Monday, January 9, 2023

Who will win the ammunition war in Ukraine?

  SOURCE: 

(   )  https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/09/09/who-will-win-the-ammunition-war-in-ukraine-russia-is-buying-shells-from-north-korea-the-us-is-burning-through-its-stockpile-of-weapons/

(   )  https://youtu.be/deK98IeTjfY


Who will win the ammunition war in Ukraine?

Joshua KeatingGlobal Security Reporter

Russia is buying shells from North Korea; the U.S. is burning through its stockpile of weapons.

September 9, 2022

Coverage of the war in Ukraine has focused heavily on new high-tech weapons systems that promise to change the balance of power; TB2 dronesJavelin anti-tank missiles, and High Mobility Advanced Rocket System (HIMARS) rocket launchers have all gotten their turn in the spotlight. But as the war stretches on into an open-ended battle of attrition, victory may be less a matter of metaphorical silver bullets than supplies of the actual bullets — and shells, rockets and missiles — that both sides are firing at each other at shocking rates.

For months, the assumption has been that Russia’s larger defense industrial base and huge stockpiles of weapons and ammunition would give it an advantage in a prolonged firefight. But a recent U.S. intelligence report, suggesting Russia is now buying ammunition from North Korea, has raised doubts about just how robust those supplies may be.

Beyond the sheer volume of shells Russia is expending in the war, there is now Ukraine’s strategy of targeting Russian ammunition depots, particularly with its recently acquired long-range HIMARS rockets. The strategy appears to be working: In the first month of the HIMARS operation, Ukraine claimed to have destroyed 50 of these depots.

Ukraine has its own concerns when it comes to supplies of ammunition. Former Deputy Defense Minister Alina Frolova recently told Grid that while recent deliveries of high-tech weapons systems from the West had helped the Ukrainians close the gap in terms of battlefield capabilities, “the biggest concern, for now, is still ammunition. It’s quite heavily used. The delivery and production of ammunition is the principal point for now.” Ammunition has been a big part of the assistance packages the Ukrainians have received from the U.S. and other allies, but those supplies may not be inexhaustible either. With no end in sight in the overall conflict, what will it take to win the ammunition war?

Russia’s stockpiles of weapons: smaller and dumber

“Ammunition” can refer to a number of things, big and small, ranging from bullets for small arms to the “hypersonic” Kinzhal missiles Russia has reportedly used several times in Ukraine. The Russians are reportedly facing acute shortages of more advanced forms of ammunition such as cruise and ballistic missiles and other precision-guided weapons, in large part because of their continued reliance on Western technology imports such as computer chips. Western sanctions have specifically targeted the technologies Russia’s defense industry needs to produce these weapons, and those sanctions seem to be working. Ukraine’s prime minister recently told Politico that Russia is down to just four dozen of its hypersonic missiles.

As a U.S. defense official told reporters in late July, “They have expended a lot of their smarter munitions. … Their capabilities are getting dumber.”

But some experts caution against reading too much into this dumbing down of Russia’s capabilities. “My concern is that we’re mirror-imaging. They’re not fighting the way we do,” David E. Johnson, a former U.S. Army artillery officer who is now a principal researcher at the RAND Corporation, told Grid. “They’re running out of the things we would use. Therefore [we assume] they’re running out of everything that’s useful. After all, the Russian military has used unguided munitions with brutal effectiveness in the virtual destruction of several Ukrainian cities.”

As for the less sophisticated types of ammunition, a July report from Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) said Russia was firing 20,000 152-milimeter artillery shells per day, the vast majority of them unguided. Among the many mysteries of this war has been just how long the Russians can keep this up. Undersecretary of Defense Colin Kahl said in a press briefing earlier this month, “My sense is they have a lot of kind of dumb artillery rounds and other munitions like that. I don’t think we have any assessment to suggest they’re reaching some inflection point where they’re about to run out of that.” The RUSI report noted that when it came to existing stockpiles of artillery ammunition, “by some estimates, several years’ worth still remains” and that Russia’s defense industry still had the capability to build more.

This is what made this week’s New York Times report that Russia is buying “millions of artillery shells and rockets” from North Korea so notable. The shells in question aren’t the kind of precision systems that Russia is having a hard time producing because of sanctions. They’re the “dumb” Soviet-era weapons that Russia supposedly had in abundance. There have also been reports in recent months of Russia drawing on Belarus’ ammunition stockpile and bringing shipments of weapons home from its ongoing military mission in Syria.

All of which would suggest that Russian ammo supplies are feeling the strain of a longer-than-expected conflict.

Why can’t Russia just build more?

Experts are divided as to what this all means. Some analysts suggest that Russia is scouring the globe for ammunition because it’s unable to mobilize its industrial base to build its own. “The only reason the Kremlin should have to buy artillery shells or rockets from North Korea or anyone is because [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has been unwilling or unable to mobilize the Russian economy for war at even the most basic level,” the American Enterprise Institute’s Frederick Kagan told the New York Times.

Matthew Cancian, a military operations analyst and contractor at the U.S. Naval War College, said it’s too soon to reach that conclusion. The North Korean purchase may be a means of shoring up short-term supplies while Russia settles in for a long struggle. “The Russians need these shells now, and it takes years to set up production lines,” Cancian told Grid. He pointed to a quote from then-British Prime Minister Winston Churchill about Britain’s industrial difficulties during World War II: “Here is the history of munitions production: first year, very little; second year, not much, but something; third year, almost all you want; fourth year, more than you need.”

In this line of thinking, a big buy of North Korean ammunition might be a way to shore up supplies until more domestic shells can be produced.

Jack Watling, the co-author of the July RUSI report, acknowledged on Twitter this week that his report had overestimated Russia’s current ammunition stockpiles and ability to sustain its current rate of fire in the short-term, but that “for unguided ammunition … production is likely able to step up to ensure long-term supply.”

The Russian government has shown signs that it’s trying to do just that. In July, the parliament passed legislation allowing companies supplying the military to compel employees to work nights, weekends, and holidays. Shortly thereafter, Putin appointed Denis Manturov, reportedly a close confidant of the president, as a new deputy prime minister in charge of the defense industry.

But Pavel Luzin, a Russian defense analyst who is currently a visiting scholar at Tufts University, told Grid he’s skeptical Russian industry has the capability to vastly increase production given a number of factors — including a shortage of skilled workers, deteriorating equipment, reliance on foreign-supplied parts and an overly centralized organization structure.

“How can Russia increase productivity? To me, it seems just impossible to do,” he said. Based on his own calculations of current defense spending and the rate of fire in Ukraine, Luzin projects that Russian forces will have to reduce their rate of artillery use in order to conserve ammunition by the end of 2022, if not sooner.

Ukraine’s pipeline problem

In a now-famous (though possibly apocryphal) moment on the eve of the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded to a U.S. offer of evacuation by saying, “I need ammunition, not a ride.”

Ukraine has been dealing with ammunition shortages throughout the war, which have hurt the country’s ability to respond to the Russian barrage, particularly during the fierce artillery fighting in the Donbas in early summer. According to the RUSI report, Ukraine was firing only 6,000 artillery rounds per day to Russia’s 20,000.

Ukraine’s aging Soviet-era ammunition stockpiles were not in great shape at the beginning of the war, depleted by years of fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas as well as a series of fires and explosions in 2017 that destroyed some 32,000 tons of artillery shells. As such it has been heavily dependent on Western aid to keep its cannons firing.

Complicating the effort to get Zelenskyy his ammo is the fact that most of Ukraine’s artillery systems at the beginning of the war fired 152-millimeter Soviet-standard shells, whereas NATO militaries use 155-millimeter shells. Unfortunately for Ukraine, most of the world’s Soviet standard ammunition was in the hands of Russia and its allies. This led to a mad dash in the early months of the war to scour the world for remaining stockpiles of Soviet-standard ammunition as well as to provide the Ukrainians with NATO-standard systems.

Some of the U.S. aid to Ukraine comes in the form of money it can use to purchase its own weapons. Other military aid is weaponry and equipment drawn down from U.S. stockpiles. As of Aug. 24, the U.S. has provided Ukraine with 806,000 rounds of 155-millimeter ammunition, but even America’s vast stockpiles are not unlimited. At 6,000 rounds a day, this would last Ukraine for just about four and a half months, but more ammo is on the way in subsequent aid packages.

Last month, the Wall Street Journal quoted a U.S. defense official saying that because of the drawdown to supply Ukraine, current U.S. ammunition stockpiles are now “uncomfortably low” and “not at the level we would like to go into combat.” The same may soon be true of the guided rockets fired by the HIMARS. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged in July that while this system has been extraordinarily effective in Ukraine, “the issue will become ammunition and the consumption rates.”

No farewell to arms

The contest over ammunition supplies is, to a large extent, already driving Ukraine’s strategy including its ongoing practice of targeting Russian ammunition depots and, as the Washington Post recently reported, its use of decoy rocket launchers to lure the Russians into wasting valuable long-range cruise missiles. Worries about whether Western supplies can continue indefinitely may be one factor behind Ukraine’s decision to launch an offensive in the south last month. Ukraine needs to press its advantage as much as it can while it still has the firepower.

As for the Russians, Luzin said we will soon see the end of Russia’s reliance on its overwhelming artillery advantage to gobble up Ukrainian cities and territory. “[Russia] may be trying to reduce the intensity of the conflict into, not a full-scale war, but an irregular war. That way, they could continue the campaign for the next several years,” he said.

Beyond this war, the artillery duel in Ukraine could also change some assumptions about the future of warfare and just how much ammunition will be needed to fight those wars. Even as U.S. defense budgets overall have steadily increased in recent years, artillery stockpiles have been rapidly decreasing. Another recent RUSI analysis found that current U.S. annual artillery production would at best only last for 10 days to two weeks of combat in Ukraine. In a recent war game, British forces ran out of artillery in eight days of fighting.

Johnson told Grid, “We’ve taken our experience of the last 30 years as the future. We think war is going to be quick, fast, decisive, and low-casualty. What this war is showing is that this may be partially true, but when you show up with a million artillery rounds and start pounding something, your presence is noted.”

                ______________________________

Sunday, January 8, 2023

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JAN 8, 2023.

(   )  BAKHMUT /1310 UTC 9 JAN/ In heavy combat, UKR forces continue counter-attacks against RU Wagner PMCs and RU units around Solar. RU forces were driven back from Yokolivka. UKR’s 46th Air Mobile Brigade is reported to be advancing SE, in the vicinity of the mine complex.


https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1612434921271791623/photo/1 ]

_______________________________


(  )        Russia On Brink of Capturing Soledar, Ukraine Bakhmut Defences Crumble, West Rushes Weapons, Ukraine

 https://twitter.com/DeuNachrichten/status/1611970497729953797/photo/1


___________________________________


(   )  Ukraine War, 9 January 2023: https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-9-january-2023-44f3591d64e6

_______________________________



( ) [ https://youtu.be/-cTs6Dig5-I ]Cash-Strapped Pakistan Mulls To Transfer Artillery Shells To Ukraine



  _____________________________________

ASSESSMENT

     RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, JAN 8, 2023.

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

January 8, 3:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 8.

 This report discusses the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) attempts to claim that Russian forces responded to the December 31 Ukrainian strike on Russian positions in Makiivka; the Russian MoD’s use of a grievance-and-retaliation framework and the resulting creation of negative feedback loops in the pro-war Russian information space; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s potential attempts to financially exploit Ukrainian natural resources around Bakhmut; and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense’s (UK MoD) assessment that Russian forces may be preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensive actions along the Zaporizhia and Luhansk oblast frontlines.

The Russian MoD’s attempts to claim Russian forces responded to the December 31 Ukrainian strike against Russian positions in Makiivka are generating further discontent in the Russian information space. The Russian MoD announced on January 8 that Russian forces conducted a “retaliation operation” against Ukrainian forces for the December 31 strike on Makiivka that killed up to 400 mobilized soldiers due to Russian command failures and poor personnel dispersal practices.[1] The Russian MoD falsely claimed the retaliatory strike targeted several temporary Ukrainian deployment points in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, and killed over 600 Ukrainian personnel.[2] This claim is false — a Finnish reporter visited the site of the strike in Kramatorsk on January 8 and noted that it hit an empty school.[3] Several Russian milbloggers responded negatively to the Russian MoD’s claim, pointing out that the Russian MoD frequently presents fraudulent claims and criticizing Russian military leadership for fabricating a story to “retaliate” for the Makiivka strike instead of holding Russian leadership responsible for the losses accountable.[4]

The Russian MoD application of a grievance-and-retaliation framework to many of its operations has created a negative feedback loop with prominent members of the pro-war Russian information space. At the beginning of the massive campaign of strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in October 2022, the Russian MoD employed a similar framing of “retaliation” against claimed Ukrainian strikes on the Kerch Strait Bridge and other Russian infrastructure.[5] The Russian MoD partially used this framing to mollify escalated demands from the pro-war community to “avenge” Ukrainian actions but provoked an array of responses from milbloggers outlining other instances that the Russian MoD should equally “retaliate” for.[6] The Russian MoD has thus created a negative feedback loop, wherein it attempts to respond to Ukrainian offensive successes with a discrete, retaliatory, offensive action, which then opens the MoD up to continued criticism from discontented Russian milbloggers highlighting their beliefs that the MoD is responding in the wrong manner or to the wrong event. The Russian MoD’s response to the Makiivka strike is a clear continuation of this grievance-and-retaliation model that has once again opened Russian military leadership to staunch criticism of their conduct of the war.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to financially exploit Ukrainian natural resources around Bakhmut and is using the war in Ukraine to connect his military forces with Russian regional officials. An unnamed White House official stated on January 5 that the United States believes Prigozhin seeks to extract salt and gypsum from mines in the Bakhmut area for monetary gain.[7] Prigozhin attempted to justify the importance of mines around Bakhmut and Soledar (which Russian forces have struggled to capture from Ukrainian defenders) on January 7, stating that these mines have “unique and historic defenses” that act as a “network of underground cities.”[8] Prigozhin added that these mines can house personnel and military equipment up to a depth of 80 to 100 meters and claimed that these mines are stocked with weaponry from World War I. Prigozhin’s statements are likely an attempt to both explain the slow pace of Wagner’s advances around Bakhmut but may also partially explain his months-long and costly determination to establish control of the area. A former Russian officer and mil blogger criticized Prigozhin and Russian commanders, stating that everyone knew about the existence of these mines when developing an offensive plan and dismissed the claim of the presence of historic weapons in the area.[9] The mil blogger also noted even if Russian forces and Wagner troops seize Soledar, Prigozhin and the Russian military will lose strategically due to committing their best forces to an attritional battle.[10] ISW had previously reported that another Russian silovik, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, is reportedly attempting to secure business opportunities in occupied Mariupol.[11]

Prigozhin is also continuing to publicly align himself with select Russian governors in an effort to increase his influence and advance his personal interests in Russia, as opposed to strictly winning the war. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit visited the Wagner training facility for the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia on January 8 and reportedly trained alongside Prigozhin and “real men” who are patriots during his visit.[12] Russian outlets claimed that Starovoit even received an offer to sign a contract with Wagner, which he declined due to his public duties.[13] Some Russian outlets even framed Starovoit’s visit to the training ground as model behavior for a Russian politician, further boosting Prigozhin’s image as a patriotic wartime leader in the Russian information space.[14] Prigozhin is likely attempting to rally support for the legalization of the Wagner Group in Russia.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) confirmed ISW’s previous assessments that Russian forces are preparing for the possibility of future Ukrainian counteroffensives in Zaporizhia or Luhansk oblasts. The UK MoD reported on January 8 that in recent weeks, Russian forces have expanded defensive fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast along the Vasylivka-Orikhkiv line and are maintaining a large force grouping in this sector in a way that suggests that Russian commanders are concerned by the possibility of a major Ukrainian counteroffensive push in southern Ukraine.[15] The UK MoD suggested that Russian forces are facing two equally exigent counteroffensive scenarios: A Ukrainian breakthrough on the Zaporizhia line that could seriously challenge the viability of the Russian land bridge linking Rostov Oblast with occupied Crimea or a Ukrainian breakthrough in Luhansk Oblast that could further unhinge the Russian offensive objective of occupying the entirety of Donbas.[16] ISW has previously noted indicators of preparations for a Russian decisive effort (likely of a defensive nature) along the Svatove-Kreminna line in Luhansk Oblast and assessed that the Russian force posture and prevalence of defensive structures in Zaporizhia Oblast suggest that Russian forces may be preparing for potential Ukrainian efforts against this sector.[17]

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 8:

  • Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on January 8 that Russia plans to begin domestic production of Iranian-made drones.[18]

  • Russian forces continued counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 8.[19] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that Russian forces transferred several battalions from the Bakhmut area to the Kreminna area.[20]

  • Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 8 that Russian forces do not control Solar, and other official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Russian positions near Bakhmut.[21] Prominent Russian mil bloggers expressed divergent opinions of the potential for the Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.

  • Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[22]

  • Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on January 7 that 300 Chechen Akhmat-1 OMON personnel were deployed to Ukraine.[23]

  • Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike civilian infrastructure in Kherson City overnight on January 7–8.[24]

  • Russian forces are continuing to intensify filtration measures to identify partisans in occupied territories. Russian occupation authorities claimed that likely Ukrainian partisans committed sabotage by mining a gas pipeline in Luhansk Oblast on January 8.[25]

  • Russian occupation authorities intensified passportization efforts in occupied territories on January 8.[26]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the currently assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. 

This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

  • Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

  • Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitsky stated on January 8 that Russia is planning to use mobilized personnel in offensive operations in unspecified areas of the front in the spring and summer.[27] Skibitsky stated that Russia will need two months to prepare its military forces for the offensive and that Russian forces’ success depends on their training and provisions.[28]

  • Russia deployed more military personnel to Belarus on January 7–8. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that a Russian Military Space Forces aviation element of an unspecified echelon arrived in Belarus on January 8.[29] Independent Belarusian monitoring outlet Belarusian Hajun Project reported that an additional 15 passenger train cars carrying 700–800 Russian military personnel arrived in Vitsebsk, Belarus on the evening of January 7.[30] The Hajun Project reported that Russian armored elements of the same echelon arrived to Vitsebsk, Belarus on January 6, as ISW has previously reported.[31]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

  • The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 8.[32]
 
 
 

References

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/23279

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/23279

[3] https://twitter.com/YLEKuronen/status/1612093160343191553;
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1612097090473103360

[4] https://t.me/grey_zone/16528; https://t.me/milinfolive/95242https://t.me/rybar/42550

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct11https://isw.pub/UkrWar102522https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct09https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct8

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-thinks-putin-ally-prigozhin-want...

[8] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/236

[9] https://t.me/strelkovii/3701

[10] https://t.me/strelkovii/3701

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[12] https://t.me/gubernator_46https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/08/gubernator-kurskoy-oblasti-rasskazal-chto-proshel-kurs-podgotovki-v-lagere-chvk-vagnera

[13] https://t.me/readovkanews/50311

[14] https://t.me/readovkanews/50311

[15] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1611978511719301120

[16] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1611978511719301120

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[18] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/08/sovet-natsionalnoy-bezopasnosti-i-oborony-ukrainy-rossiya-sobiraetsya-zapustit-sobstvennoe-proizvodstvo-iranskih-dronov-kamikadze

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuA...

[20] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9059 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7889;

[21] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02i8fWznXG3K86t74j2zY6Yj5... ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=940911193984952 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/okupanty-soledar-ne-kontrolyuyut-sergij-cherevatyj/

[22] https://t.me/rybar/42543 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/3701 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuA...

[23] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3255

[24] https://suspilne.media/354598-rosijska-armia-obstrilala-odin-z-mikrorajo...https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2972https://t.me/hueviyherson/32567; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/26545

[25] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2293; https://telegra dot ph/V-Lutuginskom-rajone-proizoshel-vzryv-gazoprovoda-01-08; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2294https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10142;

[26] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/08/rosiyany-prymusovo-pasportyzuvaly-praczivnykiv-zaes/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7886https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/na-zaporizkij-aes-prodovzhuyut-perebuvaty-rosijski-vijskovi-ta-tehnika-agresora/

[27] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/mobilizovanykh-rosiian-planuiut-vykorystaty-v-nastupalnykh-operatsiiakh-navesni-ta-vlitku.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/06/russia-preparing-mobilise-...

[28] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/mobilizovanykh-rosiian-planuiut-vykorystaty-v-nastupalnykh-operatsiiakh-navesni-ta-vlitku.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/06/russia-preparing-mobilise-...

[29] https://t.me/modmilby/21535

[30] https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1611784572399923200

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid081fnfTsQVA6d3hp19me...https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid081fnfTsQVA6d3hp19me...