Vasundhra

( ) Ukraine Situation Report: U.S. Strykers, Modern European Tanks On The Table For Kyiv: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-us-strykers-modern-european-tanks-on-the-table-for-kyiv

( ) SOLEDAR MINES /1345 UT 10 JAN/ RU Wagner; https://twitter.com/ChuckPfarrer/status/1612804970536992768/photo/1

_______________________________

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN, JAN 9, 2023.

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

January 9, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force. Wagner Group forces claimed to capture territory within Soledar over the past few days, and many Russian sources have discussed the gains as indicators that Wagner Group forces may soon encircle Bakhmut.[1] Combat footage widely circulated on social media on January 9 shows Wagner Group fighters engaging in fierce small-arms combat near the city administration building in central Soledar.[2] Several Russian milbloggers remarked on January 8 and 9 that Wagner Group forces are responsible for block-by-block advances in Soledar and other critical settlements northeast of Bakhmut, as well as within Bakhmut.[3] Prigozhin emphasized on January 9 that “exclusively” Wagner Group units are taking ground in Soledar, and noted that Wagner fighters are currently engaged in “fierce battles for the city administration building.”[4] Prigozhin will continue to use both confirmed and fabricated Wagner Group success in Soledar and Bakhmut to promote the Wagner Group as the only Russian force in Ukraine capable of securing tangible gains, as ISW has previously reported.[5]

Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill setting conditions for further institutionalized corruption in Russia through domestic legislative manipulations. Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma on January 9 denouncing the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and withdrawing Russia from the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).[6] Putin submitted the bill on the grounds that the Council of Europe terminated Russia’s GRECO membership, thus removing Russia’s ability to vote but requiring them to cooperate on several obligations.[7] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that this move does not undermine Russian legislative capacity to fight corruption and emphasized that corruption has not been eradicated anywhere in the world.[8] ISW has previously reported on Putin’s efforts to institutionalize corruption through various legal manipulations, and Russia’s discontinued membership in GRECO would likely serve as another means by which Putin can institute legislation supporting and enabling corrupt practices without facing international legal mechanisms to hold him to account.[9]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the Russian information space to accept increased censorship of opposition voices in a Telegram message on January 8. Medvedev posted a message on Telegram on January 8 which he framed as a response to discussions in the Russian information space about “traitors who have gone over to the enemy.” Medvedev stated that a serious conversation began “between the bosses” (likely in reference to Russian leadership) on whether to respond with rule of law or with justice.[10] Medvedev noted that “quiet groups of impeccably inconspicuous people” operated in Russia to enforce “special rules of wartime” during World War II with great success, likely alluding to internal censorship.[11] Some Russian milbloggers appeared to understand Medvedev’s implied censorship and agreed, noting that Soviet security and counterintelligence organizations were highly effective at censorship and that “ideological people” are willing to assist these efforts.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have recently intensified efforts to silence Russian mil bloggers who criticize the Russian government, as ISW has previously reported.[13]

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group's success in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized corruption in Russia through domestic legislative manipulations.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the Russian information space for the censorship of figures deemed as pro-Ukrainian sympathizers, garnering some acceptance from the nationalist mil blogger community.

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.

Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains around Soledar and Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued to reinforce positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces continued to construct defensive fortifications and transport military equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued concerns over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area.

Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that a second wave of mobilization may be imminent or ongoing.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) on both January 8 and 9.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops neutralized Ukrainian sabotage groups northwest of Svatove near Kotlyarivka, Novoselivske, and Dvorichna.[15] A Russian mil blogger claimed that Ukrainian command is rotating forces along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.[16] Russian forces also continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions near Kreminna on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attacked near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[17] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that heavy fighting is ongoing near Kreminna and that Russian forces transferred several paratroop battalions and heavy equipment to the area in order to hold their line of defense.[18] A Russian mil blogger warned on January 9 that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a renewed offensive on the Lyman sector west of Kreminna and are concentrating equipment near Terry (15km west of Kreminna).[19] Geolocated combat footage shows a duel between Russian and Ukrainian tanks southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova, indicating that Ukrainian troops have likely made gains in the forest area west of Kreminna.[20] Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian reconnaissance activities in this area southwest of Kreminna, particularly in forest areas along the Serebrianka-Hryhorvika line 10km south of Kreminna.[21]

Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian assets along critical ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the rear areas of Luhansk Oblast. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Internal Affairs Ministry stated on January 8 that unidentified actors, presumably Ukrainian partisans, committed an act of sabotage and mined a gas pipeline near the Lutuhyne (20km southwest of Luhansk City along the H21 highway), causing an explosion that left 13,000 people without gas.[22] Local LNR Telegram channels additionally reported the activation of an air siren in Alchevsk (35km west of Luhansk City along the M04 highway) and air defense over Stakhanov (45km west of Luhansk City along the T1317 highway) on January 9.[23]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Soledar on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian defense officials reiterated that while Russian forces do not fully control Soledar, the situation in the settlement is extremely difficult and Wagner Group personnel are advancing in certain areas.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces are fighting in central Soledar, and footage posted on January 9 shows intense small arms exchanges near the Soledar administration building.[25] A Russian mil blogger noted that Ukrainian troops maintain control of the Artyomsol enterprise and surrounding high-rise buildings in northern Soledar.[26] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces took control of Bakhmutske (just southeast of Soledar), Krasna Hora, and Paraskoviivka (just southwest of Soledar); and that battles are ongoing in Berkhovka (10km southwest of Soledar along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Soledar, Krasna Hora, Pidhorodne, and Rozdolivka between January 8 and 9.[28]

Russian forces continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut and within Bakhmut itself on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut, Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Zalizne (25km southwest of Bakhmut) on January 8 and 9.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 9 that Russian troops captured Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut), and geolocated footage of Ukrainian drones striking Russian positions confirms that Russian troops have made marginal advances in this area.[30] Russian sources continued to discuss urban combat on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut and south of Bakhmut.[31]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian attacks near Vodiane, Pervomaiske, and Krasnohorivka on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and near Marinka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka on the southwestern outskirts between January 8 and 9.[32] A Russian mil blogger also reported fighting in these areas.[33] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage on January 9 of the 5th DNR Brigade firing incendiary munitions at a Ukrainian force concentration in Marinka.[34] The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts the use of incendiary weapons as a means or method of warfare during armed conflict.[35]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk or eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on January 8 or 9. Russian sources, however, claimed on January 9 that Ukrainian forces are concentrating a large group of forces in western Donetsk Oblast in the Vuhledar area in preparation for renewed offensives.[36] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are active in this area.[37] Russian forces continued routine indirect fire in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[38]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to reinforce their positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces continue to move military personnel equipment to Henichesk Raion near the Kherson-Crimea border and are preparing to defend Crimea.[39] Khlan stated that Russian forces used a smoke screen to conceal the unloading of military equipment in Novooleksivka, 9km northwest of Henichesk on the R47 Henichesk-Kakhovka highway.[40] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces shelled Kherson City with incendiary munitions overnight on January 7–8 and posted footage of the munitions detonating over the city.[41] The 1980 Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts use of incendiary weapons as a means or method of warfare during armed conflict.[42] Russian forces continued routine shelling of Kherson City and its environs on January 8 and 9.[43]

Russian forces continued to construct defensive fortifications and transport military equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 8 and 9 amid continued concerns over a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated on January 9 that Russian forces continue to build defensive fortifications southwest of Melitopol towards Crimea, including dragon’s teeth anti-tank fortifications on the E105 Melitopol-Dzhankoy highway between Vovchanske and Chervone, and trenches along the Kakhovskyi Canal that runs between Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast and Novohryhorivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[44] An image posted on January 8 shows a Russian train transporting tanks in an unspecified direction near Melitopol.[45] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian authorities purposefully lowered the water level in the Kakhovka Reservoir, which Rogov claimed indicates Ukrainian forces are preparing to cross the reservoir and may land near Enerhodar.[46] Rogov also claimed on January 9 that Ukrainian forces significantly increased their rate of shelling along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline in the past 24 hours.[47]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets in southern Ukraine on January 8 and 9. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that there were explosions at the Hidromash factory in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Rogov claimed that Russian air defenses shot down drones over the city.[48] A Russian source claimed that there is evidence that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian ammunition depots in Melitopol.[49] Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to strike Tokmak, Enerhodar, and Mykhailivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[50] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions in occupied Nova Kakhovka, Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City), Hola Prystan (10km southwest of Kherson City), Skadovsk (57km southeast of Kherson City), and Zaliznyi Port (58km southwest of Kherson City), Kherson Oblast on January 8 and 9.[51]

Russian forces continued routine fire against areas in Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 8 and 9.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian and Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that a second wave of mobilization is imminent and could potentially begin on January 15. Former Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District Andrey Gurulev called on Russian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on January 7 to begin actively preparing a mobilization reserve, despite his comments on January 4 that "there are no prerequisites for a second wave of mobilization in the next six months."[53] Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitsky told The Guardian on January 6 that Russia will begin the second wave of mobilization on January 15, after the Russian holiday season ends.[54] Skibitsky stated that he expects Russia to mobilize another 500,000 people.[55] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Igor Girkin also stated on January 4 that Russia “will be forced to carry out a second, and maybe a third wave of mobilization. To win in Ukraine, [Russia] will need to put another half a million soldiers into service.”[56] As ISW continues to assess, discussion of a second wave of mobilization is erroneous to some extent because mobilization has never truly ceased and this has been a part of a greater, ongoing effort to recruit reservists and others into service since before February 2022.[57]

Russia’s systematic force-generation failures continue to have ramifications for Russian offensive capacity. The Russian information space circulated a video recorded by Russian troops from Belgorod Oblast addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian MoD leadership detailing how they trained as artillerymen but were sent to the frontlines in Ukraine as infantrymen under the 1st Army Corps (the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic) and used as cannon fodder.[58] A Russian mil blogger amplified the video to criticize the transfer of artillerymen of the 568th Howitzer Artillery Battalion, which is now subordinate to the 1st Army Corps, to the infantry.[59] Another Russian mil blogger reposted a statement from a Russian artillery officer who claimed that Putin is trying to create new artillery units, but the officer is unsure where Putin will get the personnel for these units because Russian military leadership keeps sending trained artillerymen to fight as infantrymen.[60] ISW previously reported that the Russian military deployed personnel trained as artillerymen and tankers to infantry divisions in Ukraine with no formal infantry training, likely to the detriment of the overall combat capabilities of such units.[61]

Russian leadership may be planning to reduce previously promised compensation for Russian servicemembers wounded in action. A Russian Telegram channel, citing internal sources, claimed on January 8 that Russian leadership is considering the possibility of limiting compensation payments to only Russian personnel who incurred major injuries such as loss of limbs while fighting in Ukraine.[62] The posts claims that this change would be unofficial and is likely already occurring as there has been an uptick in reports of headquarters “losing” the required proof of injury documents that would enable the injured to receive payments.[63]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continued to face partisan pressure in occupied territories on January 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 9 that collaborator policemen in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, are submitting their resignation as they fear that highly effective partisans will continue targeting law enforcement in occupied territories.[64] The Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) Internal Ministry claimed on January 8 that likely Ukrainian partisans committed sabotage by mining a gas pipeline in Lutuhyne, Luhansk Oblast.[65]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to take measures to control movement throughout occupied territories. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities will begin issuing passes allowing residents to move throughout Zaporizhia Oblast on January 9.[66] Rogov stated that Zaporizhia Oblast residents and organizations must submit an application and provide documents verifying vehicle ownership to a military commandant’s office in Melitopol, Tokmak, or Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, to receive the required passes.[67] A local Ukrainian Mariupol news outlet reported on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities established a mobile checkpoint in the Kalmiuskyi district of Mariupol.[68] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities continue to demand that residents present passes when seeking to move throughout the occupied territories.[69] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities are continuing to block the entrances to and exits from select settlements in Luhansk Oblast and arrest residents whom they have accused of assisting the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[70] A Ukrainian Kherson City media outlet reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities continued searching private homes in Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, to identify people cooperating with and assisting Ukrainian forces.[71] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces Yevhen Yerin reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities continued imposing restrictions on civilian movement in Zaporizhia Oblast, including at the Vasylivka checkpoint.[72]

Ukrainian sources reported on January 8 and 9 that enterprises in occupied territories continue to accept the hryvnia despite Russian occupation authorities’ threats and raids.[73] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities are conducting raids on enterprises in occupied territories to identify any person or establishment using the hryvnia.[74] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities in Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, are removing ATM terminals from businesses to prevent residents from acquiring the hryvnia, as well as threatening to confiscate the property of local businesses if they are found accepting the hryvnia.[75] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities in occupied territories are threatening local businesses with fines and sanctions if they do not set prices in rubles.[76]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing passportization efforts by withholding social services from those without Russian passports in occupied territories. Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushenko stated on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities will offer mortgages on real estate in Mariupol by the end of January 2023 but require that all applicants hold a Russian passport, official income, or housing or property for collateral savings.[77] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities require that residents in Luhansk Oblast hold a Russian passport in order to receive car registration documents, license plates, and driver’s licenses.[78]

Russian occupation authorities continued taking measures to consolidate social control of occupied territories on January 8. Advisor to Mariupol Mayor Petro Andryushenko stated on January 9 that Russian occupation authorities plan to bring approximately 50,000 Russian civilians to Mariupol from Russia.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities replaced all Ukrainian television channels with Russian broadcasting in Hornostaivka, Kairy, Zavodivka, and Marinske, Kherson Oblast.[80]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to seize and repurpose civilian hospitals to support Russian forces operating in occupied territories. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported on January 8 that Russian occupation authorities are removing pregnant women from a maternity hospital in Antracyty, Luhansk Oblast, and converting the facility into a military hospital.[81]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the currently assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low.

This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 9 that Russian forces removed a significant amount of weapons and equipment deployed from Russia to Belarus out of long-term storage for maintenance and repair.[82]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

Voice of America’s (VOA) US National Security correspondent Jeff Seldin amplified a statement made by an unidentified senior US defense official on January 9 that while Russian and Belarusian troops are training together, the US has not observed any indicators that Belarus intends to enter the war.[83]

Ukrainian State Border Guards Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on January 9 that the situation on the border with Belarus remains fully under control and that there are no signs of movement of Russian or Belarusian equipment, personnel, or units.[84] Demchenko stated that there are some units on the border with Ukraine, but that the number and nature of their activities are not changing.[85]

The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated on January 9 that there are no observed signs of Russian offensive groups forming near Ukraine’s northern border regions.[86]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

References

[1] https://t.me/operativsvo/2471; https://t.me/kommunist/14742

[2] https://t.me/rybar/42562; https://t.me/grey_zone/16554; https://t.me/b...

[3] https://t.me/rybar/42543; https://t.me/brussinf/5512; https://t.me/bor... https://t.me/vysokygovorit/10463

[4] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2347; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/239

[5] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct13; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct19

[6] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/272467-8; https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/879954; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/09/putin-vnes-v-gosdumu-zakonoproekt-o-vyhode-rossii-iz-konventsii-ob-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti-za-korruptsiyu

[7] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/272467-8; https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/879954; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/09/putin-vnes-v-gosdumu-zakonoproekt-o-vyhode-rossii-iz-konventsii-ob-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti-za-korruptsiyu

[8] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/272467-8; https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/879954; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/09/putin-vnes-v-gosdumu-zakonoproekt

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123022

[10] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/245

[11] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/245

[12] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74760; https://t.me/kommunist/14784; https://t.me/notes_veterans/7346

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuA...

[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/23278; https://t.me/mod_russia/23302

[16] https://t.me/rybar/42558

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tJHpCDya9TEZrM7hE8...

[18] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7889; https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9059

[19] https://t.me/rybar/42558

[20] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1612145956530552832; https://tw...
https://twitter.com/UAControlMap/status/1611754018493108225
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/35430

[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/23303; ttps://t.me/mod_russia/23278

[22] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2293; https://telegra dot ph/V-Lutuginskom-rajone-proizoshel-vzryv-gazoprovoda-01-08; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2294; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10142; htt...

[23] https://t.me/newsalch/7510; https://t.me/kommunist/14798

[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/ganna-malyar-pro-sytuacziyu-na-donnechchyni-u-soledari-vazhko-ale-na-deyakyh-dilyankah-povilno-prosuvayemos-vpered/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/okupanty-soledar-ne-kontrolyuyut-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://suspilne.media/354832-50-ukrainskih-zahisnikiv-povernulisa-z-pol...

[25] https://t.me/rybar/42562; https://t.me/grey_zone/16554; https://t.me/b...

[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74787

[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74795; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/10896; https://t...

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuA...

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuA...

[30] https://twitter.com/fdov21/status/1612223725297868801?s=20&t=kYl1ipH0H3x...

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[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02tJHpCDya9TEZrM7hE8...

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/10244

[34] https://t.me/nm_dnr/9713; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/21163

[35] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/ccw-protocol-iii-1980

[36] https://t.me/readovkanews/50368; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/2115...