order to interfere with Ukraine’s ability to operate across the Inhulets River
  • The Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv Oblast continues to degrade Russian forces and threaten Russian artillery and air defenses.
  • Russian and Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks in northern Kherson Oblast, western Kherson Oblast, and northwest of Kherson City but did not report any major gains.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and northwest and southwest of Donetsk City.
  • Funding volunteer battalions are likely placing financial strain on Russian cities and oblasts.
  • Russian occupation authorities shut off mobile internet in occupied Luhansk Oblast on September 14, likely to preserve Russian operational security and better control the information environment as Russian forces, occupation officials, and collaborators flee newly-liberated Kharkiv Oblast for Russian and Russian-controlled territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv Oblast continues to degrade Russian forces and threaten Russian artillery and air defenses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that the intensity of Russian artillery attacks on Kharkiv City has decreased significantly, suggesting that Ukraine's counteroffensive has degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct routine artillery strikes on the center of Kharkiv City as Russian forces have been pushed eastward towards the Oskil River and north back into Russia.[10]  Ukrainian advances in eastern Ukraine have likely forced Russian forces to pull air defenses further away from the frontlines in order to protect those systems from Ukrainian artillery fire, potentially exposing frontline Russian troops to air attacks. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that Russian convoys carrying S-300 and Buk systems moved through Lutuhine, Luhansk Oblast in the direction of the Russian border on September 11 and 12.[11]

Russian sources continued to discuss limited Ukrainian ground attacks in eastern Kharkiv, northern Donetsk, and western Luhansk Oblasts. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian and proxy forces are defending against Ukrainian attacks on Lyman in northern Donetsk Oblast.[12] Russian sources also reported that fighting is ongoing in Bilohorivka (along the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border) and in nearby settlements around Siversk.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops attempted to attack in Spirne (12km south of Bilohorivka), likely in an attempt to push northwards and threaten Ukrainian forces in Bilohorivka.[14]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military sources maintained their operational silence on September 14. Kherson Oblast Council Head Oleksandr Samoilenko announced that Ukrainian forces have liberated Kyselivka, approximately 23km northwest of Kherson City, but Ukrainian military officials have not confirmed the liberation of the settlement at this time.[15] ISW has not seen any visual evidence supporting Samoilenko‘s statement, and Russian sources denied Ukrainian local reports of advances in the area.[16] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian strikes are continuously undermining Russian efforts to repair the Kakhovka Bridge over the Dnipro River and have rendered the Darivka pontoon bridge over the Inhulets River impassable.[17] Ukrainian forces have reportedly continued to target Russian crossings near the Antonivka area and are firing at Russian convoys.[18] Ukrainian forces maintained their interdiction campaign, reportedly targeting Russian manpower and equipment concentration points in Hola Prystan (approximately 12km southwest of Kherson City), Dudchany, and Mylove (both on the T0403 highway).[19]  The Southern Operational Command also stated that Ukrainian forces inflicted damage on four ammunition depots in Kherson Raion.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces continued to house troops in residential areas, specifically in the Chaplynka Raion north of the Kherson Oblast-Crimea border.[21]

Social media footage and statements by Russian-appointed occupation officials are corroborating the ongoing Ukrainian interdiction campaign. Geolocated footage showed the aftermath of the Ukrainian strike on the School of Higher Sportsmanship, which reportedly served as an area of Russian troop concentration.[22] Geolocated footage also showed a Ukrainian volunteer air reconnaissance unit striking a Russian storage building in Velyka Oleksandrivka, on the T2207 highway.[23] Local residents also reported hearing the sound of explosions and six missile strikes near Kherson City.[24] The head of the Kherson Oblast occupation administration, Vladimir Saldo, stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivsky Bridge, but noted that occupation authorities are continuing to use ferry crossings in the area.[25] The deputy head of the Kherson Oblast occupation regime, Kirill Stremousov, claimed that Ukrainian forces fired at a ferry transporting civilians across the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge.[26] Numerous geolocated videos show that Russian forces are using ferries to transport military equipment across the Dnipro River, and Stremousov did not provide evidence supporting his claims.[27]

Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three main areas of kinetic activity on September 14: northwest of Kherson City, around the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Border near Vysokopillya. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have adopted defensive measures near Posad-Pokrovske (about 30km northwest of Kherson City) and are conducting probing operations by firing at Russian defenses in Blahodatne and Barvinok (just south of Posad-Pokrovske).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Novohryhorivka (29km northwest of Kherson City) and Bezimenne near the Inhulets River.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces shelled Mala Seideminukha and Novohredevne—both settlements near the Inhulets just south of Blahodativka—which indicates that Ukrainian troops have advanced further west from within the Sukhyi Stavok pocket.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian military equipment in Bruskynske, along the T2207 highway that runs into Davydiv Brid.[31] A milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Arkhanhelske (southwest of Vysokopillya) and Kostyrka (southeast of Vysokopillya).[32] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces also struck Ukrainian forces in Potomkyne (southeast of Vysokopillya).[33]

The Russian MoD did not comment on the situation in Kherson Oblast on September 14, only claiming that Russian troops struck Ukrainian positions along the Kherson-Mykolaiv frontline.[34]

Russian Main Effort- Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian troops continued ground attacks throughout Donetsk Oblast on September 14. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian troops, specifically Wagner Group detachments, conducted ground assaults south of Bakhmut.[35] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Defense claimed that proxy troops took control of Mykhailivka and Mykhailivka Druha, both about 12km southwest of Bakhmut along the T0513 highway.[36] Russian sources also discussed continued Russian ground assaults northeast of Bakhmut around Soledar.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest and southwest of Donetsk City.[38] Russian forces continued routine artillery strikes around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.[39]

Supporting Effort- Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 14 and continued to fire along the line of contact.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops are amassing along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline and that Ukrainian troops attempted a failed offensive from Orikhiv (about 50km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) towards Nestryanka (10km southeast of Orikhiv).[41] Russian sources are seemingly concerned that Ukrainian troops may attempt to attack Vasylivka or push south on Russian-occupied Tokmak.[42] Russian forces also continued routine shelling throughout Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[43]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian military authorities continue to rely heavily on ostensibly Chechen units to generate combat power for operations in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 14 that Russian leadership plans to redeploy four Chechen battalions to Ukraine, but these battalions are significantly understrength and comprised mainly of non-Chechen mercenaries from economically depressed regions of Russia.[44] Social media footage circulated on pro-Russian channels showed a detachment of Chechen servicemembers arriving in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[45]

Funding volunteer battalions is likely placing financial strain on Russian cities and oblasts. An opposition member of the St Petersburg Legislative Assembly, Boris Vyshnevskiy, filed a motion on September 14 asking the city’s governor to explain which part of the city’s budget is providing funding for the city’s volunteer battalions.[46] The city government rejected his motion, likely suggesting either that the St Petersburg government does not have sufficient funding for the battalion, that funding for the battalion is coming from the Kremlin, or that the city is diverting funding from other programs in a way that would be embarrassing to admit publicly. The model of having localities pay for parts of the volunteer program was likely a Kremlin attempt both to obfuscate and to disperse the cost of the program.

Russian military leadership is likely attempting to force Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) proxy forces evacuated from Kharkiv Oblast to relocate to frontlines in Donetsk Oblast, rather than reinforcing the new frontlines in Luhansk, their home province. Odesa military spokesperson Sergey Bratchuk reshared a Telegram post alleging that women in Luhansk attempted to protest the LNR forces’ immediate redeployment and shared a video of many uniformed personnel and civilians on the streets in an unspecified location.[47] Forcing proxy forces to fight outside of their claimed oblasts will likely exacerbate morale issues and possible insubordination among proxy forces particularly if Ukrainian forces advance further into Luhansk Oblast.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities shut off mobile internet in occupied Luhansk Oblast on September 14, likely to preserve Russian operational security and better control the information environment as Russian forces, occupation officials, and collaborators flee newly-liberated Kharkiv Oblast for Russian and Russian-controlled territories. The Ukrainian head of Luhansk Oblast, Serhiy Haidai, reported on September 14 that occupation authorities ostensibly shut down the internet “to ensure defense capability and security,” but implied that occupation authorities intended the shutdown, at least in part, to hide large-scale evacuations and looting.[48]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


References

[1] https://t.me/stranaua/63921; https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1570087287643414528; https://t.me/rybar/38777; https://t.me/milinfolive/90493

[2] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/63915

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[4] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/16094

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[6] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1845; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1497...

[7] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/63925; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/63924; http... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/63903

[8] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1845; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1497... https://t.me/readovkanews/41738

[9] https://t.me/strelkovii/3237; https://t.me/sashakots/35627; https://t.... https://t.me/readovkanews/41738

[10]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029y5AMqGgBHkM1pqm2p...

[11]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029y5AMqGgBHkM1pqm2p...

[12] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1569976610274639875/photo/1; ht...

[13] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/9306; https://t.me/sashakots/35627; https://t....

[14]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oRUmg4pTU7kgf7NLuq...

[15] https://tsn dot ua/ato/zsu-vzyali-pid-kontrol-kiselivku-teper-vid-hersona-ukrayinsku-armiya-viddilyaye-lishe-chornobayivka-mapa-2157904.html; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2022/09/14/7367490/; https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/858883.html

[16] https://t.me/sashakots/35627

[17] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1715167182187136

[18] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=397741835837951

[19] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=397741835837951; https://www.facebook...

[20] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1715167182187136

[21]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oRUmg4pTU7kgf7NLuq...

[22] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1570016030742790145; https://twit...

[23] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1569786629174222849; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1569797684726226944; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1569793029061345283

[24] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25901; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25897

[25] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/137

[26] https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/316

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[28] https://t.me/rybar/38761; https://t.me/rybar/38760

[29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oRUmg4pTU7kgf7NLuq...

[30]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029y5AMqGgBHkM1pqm2p...

[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/19835

[32] https://t.me/rybar/38769; https://t.me/rybar/38760

[33] https://t.me/rybar/38760

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/19835

[35]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oRUmg4pTU7kgf7NLuq...

[36] https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7513; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7508

[37] https://t.me/rybar/38740; https://t.me/wargonzo/8271

[38]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029y5AMqGgBHkM1pqm2p...

[39]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oRUmg4pTU7kgf7NLuq...

[40]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oRUmg4pTU7kgf7NLuq...

[41] https://t.me/sashakots/35627; https://t.me/rybar/38770; https://t.me/r...

[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/40373

[43] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=397741835837951; https://t.me/dniprop...

[44] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/viiskovi-chastyny-rf-skasovuiut-vidpravku-pidrozdiliv-v-ukrainu-cherez-masovi-vidmovy-osobovoho-skladu-braty-uchast-u-boiovykh-diiakh.html

[45] https://twitter.com/WhereisRussia/status/1570052236780228608; https://t...

[46] https://www dot zaks.ru/new/archive/view/230711

[47] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18679

[48] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5742

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