Tuesday, November 15, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 14, 2022

 (  )  IT’S COMING: Knowing that a Ukrainian offensive will soon target Melitopol, Chechen mercenaries offered 80,000 ₽ (~$1,300 ) for anyone who'd help dig trenches. When no one would take their money, they resorted to threats to make villagers to work: https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1592345653195472898/photo/1

( ) KHERSON CITY/14 NOV/ On 12-13 NOV, 4 explosions in the city were attributed to RU mines & long-fused explosives. In separate incidents, two anti-vehicle mines wounded 6 rail workers, & an automobile struck a RU road mine injuring six family members. RU sorties UAVs over the area: https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1592154092545413122/photo/1




ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN , NOVEMBER 14, 2022 

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, Angela Howard, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Madison Williams, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 14, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on November 13 and 14, likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast following withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces completed the capture of Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13 and of Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) on November 14 after several weeks of not making claims of Russian territorial gains.[1] As ISW assessed on November 13, Russian forces will likely recommit troops to Donetsk Oblast after leaving the right bank of Kherson Oblast, which will likely lead to an intensification of operations around Bakhmut, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian forces will likely make gains in these areas in the coming days and weeks, but these gains are unlikely to be operationally significant. The Russian MoD is likely making more concrete territorial claims in order to set information conditions to frame Russian successes in Donetsk Oblast and detract from discontent regarding losses in Kherson Oblast.

Russian mil bloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers largely complained that Zelensky arrived in Kherson City and was able to move around with relatively little concern about Russian strikes in his vicinity and questioned why Russian forces did not launch strikes on Zelensky.[3] One prominent milblogger noted that this shows that Russia does not want to win the war and criticized Russian forces for allowing Zelensky to step foot on “Russian territory.”[4] Russian milbloggers have notably maintained a relatively muted response to the Russian loss of the right bank in the past days, as ISW has previously reported.[5] The clear shift in rhetoric from relatively exculpatory language generally backing the withdrawal as a militarily sound decision to ire directed at Russian military failures suggests that Russian military leadership will likely be pressured to secure more direct gains in Donetsk Oblast and other areas.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent, Stalinist warlord in Russia, becoming a prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war community. Prigozhin commented on a Russian execution video of a reportedly exchanged Wagner prisoner of war, Yevgeniy Nuzhin, sarcastically supporting Nuzhin’s execution and denouncing him as a traitor to the Russian people.[6] Most sources noted that Wagner executed Nuzhin following a prisoner exchange on November 10, but a few claimed that Wagner kidnapped the serviceman via Prigozhin’s connections to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian General Staff.[7] Prigozhin claimed that Nuzhin planned his escape to free Ukraine and used the opportunity to compare Nuzhin to Russian elites who disregard the interests of the Russian people and fly away from Russia‘s problems in their personal business jets.[8] The Russian nationalist community overwhelmingly welcomed the public punishment of the supposed deserter, noting that the Wagner command is undertaking appropriate military measures to discipline its forces.[9] Some milbloggers even compared the execution to Joseph Stalin’s “heroic” execution of Russian Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky who had also fled Bolshevik Russia, further confirming Prigozhin’s appeal among the proponents of Stalin’s repressive legacy.[10] Prigozhin is taking actions that will resonate with a constituency interested in the ideology of Russia’s national superiority, Soviet brutalist strength, and distastefulness of the Kremlin’s corruption, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has used as a political force throughout his reign.

Prigozhin is steadily using his participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to consolidate his influence in Russia. One mil blogger voiced a concern that the integration of Wagner mercenaries into Russian society is “the destruction of even the illusion of legality and respect for rights in Putin’s Russian Federation.”[11] The mil blogger added that Prigozhin is seizing the initiative to expand Wagner’s power in St. Petersburg while Russian security forces are “asleep.” Such opinions are not widespread among Russian nationalists but highlight some concerns with Prigozhin’s rapid expansion amid the Russian “special military operation” and its implications on the Putin regime. Prigozhin, for example, has requested that the FSB General Prosecutor’s office investigate St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for high treason after St. Petersburg officials denied a construction permit for his Wagner Center in the city.[12] He had also publicly scoffed at the Russian bureaucracy when asked if his forces will train at Russian training grounds, likely to further assert the independence of his forces.[13] Prigozhin’s unhinged antics in the political sphere are unprecedented in Putin’s regime.

Key Takeaways

  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) escalated claims of Russian territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast on November 13 and 14, likely to emphasize that Russian forces are intensifying operations in Donetsk Oblast following their withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast.

  • Russian mil bloggers seized on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s November 14 visit to Kherson City to criticize Russian military capacity more substantively than in previous days during the Russian withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson Oblast.

  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to establish himself as a highly independent, Stalinist warlord in Russia, becoming an even more prominent figure within the nationalist pro-war community.

  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line and clashed with Russian troops near Bilohorivka.

  • Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.

  • Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and claimed to have gained territory around Bakhmut and southwest of Donetsk City.

  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops launched an unsuccessful raionto the Kinburn Spit.

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin signed additional decrees refining mobilization protocols and expanding military recruitment provisions, likely in an ongoing effort to reinforce Russian war efforts.

  • Russian occupation officials continued to drive the “evacuation” and forced relocation of residents in occupied territories and took efforts to move occupation elements farther from the Dnipro River.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces continued their counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 13 and 14. Geolocated footage published on November 13 confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated Makiivka, approximately 23km southwest of Svatove.[14] Commander of the Russian combat army reserve unit BARS-13, Sergey Femchenkov, claimed that the situation on the Svatove frontline “escalated,” forcing Russian forces to retreat from the Makiivka area.[15] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing clashes in the direction of Novoselivske, Volodymyrivka, and Stelmakhivka (all just northwest of Svatove) in the direction of the R66 highway.[16] Some Russian milbloggers noted that motorized rifle elements of the 1st Tank Army are holding defensive positions in the vicinity of Novoselivske.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack Russian positions in the Chervonopopivka area, fewer than 10km northwest of Kreminna.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian assaults near Torske, about 16km due west of Kreminna.[19] Ukrainian forces also continued to target Russian logistics on the Svatove-Kreminna line, and geolocated footage showed the aftermath of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base on Miluvatka, just south of Svatove.[20]

Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in clashes northwest of Lysychansk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast, approximately 13km northwest of Lysychansk.[21] Russian sources for the second time since November 7 claimed that Wagner Group troops and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) units broke Ukrainian defenses in Bilohorivka and entered the settlement.[22]

Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain positions in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on November 13. Ukrainian and Russian sources claimed that a Russian attack helicopter conducted a sortie against Ukrainian positions in Terranova (about 31km northeast of Kharkiv City), and a Russian mil blogger noted that Russian forces failed to get a foothold in the settlement on November 13.[23] Russian forces also launched missile strikes from S-300 air defense systems on an enterprise in Kharkiv City on November 14.[24]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 13 and 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut, Bilohorivka (about 20km northeast of Bakhmut), Spirne (30km northeast of Bakhmut), Toretsk (25km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut) on November 13, but Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesperson Serhiy Cherevatyi disputed these claims.[26] ISW is unable to independently confirm these reports. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also conducted ground assaults northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske, Spirne, and Bilohorivka.[27] Russian sources also claimed that Wagner forces advanced deep into the southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut, and that fierce fighting between Ukrainian and Wagner forces persists in the southeastern outskirts of Soledar (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut).[28] These sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are equipping their strongholds in the path of Russian forces, near Bakhmut and Soledar.[29] The Ukrainian government reported that Russian forces dropped prohibited chemical weapons, several K-51 aerosol grenades, on Ukrainian strongholds on November 14.[30] The use of chemical weapons such as K-51 aerosol grenades is explicitly prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[31] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces intensified shelling, missile, and artillery strikes along the contact line in the Bakhmut area.[32]

Russian forces intensified offensive operations around Avdiivka–Donetsk City on November 13 and 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, and Vodiane, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and Marinka and Novomykhailivka on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces slowly advanced through Ukrainian fortified areas near Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka.[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces slowly advanced through Ukrainian fortified areas near Pervomaiske, Vodiane, and Nevelske (19km northwest of Donetsk City).[35] Geolocated footage posted on November 12 showed that Russian forces advanced into the northwestern outskirts of Opytne (about 12km northwest of Donetsk City), and Russian sources claimed that Russian troops are attempting to push Ukrainian forces farther west of the settlement.[36] A Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces set up mine barriers in the Russian forces’ path to slow this Russian push west.[37] One Russian mil blogger claimed that Russian forces aim to capture Vodiane, which would allow them to bypass Avdiivka and ultimately take Tonenke (about 19km northwest of Donetsk City), in an effort to cut off Ukrainian supply lines in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area.[38] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces intensified shelling, missile, and artillery strikes along the contact line in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.[39]

Russian forces claimed to have made gains southwest of Donetsk City on November 13 and 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian news outlets claimed that Russian troops captured Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) on November 14 after Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks near Pavlivka and Nikolske on November 13.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Pavlivka on November 13, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to consolidate control over the northern outskirts of Pavlivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations from the direction of Pavlivka in an attempt to dislodge Ukrainian forces from behind the Kashlahach River.[42]Russian sources claimed that advancing units of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, and the “Kaskad” Battalion killed a large number of Ukrainian personnel who did not have time to withdraw from positions in Pavlivka on November 13 and took the remaining Ukrainian servicemembers in Pavlivka as prisoners of war on November 14.[43] Certain Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made no significant progress south of Novomykhailivka due to Ukrainian forces using elevation differences between Pavlivka and Vuhledar to their advantage.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on November 13 and 14.[45]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued defensive actions on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14. Geolocated satellite imagery posted on November 13 shows newly created Russian defensive lines along the left bank of the Dnipro, east of Beryslav around Hornostaivka (28km northeast of Beryslav), Liubymivka (8km southeast of Beryslav), and Petropavlivka (25km southeast of Beryslav).[46] Additional satellite imagery shows the development of Russian defensive lines in Lukyanivka (16km southeast of Beryslav) between October 8 and November 10.[47] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian troops are conducting defensive preparations on the left bank and striking Ukrainian positions and residential communities on the right bank.[48] The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Forces, Nataliya Humenyuk, stated that Russian forces struck an abandoned equipment concentration in Chornobaivka (just northwest of Kherson City) on November 13, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed was a strike on a Ukrainian command post.[49] Ukrainian sources also stated that Russian forces conducted a mortar strike on November 14 on the private sector of Hornostaivka, a settlement on the left bank of the Dnipro River, because civilians refused to evacuate.[50]

Russian sources widely claimed that Ukrainian troops launched a limited raid and attempted to land on the Kinburn Spit on the night of November 13 and 14. Russian mil bloggers reported that Ukrainian landing groups formed in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast, and attempted to land on the Kinburn Spit at Pokrovske, but that Russian forces destroyed the grouping during the ensuing battle.[51] Ukrainian sources did not comment on these claims. Russian mil bloggers voiced concerns that this raid is indicative of Ukraine’s ability to land on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[52]

Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and on the right bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14.[53] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces launched anti-aircraft missiles at Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast on November 14, which Russian sources reported was intended to disrupt Ukrainian fire control over the Kinburn Spit.[54] Ukrainian forces notably struck Russian concentration areas on the left bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14 and targeted personnel concentrations in Dnipryany, Chaplynka, and Hola Prystan.[55]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed additional decrees refining mobilization protocols and expanding military recruitment provisions, likely in an ongoing effort to reinforce Russian war efforts. Putin decreed that foreign citizens can serve in the Russian armed forces on November 14.[56] The decree also allows Russian officials to conscript Russian dual-nationals or foreigners with residence permits.[57] Such provisions will allow the Kremlin to recruit forces internationally and among immigrant populations in Russia. Recruitment of foreigners can also ignite further ethnoreligious conflicts that have been plaguing Russian ad hoc forces, however.

Putin is establishing enforcement measures for censorship of foreigners with acquired Russian citizenship, which would allow military recruitment officials to further carry out covert mobilization and respond to criticism of the failures of the Russian military campaign in Ukraine. Putin proposed an amendment that would deprive people of their acquired Russian citizenship if they spread “fakes about the Russian Armed Forces” or affiliate with “extremist organizations” that advocate against Russian territorial integrity. The Russian State Duma is also considering a law that would deprive residents of acquired Russian citizenship if they surrender or evade military service.[58] Both proposals excluded Russian-born citizens and are likely attempts to silence immigrant groups and ethnically based civil society in Russia. The amendment would task the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with prosecuting individuals with such views, and Putin may be attempting to set up an internal repression apparatus. ISW previously assessed that Putin has never built an internal repression apparatus like the Soviets, instead relying on control over the information space.[59]

Putin may also be refining conditions for future force-generation efforts, such as a new wave of mobilization. Putin decreed that individuals with drug possession and consumption criminal charges will not be able to sign a contract with the Russian Armed Forces, likely in an effort to appear to address instances of substance abuse among new recruits and mobilized men.[60] It is unclear if Russian officials will actually follow Putin’s order prohibiting individuals with drug-related charges from serving, but the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) will likely continue to recruit these individuals regardless of Putin’s order regarding the conventional Russian military.

Russian authorities continue their struggle to integrate combat forces lacking a coordinated central command structure. Putin eliminated one inconsistency in Russian and Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) force-generation policy by decreeing the demobilization of students in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts on November 13.[61] The students were mobilized as part of DNR/LNR efforts rather than as part of the general Russian mobilization effort. The DNR and LNR will likely maintain their covert mobilization practices to ensure a supply of reinforcements, however. The Ukraine Resistance Center stated on November 14 that Russian forces continued to forcibly mobilize students in Donetsk and Luhansk from universities.[62] It is unclear whether DNR and LNR officials had any input into Putin’s decision, though DNR Head Denis Pushilin thanked Putin for giving DNR students the same opportunity as students in “other regions of Russia.”[63] A prominent Russian mil blogger also noted that such issues will not resolve instantly due to divergences between DNR, LNR, and Russian laws.[64] Another Russian milblogger noted that Russian hospitals continue to deny treatment to DNR and LNR servicemen, and it is likely that Russian Armed Forces’ disparaging attitude towards non-Russian forces will persist throughout Russian efforts to consolidate the proxy republics’ and Russian Federation’s legalthe  systems.[65] The resolution of discrepancies between Russia and the forces the Kremlin is working to absorb has contributed to friction between the force groups, as ISW has previously reported.[66]

The aftermath of partial mobilization is continuing to have domestic social ramifications in Russia. Social media footage from November 13 shows a large group of mobilized servicemembers in Patriot Park, Moscow Oblast, protesting against the poor quality of their training and threatening their commander for disregarding training and material necessities.[67] The protestors angrily questioned why mobilized recruits are conducting small-arms fire exercises at tank training grounds.[68] The families of forcibly mobilized servicemembers similarly continue to claim that the Russian command deployed their loved ones to the frontlines in Ukraine without training or equipment and stated that they have lost contact with their relatives.[69] The Sverdlovsk and Voronezh military registration authorities are reportedly refusing to issue the badge numbers of certainly mobilized servicemen, which makes it impossible for families to view information about service payments belonging to their deceased loved ones on the battlefield.[70]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued to drive the “evacuation” and forced relocation of residents in occupied territories on November 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 14 that Russian officials are evicting Ukrainian citizens from their homes in some temporarily occupied settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast to house Russian servicemen.[71] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on November 14 that Russian forces plan to completely evacuate the civilian population from Rubizhne, Kreminna, and Severodonetsk, all of which are in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast.[72]

Russian occupation officials continued efforts to relocate their administrative presence away from the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 14. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 14 that the Russian Duma Liberal Democratic deputies Leonid Slutsky, Vladimir Koshelev, and Vladimir Sibyagin are supervising Kherson occupation officials as they attempt to launch operations of the administrative center after officially moving the Kherson Oblast temporary administrative capital to Henichesk on November 12.[73] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupiers are evacuating the families of Russian workers from Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast.[74]

Russian authorities are continuing to import Russian citizens to serve in occupation administrations, replacing possibly ineffective Ukrainian collaborators and personnel from Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Luhansk Oblasts. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 13 that Russian occupation officials have appointed new heads of prosecutors’ offices in occupied territories after chief prosecutors arrived in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Luhansk Oblasts on November 7.[75] A Russian source similarly claimed on November 14 that Russia is abolishing the LNR’s prosecution office to further integrate the territory into Russia.[76]               

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to erode Ukrainian national identity among residents of occupied territories. Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov stated on November 14 that Russian occupation officials in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, destroyed Ukrainian history textbooks and literature.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 14 that the Commissioner for Children’s Rights under the Russian Presidential Administration, Maria Lvova-Belova, is personally responsible for the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families for the purpose of forcing assimilation into Russia.[78]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


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[57] https://centralasia dot media/news:1818719

[58] https://t.me/stranaua/75125

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[60] https://t.me/readovkanews/46815

[61] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/meduzalive/73273 ; https://t.me/meduzalive/73274; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/9661; https://t.me/dnronline/85294; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9554; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/19804; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/12011; https://t.me/epoddubny/13641

[62] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/na-shodi-ukrayiny-rosiyany-mobilizuvaly-studentiv-psevdouniversytetiv/

[63] https://t.me/pushilindenis/2895

[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70244

[65] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1591493817156644866/photo/1

[66] ﷟https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[67] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/55779; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization...

[68] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/55779; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization...

[69] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/ostorozhn...

[70] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-nov-12-13; https://t.me/horizonta...

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DK4f2arU8MDofYKaa2...

[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02d9Z7xA3UMqSykA8kuA...

[73] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/13/rosiyany-namagayutsya-nalagodyty-robotu-okupaczijnoyi-administracziyi-v-genichesku/; https://ria dot ru/20221112/genichesk-1830990519.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... gov.ua/2022/11/14/rosiyany-vyvezly-svoyih-posipak-z-zaliznogo-portu-do-skadovska/

[74] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/rosiyany-vyvezly-svoyih-posipak-z-zaliznogo-portu-do-skadovska/

[75] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/13/okupanty-zavezly-svoyih-prokuroriv-na-tymchasovo-okupovani-terytoriyi/

[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70251

[77] https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/1259

[78] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/14/upovnovazhena-putina-osobysto-kontrolyuye-vykradennya-ukrayinskyh-ditej-do-rf/



Monday, November 14, 2022

LOGISTICS : FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI

 SOURCE : 

(   )  FEEDING THE BEAR  :   https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/

(   )  RUSSIA’S LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS: https://mwi.usma.edu/russias-logistical-problems-may-slow-down-russias-advance-but-they-are-unlikely-to-stop-it/

(   )  THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR:   https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf

(   )   FM 4-0 SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS:   https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19602_FM%204-0%20FINAL%20WEB%20v2.pdf



COMMENTARY

FEEDING THE BEAR: A CLOSER LOOK AT RUSSIAN ARMY LOGISTICS AND THE FAIT ACCOMPLI

NOVEMBER 23, 2021


Russia’s military buildup along the border with Ukraine has clearly gotten the attention of policymakers from Kyiv to Washington, D.C. CIA Director Bill Burns flew to Moscow to try to avert a crisis, while U.S. intelligence officials are reportedly warning NATO allies that a Russian invasion of large parts of Ukraine can’t be ruled out.

The possibility of Russian aggression against Ukraine would have huge consequences for European security. Perhaps even more concerning would be a Russian attack against a NATO member itself. Moscow might want to undermine security in the Baltic states or Poland, for instance, but could the Russian government successfully carry out a large-scale invasion of those countries? If recent wargames are any indication, then the answer is a resounding yes — and it could do so pretty easily. In a 2016 War on the Rocks article, David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson projected that the Russian army would overrun the Baltic states in three days.

Most of these wargames, such as RAND’s Baltic study, focus on fait accompli, an attack by the Russian government aimed at seizing terrain — then quickly digging in. This creates a dilemma for NATO: launch a costly counter-attack and risk heavy casualties and possibly a nuclear crisis or accept a Russian fait accompli and undermine faith in the credibility of the alliance. Some analysts have argued that these seizures are much more likely to be small in size, limited to one or two towns. While that scenario should, of course, be studied, the concern about the feasibility of a fait accompli in the form of a major invasion still stands.

While the Russian army definitely has the combat power to achieve these scenarios, does Russia have the logistics force structure to support these operations? The short answer is not in the timelines envisioned by Western wargames. In an initial offensive — depending on the fighting involved — Russian forces might reach early objectives, but logistics would impose requirements for operational pauses. As a result, a large land grab is unrealistic as a fait accompli. The Russian army has the combat power to capture the objectives envisioned in a fait accompli scenario, but it does not have the logistic forces to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure. The Russian Aerospace Forces (with a sizable tactical bomber and attack aircraft force) and attack helicopters can also pick up fire support to alleviate artillery ammunition consumption.

NATO planners should develop plans focusing on exploiting Russian logistic challenges rather than trying to address the disparity in combat power. This involves drawing the Russian army deep into NATO territory and stretching Russian supply lines to the maximum while targeting logistics and transportation infrastructure such as trucks, railroad bridges, and pipelines. Committing to a decisive battle at the frontier would play directly into Russian hands, allowing a shorter supply to compensate for their logistic shortfalls.

Railroads and Russian Logistics Capabilities

Russian army logistics forces are not designed for a large-scale ground offensive far from their railroads. Inside maneuver units, Russian sustainment units are a size lower than their Western counterparts. Only brigades have an equivalent logistics capability, but it’s not an exact comparison. Russian formations have only three-quarters the number of combat vehicles as their U.S. counterparts but almost three times as much artillery. On paper (not all brigades have a full number of battalions), Russian brigades have two artillery battalions, a rocket battalion, and two air defense battalions per brigade as opposed to one artillery battalion and an attached air defense company per U.S. brigade. As a result of extra artillery and air defense battalions, the Russian logistics requirements are much larger than their U.S. counterparts.

Maneuver formationU.S. sustainment formationRussian sustainment formation
BattalionCompanyPlatoon
RegimentBattalion/SquadronCompany
BrigadeBattalionBattalion
DivisionBrigadeBattalion
CorpsBrigadeNone
Combined Arms ArmyN/ABrigade

 

Additionally, the Russian army doesn’t have sufficient sustainment brigades — or material-technical support brigades, as they call them — for each of their combined arms armies. A look into Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, shows 10 material-technical support brigades supporting 11 combined arms armies, one tank army, and four army corps. Russia’s Western and Southern Commands each have three armies and three material-technical support brigades to support them. In defensive operations, a Russian brigade can pull directly from the railhead. A trump card the Russians have are their 10 railroad brigades, which have no Western equivalents. They specialize in railroad security, construction, and repair, while rolling stock is provided by civilian state companies.

The reason Russia is unique in having railroad brigades is that logistically, Russian forces are tied to railroad from factory to army depot and to combined arms army and, where possible, to the division/brigade level. No other European nation uses railroads to the extent that the Russian army does. Part of the reason is that Russia is so vast — over 6,000 miles from one end to the other. The rub is that Russian railroads are a wider gauge than the rest of Europe. Only former Soviet nations and Finland still use the Russian standard — this includes the Baltic states. There are several railheads prior to Baltic capitals, but it will still take several days to reach and establish railhead operations. Forward railhead operations are more than just cross-loading cargo from train onto truck. It involves receiving and sorting cargo, repackaging for specific units, and storing excess on the ground. Due to the hazardous nature of military cargo, the ground needs to be prepared so that cargo can be stored in safe, distributed environments. This process can take one to three days. The site also needs to be outside the range of enemy artillery and secured from partisans. A single lucky shell or an rocket propelled grenade can result in a major explosion and have a disproportionate effect on the tempo of an entire division. This is assuming the key bridges, such as one at Narva on the Russian-Estonian border, aren’t destroyed and have to be repaired. Poland only has one wide gauge rail line, which runs from the Krakow region to Ukraine and can’t be used by Russian forces, without capturing Ukraine first. There are no wide gauge lines running from Belarus to Warsaw. Rail traffic moving across borders usually stops to cross-load cargo or uses adjustable railroad carriages and switches engines (which cannot adjust). In times of war, it is highly unlikely that the Russian army would capture enough Western train engines to support their army, forcing them to rely on trucks. This means that Russian army rail sustainment capability ends at the borders of the former Soviet Union. Trying to resupply the Russian army beyond the Russian gauge rail network would force them to rely mostly on their truck force until railroad troops could reconfigure/repair the railroad or build a new one.

Russia’s truck logistic support, which would be crucial in an invasion of Eastern Europe, is limited by the number of trucks and range of operations. It is possible to calculate how far trucks can operate using simple beer math. Assuming the existing road network can support 45 mph speeds, a single truck can make three trips a day at up to a 45-mile range: One hours to load, one hour to drive to the supported unit, one hours to unload, and another hour to return to base. Repeating this cycle three times equals 12 hours total. The rest of the day is dedicated to truck maintenance, meals, refueling, weapons cleaning, and sleeping. Increase the distance to 90 miles, and the truck can make two trips daily. At 180 miles, the same truck is down to one trip a day. These assumptions won’t work in rough terrain or where there is limited/damaged infrastructure. If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.

The Russian army does not have enough trucks to meet its logistic requirement more than 90 miles beyond supply dumps. To reach a 180-mile range, the Russian army would have to double truck allocation to 400 trucks for each of the material-technical support brigades. To gain familiarity with Russian logistic requirements and lift resources, a useful starting point is the Russian combined arms army. They all have different force structures, but on paper, each combined army is assigned a material-technical support brigade. Each material-technical support brigade has two truck battalions with a total of 150 general cargo trucks with 50 trailers and 260 specialized trucks per brigade. The Russian army makes heavy use of tube and rocket artillery fire, and rocket ammunition is very bulky. Although each army is different, there are usually 56 to 90 multiple launch rocket system launchers in an army. Replenishing each launcher takes up the entire bed of the truck. If the combined arms army fired a single volley, it would require 56 to 90 trucks just to replenish rocket ammunition. That is about a half of a dry cargo truck force in the material-technical support brigade just to replace one volley of rockets. There is also between six to nine tube artillery battalions, nine air defense artillery battalions, 12 mechanized and recon battalions, three to five tank battalions, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and small arms ammunition — not to mention, food, engineering, medical supplies, and so on. Those requirements are harder to estimate, but the potential resupply requirements are substantial. The Russian army force needs a lot of trucks just for ammunition and dry cargo replenishment.

For fuel and water sustainment, each material-technical support brigade has a tactical pipeline battalion. These have lower throughput than their Western equivalents but can be emplaced within three to four days of occupying new terrain. Until then, fuel trucks are required for operational resupply. One might argue that the Russian army has the range to reach its objectives on their original tank of fuel, especially with auxiliary fuel drums they are designed to carry. That is not entirely correct. Tanks and armored vehicles burn through fuel when maneuvering in combat or just idling while stationary. This is the reason why the U.S. Army uses “days of supply” to plan fuel consumption, not range. If a Russian army operation lasts 36 to 72 hours as the RAND study estimates, then the Russian army would have to refuel at least once before tactical pipelines are established to support operations.

Sustaining Logistics Is the Hard Part

A Scenario in the Baltics

There are serious logistic challenges with large-scale fait accompli operations in the Baltics. Small scale fait accompli operations are feasible with small forces without a logistical challenge but on a large scale are far more challenging. Fait accompli requires Russian forces to overrun Baltic states and eliminate all resistance in less than 96 hours — before NATO’s Very High Readiness Task Force can reinforce the defenders. This force won’t stop a Russian attack, but it commits NATO to a land war, negating the very purpose of fait accompli.

Logistics are the key stumbling block in the fait accompli timeline. The railroad is wide gauge and usable, but the timeline is too short for captured railheads to be put back into operation. A dozen NATO air-launched cruise missiles fired over Germany can destroy key rail bridges at Narva, Pskov, and Velikie Lugi, shutting down rail traffic into the Baltics for days until those bridges are repaired. Logistic planners in Russian Western Command have to plan for a scenario in which Baltic states choose to fight a battle in their capital. Historically, urban combat consumes massive amounts of ammunition and takes months to conclude. During the two most prominent examples, the battles of Grozny in the Chechen wars and the Battle of Mosul in 2016, defenders tied down four to 10 times their numbers for up to four months. At Grozny, Russians were firing up to 4,000 shells a day — that’s 50 trucks a day.

Even in a Baltic scenario, Russian planners have to consider the risk that Poland, which can muster four divisions, will launch an immediate counter-attack, trying to catch the Russian army off-balance. The Russian army would have large forces tied to sieges of Tallinn and Riga while fending off a Polish counter-attack from the south. The ammunition consumption would be massive. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, some Russian forces expended an entire basic load of ammunition in 12 hours. Assuming the same rates, the Russians would have to replace substantial amounts of ammunition every 12 to 24 hours.

Herein lies the dilemma. Overwhelming local forces in the Baltics before NATO troops arrive does not give Russia time to establish railheads, forcing reliance on trucks. At 130 miles, they can only do one trip a day, generating a truck shortage. Russian planners could commit fewer maneuver forces and risk failing to overwhelm defenders. Alternatively, they could take a logistics pause for two to three days and give the Baltic states time to mobilize and NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force time to arrive. Meanwhile, they would be taking attrition from local partisans, NATO airstrikes, maintenance breakdowns, and loitering munition as seen in the latest Nagorno-Karabakh War. Either way, fait accompli fails, and conflict degenerates into protracted war, which Russia is likely to lose. Russian logistics can only support a large-scale fait accompli if NATO forces fight a decisive battle at the frontier. The bulk of supply consumption would take place close to Russian depots. Russian air forces can alleviate the logistic strain by taking on fire support. What’s uncertain is how long the Russian air force would provide close air support in the face of NATO airpower, given NATO’s ability to conduct standoff air-to-air engagements with long-range missiles from beyond the effective range of Russian air defense in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. A similar picture exists at sea. The combination of airpower, diesel submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missiles is likely to deny the Baltic Sea to surface fleets of both sides.

The Russian army has ample combat power to capture the Baltic states, but it won’t be a rapid fait accompli unless the Russian government scales down the size of the territory it wishes to seize. Using Van Jackson’s 2×2 “Variations of Fait Accompli” diagram as a conceptual framework, we can fully appreciate the Russian dilemma. The logistic forces can only support a gradual fait accompli, which won’t shatter NATO unity, instead giving NATO time to mobilize and seal off the land grab. Even if NATO chooses not to reconquer the territory right away, its member states would likely impose crippling economic sanctions until Russia caves in. On the other hand, the decisive fait accompli, such as the conquest of a full member state, may achieve the objective of shattering NATO unity, but it can’t be logistically supported by the Russian army. It also runs a major risk of miscalculation by assuming that all thirty member states have to declare NATO Article 5. On paper, that’s true, but in practice, only the United States (to provide combat power), Germany, and Poland (to secure access) have to honor Article 5, and Russia would find itself in a major conflict that can escalate beyond the nuclear threshold.

A Polish Scenario

The Russian army’s logistic challenges are different in a Polish scenario. There are fewer time constraints but greater difficulties due to the distances involved and lack of wide gauge railroads, which end at the Belarusian border. The closest railhead to Poland is Grodno and Brest in Belarus. The first is located 130 miles and the second 177 miles from Warsaw. For an army that is stretched to sustain 90 miles, that is a long supply line to support.

Kaliningrad could be considered as another option, but it is not practical, as it is landlocked by NATO members. The combination of NATO airpower, naval forces, and Polish land-based anti-ship missiles make resupply by sea unlikely. According to Military Balance, there is a Russian corps with major depots but no supporting logistics units to push supplies out. Maneuver forces would have to pull these supplies using organic logistic formations, a range of about 45 miles. The garrison there can hold out in isolation for a long time but cannot conduct ground offensive operations. The Russian army will be able to reach Warsaw but cannot capture it without a logistic pause to halt, reconfigure/repair the railroad, and build tactical pipelines and frontline depots. Instead of pausing for a couple of days as in the Baltic scenario, the pause in the Polish scenario could take up to a couple of weeks. This gives NATO breathing space to build combat power.

The logistics are also useful to assess a Ukrainian conflict as Russian forces are again massing on the border. The best means of interpreting the seriousness of Russian intentions is to track the buildup of logistic forces and supply dumps rather than count battalion tactical groups that have moved to the border. The size and scale of logistic preparation tell us exactly how far and deep is Russian army planning to go.

Russian Strategic Reserves

Russia could reinforce its Western Joint Strategic Command (Western Military district) from other parts of the country to increase logistic power, but not by much. As Michael Kofman has pointed out, NATO has the ability to horizontally escalate the conflict by holding most Russian theaters at risk. The Russian General Staff cannot ignore this threat. As a result, Russia’s Central Command and parts of the Eastern Command are the only joint commands not facing an external threat and are able to reinforce Western Command. However, the sustainment forces they provide would be consumed by the additional combat forces that come with it. There are no extra trucks in the Russian army that are not tied to supporting engaged forces.

One of the strengths of the Russian army in a war in the Baltics or Poland would be its ability to mobilize reservists and civilian trucks. Russia still has a massive mobilization capacity built into its national economy, a legacy of World War II and the Cold War. However, mobilizing civilians to fight a war has major economic and political costs. To maintain political stability at home, the Russian people would have to genuinely believe they are defending their country. They will not tolerate husbands, sons, and fathers going off to a war on Putin’s whim. The last time the Russian government heavily relied on conscripts and reservists was during the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Within two months, a major antiwar movement appeared, spearheaded by soldiers’ mothers.

Russia and the Fait Accompli

The Russian army will be hard-pressed to conduct a ground offensive of more than 90 miles beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union without a logistics pause. For NATO, it means it can worry less about a major Russian invasion of the Baltic states or Poland and a greater focus on exploiting Russian logistic challenges by drawing Russian forces further away from their supply depots and targeting chokepoints in the Russian logistic infrastructure and logistic force in general. It also means that Russia is more likely to seize small parts of enemy territory under its logistically sustainable range of 90 miles rather than a major invasion as part of a fait accompli strategy.

From the Russian perspective, it does not appear that they are building their logistic forces with fait accompli or blitzkrieg across Poland in mind. Instead, the Russian government has built an ideal army for their strategy of “Active Defense.” The Russian government has built armed forces highly capable of fighting on home soil or near its frontier and striking deep with long-range fires. However, they are not capable of a sustained ground offensive far beyond Russian railroads without a major logistical halt or a massive mobilization of reserves.

Deciphering Russia’s intentions right now is increasingly difficult. Its military buildup on the border with Ukraine could be preparation for an invasion or it could be yet another round of coercive diplomacy. Nevertheless, thinking through Russia’s military logistics capabilities could give NATO some insights into what Moscow might be planning to do next — and what the Western alliance might do to protect its interests.

 ------------------------------------------------

Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin commissioned as a second lieutenant, branched armor, in 2002. He has 10 years of frontline experience in Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including four combat tours. Since 2014, he has worked as a modeling and simulations officer in concept development and experimentation field for NATO and the U.S. Army, including a tour at the U.S. Army Sustainment Battle Lab, where he led the experimentation scenario team.