Monday, December 12, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 11, 2022.

 


ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, DECEMBER 11,2022.

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 11, 9 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, December 11. This report discusses how the Belarusian regime’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as Russian pressure on Belarus to become more involved further constrains Belarusian readiness and willingness to enter the war in Ukraine. 

Russian officials consistently conduct information operations suggesting that Belarusian conventional ground forces might join Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Belarusian leaders including Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko sometimes play along with these information operations. The purpose of these efforts is to pin Ukrainian forces at the Belarusian border to prevent them from reinforcing Ukrainian operations elsewhere in the theater. Belarus is extraordinarily unlikely to invade Ukraine in the foreseeable future whatever the course of these information operations. A Belarusian intervention in Ukraine, moreover, would not be able to do more than draw Ukrainian ground forces away from other parts of the theater temporarily given the extremely limited effective combat power at Minsk’s disposal.

The Kremlin’s efforts to pressure Belarus to support the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine are a part of a long-term effort to cement further control over Belarus. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin intensified pressure on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to formalize Belarus’ integration into the Union State following the Belarusian 2020 and 2021 protests.[1] Russia particularly sought to establish a permanent military base in Belarus and direct control of the Belarusian military.[2] Russia has routinely tried to leverage its influence over Belarusian security and military affairs to place pressure on Belarus to support its invasion of Ukraine.[3] ISW assessed that Russian Minister of Defense Army General Sergei Shoigu meet with Lukashenko on December 3 to further strengthen bilateral security ties - likely in the context of the Russian-Belarusian Union State - and increase Russian pressure on Belarus to further support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[4] 

The Belarusian regime’s support for the Russian invasion has made Belarus a cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko offered Belarusian territory to Russian forces for the initial staging of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[5] Belarusian territory offered critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Russian Armed Forces in their failed drive on Kyiv and their subsequent withdrawal from northern Ukraine.[6] ISW has previously assessed that Belarus materially supports Russian offensives in Ukraine and provides Russian forces with secure territory and airspace from which to attack Ukraine with high-precision weapons.[7]

Belarusian support for Russia’s war in Ukraine is likely degrading the Belarusian military’s material capacity to conduct conventional military operations of its own. The Belarusian open-source Hajun Project reported on November 14 that the Belarusian military transferred 122 T-72A tanks to Russian forces, likely under the guise of sending them for modernization work in the Russian Federation.[8]The Hajun Project reported on November 17 that Belarus transferred 211 pieces of military equipment to the Russian Armed Forces, including 98 T-72A tanks and 60 BMP-2s.[9] The confirmed transfer of 98 T-72 tanks represents roughly 18 percent of the Belarusian inventory of active main battle tanks, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021 Military Balance report.[10] It is unclear if the 98 transferred tanks are part of the 122 tanks designated for modernization or if they are a separate collection of equipment. Neither is it clear that the tanks sent to Russia were part of the active Belarusian tank park or vehicles held in storage or reserve. Belarus lacks the capabilities to produce its own armored fighting vehicles making the transfer of this equipment to Russian forces both a current and a likely long-term constraint on Belarusian material capacities to commit mechanized forces to the fighting in Ukraine.[11]

Belarus is also likely drawing down its inventory of artillery munitions through munitions transfers to the Russian military. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 3 that Belarus has been transferring 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition to the Russian Armed Forces throughout October and November.[12] The GUR reported on November 17 that Belarusian authorities are interested in establishing a closed cycle of production for these artillery shells and that Belarusian officials planned to meet with Iranian officials to discuss such closed production cycles of artillery munitions.[13] The GUR also reported on October 11 that a train with 492 tons of ammunition from the Belarusian 43rd Missile and Ammunition Storage Arsenal in Gomel arrived at the Kirovske Railway Station in Crimea on an unspecified date.[14]

Belarusian officials are likely trying to conceal the amount of military equipment they are sending to Russia to support its invasion of Ukraine. The Hajun Project reported on November 5 that the Belarusian State Security Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Belarusian Special Forces have instituted enhanced protection and surveillance of rail infrastructure and have banned trains carrying military equipment from passing through Belarusian cities.[15] Belarusian authorities likely are trying to prevent Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies from fully assessing the extent of the Belarusian military equipment transfers to Russia. Belarus may be sending more extensive amounts of military equipment to Russian forces. Belarusian authorities may also be attempting to hide the extent of the transfers in order to mitigate the possible backlash against Lukashenko‘s degradation of the country’s military capacity and subservience to Moscow.

The Belarusian military is likely facing constraints on its capacity to train current and new personnel due to its supporting role in Russian force generation efforts. The Belarusian military is continuing to train Russian mobilized military personnel at the 230th Combined Arms Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground in Brest, Belarus and at other training facilities near Mozyr, Gomel, and Mogilev in Belarus as part of the Union States’ Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV).[16] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reportedly drafted 10,000 conscripts into the Belarusian Armed forces as a part of its autumn conscription campaign, a similar number to those drafted in the autumn cycle in 2021.[17] The Belarusian training of these mobilized Russian servicemembers coincides with the start of the Belarusian military’s academic year.[18] The GUR reported on September 29 that Belarus was preparing to accommodate up to 20,000 mobilized Russian servicemembers.[19] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 25 that 12,000 Russian personnel were stationed in Belarus.[20] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces deployed the mobilized men for training in Belarus as part of the RGV due to Russia‘s degraded training capacity.[21]

The Belarusian military likely has a relatively limited capacity to train existing and new personnel. The Belarusian military has only six maneuver brigades and is comprised of roughly 45,000 active personnel split into two command headquarters.[22] The small Belarusian military likely has limited training capacity and infrastructure to support its own force generation efforts. Belarusian military officials are now responsible for training at least two times as many service members as the Belarusian military normally trains. Belarusian support for Russian force generation efforts would likely also constrain it from being able to train more Belarusian military personnel if Lukashenko wished to increase the number of drafted conscripts in the next conscription cycle to prepare for possible losses in combat following a putative Belarusian invasion of Ukraine.

The degradation of the Russian military through devastating losses in Ukraine would also hinder the deployment of Belarusian mechanized forces to fight alongside Russian troops. Belarusian forces should theoretically be able to operate in combined units with Russian mechanized forces. ISW previously assessed that Russia pursued efforts to integrate the Belarusian military into Russian-led structures in joint military exercises and permanent joint combined combat training centers before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[23] The Belarusian military coordinated with the Russian military in the Zapad-2021 joint exercises in September of 2021 in which Russian and Belarusian units formed joint ”mobile tactical groups” that operated as single military units at the battalion level.[24] These combined units require a high degree of coordination and military training, and therefore Russian and Belarusian forces used elite units in such efforts. Russian units that took part in the joint exercises with Belarusian forces included elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, the 20th Combined Arms Army, the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, and the 106th Guards Airborne Division, all elite units that ISW has assessed have been severely degraded in Ukraine.[25] These Russian units now likely lack the capability to operate in combined formations with Belarusian forces and likely are unable to operate effectively in combined operations. Belarusian forces would likely have to operate together with poorly trained mobilized Russian personnel if they entered the war in Ukraine.[26] The outcome of efforts to form and use such combined units in combat is likely to be poor.

Lukashenko’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and Russian pressure on Belarus to join the fighting is likely causing friction within the Belarusian militaryThe Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 7 that soldiers of the Belarusian border service and the Belarusian Armed Forces are increasingly dissatisfied with the activities of the Belarusian military-political leadership due to the threat of Belarus entering the war in Ukraine.[27] Ukrainian sources reported on November 13 that social tensions between Belarusians and Russian forces in Brest Oblast intensified as Russian forces strained local hospitals due to unsanitary conditions at the 230th Combined Arms Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground.[28] The GUR reported on November 6 that internal memos from senior Belarusian military officers show numerous complaints from rank-and-file Belarusian servicemen about tensions with Russian mobilized personnel, particularly in relation to derogatory ethnic statements.[29]

Belarusian personnel is certainly aware of the significant losses that Russian forces suffered in Ukraine and likely do not wish to experience the same result. An October 25 CNN report detailed how the Belarusian military and hospitals treated many Russian casualties as the Russian military offensive to capture Kyiv failed.[30] Belarusian units that trained with elite Russian units that have since suffered heavy losses fighting in Ukraine are also likely aware of the extent of the casualties that the Russian army has faced in Ukraine. These Belarusian units likely know that their units and the Belarusian military as a whole would not fare better than Russian units which were far more capable and well-trained.

Elements within the Belarusian military have shown resistance to the idea of entering the war in Ukraine. A Belarusian lieutenant colonel posted a viral video on February 27 in which he called upon Belarusian military personnel to refuse orders if instructed to enter the war in Ukraine.[31] It is likely that some elements of the Belarusian Armed Forces would express reluctance or outright refusal if Lukashenko decided to invade Ukraine.

Lukashenko’s setting of information conditions likely further constrains Belarusian willingness to enter the war. Lukashenko continues to set informational conditions to resist Russian pressure to enter the war in Ukraine by claiming that NATO is preparing to attack Belarus.[32] Lukashenko would likely struggle to set information conditions justifying the Belarusian military’s involvement to the south in Ukraine that did not obviously contradict the supposed threat of NATO forces to the west that he has framed to the Belarusian public. Belarusian officials’ repeated invocations of the threat of NATO may have also instilled a misguided belief among some Belarusian government and military officials that a defensive posture in western Belarus is essential.

Belarus is already unlikely to invade Ukraine due to internal dynamics within the country. ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko does not intend to enter the war in Ukraine due to the possibility of renewed domestic unrest if his security apparatus is weakened through participation in a costly war in Ukraine.[33] Lukashenko relied upon elements of the Belarusian Armed Forces in addition to Belarusian security services to quell popular protests against his rule in 2020 and 2021.[34] Committing a substantial amount of that security apparatus to the war in Ukraine would likely leave Lukashenko open to renewed unrest and resistance. Lukashenko is also likely aware that invading Ukraine would undermine his credibility as the leader of a sovereign country as it would be evident that Russia’s effort to secure full control of Belarus had succeeded.

Belarusian entry into the war would at worst force Ukraine to temporarily divert manpower and equipment from the current front lines. Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov stated on November 24 that 15,000 Belarusian military personnel, in addition to the 9,000 Russian personnel stationed in Belarus, could theoretically participate in the war with Ukraine.[35] Even if Lukashenko committed a substantially larger number of his forces to an offensive into Ukraine, the Belarusian military would still be a small force that would be unable to achieve any substantial operational success. ISW has previously assessed that a Russian or Belarusian offensive from Belarus would not be able to cut Ukrainian logistical lines to the West without projecting deeper into Ukraine than Russian forces did during the Battle of Kyiv when Russian forces were at their strongest.[36] A Belarusian invasion could not make such a drive, nor could it seriously threaten Kyiv. Belarus’ entry into the war would at worst divert Ukrainian forces away from the current front lines in eastern Ukraine.

Belarus will continue to help Russia fight its war in Ukraine even though Lukashenko is highly unlikely to send his army to join the fightingBelarus can offer material to Russia that Russia cannot otherwise source due to international sanctions regimes against the Russian Federation that do not impact Belarus.[37] Belarusian provision of territory and airspace allows Russian forces to support their offensive operations in Ukraine and conduct their strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets from a safe haven.

Russian officials will continue to conduct information operations aimed at suggesting that Belarusian forces might invade Ukraine in order to pin Ukrainian forces at the Belarusian border. These information operations are extraordinarily unlikely to herald actual Belarusian intervention in the foreseeable future.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on December 11:

  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) denied rumors on December 11 that General Valery Gerasimov resigned or was removed from his position as Chief of the General Staff.[38]

  • Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that fighting continues along the Svatove-Kreminna line and near Lyman amidst poor weather conditions.[39]

  • A Russiamil bloggerer claimed that Russian forces transferred over 200 pieces of equipment from the Kherson direction to the Kupyansk direction, and geolocated footage shows Russian T-90 tanks in Luhansk Oblast headed west.[40] A Ukrainian official stated that a larger Russian force grouping does not currently pose a threat.[41]

  • Russian forces made marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut as Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in the area.[42] A Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group spokesperson stated that Russian forces changed tactics from using battalion tactical groups (BTGs) to smaller assault groups for offensive actions.[43]

  • Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk, Hola Prystan, Oleshky, and Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, all along major Russian logistics lines.[44]

  • Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military base in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[45] One source claimed that the strike killed up to 200 Russian military personnel.[46]

  • Ukrainian officials reported that Russian occupation authorities intensified forced mobilization measures in occupied Ukraine.[47] Russiamil bloggersrs claimed that Russian forces face shortages of blood for wounded military personnel and are running donor drives in occupied Crimea.[48]

  • A Ukrainian partisan group claimed responsibility for setting fire to a Russian military barracks in Sovietske, Crimea.[49] Ukrainian and Russian officials reported that Russian authorities continued filtration and law enforcement crackdowns in occupied Ukraine.[50]

 

 


References

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-for...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-for...

[3]https://isw.pub/RusCampaignMar11 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignMar21 ;...

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120322

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/map/russian-forces-belarus-january-25-2...

[6] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr3

[7] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct11

[8] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5792

[9] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5830

[10] International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021 The Military Balance, 183-184 ( https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/currentaffairs/The%20Military%20Balance%20...)

[11] International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021 The Military Balance, 183-184 ( https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/currentaffairs/The%20Military%20Balance%20...)

[12] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/za-deiakymy-vydamy-ozbroiennia-rosiia-vzhe-vykorystovuie-stratehichnyi-zapas.html

[13] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/v-bilorusi-planuiut-nalahodyty-vyrobnytstvo-snariadiv-dlia-stvolnoi-artylerii-ta-rszv.html

[14] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-prodovzhuiut-perekydaty-na-terytoriiu-bilorusi-dronykamikadze-shahed136.html

[15] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5733

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; ; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5717 ;  ; https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5900 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0RdkUN4VDMb4WU8WgfzG... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/22459 ; . https://t.me/mod_russia/22459

[17]  https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5597 ; https://motolko.help/ru-news/komplektovanie-srochnikami-vs-rb-kakim-roda... ;  https://primepress dot by/news/ekonomika/otpravka_v_voyska_prizyvnikov_osennego_prizyva_nachalas_v_belarusi-39008/

[18] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5888

[19] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-bilorusi-hotuiutsia-pryiniaty-20-tysiach-mobilizovanykh-z-rf.html

[20] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/25/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-rozgortaty-vijska-v-bilorusi/

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112822

[22] International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021 The Military Balance, 183-184 ( https://hostnezt.com/cssfiles/currentaffairs/The%20Military%20Balance%20... )

[23] Russia’s Zapad-2021 Exercise | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org) ; Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

[24] Russia’s Zapad-2021 Exercise | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

[25]https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct3;https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10 ;https://isw.pub/RusCampaignApr3; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJune8

[26] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10

[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08ERrBJJor2mUkZyp3z7...

[28]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YCSX87CsqK2udvjM2z...

[29] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/sered-rosiiskykh-chastkovo-mobilizovanykh-u-bilorusi-spalakh-zakhvoriuvan-cherez-nedotrymannia-sanitarnykh-umov.html 

[30] https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/10/europe/belarus-hospitals-rus...

[31] https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1497911200692289544

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kre... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-vio... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-opp... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-bel...

[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLG2IZaEQf0; https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/11/24/10-15-tysyach-biloruskyh-sylovykiv-...

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[37] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust21

[38] https://t.me/readovkanews/48710; https://t.me/swodki/201791https://t.me/notes_veterans/6986https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/43559https://t.me/arnamax/6304https://t.me/mig41/22438https://t.me/mod_russia/22588

[39] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10249https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10250https://t.me/miroshnik_r/9827https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/20536; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10253https://t.me/stranaua/79881https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BaPRkC1tPp53SEWzh7...https://t.me/mod_russia/22572https://t.me/wargonzo/9704 

[40] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1601718010162839552https://t.me/notes_veterans/6984

[41] https://t.me/stranaua/79876

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/22572https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BaPRkC1tPp53SEWzh7...https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026zZzZfMLuTFAs1uGTQ...https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1601883386943246337 

https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1601856772049965056https://t.me/robert_magyar/239 

https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1601688657316175873 

https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1601696466200059904https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1601675015619248128 

https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1601684321814728704https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/24517https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/54951; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/72569; https://t.me/brussinf/5367https://t.me/wargonzo/9704;

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/12/11/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-okupanty-zminyly-taktyku-vedennya-bojovyh-dij-sergij-cherevatyj/

[44] https://t.me/readovkanews/48700; https://t.me/readovkanews/48663https://suspilne dot media/336006-pivtora-miljona-ludej-na-odesini-bez-svitla-es-pogodivsa-nadati-18-milardiv-ukraini-291-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30748

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/22572https://t.me/nm_dnr/9569https://t.me/BalitskyEV/587; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/586; https://t.me/vrogov/6438;  https://t.me/vrogov/6441; https://t.me/vrogov/6432; https://t.me/readovkanews/48671; https://t.me/wargonzo/9701https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1601860410755682304 

https://t.me/izvestia/114955https://t.me/rybar/41913https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1601697039452364800 

https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1601682486861660161https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1601825348404273153https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1601703038640877568https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1601702987654889472 

https://t.me/rian_ru/188336https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35233; https://ria.ru/20221211/melitopol-1837856255.html;

[46] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1601856383472881666

[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BaPRkC1tPp53SEWzh7...https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/12/11/rosiyany-aktyvizuyut-mobilizacziyu-na-tot/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7366https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7367

[48] https://t.me/rybar/41912; https://t.me/dva_majors/6687

[49] https://t.me/atesh_ua/267

[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/9570https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid029vwMB4NrzykBNWV1NSsLo...https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1022

Sunday, December 11, 2022

Why Modern Wars cannot escape the Trenches

SOURCE: 

(   ) https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3765218-why-modern-wars-cannot-escape-the-trenches/?utm_source=pocket_saves


 OPINION CONTRIBUTOR

Why Modern Wars cannot escape the Trenches

BY MICHAEL P. FERGUSON. 


12 Aug 2022

A Ukrainian serviceman checks the trenches dug by Russian soldiers in a retaken area in Kherson region, Ukraine, Wednesday, Oct. 12, 2022.




As Ukraine heads into a long, cold winter, images from the front near Bakhmut are hauntingly reminiscent of European battlegrounds a century ago — more like Verdun than any vision of futuristic warfare. Such photos reveal an inconvenient truth that western nations have labored to escape for generations: War is still a hellish and mostly human endeavor. Nuclear weapons and information-age machines have done little to change that, but not for lack of trying. 

Since the 1970s, defense policies that relied on technology to offset force imbalances between the United States and the Soviet Union induced visions of a largely robotic future battlefield. “War Without Men,” published in 1988, and “Waging War Without Warriors?” published in 2002, examined the possibility of automated conflicts merely administered by distant human beings. Others have gone so far as to argue that the latest war in Iraq was a “war of robots.” My experience there compels me to disagree

Still, narratives declaring an imminent mechanization of the battlefield remain popular. Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov proclaimed as much in 2013, but nearly a decade later we see the fruits of such thinking. Russia can barely field a tank on improved roads 100 miles from its border, much less a sophisticated robot army half a world away in adverse terrain. Granted, the automation of warfare has indeed increased since the turn of the century, but nature remains one of the most restrictive forces on mechanical devices. 

Putting the ethics debate aside, intricate machines cannot man muddy trenches in deep snow or driving rain for long periods without human support. And all but the most sophisticated (and expensive) unmanned aerial systems are severely limited by inclement weather. A recent study compiled by British think tank RUSI based on data from the Ukrainian General Staff found that 90 percent of the drones employed in Ukraine this year were lost, which means expendable platforms are the most useful.

Someone must bring these smaller drones within range of enemy positions and hope for favorable conditions once there. Maintenance of advanced land and air systems is complex as well, often requiring non-combatant engineers to fix them in a rear area and someone else to transport them to and from the front where they are employed.  

All this movement on the battlefield exposes forces to enemy targeting, thus amplifying the importance of the principle of dispersion that analysts are rediscovering in Ukraine. Above-ground command posts concentrate forces in a single area, making them easy targets, while trenches and subsurface routes allow formations to disperse with some degree of protection. These concepts are not new.

Theories of dispersion and concentration have been hallmarks of military thought since at least the Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815). A century later, British soldiers tunneled their way under the kill zones of World War I to reach enemy positions. At Messines in 1917, after a year of digging, 455 tons of explosive charges detonated underground, killing about 10,000 Germans.  

The history of warfare is not linear, and introducing new capabilities to the battlefield can elicit the return of old ones. One of the greatest military historians to ever live, Sir Michael Howard, explained how lessons from the last war can mislead as much as they inform. Yet the human fascination with novelty often compels us to draw broad inferences about the future from those lessons. 

Russia’s war on Ukraine has evolved into a sort of Protean tarot card that observers can use to support conclusions in line with their interests. One such theory outlines an emerging political doctrine involving aggressive, sustained military aid that the United States could replicate elsewhere. This is yet another form of offset, but rather than using machines, advocates claim the United States could rely entirely on another nation’s military to achieve U.S. policy objectives. This works, of course, until it does not.  

Western arms packages are only as effective as the arms into which they fall, and luckily those are now Ukrainian. But that will not always be the case. Without a trained, disciplined and numerically significant army ready to die wielding them, no number of modern weapons can be decisive. Reports of Russian soldiers failing to employ high-tech artillery systems because they were untrained in their use are a testament to that truth. The success of U.S. policy in Ukraine, it seems, is as much a reflection of Ukraine’s uncommon martial aptitude as the policy itself. 

Shortly after the 2020 collapse of Kabul, historian Andrew Bacevich wrote that relying on foreign armies to defend American interests is always a gamble. Turning such gambles into policy could cause future wars to descend into anachronistic grudge matches over which U.S. arms deliveries have little control. In such instances, when American defense is in for a penny, it is typically in for a pound

As the United States continues to invest in exquisite technologies and foreign military aid, the challenge put to Washington is one of balancing the urgent demand for battlefield mechanization with the enduring yet inconvenient realities of ground warfare. A thought-provoking study on military innovation from Kendrick Kuo at the U.S. Naval War College found that “what is lost in an innovation process may be as important as what is created.” If those creations do not perform as expected in war, the loss of both old and new places the U.S. military at a capability deficit. At that point, assuming past is prologue, the grunt bears the burden of such miscalculation in the trenches. 

The war in Ukraine may offer valuable lessons upon its conclusion, especially those pertaining to the importance of reducing digital signatures to confound enemy targeting methods in modern warfare. But the lesson most overlooked in Ukraine is a bitter truth that military historians such as                                  T. R. Fehrenbach already knew: If you want to keep for the civilization that portion of land called home, you still need to be willing to put your sons and daughters in the mud to defend it. This winter, it is there that many Ukrainians will sleep.  

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Capt. Michael P. Ferguson is an officer in the U.S. Army with two decades of combat, staff, and security cooperation experience on four continents. He has authored dozens of articles and is co-author of a forthcoming military history of Alexander the Great. 


Saturday, December 10, 2022

Russia Crisis Military Assessment: Can Ukraine press its offensive this winter?

 SOURCE:  

(   )  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-crisis-military-assessment-can-ukraine-press-its-offensive-this-winter/


Russia Crisis: Mil Assessment

Russia Crisis Military Assessment: Can Ukraine press its offensive this winter?

By Atlantic Council military fellows

In light of the ongoing Russia crisis, the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense (FD) practice will share weekly assessments of the latest force developments surrounding Ukraine, leveraging the expert perspectives of our senior military fellows. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any other US government agency.

November 30, 2022

The Bottom Line

On November 9, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from the city of Kherson, a significant and embarrassing defeat for the Kremlin. Kherson, one of the regions annexed through sham referendums, represented the only regional capital that Russia had seized since the war began, and its loss is not only tactically but strategically damaging. However, Russian and Ukrainian forces face a long winter ahead, as changing weather will complicate both offensive and defensive operations in the coming months.

No doubt, Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) troops bedding down in Kherson are asking themselves “what are we doing next?” Indications are that this war will continue for some time, despite the AFU’s incredible and valorous successes. Ukraine must carefully balance the allure of capitalizing on momentum against a weakened opponent with the challenge of sustaining hard-won gains through the winter.

However, time is not on Kyiv’s side. Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight against Russia hinges on NATO and US support and, as the West endures higher energy and food costs, the calls for an end to the war will only grow louder.

The calendar—and conditions—change


Building on momentum. The AFU unquestionably has the momentum in the war given a string of victories in Kharkiv, Izyum, Lyman, and now Khersonthis despite Russia utilizing terror tactics such as targeting Ukrainian power infrastructure and civilians, indiscriminate targeting with Iranian loitering munitions, and threatening the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The AFU effectively cut off Russian troops from critical ground lines of communication across the Dnipro River through systematic targeting of bridges and crossings. Over time, these tactics eventually forced Russia to concede that its position was impossible to defend and proved decisive in avoiding catastrophic urban warfare.

  • Winter is coming. As winter approaches, the type of offensive operations that the AFU has successfully executed will become increasingly challenging due to harsh weather, ground conditions, and shifting prioritization for sustainment and logistics. Ground mobility, concealment, and reconnaissance can all become increasingly difficult in the mud, snow, and brutally cold weather conditions in the region. Accordingly, we are seeing AFU requests for international support shift from tanks to air defenses and now to sustainment equipment such as generators. The inherent challenges of warfare, particularly offensive operations, in cold weather conditions may impact decision-making on the consolidation of gains versus onward advancement.
  • The Kremlin’s approach. Russia is moving to consolidate into more defensible positions in historically held terrain to the east of the Dnipro River and to the south near Crimea. Given the challenges Russia has had with training and equipping its newly mobilized troops (numbering around three hundred thousand personnel), consolidation to more advantageous defensive positions may allow for the time necessary to properly outfit new units. In fact, it may be Russia’s tactic to force a stalemate through the winter from more entrenched positions with the intent to begin rotating newly trained and equipped mobilization forces to the front as spring approaches.

Mother nature is the great equalizer. The tactical realities of cold-weather operations will likely impact all parties. Modern militaries recognize “cold weather training” as an indispensable skill set in a conventional fight. Underestimating the effects of winter on operations often results in disaster. Weapon systems malfunction. Engines seize or do not start at all. Combined arms operations are disrupted. Extreme cold hampers gross and fine motor skills, cognition, and the overall performance of human beings attempting to execute a multitude of warfighting tasks—especially over time.

  • Planning ahead. Success or failure in sustaining the fighting is directly linked to a force’s ability to plan, adapt, and anticipate the needs of the warfighter. Mud and fog disrupt ground combat operations by impeding speed and mobility. When a unit’s freedom of movement is compromised, its ability to link up with logistics trains can fail miserably, because those evolutions are often tied into a larger sustainment operation within a particular theater.
  • Sustainment delays impact operational tempo. Interruptions can have a profound influence on both the execution and the outcome of a plan. Refueling, rearming, and resupplying all become infinitely harder in poor weather conditions because throughput methods, distribution systems, and delivery platforms are vulnerable to temperature, precipitation, and fog. Sustainment operations are conducted via multiple domains, and disruption or delay due to weather on one platform likely has a domino effect on others, further complicating the time and sequencing in which units receive fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, water, equipment, and casualty replacements. While seemingly a singular tactical action, one surface connector or aircraft failing to execute delivery of sustainment on-time or on-target reverberates across the force, resulting in strategic impacts to operations.

Is the best defense a good offense? The question to the AFU at this juncture is how much farther to press the offensive given the increasing challenges presented by winter, as well as the strains on a force that has been sustaining a high operational tempo. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has openly stated his intent for Ukraine to regain full control of its territory within its internationally recognized borders, which would include retaking Crimea.

  • Assessing tradeoffs. On one hand, the AFU is at its greatest position of advantage since the war began in February. It continues to enjoy high levels of support from the United States and European allies, and the momentum gained through the successful counter-offensive campaign has seemingly increased Ukrainian resolve. These factors may persuade Ukraine to capitalize on its momentum and push the fight beyond Kherson and potentially into Crimea. However, degrading winter conditions historically favor the defensive-minded “home team.” A move to retake Crimea would be an expeditionary offensive operation, which would bring with it a significant sustainment and logistics problem given Crimea’s geography. It would also place high demands on AFU forces to project combat power into a region that has been controlled by Russia since 2014, and such an offensive directly brings in the maritime domain, introducing the potential that the domain could be leveraged in a more meaningful way as the war continues.
  • Asymmetric options. The AFU could utilize some of its offensive capacity to asymmetrically harass Russian forces in disparate locations across the line of contact, keeping Russian resupply mechanisms engaged without forcing large-scale battles of attrition. Russia may look to rotate more experienced officers off the line to enable better training and equipping of mobilized forces. A campaign of unpredictable and asymmetric attacks by the AFU could be a more agile means to disrupt Russia’s ability to exploit a lull and better posture mobilized forces for future offensive operations.
  • Going on the defensive. The most conservative approach would be for Ukraine to fortify positions across the recently gained territory and attempt to rotate units from the line, capitalizing on a potential lull in activity through the winter. However, this approach could allow for the time and space the Kremlin needs to better train and equip its mobilization force, ultimately improving its position for the spring. While offensive operations are more challenging in winter conditions, Russia will most likely continue to conduct rocket and missile attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure in an attempt to break the will of Ukraine and its allies.

When should Ukraine sue for peace?

The road to peace. The Ukrainians will have to negotiate with Russia at some point to end the war. Ukraine likely will not be able to achieve everything it wants, so compromising sooner rather than later may be prudent. Zelenskyy will have to calculate the odds that his military campaign will continue to overperform, the probability that foreign aid will continue to flow smoothly into Ukraine, and the chances that Russian President Vladimir Putin blinks first. These calculations are extremely hard for any wartime leader, and Zelenskyy will be no exception.

  • Defender’s advantageUkraine’s military has outperformed everyone’s expectations to date but re-taking the entirety of the Donbas and Crimea will likely be more challenging because Russia has taken a primarily defensive posture. That posture comes with considerable benefits, including a significant information advantage, simpler sustainment plans/routes, and fixed fortifications. Russia arguably overextended on its flanks in Kharkiv and Kherson. Now that Russia is pulling back and taking a more consolidated, deliberate defensive posture, it will naturally reclaim many tactical advantages, including shorter lines of communication and less complicated resupply plans.
  • The limits of international support. There is a fair possibility that the West holds back resources to force Ukraine to the negotiating table, and this probability only increases as the war continues. A new and divided US Congress will convene on January 3, and although there is a movement to pass a substantial aid package in the coming weeks during the lame-duck session, increased budgetary gridlock in 2023 could result in a slowdown or gap in resourcing. While most in the West publicly support Zelenskyy’s lofty goals for Ukraine, practicality is starting to weigh more heavily into the search for an end to the war. The costs to keep Ukraine solvent and the eventual costs to rebuild the country also matter to the West.