Monday, October 3, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 2 ,2022 .

NEW

( ) Ukraine War, 24 Sep — 3 Oct 2022; Russian Counterattack on Kupyansk :

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-24-sep-3-oct-2022-russian-counterattack-on-kupyansk-c3d5c9a0fcdf

( ) Putin never defined exactly how much of Ukrainian territory is he annexing. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=3255230124747544&set=a.1876977999239437

SOURCE:

( A ) ARCHIVE BLOG OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT: HTTPS://WWW.ISWRESEARCH.ORG/

(B) MILITARY LEARNING AND THE FUTURE OF WAR PROJECT: HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/

(C)   BACKGROUNDER TRACKER :  HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/USER/3100/TRACK
(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION: HTTPS://WWW.GRAPHICNEWS.COM/
  (E) RUSSIA MILITARY: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE:   HTTPS://IRP.FAS.ORG/WORLD/RUSSIA/TRADOC-REFGUIDE.PDF
( F ) LIVE SITU MAP :    HTTPS://LIVEUAMAP.COM/EN/2022/16-AUGUST-AT-PIVDENNY-BUH-DIRECTION-RUSSIAN-TANKS-AND-ARTILLERY
( G )    RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN UKRAINETIME LINE BACK IN TIME : HTTPS://WWW.UAWARDATA.COM/
   (Q)   RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:  2022 RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE 24 FEBRUARY 2022 TO PRESENT https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg
(R)    ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:   HTTPS://T.CO/63FVBMXIWL
( S ) FUTURE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY :      https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3099/RAND_RR3099.pdf

( T ) The Russian Militar The Russian Military in Contempor y in Contemporary Perspective : https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1910&context=monographs

( U ) Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization : https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Explainer%20on%20Russian%20Conscription%2C%20Reserve%2C%20and%20Mobilization%204%20March%202022.pdf

(v) Military Losses in Ukraine : https://twitter.com/ragnarbjartur

-----------------------------

ASSESSMENT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, OCT 2 , 2022.
Special Edition on Changes in the Russian Information Space Following the Russian Defeat in Lyman
Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan
October 2, 10:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
This campaign assessment special edition focuses on dramatic changes in the Russian information space following the Russian defeat around Lyman and in Kharkiv Oblast and amid the failures of Russia’s partial mobilization. Ukrainian forces made continued gains around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, and have broken through Russian defensive positions in northeastern Kherson Oblast.  Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow when more confirmation is available.
The Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, combined with the Kremlin’s failure to conduct partial mobilization effectively and fairly are fundamentally changing the Russian information space. Kremlin-sponsored media and Russian mil bloggers – a prominent Telegram community composed of Russian war correspondents, former proxy officials, and nationalists – are grieving the loss of Lyman while simultaneously criticizing the bureaucratic failures of the partial mobilization.[1] Kremlin sources and mil bloggers are attributing the defeat around Lyman and Kharkiv Oblast to Russian military failures to properly supply and reinforce Russian forces in northern Donbas and complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the progress of the war.[2]
Some guests on heavily-edited Kremlin television programs that aired on October 1 even criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian oblasts before securing their administrative borders or even the front line, expressing doubts about Russia’s ability ever to occupy the entirety of these territories.[3] Kremlin propagandists no longer conceal their disappointment in the conduct of the partial mobilization, frequently discussing the illegal mobilization of some men and noting issues such as alcoholism among newly mobilized forces.[4] Some speaking on live television have expressed the concern that mobilization will not generate the force necessary to regain the initiative on the battlefield, given the poor quality of Russian reserves.[5]
The Russian information space has significantly deviated from the narratives preferred by the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that things are generally under control. The current onslaught of criticism and reporting of operational military details by the Kremlin’s propagandists has come to resemble the mil blogger discourse over this past week. The Kremlin narrative had focused on general statements of progress and avoided detailed discussions of current military operations. The Kremlin had never openly recognized a major failure in the war prior to its devastating loss in Kharkiv Oblast, which prompted the partial reserve mobilization.[6]
The Russian MoD has consistently focused on exaggerating Russian success in Ukraine with vague optimistic statements while omitting presentations of specific details of the military campaign. The daily Russian MoD briefing has claimed to capture the same villages more than once as ISW and independent investigators have observed, and the Russian MoD rarely releases photographic evidence confirming claims of Russian advances. [7]
The Russian MoD has sought to impose this kind of narrative on the mil bloggers as well. Advisor to the Russian Defense Minister Andrey Ilnitsky called on Russian journalists and mil bloggers on May 26 to refrain from presenting detailed coverage of the war and to avoid publishing negative information that could help the West infiltrate the Russian information space and win the “hybrid war.”[8]
The milbloggers largely disregarded the MoD’s directives, and Putin seemed to support them in this disobedience, rewarding them with a lengthy personal meeting on June 17.[9] Most milbloggers have continued to report Russian battlefield setbacks and to criticize failures in the partial mobilization, often in strident tones. Putin has not apparently punished any major mil bloggers for their outspokenness or allowed others to punish them. He has, however, kept their critiques off of the mainstream Russian airwaves. Kremlin mouthpieces on federally-owned TV channels had continued to puppet the MoD and Kremlin lines for the most part—until the partial mobilization.
The Kremlin’s declaration of partial mobilization exposed the general Russian public to the consequences of the defeat around Kharkiv and then at Lyman, shattering the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the war as limited and generally successful. The Russian defeat around Lyman has generated even more confusion and negative reporting in the mainstream Russian information space than had the Russian withdrawals from Kyiv, Snake Island, or even Kharkiv. The impact of Lyman is likely greater because Russians now fear being mobilized to fix problems on the battlefield. An independent Russian polling organization, the Levada Center, found that more than half of respondents said that they were afraid that the war in Ukraine could lead to general mobilization, whereas the majority of respondents had not voiced such concerns in February 2022.[10] Russians also likely see that the Kremlin is executing the current partial mobilization – which was supposed to be a limited call-up of qualified reservists – in an illegal and deceptive manner, which places more men at the risk of being mobilized to reinforce collapsing frontlines.
Putin relies on controlling the information space in Russia to safeguard his regime much more than on the kind of massive oppression apparatus the Soviet Union used, making disorder in the information space potentially even more dangerous to Putin than it was to the Soviets. Putin has never rebuilt the internal repression apparatus the Soviets had in the KGB, Interior Ministry forces, and Red Army to the scale required to crush domestic opposition by force. Putin has not until recently even imposed the kinds of extreme censorship that characterized the Soviet state. Russians have long had nearly free access to the internet, social media, and virtual private networks (VPNs), and Putin has notably refrained from blocking Telegram even though the platform refused his demands to censor its content and even as he has disrupted his people’s access to other platforms. The Russian information space has instead relied on journalists and TV talk-show guests to enforce coerced self-censorship, especially after the Kremlin adopted a law that threatens Russians with up to 15 years in jail for “discrediting the army.”[11] The criticism on Russian federal TV channels of military failings and failings of the partial mobilization effort, especially following the defeat at Lyman, is thus daring and highly unusual for the Kremlin’s propaganda shows. It has brought the tone and tenor of some of the mill blogger critiques of Russia’s performance in the war into the homes of average Russians through official Kremlin channels for the first time.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Evgeniy Prigozhin have further damaged the Kremlin’s vulnerable narratives during and after the fall of Lyman. Kadyrov published a hyperbolic rant on October 1 in which he accused the Russian military command of failing to promptly respond to the deteriorating situation around Lyman and stated that Russia needs to liberate the annexed four oblasts with all available means including low-yield nuclear weapons.[12] Prigozhin reiterated Kadyrov’s critiques of the Russian military leadership. The West‘s focus on Kadyrov’s nuclear threat obscured the true importance of these statements.
Kadyrov and Prigozhin are bona fide members of the small group of leaders Russians call siloviki—people with meaningful power bases and either membership in or direct access to Putin’s inner circle. Kadyrov has a history of irresponsible statements and boasts that do not always grab headlines or shape narratives in Russia. Prigozhin is not a normally dominant voice either, although his prominence has grown in recent weeks.[13] But their statements on October 1 have had a profound effect on the Russian information space. Together they broke the Kremlin’s narrative that attempted to soften the blow of the defeat around Lyman. Federal outlets had largely expressed hopeful attitudes that newly mobilized men and deployed reinforcements could either hold the line or conduct counter-attacks in the near future, prior to Kadyrov’s statement.[14] But talk shows on federally-controlled channels picked up immediately on the Kadyrov-Prigozhin statements, prompting commentators on live television to add to the criticism of the higher military command.[15] The Kremlin’s propagandists even had to disrupt the presentation of the former Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Deputy Commander Andrey Gurulyov when he started to blame the higher military command for the defeat in Lyman during a live broadcast.[16]
Kadyrov and Prigozhin’s statement likely publicly undermined Putin’s leadership, possibly inadvertently. Kadyrov specifically targeted the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, and accused Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov of covering up Lapin’s failures in Lyman. Putin had publicly expressed his trust in Lapin when the Russian MoD announced Lapin’s victory around Lysychansk on June 24.[17] Western military officials have also reported that Putin has been making operational military decisions in Ukraine and micromanaging his military command.[18] Putin is thus likely responsible for the decisions not only not to reinforce Lyman but also to attempt to hold it--facts that are probably known to a number of people in his inner circle at least.[19] Kadyrov’s direct attack on Lapin is thus an indirect attack on Putin, whether Kadyrov realizes it or not. Putin and his mouthpieces have been extremely tight-lipped about the performance of the military commanders or their replacements, which makes Kadyrov’s statement and Prigozhin’s echo of it especially noteworthy.
Putin likely recognizes the dangerous path Kadyrov and Prigozhin had begun to walk, prompting push-back by Kremlin-controlled voices and milbloggers against the direct critiques of military commanders. Federal television channels characterized Kadyrov’s statements against Lapin as rather “harsh,” while mil bloggers argued that the Russian MoD is more responsible for the defeat claiming that Lapin was not in command of the Lyman garrison.[20]
Putin has not previously censored nationalist mil blogger figures, Kadyrov, war correspondents, and former proxy officials, likely because he has seen them as voices pushing for the preferred policies that Russians willing to support him are more likely to trust. ISW has previously assessed that Putin is likely attempting to keep the mil bloggers on his side and to use them to establish new scapegoats for his failures in Ukraine.[21] Putin may also have obtained a more unvarnished view of what is occurring on the front lines than he was getting from the chain of command, which may be one of the reasons he met with the mil bloggers in mid-June. Mil bloggers likely have a reputation with their audiences of being more accurate sources than the Russian MoD because they report setbacks and mistakes while advancing pro-war and patriotic views. Putin likely seeks to retain the favor of the audience these nationalist figures reach as they promote his grandiose vision for the war.
The mil blogger community may begin to undermine Putin’s narratives to his core audience amidst the defeats and failures of the Russian war in Ukraine, however, especially as their narratives spread to mainstream Kremlin-controlled outlets. Mil bloggers are increasingly appearing on Russian state television and in Kremlin-affiliated outlets following the collapse of the Kharkiv frontline and are boldly pointing out failures in the Russian military campaign while exaggerating the need for Russia to win the war and the price Russians should be prepared to pay.[22] Putin likely attempted to win back some of the mill bloggers by inviting them to his annexation speech in Moscow and by integrating them into the mainstream media.[23] But my bloggers are fueling impossible expectations and making demands that Putin and the Russian government cannot possibly meet. They insist that Putin seize all of Ukraine when Russian forces are only capable of making incremental territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka. They are calling on Russian military recruitment centers and the Russian MoD to fix the generational bureaucratic issues plaguing partial mobilization. They are likely adding to the domestic problems Putin will face in the coming months, however much it may seem to Putin that they are helping him through a hard time.
Putin may be experiencing an odd variant of the problems Mikhail Gorbachev encountered resulting from his glasnost’ (openness) policy. Gorbachev partially opened the Soviet information space in the mid-1980s in the hopes that Soviet citizens would give him insight into the causes of bureaucratic dysfunction within the Soviet state that he could not identify from above. But Soviet citizens did not stop where Gorbachev wanted or expected them to and instead began attacking the entire Soviet system. The reforms (perestroika) he initiated after a period of glasnost’ ended up destroying the Soviet Union rather than strengthening it.
Putin is no doubt fully aware of this pattern and surely has no intention of repeating it.  He has never established Soviet-level degrees of control over the Russian information space even as he has steadily narrowed it to only platforms he tolerates. He has absolved the mil bloggers of having to adhere to Kremlin-approved narratives while keeping open the platform on which they present to a core constituency on which he relies, and he is now mainstreaming them further.  It remains to be seen how much Putin will tolerate and what will happen if and when he attempts to shut down the mill bloggers and their critiques, increasingly of his own decisions, that he has allowed for the moment to circulate in Russia.
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on October 2:
Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements east and northeast of Lyman and liberated Torske in Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces withdrew from their positions northeast of Lyman, likely to positions around Kreminna and along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[24]
Ukrainian forces continued to advance on settlements east of Kupyansk and liberated Kisharivka in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]
Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut, Vyimka, and Avdiivka.[26]
Ukrainian forces resumed counteroffensives in northern Kherson Oblast and have secured positions in Zolota Balka and Khreshchenivka. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also liberated Shevchekivka and Lyubymivka, pushing Russian forces to new defensive positions around Mykailivka.[27]
Russian forces continued to target Kryvyi Rih and Mykolaiv Oblast with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.[28]
Russian State Duma MPs withdrew a law that would have given mobilized men a one-time payment of 300,000 rubles (about $4,980) and other benefits, without providing a reason for their decision.[29] Ukrainian military officials stated that Russian forces are forming a motorized rifle division with mobilized men from Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and the Republic of Adygea.[30]
Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a draft law to the State Duma on admitting the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, to the Russian Federation.[31]

References
[1] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1576469565437267968; https://t.me... dot ru/video/06c9e2ac69571a918b1fb9a63068f349/; https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576410989104627712
[2] https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576331334317879297; https://... dot ru/brand/66924?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=special-donbass&utm_campaign=special-donbass-programs; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/
[3] https://twitter.com/adagamov/status/1576531804324270080
[4] https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576045751209431040; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2487471
[5] https://twitter.com/adagamov/status/1576531804324270080; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[7] https://www dot proekt.media/research/ofitsialnaya-statistika-minoborony/#geography
[8] https://amicable dot ru/news/2022/05/26/19847/vystuplenie-v-sfrf/
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreadi...
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[14] https://smotrim dot ru/video/2486671
[15] https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/; https://smotrim dot ru/brand/66924?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=special-donbass&utm_campaign=special-donbass-programs; https://rutube dot ru/video/06c9e2ac69571a918b1fb9a63068f349/
[16] https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576410989104627712
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[18] https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-is-micromanaging-russian-war-effor...
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...
[20] https://rutube dot ru/video/06c9e2ac69571a918b1fb9a63068f349/; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/12221; https://t.me/Hard_Blog_Line/8283; ht...
[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[22] https://smotrim dot ru/video/2486671; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/
[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/20462; https://t.me/rybar/39647; https://twitt...
[25] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/45459; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status...
[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EoCvG5sukqjucCqAaD...
[27] https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1576636707134324736; https://t...
[28] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3195685584004587; https://www.faceboo...
[29] https://t.me/Protestnarod/23641
[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EoCvG5sukqjucCqAaD...
[31] https://t.me/TRO_DPR/8216; https://t.me/dnronline/80607; https://t.me/...

Attachments:

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft October 02, 2022.png

Donetsk Battle Map Draft October 02, 2022.png

DraftUkraineCOTOctober02,2022.png

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft October 02, 2022.png

Sunday, October 2, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 1 ,2022

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , OCTOBER 1 ,2022.

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 1, 7 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces inflicted another significant operational defeat on Russia and liberated Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, on October 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lyman to “more advantageous positions” to avoid the “threat of encirclement” in the settlement.[1] Social media footage and Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces have entered Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.

The Russian information space – composed of Kremlin propagandists, pundits, and milbloggers – registered the defeat as the result of the Russian military command’s failure to send reinforcements in a timely manner, while openly criticizing repeated bureaucratic failures during the mobilization.[2] Russian commentators overwhelmingly expressed their hopes that partial mobilization would generate enough force to resume offensive operations and regain the initiative. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, apparently devastated by the defeat in Lyman, called on Russia to continue to fight to ”liberate” the four annexed territories with all available means including low-yield nuclear weapons.[3]

Kadyrov’s rant is similar to the disorganized and often hyperbolic mil blogger rants that call for the Kremlin to continue the war in Ukraine, and his call for the use of nuclear weapons was not representative of the discourse within the Russian information space. Russian federal TV channels and ultra-hawkish mil bloggers have often discussed Russian nuclear capabilities as part of their efforts to stoke patriotic sentiments among Russian domestic audiences, and Kadyrov’s statement was not especially noteworthy in this context.

Kadyrov’s call for using tactical nuclear weapons is likely inconsistent with his demands to continue the “special military operation” to bring more Ukrainian territory under Russian control. The Russian military in its current state is almost certainly unable to operate on a nuclear battlefield even though it has the necessary equipment and has historically trained its units to do so. The chaotic agglomeration of exhausted contract soldiers, hastily mobilized reservists, conscripts, and mercenaries that currently comprise the Russian ground forces could not function in a nuclear environment. Any areas affected by Russian tactical nuclear weapons would thus be impassable for the Russians, likely precluding Russian advances. This consideration is another factor that reduces the likelihood of Russian tactical nuclear weapons use.

Kadyrov[ CHECHEN WARLORD } blamed the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, for failures around Lyman. Kadyrov’s attacks gained significant traction within the Russian information space and indicate that the rift between Russian traditional and non-traditional forces is likely growing. Kadyrov stated that Lapin, responsible for the ”central” group of forces in Ukraine, failed to properly equip units operating in the Lyman area and moved his headquarters far from the frontlines. Kadyrov also accused the Russian General Staff and specifically Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, of covering up Lapin’s failures. Wagner Group financier Evgeniy Prigozhin publicly agreed with Kadyrov’s criticism of Lapin, saying that the higher military command should fight “barefoot with machine guns on the frontlines.”[4] Milbloggers and state television hosts praised Kadyrov‘s and Prigozhin’s critiques of the Russian military command, adding that the command is corrupt and disinterested in Russian strategic goals.[5] Kadyrov, Lapin, and Prigozhin are all operating in the Donbas sector, and such comments indicate the strains within the Russian forces operating in Ukraine and their leadership. The Kremlin may be amplifying such criticism to set informational conditions for personnel changes within the higher military command in weeks to come.

The defeat around Lyman also indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin – who has reportedly been micromanaging Russian commanders on the ground – is deprioritizing defending Luhansk Oblast in favor of holding occupied territories in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian sources consistently indicate that Russian forces continued to reinforce Russian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, despite the recent collapse of the Kharkiv-Izyum front and even as the Russian positions around Lyman collapsed.[6] The decision not to reinforce vulnerable Kupyansk or Lyman front lines was almost certainly Putin’s, not that of the military command, and suggests that Putin cares far more about holding the strategic terrain of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts than he does about Luhansk Oblast.

Russia is likely to set conditions to assume legal responsibility for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Russian authorities detained the general director of the ZNPP, Ihor Murashov, on September 30.[7] A Russian mi blogger claimed that Murashov’s detention will have no tangible impact on the operation of the plant since the power units are already shut down and stated that authorities are currently undertaking ”routine“ legal work to transfer control of the plant to the Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom and create a new legal entity for the ZNPP.[8] Murashov’s detention and the ”legal” process of transferring control of the ZNPP to Rosatom are noteworthy indications that Russian authorities will likely seek to exploit their control of the ZNPP to pressure the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize the illegal Russian annexations of occupied Ukrainian territory by coercing it to acknowledge Russia‘s legal control over the ZNPP.

Russian forces conducted a failed ground attack on Kozacha Lopan in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack on Kozacha Lopan, 5km from the Kharkiv Oblast-Russia border.[9] Such attacks indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin likely retains the aim of regaining control of territory beyond the oblasts he has illegally annexed and is willing to allocate Russian military assets to such offensive actions rather than dedicating them to defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Donbas.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.
Russia is likely setting conditions to assume legal responsibility for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
Ukrainian troops are continuing to conduct counteroffensive operations in Kherson Oblast and setting conditions for future advances.
Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas of Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued routine strikes against Ukrainian rear areas in the south.
Russian military leadership is continuing to compromise the future reconstitution of the force by prioritizing the immediate mobilization of as many bodies as possible for ongoing fighting in Ukraine.
Russian mobilization authorities continue to carry out discriminatory mobilization practices.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman on October 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense and various Russian mil bloggers confirmed that Russian troops withdrew from Lyman to “more advantageous lines,” and geolocated social media footage shows Ukrainian troops in various parts of Lyman throughout the day on October 1.[10] Russian sources indicated that the BARS-13 detachment that was holding the Russian defensive line in Drobysheve, just northwest of Lyman, withdrew to Kreminna (about 25km east of Lyman).[11] Details about Ukrainian advances remain unclear, however. Several Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops blew up a bridge on the eastern outskirts of Kirove, 10km northeast of Lyman.[12] However, the footage is not corroborated by social media geolocation communities. The dynamic nature of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in this area is likely generating confusing and contradictory reporting. Russian sources also discussed Ukrainian attacks north of Lyman around Torske, Terry, and Yampilske, suggesting that Ukrainian troops are continuing efforts to take settlements north of Lyman as well.[13] ISW will continue to monitor developments around Lyman and provide updates on control of terrain as they become corroborated.

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian military officials reiterated on October 1 that Ukrainian troops are continuing to conduct counter-offensive operations in Kherson Oblast and setting conditions for future advances in various areas along the frontline.[14] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Russian forces are drawing up reserves and regrouping in the face of constant Ukrainian actions in southern Ukraine.[15] Ukrainian officials additionally stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing an interdiction campaign to target Russian concentration areas in Kherson Oblast.[16]

Social media footage indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition warehouse in Tavriisk, 57km east of Kherson City and on the outskirts of Nova Kakhkova.[17]

Russian sources identified one main area in which Ukrainian troops conducted active ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on October 1. A Russian mil blogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions in Davydiv Brid, in western Kherson Oblast near the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border near the Inhulets River.[18] The milblogger claimed that Russian troops repelled the attack and forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw across the Inhulets, but maintained that Ukrainian troops are focused on taking Davydiv Brid.[19]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas and continued routine fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on October 1.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks directly on Bakhmut, to the northeast near Soledar, and south of Bakhmut near Vesela Dolyna (6km southeast of Bakhmut), Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut), and Niu York (15km west of Horlivka), and west of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[21]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on October 1.[22] Russian forces struck Zaporizhia City, Mykolaiv City, Ochakiv, and Nikopol.[23] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued to strike Mykolaiv City with Shahid-136 kamikaze drones and damaged port, residential, and industrial infrastructure.[24] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces also conducted a missile strike against Odesa City, damaging industrial infrastructure.[25] Russian Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administrator Vladimir Rogov accused Ukrainian forces of intensifying shelling against Enerhodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.[26]

Russian forces continued to divert Russian military assets to southern Ukraine. Footage posted to Twitter on September 30 shows Russian covered and armored vehicles and tanks moving by rail reportedly to Crimea.[27] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces transported 11 pieces of heavy equipment from Nikolske, Donetsk Oblast west towards Rozivka, Zaporizhia Oblast on October 1.[28]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions at the Belbek Airfield in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on October 1. Russian occupation Governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that a Russian plane skidded off the runway and caught fire as it attempted to land.[29] Blurred footage shows a plane exploding after rolling off the runway, and footage of the aftermath shows plumes of smoke and secondary explosions of what appears to be rocket ammunition.[30]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian military leadership is continuing to compromise the future reconstitution of the force by prioritizing the immediate mobilization of as many bodies as possible for ongoing fighting in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 1 that the Russian military leadership has ordered the early graduation of cadets from Russian military academies due to the shortage of officer-cadre personnel.[31] Cadets in their final year at the Ryazan Airborne Training School will reportedly be assigned to junior officer positions and will train mobilization reserve regiments at grounds near Ryazan, Omsk, Pskov, Tula, and other cities.[32] The General Staff reported that cadets and their reserve regiments will deploy to the frontline in Ukraine after no more than a month of training.[33] The practice of prematurely assigning cadets to reserve regiments will likely further degrade already-poor command structures, as underprepared cadets will be forced into leadership roles with insufficient training and little or no professional experience. The expending of cadets in this fashion can gravely complicate Russian efforts to rebuild the Russian military in years to come.

Russian mobilization authorities continue to carry out discriminatory mobilization practices. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted audio of an intercepted phone call in which a Russian serviceman complains that men from more affluent Russian regions, namely around St. Petersburg and Moscow, are not being mobilized to the same degree as areas such as Kursk, Voronezh, and Belgorod Oblasts, where the largest mobilization efforts are taking place.[34] The intercepted audio confirms that mobilization regimes in more peripheral and less affluent Russian oblasts are mobilizing men without military experience.[35] Ukrainian officials additionally stated that Russian officials are increasingly detaining military-aged men in occupied regions of Ukraine.[36]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

References :

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/20439

[2] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2911; https://t.me/stranaua/67237; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2487471; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/41078; https://t.me/notes_veterans/5385; h...

[3] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2911;

[4] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/1740; https://twitter.com/christogrozev/stat...

[5] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/12198; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2420; ht... dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/

[6] https://twitter.com/tinso_ww/status/1575888527492907009

[7] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9909; https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/1115; http... https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/10/01/okupanty-vykraly-generalnogo-dyrektora-zaporizkoyi-aes/; https://twitter.com/iaeaorg/status/1576219059384774657; https://twitter.com/iaeaorg/status/1576219062744801281

[8] https://t.me/rybar/39603

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid05XEkbjKACXf3utEgWgD...

[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/20439; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/... https://suspilne dot media/287416-liman-ukraina-i-nato-svit-ne-viznae-priednanna-ukrainskih-teritorij-do-rf-220-j-den-vijni-onlajn/;https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1576181741986885632; https://www.fa... https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1576151691740659712; https://twit...@alkash47_ak/video/7149253580422253826; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1576127297295613952; https://twit... https://twitter.com/NovaGorlivka/status/1576128770549121024

[11] https://t.me/kommunist/10293; https://t.me/wargonzo/8562; https://t.me...